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Abstract
Refugees and Resistance:
International Activism for Grassroots Democracy and Human Rights in New York, Miami,
and Haiti, 1957 to 1994
by
Carl Lindskoog

Advisor: Professor Joshua B. Freeman
This dissertation explores the evolution of political activism among Haitians in the
United States from the formation of Haitian New York in the late 1950s to the return of Haitian
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to Haiti in 1994. It traces the efforts of Haitian activists to
build bridges connecting New York and Miami to the grassroots organizations in Haiti, finding a
considerable degree of success in their efforts to construct a transnational movement that had a
substantial impact both in Haiti and in the United States. Shedding additional light on the
interconnected history of Haiti and the United States, this dissertation also adds to the growing
historiography on immigrant activism and international campaigns for democracy and human
rights.
At the outset, politics in Haitian New York was splintered among competing factions,
though by the early 1970s there began to form a somewhat unified anti-Duvalier opposition
movement. The arrival of the Haitian “boat people” in South Florida in the early 1970s
continued the evolution of Haitian politics in the United States, triggering a refugee crisis that
drew the attention of the activists in New York and forcing a reconsideration of political vision
and strategy that had previously been solely concerned with the overthrow of the Duvalier
dictatorship. The grassroots resistance in Haiti and in the United States saw a slight opening
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with the arrival of President Jimmy Carter, but with Carter’s successor, Ronald Reagan, came a
wave of repression in Haiti and stringent new policies toward Haitian refugees. The uprisings of
1985 and 1986 that toppled the Duvalier dictatorship transformed Haitian politics at home and
abroad, enabling an expanded and tightened network of activism connecting New York, Miami,
and Haiti, which grew from 1987 to 1989. The years 1990 and 1991 were the pinnacle moment
for the linked popular movements in New York, Miami, and Haiti, though Haitian activists were
soon forced to pour their energy into the overlapping campaigns aimed at reversing the coup
against Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and defending the new wave of refugees that the
coup produced.
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1
Introduction
This dissertation examines the origins and the evolution of political activism among
Haitians in the United States. It traces the efforts of Haitian exiles, refugees, and community
organizers to build bridges connecting activists in the Haitian communities of New York and
Miami and linking the US-based activists to the grassroots activists and organizations in Haiti. It
also charts the evolution of this trans-regional and transnational activism from its origins in the
anti-Duvalier exile community of New York in the late 1950s to the defeat of the coup that
returned Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to Haiti in 1994. A core set of questions has
guided this research: How did leaving Haiti and living abroad shape the political activity and
vision of Haitians in the United States? How did those who emerged as political activists
negotiate the relationship among their often multiple, overlapping objectives, which included
achieving political change and grassroots democracy in Haiti and ensuring the defense and fair
treatment of Haitian refugees in the United States? How successful were these activists in
mobilizing their communities, in enlisting American allies in their campaigns, and in building
border-crossing political movements? And finally, how can the success or failure of the actors in
this story be accounted for and what can their experience teach about activism, political
networks, and social movements that connect distant regions and that cross international
borders?
A handful of excellent works address some of these questions about the Haitian
immigrant experience. Despite these valuable contributions, however, there remains a dearth of
historical scholarship on Haitians in the United States and Haitian politics at the grassroots level.
This dissertation seeks to help fill that gap. And, since this study focuses on the history of
political activism connecting Haitian New York and Miami with Haiti, it maintains a somewhat
different focus from that of the existing scholarship on Haitians in the United States. While
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virtually all of the scholarship does acknowledge the ongoing connection Haitians had to their
homeland, the literature’s treatment of Haitians is one in which developments in Haiti fade from
the picture, bursting back onto the scene occasionally, to be sure, but not as an ongoing and
indispensable part of Haitians’ post-migration story. Perhaps this episodic engagement with
Haiti accurately reflects the experience of some Haitians in the United States, but for the
principle actors in my story – US-based political activists who endeavored to support the
grassroots movement in Haiti while also fighting for fair treatment for Haitians in the United
States, the history of Haiti must be continuously interwoven into their own history in the United
States. And once the necessity of a serious engagement with Haitian history throughout the
whole period becomes clear, another important conclusion emerges: the history of Haiti does not
become fully clear unless one incorporates the role of the United States and US-based activists.
Therefore, in this history of Haitian political activists based in New York and Miami, while local
conditions continue to be an important factor in shaping experience and ideas, events in Haiti too
remain a vital part of the story. In his pioneering work on Haitians in the United States, Michel
S. Laguerre observes Haitian immigrants’ intense engagement with what he terms “border
crossing political practices.”1 This dissertation, which might best be called a border crossing
political history of Haitians in Haiti and in the United States, builds upon the work of Laguerre
and other scholars who have begun to explain this crucial dynamic.
This dissertation draws upon a range of primary and secondary sources. Research for the
project began with the cultivation of the limited number, but invaluable, works in the related
social sciences that document aspects of the early history of Haitians in the United States. The
dissertations of Susan Buchanan, Carolle Charles, Georges Fouron, Karen Richman, and Nina
1

Michel S. Laguerre, Diasporic Citizenship: Haitian Americans in Transnational America (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1998), 157-75.
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Glick Schiller, and the articles and book chapters that grew out of these projects, along with the
scholarship of Michel S. Laguerre and Alex Stepick in particular, provide the foundation on
which this dissertation is constructed. Even with these essential works, however, the early
history of Haitians in New York was a particularly difficult thing to piece together.
Indispensable to understanding this early history were the archival sources contained in the Ira
Gollobin Haitian Refugee Collection at the Schomburg Center for Research in Black Culture,
located in the New York Public Library. In addition, State Department papers published in the
series Foreign Relations of the United States provided additional insight into the political activity
of the first Haitian exiles as well as the motives behind US policy toward Haiti and the Haitian
exiles. The few newspaper articles that consider the Haitian experience in the 1950s, 1960s, and
1970s (including the first Haitian weekly published in the United States, which was established
in 1971) as well as pamphlets, papers, and newsletters of the Haitian political organizations of
the period, and oral history interviews all added to the picture of this history of Haitian politics
and political activism.
From the early 1980s onward (examined in chapters three through six), more published
sources are available. Haitian newspapers and newsletters published in the United States
provided an important window into the history of the community and, because they were such
political organs, a window into the political debates of each period as well. Archival materials
featured in the Haiti Dechoukaj collection and the Amy Wilentz collection, also housed at the
Schomburg Center, provided much needed information on developments in Haiti just before and
after the pivotal departure of Duvalier in 1986. Non-Haitian newspaper articles and wire service
reports (domestic and international) were essential in constructing the historical narrative and
understanding key developments in Haiti and throughout the United States. Finally, the public
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papers of Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton along with records of
congressional hearings and a handful of other congressional records contributed to a better
understanding of US policy toward Haiti and Haitian refugees.
Although this dissertation contributes to the relatively limited scholarship addressing the
history of Haitians in the United States, it does much more. By focusing on activists who sought
to build international networks that would allow them to support political change in their country
of origin, this dissertation is in dialogue with the historiography of immigrant political activism
that drew on international networks to promote political change in their home countries. One
example of such study is of emigré activism that was an important part of the Polish experience
in the United States, going back to the mid-nineteenth century, a time during which Polish
immigrants in the United States worked closely with political allies throughout Europe in support
of independence for Poland. Such activism continued to hold a prominent place in the
community throughout the twentieth century.2 Another example of such study is of Italians, a
group of European immigrants that have often maintained a particularly international orientation,
continuing to preserve connections to Italy and drawing upon the political networks and ideas of
the home country to stimulate and inform their political action abroad.3 Scholarship on Latin
American migration and immigrant activism in the Americas adds further to this body of
2

Florian Stasik and James S. Pula, Polish Political Emigrés in the United States of America, 1831-1864 (Boulder,
CO: East European Monographs, 2002), distributed by Columbia University Press; Anna D. JaroszynskaKirchmann, The Exile Mission: The Polish Political Diaspora and Polish Americans, 1939-1956 (Athens: Ohio
University Press, 2004).
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Michael Miller Topp describes a dynamic among Italians that seems especially relevant to the Haitian experience,
particularly Italian immigrants’ close connection to activists in Italy, their awareness of political developments in
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Topp, “The Transnationalism of the Italian-American Left: The Lawrence Strike of 1912 and the Italian Chamber of
Labor of New York City,” Journal of American Ethnic History 17, no. 1 (Fall 1997): 39-63. See also Donna R.
Gabaccia and Fraser M. Ottanelli, Italian Workers of the World: Labor, Migration, and the Formation of
Multiethnic States (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001) and Donna R. Gabaccia and Franca Iacovetta,
Women, Gender, and Transnational Lives: Italian Workers of the World (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2002).
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scholarship and highlights some interesting parallels between the Haitian experience and that of
other Latin American immigrants. For example, at the same time and in the same city in which
Haitian exiles were growing their Haiti-focused international campaigns, Puerto Rican activists
were forging links between radical political movements in the United States and in Puerto Rico
and combining support for US-based social movements with the cause of national independence
for Puerto Rico.4 In addition, recent scholarship focusing on Mexicans and Mexican Americans
shows how this pattern occurs in immigrant communities in ways that are closely related to those
that appear among Haitians. The development of transnational political campaigns connecting
Mexico to the Mexican communities of the United States, the role of US-based Mexicans in
pushing for democratic reforms in their home country, and cross-border activist connections like
the network of “transnational resistance” that Anna Sampaio found connecting Chiapas, Mexico,
to Denver, Colorado, all echo themes that this dissertation finds among Haitian activists in the
mid to late twentieth century.5 More than a contribution to the history of Haitians in the United
States, this dissertation is intended to add to the body of work that explores the ways immigrant
activists have used international networks to promote political change in their country of origin
while also attempting to advance their status in the United States.
This dissertation also speaks to the history of African Americans and the African
diaspora in the Americas. As Kevin Gaines notes, there is considerable evidence of black
Americans’ global consciousness stretching back to the era of slavery and the international
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Andrés Torres and José E Velázquez, eds., The Puerto Rican Movement: Voices from the Diaspora (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1998); Jose E. Cruz, Identity and Power: Puerto Rican Politics and the Challenge of
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abolitionist movements. Framing the African American experience within the context of the
African diaspora is an attempt to recognize the ideas, movements, and networks connecting
African Americans to people of African descent in other parts of the world. And as many
exciting recent works document, this global consciousness and international focus entered a new
phase after World War II with black Americans’ identification with and support of global anticolonial movements. These works also highlight the interplay between the black freedom
struggle and the world created by the Cold War.6 The history of Haitians in this dissertation adds
a piece to the growing understanding of African Americans’ place in the African diaspora,
providing further evidence of black Americans’ global consciousness and practice. For African
Americans (though sometimes in conflict with Haitians) US policy toward Haiti, and local and
national authorities’ policies regarding Haitian refugees were crucial to their sense of place and
status in America and to their demands for racial justice. From 1991 to 1994, in particular,
African Americans’ already growing identification with Haitians exploded into a nationwide
movement, reinforcing their connection to the global African diaspora, which was itself caught
up in the movement for democracy in Haiti and justice for the Haitian refugees.
Chapter one of this dissertation examines the origins of the Haitian community of New
York and explores its development from 1957 to 1973. The rise of the Duvalier regime and the
seemingly limitless state violence Papa Doc unleashed on the Haitian people frames the founding
of Haitian New York. The principal task of this first chapter is to untangle the politics of the
Haitian community in these early years and to learn how the competing and often contradictory
forces among Haitian political activists were able to come together by the early 1970s to begin
the formation of a somewhat unified anti-Duvalier opposition movement.
6

Kevin Gaines, “African American History,” in American History Now, edited by Eric Foner and Lisa McGirr
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011), 400-20.
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Chapter two introduces the Haitian community of Miami, the conditions which shaped its
early history, and the developments in Haiti in the 1970s that displaced the “boat people” and
propelled them on the perilous journey to Florida where they became the primary constituents of
the South Florida community. The ensuing refugee crisis quickly drew the attention and energy
of the Haitian activists in New York, and this chapter analyzes how the advent of the refugee
issue reshaped the vision and action of political activists who had previously been solely
concerned with the overthrow of the Duvalier dictatorship. Chapter two also examines how the
tenure of Jimmy Carter as president influenced the anti-Duvalier resistance in Haiti and
encouraged Haitian activists in the United States to rethink their strategy regarding political
change in Haiti.
In chapter three the immense impact that the Reagan presidency had both on Haiti and on
Haitians seeking refuge in the United States is studied. It considers how the repression in Haiti,
which corresponded to Reagan’s coming to office, shaped the resistance movement in Haiti and
the ideas and activity of activists in the United States. It also examines the ways activists
responded to Reagan’s stringent new policies toward Haitian refugees. Finally, chapter three
examines the uprisings of 1985 and 1986 that toppled the Duvalier dictatorship and analyzes how
this watershed moment transformed Haitian politics at home and abroad.
Chapter four focuses on the tightening relationship among the Haitian activists in New
York, Miami, and Haiti from 1987 to 1989. In the years after Duvalier’s departure, members of
the grassroots movement in Haiti came under intense attack by those trying to destroy the
budding popular movement. This chapter examines how activists in New York and Miami
attempted to defend their allies in Haiti even while they continued to expand their campaigns in
defense of Haitians in the United States.
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Chapter five focuses on the years 1990 and 1991, the pinnacle moment for the linked
popular movements in New York, Miami, and Haiti. This chapter analyzes why and how Haitian
activists in each location achieved an unprecedented level of mobilization. It also examines the
relationship between the victories of this two-year period and the trans-regional and transnational
movement that had its roots in the struggle against the Duvalier dictatorship and that blossomed
after Duvalier’s departure in February 1986.
The sixth and final chapter examines the coup years from 1991 to 1994. It seeks to
explain how the international network of activists and organizations functioned during the coup
when the grassroots movement was once again under assault. It also analyzes the way Haitian
activists’ history in the anti-Duvalier resistance and the support for Haitian refugees informed
their campaign against the coup. Finally, the chapter assesses the impact of the coup years on
the political activists and the networks they had built and nurtured in the preceding years.
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Chapter 1
Haitian Exiles in New York: the Early Years, 1957-1973
On September 22, 1957, Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier was elected president of the
Republic of Haiti. Papa Doc’s electoral victory emerged from a period of bitter conflict and
intense political violence in Haiti. For the previous year Duvalier had been locked in political
struggle with the other contenders for the position of head of state. Cultivating a public image as
a champion of indigenisme and noirisme, movements that articulated black nationalism and race
pride as the true form of Haitian nationalism, Duvalier established his base among the black
middle class and segments of the black military leadership. His principal challengers for the
presidency were Louis Dejoie, the candidate of the milat or mulatto bourgeoisie, Clement
Jumelle, the candidate who enjoyed the backing of the previous Haitian president, General Paul
Magloire, and Daniel Fignole, defender of the urban working class and head of the Movement of
Workers and Peasants (MOP).7 Analyzing the reasons for Duvalier’s victory, Michel-Rolph
Trouillot observes, “Violence saturated the Haitian political climate during 1956-57;” Duvalier’s
election was a victory for “those best prepared and most willing to use violence.” Fraud, too,
helped Duvalier capture the presidency; votes for Duvalier exceeded by 50 percent the number of
voters in some provinces.8
After his election, Duvalier began a campaign to reorganize Haitian society so that all
institutions would be under his personal control. What followed was a systematic attack on any

7

Paul Farmer, The Uses of Haiti, 3rd ed. (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 2006), 91; Alex Dupuy, Haiti in the
World Economy: Class, Race, and Underdevelopment since 1700 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 143, 15556; Matthew J. Smith, Red & Black in Haiti: Radicalism, Conflict, and Political Change, 1934-1957 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 106-7, 170-74.
8

Michel-Rolph Trouillot. Haiti: State against Nation: The Origins and Legacy of Duvalierism (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1990), 152-53; Smith, Red & Black in Haiti, 185. For an extensive discussion of the role of violence
in the campaign of 1956-1957, see Chapter 5 of Smith, Red & Black in Haiti, 168-85.
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institution, organization, or individual that posed a threat. Duvalier closed schools and
seminaries, centralized the university system, attacked teachers, students, and clergy, and shut
down the independent press. He also closed the Military Academy and replaced it with a system
by which he personally promoted soldiers from the ranks, and created his own paramilitary, the
Volontaires de la Securite Nationale (VSN), later to become known as the Tonton Macoutes. As
in Duvalier’s earlier political victory, violence proved instrumental in this process.9
While political violence was not a new phenomenon in Haiti at this time, Duvalier
ushered in an era in which state violence seemed absolutely limitless and total. For example,
women were no longer protected from the direct exercise of state violence nor were other
traditionally protected groups, such as children, the elderly, teachers, and the clergy. As Carolle
Charles observes, despite Haiti’s history of authoritarianism, “cultural codes” had previously
established boundaries for state violence by which women, children, and the elderly were
protected as “political innocents.” After Duvalier came to power, however, “women began to be
detained, tortured, exiled, raped, and executed.” In July 1958 Duvalier sent a clear signal that he
did not intend to respect the traditional limits of state violence when his forces kidnapped, beat,
and raped the feminist and anti-Duvalier editor Yvonne Hakime Rimpel, actions that sent “a chill
through both the political and the journalistic communities.”10
As Duvalier undercut or eliminated all independent institutions and tightened the circle
around his executive position, many Haitians realized the economic benefits of allegiance to
Duvalier. The Haitian government under Duvalier greatly expanded its role in the economy by

9

Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 159-61.
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Carolle Charles, “Gender and Politics in Contemporary Haiti: The Duvalierist State, Transnationalism and the
Emergence of a New Feminism (1980-1990),” Feminist Studies 21, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 139-40; Trouillot, Haiti:
State against Nation, 166-70.
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increasing the number of government employees, including military and paramilitary forces, who
drew a government paycheck. Duvalier built an extensive network of supporters in both urban
and rural areas that depended on their relationship to the executive for their income and status.
Instead of maintaining a relatively small number of individuals growing rich through the state,
Duvalier created an expansive system of low- and middle-level loyalists spread throughout the
country, and in so doing, he not only bought the allegiance of a large number of people, but he
also intensified competition among those at the bottom of society. Michel-Rolph Trouillot calls
this system, which resembled “a basket of crabs,” “auto-neutralization,” since once it was
established, it utilized patronage and the competition that resulted to automatically neutralize
mass revolt.11
Duvalier’s rise to power drove his chief political opponents to flee the country. In 1957
Haitian political leaders, escaping from Duvalier’s Haiti, began arriving in New York. In this
period Louis Dejoie, defeated presidential hopeful and leader of the mulatto bourgeoisie, PaulEugene Magloire, Haitian president for six years before Duvalier’s rise, and Daniel Fignole,
leader of the Movement of Workers and Peasants (MOP), all fled Haiti for New York.12
“Duvalier’s repression of dissident elements was so effective that there were no organized
opposition groups inside Haiti. Oppositionists were all exiles,” noted one US State Department
official.13 Forming the foundation of the contemporary Haitian diaspora in the United States,
this wealthy and politically connected class of Haitians was the first to flee Duvalier’s Haiti.
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Carolle Charles, “Haitian Life in New York and the Haitian-American Left,” in The Immigrant Left in the United
States, edited by Paul Buhle and Dan Georgakas (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 293.
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Paradoxically, the establishment of this early exile community both widened Papa Doc’s range
of power and, at the same time, planted the seeds of his greatest political challenge. With many
of his main political opponents in exile, Francois Duvalier had more space to exercise complete
power. Indeed, he filled the void these individuals left in the Haitian political class by elevating
others who would be loyal supporters.14 On the other hand, operating from New York gave
opponents of Duvalier the space they needed to build an opposition movement in exile.
Following Haiti’s leading political figures, other members of the Haitian elite soon
made their way to New York as well. Because they had political and economic resources in
Haiti independent of Duvalier’s state, these wealthy Haitians threatened Duvalier’s quest for
total power, making them vulnerable in the whirlwind of violence descending upon Haiti. Many
who fled in the late 1950s also belonged to the light-skinned class of Haitians that felt itself
under attack by Duvalier and his supporters, who rallied around black nationalism. A US
national intelligence estimate from June 7, 1961, observed that Duvalier’s efforts to extend his
power “has almost certainly increased the resentment of churchmen, students, military men, and
others of the old mulatto elite, which has lost its power and influence since Duvalier came to
power,” resentment that drove the creation of “small exile groups” in New York as well as in
Caracas and Havana.15 And in response to the escalating violence and the increasingly limited
opportunity for anyone without ties to Duvalier, the black middle class too soon followed the
Haitian elite’s flight to New York.16 It was this group of exiled politicians and other wealthy and

14

Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 155.

15

Document 369, Special National Intelligence Estimate, June 7, 1961, in Foreign Relations of the United States,
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middle-class Haitians forced to flee Haiti that, from the very beginning, oriented the political
vision and activity of Haitian New York toward Haiti and regime change back home.
To travel from Haiti to the United States in the late 1950s and early 1960s was a difficult
and expensive process. Those leaving the country needed to obtain a Haitian passport and an
exit visa, which involved much paperwork and numerous official and unofficial “fees.” In
addition, in order to enter the United States, an individual had to obtain another visa, one of three
types: a permanent resident visa, a student visa, or a tourist visa, each with its own requirements
for eligibility. To obtain permanent residence in the United States in this period, one needed to
able to show that he or she had a job waiting in the United States. A student visa required both a
letter of acceptance from an American college or university and proof of an ability to support
oneself. Both the permanent resident and the student visas presented conditions that were
extremely difficult for most Haitians to meet, especially in the late 1950s and early 1960s when
the Haitian community in the United States was not yet well established. The tourist visa, on the
other hand, required an individual to present a round-trip ticket (demonstrating intent to return)
and evidence of an ability to support oneself during the duration of a stay in the United States (a
sum that could reach $1,500 or more).17
Despite the considerable obstacles to emigration from Haiti, more than one hundred
thousand Haitians entered the United States legally between 1957 and 1970, and most did so as
tourists, further evidence that this early wave of Haitian migration brought mostly upper- and
middle-class Haitians. From 1957 to 1970, 98,420 entered the United States from Haiti as
tourists as compared to 33,870 as permanent residents and only 2,500 as students.18 A team of
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researchers studying undocumented Haitians and Dominicans in New York City in the mid1970s found that only 2 percent of the Haitians in their sample “entered without inspection”
(without a visa and authorization by immigration officials). Unlike the Haitian community that
would later form in South Florida and that would be largely made up of people who had arrived
by boat and never had been detected by immigration authorities, New York’s early Haitian
community consisted largely of people who had entered the country legally but overstayed their
tourist visas.19
The first members of the Haitian community in New York saw their presence in the
North American city as only a temporary sojourn abroad. In fact, as one group of scholars
observes, “They were so sure that they were political exiles who would be returning to Haiti in a
matter of months that for years they didn’t unpack their bags.”20 What’s more, these upper- and
middle-class exiles experienced a considerable loss of wealth and status in their move to the
United States, intensifying their yearning to return to Haiti. Even for those who were prepared to
stay in the United States, the difficulty of life in America made them dream of home. Linda
Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc describe the Haitian migrants’
predicament:
Unable to transfer their landholdings and commercial position into ready cash, and
without knowledge of English, diplomats became orderlies, and teachers became factory
workers. People who had staffs of live-in servants all their lives became maids and
waiters . . . Whether they worked three jobs to pay for the rundown house they had
purchased in Queens, or lived in a single room occupancy hotel in Manhattan with the
strong smell of urine in every corridor, they dreamt of returning to their lives of luxury
and privilege in Haiti.21
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Whether they hoped to resume a political career upon return to Haiti or simply to return to the
relative luxury of life before migration, for many the difficulty of life in the United States
provided an added incentive to go home.

Politics in the Haitian Exile Community, 1957-1965
Hoping to hasten Duvalier’s departure and their own return to Haiti, many in the first
wave of exiles from Haiti almost immediately began plotting Papa Doc’s overthrow. They
dreamt of toppling Duvalier through a dramatic invasion planned and launched from New York,
their home in exile. This vision became the basis and the driving force for the first political
activists in the exile community of New York. On July 29, 1958, a group of officers loyal to
former Haitian President General Paul Magloire, and a handful of American mercenaries
attempted to invade Haiti and overthrow the Duvalier regime. This unsuccessful invasion was
the first of many supported and planned by Haitian exiles in the United States. In the years after
the failed 1958 invasion, Haitian exiles staged other invasions from South Florida as well as
from the Dominican Republic and Cuba, all of which also failed. Many factors, including
insufficient training, resources, and preparation, mismanagement, failure to gain substantial
support from the countries that served as launching points of the invasions, and especially the
exiles’ disconnection from the Haitian people themselves, which kept the invasions from
generating the kind of general uprising necessary to overthrow Duvalier, all contributed to their
repeated failures.22
The early exile groups were composed primarily of upper- and middle-class Haitians and
were grouped around former presidential candidates and other political leaders whose aim was to
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return to Haiti to regain the power they had lost when forced into exile. Revolving around these
traditional political figures, the dominant political culture in the early years of Haitian New York
was strongly anti-Duvalier, but at the same time conservative in its vision for the country. A
Central Intelligence Agency report drew the following conclusions:
There appear[s] a large number of refugee or exile groups intent on disposing of
Duvalier and taking over the government. Many are former Haitian political figures, who
seek restoration of their power or financial positions. Some may be motivated by high
principle, others by personal ambition, and there is evidence that some of them are both
motivated by and supported by private capital . . . [which seeks] special consideration
such as hotels, casinos, etc., in Haiti.23
A meeting of one such exile group, the Ralliement des Forces de L’Opposition, an organization
grouped around the figure of former Haitian President Paul Magloire, featured speeches and
songs that evoked a strong emotional appeal to Haitian patriotism and expressed a clear message
that Duvalierism was the enemy of Haiti and Haitians. While the event was not focused on any
individual, it was clear that the function of the event was to prepare Haitians to retake the
country in order to facilitate the return of Magloire. The same theme resonated from
organizations grouped around other Haitian politicians and traditional leaders.24
Not surprisingly, this political culture that brought together many former political rivals
and their supporters, all vying for leadership on their return to Haiti, produced no small amount
of infighting and division. An October 27, 1966, US national intelligence estimate concluded
that “Duvalier's overthrow would probably have to be largely an inside job” since “none of the
many small groupings among the divided, bickering Haitian exiles could succeed in
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overthrowing Duvalier without decisive help from the US or some other foreign government.”25
Nonetheless, there were occasional attempts to bring together the different groups, though the
multiple political coalitions that emerged in the period remained troubled. In January 1961, for
example, Daniel Fignole, former Haitian Senator Luc Stephen, and Dr. Camille Lherisson, a
former secretary of state in Haiti, initiated an effort to create a united assembly of exiled
Haitians.26 The United Opposition, which included supporters of Dejoie, Fignole, and Jumelle,
sponsored a Creole language radio show, broadcast by Radio Progreso out of Havana, Cuba,
which aimed to stimulate the Haitian people to revolt.27 Another attempt to create a unified
organization came in May 1963. At the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Hermann
Desir, former Haitian consul, announced the creation of the League of Haitian Patriots, a group
he claimed would unite the opposition in exile and facilitate their resistance activities. In a
statement that seems intended to give the impression that anti-Duvalier resistance was springing
up all over, Dr. Albert Chassagne claimed “two to three thousand [revolutionary troops]
presently under league command” and bases in the United States, Jamaica, Venezuela, and
especially in Haiti’s neighbor, the Dominican Republic.28
In the early 1960s, these efforts by Haitian exiles in the United States were bolstered by a
gulf that had opened up between Duvalier and the US government, now headed by President
John F. Kennedy. Kennedy and other administration officials were critical of Duvalier, whom
25
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they regarded as a tyrant and, in the words of one official, “an irrational man who has almost
totalitarian power over the island.”29 When Duvalier began a second term after a fraudulent
election in 1961, the State Department declined to send the US ambassador to Haiti for the
inauguration, a move Duvalier correctly interpreted as a snub by the disapproving Kennedy
administration.30 And in 1963 the Kennedy administration took greater steps to distance itself
from Duvalier when it cut off military aid to Haiti.31
As part of its program of opposition to Duvalier, the US State Department and the Central
Intelligence Agency worked to identify, maintain contact with, and support leaders of the antiDuvalier opposition in exile.

After the November 1960 election, President-elect Kennedy

formed the Task Force on Immediate Latin American Problems. Regarding Haiti, the body
recommended that the State Department “draw together the forces for a healthy alternative [to
Duvalier] (including, perhaps, some of the exiles) to the Duvalier government.” The result
would be the State Department’s “'left hand' in the United States (unofficial relations which do
not compromise) and this should be extended to the more responsible Haitian exiles. It should
set about and draw together the elements of an eventually effective government. Two possible
leaders: [former presidential candidates Daniel] Fignole and [Clement] Jumelle.”32 By June 1,
1962, the CIA, the FBI, and the INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research) had compiled a list of
29
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nearly two hundred “promising Haitian exiles and visible resistance figures” from which it was
“trying to select those most likely to be capable of heading a successor government.”33 The State
Department also asked the Immigration and Naturalization service to “issue re-entry (I-512)
permits to exile leaders residing in the United States who are attempting to organize a unified
movement of all Haitian exiles, both here and in other countries, and need to travel outside the
United States to do so;” the CIA even trained exiles and supported a number of guerilla
expeditions between 1962 and 1968 aimed at deposing Duvalier.34
However, despite the Kennedy administration’s apparent opposition to the Duvalier
regime, it refused to completely sever ties with Haiti. Seeing the country as too important
strategically and fearing a scenario in Haiti that could be even worse than that under Duvalier,
American officials sought to maintain diplomatic ties with Duvalier. An examination of several
documents from the Kennedy administration’s first year reveals its motives behind this policy
toward Haiti. In a May 26, 1961, memo circulated among top Kennedy administration officials,
US Ambassador to Haiti Robert Newbegin explained that “the U.S. interest in that country was
chiefly because of its strategic geographic location . . . It was desirable from the U.S. standpoint
that affairs in Haiti remain quiet at this time so as not to make our general Caribbean situation
more difficult than it is now . . . The Duvalier government is stable by Haitian standards and . . .
appears to be in complete control, though it remains so by brutal methods.”35 In another memo,
US Ambassador Newbegin laid out the “two sorry alternatives” facing the United States in Haiti.
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On the one hand, it could continue to support Duvalier, whose “heavy-handed suppression of a
student strike, expulsion of a number of Roman Catholic church officials, and arrest and
maltreatment of anyone thought to be opposed to his regime have increased his unpopularity and
resulted in an increasing tendency on the part of the general public to blame the Embassy and the
United States Government for ‘support’ of a despised tyrant.” On the other hand,
Should Duvalier fall, there is a decided danger of chaos and a struggle for power among
individuals in whom we would have little ground for confidence. Such a situation might
well tempt [Cuban President Fidel] Castro or [Dominican President Rafael] Trujillo to
intervene in such a way as to jeopardize our national interests, possibly even forcing
military intervention. Therefore, unless we are willing to take radical steps (including
military intervention, if necessary, after Duvalier's removal), we have little choice but to
follow our present course of maintaining friendly and helpful relations with the Duvalier
government.36
In addition, Haiti proved useful in the United State’s effort to isolate Communist Cuba. In return
for US assistance, Duvalier supported the US embargo on Cuba, pledged to provide military
assistance and its territory for military action, and cast a key vote in the Organizations of
American States (OAS) in favor of the US-led effort to impose sanctions on Cuba and to expel it
from the regional body.37 Despite the Kennedy administration’s decision to maintain diplomatic
relations with Duvalier, it did suspend military aid to Haiti in 1963 (as has been already noted),
evidence of its deep ambivalence about backing the Duvalier regime.
The administration of Lyndon Johnson was not as reluctant as the Kennedy
administration in its support for Duvalier, and US-Haitian relations warmed significantly after
President Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963. Under Johnson, the United States
continued to value Haiti for its strategic location in the Caribbean and for its anti-Cuban vote in
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the OAS. Brenda Gayle Plummer notes that “friends of the Johnson administration found
investment in Haiti attractive,” another possible factor in the warming of relations between
Washington and Port-au-Prince.38 To demonstrate the warmer relations between the United
States and Haiti, Johnson restored military aid (though direct aid to the country remained
suspended) and, after yet another fraudulent election in April 1964, an election that elevated
Duvalier to the status of President for Life, Johnson received the Haitian ambassador in
Washington.39 “The United States is now faced with the prospect that the Duvalier regime will
continue to rule Haiti for the foreseeable future,” calculated State Department officials. “In these
circumstances it is in the United States interest to seek to bring about at least a minimum level of
mutual accommodation” in line with “United States interests [that] range from the need to
protect American citizens and property interests to ensuring that Haiti votes on the merit of
questions of importance to the United States and the free world in international organizations and
forums.”40
Washington’s new stance toward Duvalier’s dictatorship also occasioned a shift in its
official relationship with Duvalier’s opponents in exile. After deciding on the need to “bring
about at least a minimum level of mutual accommodation,” State Department officials
recommended that the US government “disassociate itself from any exile attempt to invade Haiti,
or any plot against Duvalier, except in the circumstances (1) that the prospects for success appear
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favorable, (2) that public knowledge of United States Government involvement could be
successfully avoided, and (3) that the installation of an acceptable successor group is virtually
assured.” At the same time, the government should “continue discreet contacts with Haitians
outside the Government (and with those in exile) in order to attempt to build up assets for the
future.”41 Improved relations with Duvalier determined that the United States could not so
openly support those attempting to topple the regime. Still, American officials wanted to
maintain some influence over a post-Duvalier Haiti, and they continued to see their contacts
among leaders of the exile groups as a key way to do so. Indeed, Duvalier himself seems to have
been well aware of the US government’s support for his opponents in exile. A telegram from the
US ambassador to Haiti described the Haitian leader as “pathologically suspicious that USG [the
U.S. government] playing with Haitian exiles against him,” and US support for exile activity
continued to be a sensitive area in US-Haitian relations.42
Soon after he declared himself president for life, another invasion attempt gave Duvalier
the opportunity to demonstrate his determination to defeat his opponents, particularly those from
among the exile community. In the summer of 1964, a group calling itself Jeune Haiti (Young
Haiti) launched an attempt to invade the country and topple Duvalier. Although the guerilla
force consisted of only thirteen fighters, they had some military success and seem to have
represented a real threat to the Haitian government in the three months it took for Duvalier’s
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forces to repress the campaign.43 After the insurrection began, Duvalier reportedly “has told his
household staff, if he goes, he will go like Hitler and level Port-au-Prince,” a comment that
suggests that the leader considered the invasion a real threat.44 Papa Doc’s forces were
ultimately able to kill eleven of the thirteen fighters and capture the remaining two, who were
then taken to the Haitian capital so that the president could use them to send a message to other
would-be rebels.45
The story of these two young men can help to understand the experience of Haitians in
exile that chose to return to their country to fight against the Duvalier dictatorship. Marcel
Numa and Louis Drouin had grown up together in the southern Haitian city of Jeremie and had
fled Duvalier’s Haiti for New York, where their friendship continued. Drouin first served in the
United States Army and later was employed in the financial industry of New York City. Numa
worked for a shipping company and was an engineering student at the Bronx Merchant
Academy. Both joined Jeune Haiti while they lived in New York and, after Duvalier’s
assumption of the title of President for Life, committed to joining the guerrilla campaign they
hoped would liberate Haiti.46
Numa and Drouin, who had left Haiti in the same period, who maintained their friendship
while in exile, and who returned to Haiti under the same circumstances, also died together. As
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Edwidge Danticat notes in the compelling portrait she paints of the two men, on the day of Numa
and Drouin’s execution, Duvalier “decreed that government offices be closed so that hundreds of
state employees could be in the crowd. Schools were shut down and principals ordered to bring
their students. Hundreds of people from outside the capital were bused in to watch.” After
Numa and Drouin were shot to death by a firing squad, Duvalier supporters distributed
pamphlets telling Haitians how they should understand the series of events: “Dr. Francois
Duvalier will fulfill his sacrosanct mission. He has crushed and will always crush the attempts
of the opposition. Think well, renegades. Here is the fate awaiting you and your kind.”47
Whether the pamphlets made it all the way to New York or not, the message of the defeat of the
Jeune Haiti invasion was clear: Duvalier did not intend to let those outside the country threaten
his power. Duvalier’s assumption of the position of president for life and his defeat of the Jeune
Haiti insurrection were the capstones of a brutal and systematic campaign of repression he had
carried out over the previous three years.48
In response to Duvalier’s tightening control in Haiti and his declaration of his presidency
for life, the opposition in New York initiated a new effort to create unity within the fractured
exile community. In 1964 supporters of Paul Magloire began coming together with Jeune Haiti,
Le Mouvement Revolutionnaire du 12 Novembre (MR 12N), and Les Forces Revolutionnaires
Haitiennes (FRH), a process that produced Le Coalition Haitienne (the Haitian Coalition).
Under the leadership of Magloire, the Haitian Coalition produced a weekly newspaper called le
Combattant Haitien. It also collaborated with the US State Department to create Radio Vonvon
(in Creole meaning “bug” or “beetle”), a shortwave radio program through which it broadcast its
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anti-Duvalier message from New York to Haiti.49 The Haitian Coalition and its anti-Duvalier
radio program were funded by the CIA, which channeled $135,000 annually to the group.50 A
memo produced for the 303 Committee, an interdepartmental body which authorized the covert
operation, reveals that officials with the State Department and the CIA utilized Radio Vonvon as
a way of “countering the inflammatory Creole broadcasts over Radio Habana and preventing this
communist power from being the only anti-Duvalier force in the eyes of Creole-speaking
Haitians.”51 Although it is impossible to know how many people Radio Vonvon reached in Haiti,
it appears to have been a real threat to the dictatorship. In 1965 Duvalier sent a formal complaint
to the US government, asking Washington to silence the program on the grounds that it
“constitutes aggression against [Haiti’s] government” and gives Haitians the impression that
Washington supports the anti-Duvalier exiles.52
One of the individuals to take a leading role in the Haitian Coalition was Raymond
Alcide Joseph, the future founder and publisher of Haiti Observateur. Joseph, the son of a
Protestant minister, grew up in the southern Haitian town of Les Cayes. In 1954, Joseph served
as a translator for a visiting Baptist minister from Asheville, North Carolina. This experience led
him to the United States to attend the Moody Bible Institute in Chicago; after attending the
Moody Bible Institute, he completed his bachelor’s degree at Wheaton College in Illinois. He
returned to Haiti in 1957, just after Duvalier’s rise to power, but in 1961 he left the country again
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to study for a master’s degree in social anthropology and linguistics at the University of
Chicago.53 Joseph intended to continue for a doctorate when the failed Jeune Haiti revolt and
the public executions of Marcel Numa and Louis Drouin caused him to change course. As he
told a reporter in a 1975 interview,
I was working on my dissertation in November, 1964, when I read that Papa Doc took
two young men and shot them publicly. They were rebels who had come from New
York. Of course that’s the fate of rebels when they are caught. But when Papa Doc
declared a national holiday, closed the schools, and brought the children out to watch the
execution, I didn’t see any further need for me to work for a Ph.D. and go back home. I
decided right then and there to put my knowledge to work fighting the regime, and I
came to New York in 1965 to help organize the Haitians.54
According to Susan Buchanan, when he began work with the Haitian Coalition, Joseph was “a
relative unknown within Haitian political circles,” but he was able to rise to secretary-general of
the Coalition through his connections with Washington and his ability to channel financing and
support from the CIA to projects like Radio Vonvon.55 A memo produced for the 303 Committee
listed Joseph as one of nine Haitian exiles identified by the CIA as “best suited, in terms of U.S.
interests, for inclusion in a post-Duvalier provisional government.”56 From the time of his
arrival in New York in the mid-1960s and his early engagement with the anti-Duvalier exiles,
Raymond Joseph remained a major figure in the political life of Haitian New York.
The political activity of Joseph and the Haitian Coalition (as well as other organizations
like Daniel Fignole’s Brooklyn-based Movement of Peasants and Workers [MOP]) determined
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the character of the early politics in Haitian New York. These political leaders and activists were
focused on Haiti, and their overriding goal was to topple the Duvalier regime. Despite divisions
due to political rivalry and competing visions for a post-Duvalier Haiti, these exiles made some
tentative steps toward a united anti-Duvalier opposition in exile and managed to garner some
support from the US government, though the diplomatic challenges facing the State Department
always limited the level of official backing American officials offered to the exiles. Although
the political character of the Haitian community of New York would undergo many significant
changes in subsequent years, one thing that would not change was the steady focus on Haiti of
New York-based activists and their desire to work for political change in their country of origin.

A Community Taking Root: Life and Labor
By the mid-1960s the increasingly bleak situation in Haiti led new categories of the
Haitian population to seek refuge in New York. Duvalier had successfully consolidated his hold
on the country and had declared himself President for Life. Witnessing the government’s violent
clampdown and with few economic prospects, middle-class Haitians decided to join their upperclass compatriots in New York. In turn, the Haitian economy was devastated by the departure of
Haiti’s professionals and technicians, contributing to an economic crisis that was compounded
by “years of government neglect and corruption” in the countryside.57 And by the late 1960s and
the early 1970s, driven by the ever-present threat of political violence as well as by the general
misery of life in Haiti after a decade under Duvalier, lower-middle-class and working-class
Haitians began coming to New York as well. Still far from the poorest of the poor back home,
these Haitians also differed substantially from the elite that had earlier come to the city. As a
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portrait of the New York Haitian community in 1971 noted, these newest Haitians were not the
“oldest, wealthiest, most influential . . . French-speaking and Europe-oriented” Haitians that had
been the earlier arrivals, nor were they the “bourgeoisie” that had followed the elite. Instead,
they were the “petit bourgeois and workers,” they “spoke Creole, bad French, and almost no
English,” and “many were only a few years removed from peasant life.”58 Facing political and
economic oppression, the upper strata of the Haitian working class, those with the economic
means to escape the country, joined the Haitian settlement in New York.59
After arriving in New York, the immediate concern of Haitian immigrants was to find a
place to live and a place to work. Families played a key role in both of these processes, just as
they had in the migration process. Not all new arrivals were fortunate enough to have family and
friends already in the city, but those who did benefited by corresponding with family before their
leaving Haiti, receiving information and sometimes financial support that would help them
complete the trip.60 After their arrival, these new immigrants were “quickly caught up in a dense
social network of family, friends and compatriots already living in the city . . . [F]or the recent
arrivals these ‘kin’ cushioned the shocks of American culture, eliminated any need to
communicate in English and often provided temporary financial support.”61
From the late 1950s on, there developed three distinct Haitian neighborhoods in New
York: one in Manhattan, another in Brooklyn, and a third in Queens. In Manhattan the Haitian
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community lived on the Upper West Side and stretched from West 69th Street north to 112th
Street and from 125th Street to 168th Street between Columbus and Broadway.62 This was an
extremely diverse neighborhood with the mostly middle- and working-class Haitians living
alongside Dominicans, Cubans, Puerto Ricans, black Americans, and other groups in
brownstones, high-rise apartment buildings, “welfare hotels,” and sometimes in abandoned
tenements like the “two squalid tenement buildings” that housed 350 squatters, including many
Haitian families, opposite St. John the Divine Cathedral Church in Morningside Heights.63
The Haitian community in Brooklyn was the largest in New York with roughly half of
the Haitians in the city, giving the borough a Haitian population of approximately seventy-five to
one hundred thousand in the early 1970s.64 Concentrated in the areas of Brownsville, BedfordStuyvesant, Crown Heights, East Flatbush, and East New York, the Haitians lived among
“lower- and middle-class black Americans, West Indians, Hasidic Jews, Italians, Puerto Ricans
and other Spanish speaking residents.”65 As with the Haitian community in Manhattan, the
Brooklyn Haitians were represented across the socio-economic spectrum and lived in similar
structures, such as brick tenements, high-rise apartments and two-family houses.66
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The third and smallest of the Haitian communities of New York centered in the Queens
neighborhoods of Corona, Cambria Heights, and Queens Village with some Haitians also in the
areas of South Jamaica, East Elmhurst and Jackson Heights. Queens was known in the Haitian
community as the borough of upper-class Haitians. There the wealthier Haitians were more
likely to own their own single-family homes and were more often naturalized citizens.67 Haitian
exile Firmin Joseph described the allure that Queens held for Haitians in New York:
Queens is the symbol of success. Usually the Haitians who live there are teaching or
working in a bank. There are some doctors and lawyers too. The Haitians in Queens
have their own clubs . . . You’ll find there mostly cream-colored Haitians. They are the
fair-haired boys and girls of Haitian society.68
For Haitians in New York, living in Queens was a symbol of status in a country where
immigration had erased many of the old world divisions and privileges enjoyed by upper-class
Haitians. It may have been going too far for Joseph to contend that “the poor Haitians in
Manhattan and Brooklyn are all yearning to go to Queens,” but there is no doubt that the Haitian
community in Queens was recognized as the domain of the more privileged among New York
Haitians.69
Just as new immigrants followed family and friends to certain neighborhoods of New
York, so did they follow family and friends to work. In a pattern that has been playing out for
generations in the city, employers often hired family members and friends of Haitians already
employed in the workplace. This was especially true for Haitians at work in the city’s factories
and for those working in home healthcare. A 1979 study of the undocumented revealed the
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remarkable efficiency with which “chain employment” of this sort takes place: “even with
overall New York City unemployment now at 8.5%, by going through this kin network many
immigrants landed their first U.S. job in less than a week. Some found work the first day out
looking.”70
Once it is clear what an indispensable role family and social networks played for the
newly arrived Haitians, it becomes more understandable how difficult it was for those who
arrived in New York before the community was well established. In 1963 members of the
Haitian community reported that finding work was their greatest problem after not being able to
speak English. Before the Haitian community was highly integrated into the workplaces of New
York, Haitians found that they did “not know where or how to seek employment in New York;”
in a “close-knit” community in which “few have American contacts,” they were not yet able to
rely on the chain employment that would later be so effective for new arrivals to draw upon.71
In addition to family and social networks, obtaining legal status offered significant
advantages for newly arrived immigrants. Without resident status, Haitians were not legally
allowed to work, and even with work permits, one reporter noted in 1963, more than 25 percent
were unemployed or working part-time or in menial jobs, such as seasonal factory work.72 In
1970, among documented Haitians legally in the workforce, 27.3 percent were professional and
technical workers, managers, or clerical workers. An additional 33.4 percent were skilled craft
workers. Only 38.1 percent were operatives, service workers, or domestics.73
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Undocumented Haitians, on the other hand, grouped overwhelmingly in low-status jobs,
such as unskilled and semi-skilled positions in light manufacturing and service positions,
particularly as domestics. The undocumented Haitians in one 1977 study received average
wages of $150 a week or $6500 a year for a 50-week year (approximately $24,100 in 2011), and
one-half reported receiving less than $5000 a year (approximately $18,600 in 2011).74 A
comparison with Laguerre’s estimate that in 1978 the median annual income for legal residents
was $10,000 (approximately $34,500 in 2011)75 helps to understand the earning power of
undocumented Haitians. To supplement the low wages that accompanied such low-status jobs
and to address the economic crises created by regular but unpredictable layoffs, undocumented
Haitians also regularly worked “underground” jobs, providing services like child care or food
preparation, driving a gypsy cab, working as barbers or hairdressers, or engaging in skilled work
such as tailoring, carpentry, or masonry. By combining manufacturing or service work with
underground jobs in New York’s informal economy, undocumented Haitians could survive, but
it was not an easy existence.76
This experience of scraping by on low-paying, insecure factory and service jobs was not
confined exclusively to the lower-middle-class and working-class Haitians that started coming to
New York in the middle to late 1960s. Upper class Haitians, especially the undocumented, also
confronted this employment picture. Many of those who had been the elite in Haiti experienced
significant downward mobility once in the United States. Inability to speak English, lack of
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occupational skills, illegal status, and employer racism all contributed to the extremely limited
job opportunities that were open to Haitians, regardless of social or economic background. For
example, an economist in Haiti with an advanced degree from Laval University in Quebec found
himself working in a box and carton factory, an engineer toiling on a factory loading dock, a
former senator in the Haitian parliament employed as a security guard.77 For some educated
professionals, particularly doctors and nurses, there was a chance that they could find their way
back into a professional career, but for the unskilled elite who in Haiti had relied solely on their
wealth, social status, and family name, the good life was over. As one observer of the Haitian
community put it,
Distinctions are giving way, slowly and most painfully, to a new set of realities. Men
learn that their fine old family names mean nothing here . . . Men who had culture and
wealth but no special skills find themselves employed in modest office jobs, even menial
labor . . . As for professionals, there are countless stories of doctors manning gas pumps,
lawyers on the assembly line, whereas a highly skilled laborer who was considered “la
classe moyenne” in Haiti may find security and new dignity here.78
Immigration to the United States partially leveled the social and economic distinctions that had
been treated, at least by the elite, as sacrosanct in Haiti.
The immigration process initiated an equally large transformation in gender roles and the
functioning of the Haitian family. In Haiti, women were assigned to a subordinate position both
in the home and in larger society. Politics and the public sphere were considered by many to be
the exclusive domain of men while women were to occupy the domestic sphere. This was
particularly true for middle-class women, many of whom did not work due to the gendered
boundaries around public space. Working class and peasant women, however, often functioned
as the primary breadwinner and head of household in Haiti and were thus not as constrained as
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their middle-class counterparts. Still, as Carolle Charles observes, the senior male figure in the
household or community maintained authority even while women carried the “bulk of
responsibility for creating and reproducing wealth.”79
Coming to New York disrupted these traditional gender roles for Haitian women and men
and redefined the position of wife and husband within the family. Women, who represented
more than half of the overall Haitian immigrant population, often found work in New York more
easily than men and as a result established themselves as the financial anchor for the family unit.
This gave Haitian women a new status in the family and in the community, particularly for
middle-class women who in Haiti had to rely on the patriarch for financial support.80 As one
woman explained, in Haiti a woman “is forced to live with a man because it is he who gives her
food, money, clothes and shoes. Here things have changed. We have the means to help
financially with the expenses incurred in the household and with the education of our children.
Slavery is over.”81
Distressed by their loss of status in the family and the community, some Haitian men
complained that the move to New York had ruined Haitian women, making them act like “gran
moun” (grownups or adults). But despite men’s resistance and the conflict that the new gender
roles provoked, the demands of everyday life in New York transformed the Haitian family. For
those that chose to stay together, the husband-wife relationship became more equal. Haitian men
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took on a greater role in household tasks, and couples began pooling their resources, extending
control of household finances to women as well as men.82
Another major challenge facing Haitians in New York was the intensity with which they
experienced American racism in the United States. Based on his fieldwork in the Haitian
community of New York in the 1970s, Georges Fouron concludes that “racial discrimination was
one of the most painful and traumatic experiences of the Haitian immigrants.” Among those
Fouron surveyed, 76.7 percent reported experiencing racism in New York at work, school, or on
public transportation while only 5 percent claimed not to have noticed racism in the city.83 For
undocumented domestic workers like Paula, an employee in the home of an elderly French
woman, racist treatment added to the indignity of low wages and poor working conditions.
I was supposed to take care of [the woman] during the day – give her medicine, make her
meals, and just make certain she was all right. I worked eight hours a day for $60 per
week and paid for my own transportation. She treated me like a slave and expected me to
clean the house and run errands in addition to my assigned duties. She mocked my
accent, called me a “Negress” and always told me that the “Negroes” had ruined Haiti by
throwing out the French. I put up with that abuse because I had no choice. Without an
alien card, it’s hard to find a good job. I finally couldn’t stand it and left although I did
not have another position.84
For light-skinned Haitians, the rigidity of the system of racial classification in the United States
was another factor that robbed them of the status they had had back in Haiti. According to
Fouron, “the Haitian mulatto, ‘white’ by Haitian standards” was “black by the American point of
view.” Haitians with a dark complexion, on the other hand, seeing the status of people of color
in the United States and experiencing racial discrimination firsthand were, Fouron argues,
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reminded of “the negative reality [they] had known in Haiti as black and as poor.” While not all
black people in Haiti were poor, of course, the experience of dark-skinned Haitians in the United
States did seem to reinforce the practice that gave higher status to the lighter-skinned. The
conflicting experiences of race in Haiti and in the United States led to divergent responses from
Haitians in New York. While some in the Haitian community responded to their experience of
racism in America by joining African Americans in the struggle for civil rights, many refused to
identify with Americans of African descent.85 Some even went out of their way to showcase
their Haitian origin by overdoing their French accent. For these people, “staying Haitian to
avoid being Black twice” was the best way to deal with the problem of race in American
society.86
Compounding the hardship of financial stress, difficult work, conflict in the family, and
racial discrimination were the vulnerability and isolation that came with being undocumented.
By 1979, 42,868 Haitians had obtained legal residency in New York, but this number represents
a small minority of the Haitian community of New York.87 Although accurate estimates of the
size of the Haitian community (accounting for both legal and illegal immigrants) are difficult to
come by, organizations working within the Haitian community provided approximate population
numbers. An informal count conducted in 1971 by the Haitian Community Center in Brooklyn
and the Haitian Neighborhood Center in Manhattan estimated that 150,000 to 200,000 Haitians
resided in the New York Metro area.88 Four years later, a group of Catholic priests working in
the Haitian community put that number at 250,000, although other estimates in the mid-1970s
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ranged as high as 300,000.89 If the Haitians living in New York numbered approximately
250,000 at the end of the 1970s, that means that less than one-fifth of Haitians in New York
qualified as legal residents at the end of the decade. Those Haitians who were in the United
States illegally were aware that they could at any time be discovered by immigration authorities
and be deported. This led to a tremendous fear of anyone outside the Haitian community, and
even among Haitians there was much mistrust.90
Many also struggled with the heartache of being separated from their home. Like the
earliest exiles to New York, they hoped their stay in New York would be a short one. Gazing
out the window of her Manhattan apartment, one woman commented, “It is so terrible to sit in
this building in summer, looking out at other buildings. How I wish I could sit under my old
avocado tree!”91 Speaking in 1963, a member of the Haitian community articulated this
sentiment even more directly: “Our bodies are in New York, but we are still living in Haiti all the
time.”92 A religious leader agreed. “Haitians are a transient people,” he observed. “Their hearts
are in Haiti, but they are in New York.”93
Despite all the anxiety and pain of life in New York, Haitians managed to build
institutions and networks that fostered culture and community and enriched life for those in
exile. Although for most Haitians, social life centered on the family, a rich array of cultural and
recreational opportunities began to flourish in the 1960s for those who chose to take advantage
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of them.94 Along West Ninety-sixth Street between Broadway and Amsterdam, a favorite
gathering spot for the Manhattan Haitian community, one might encounter a large group of
Haitians socializing and engaging in heated debate about the future of their country.95 In
restaurants, barbershops, or in each other’s homes, Haitians gathered to play cards, dominoes,
and to socialize. Haitian bookstores, like the Librairie Haiti in Brooklyn and the Haitian Corner
in Manhattan, provided French and Creole language reading materials for the community. On
Saturday nights New York Haitians went dancing. In Queens the wealthiest Haitians attended
exclusive private clubs, while those denied access attended large public dances and concerts in
Brooklyn, small evening establishments like the Chateau Caribe in Manhattan, or parties in
neighbors’ and friends’ apartments. Community festivals featured musical performances, folk
dancing, and Haitian theater troupes performing in Creole for large Haitian audiences, and
Haitian soccer matches drew community members in the summertime.96

Steps toward a New Community Politics, 1965-1971
The growing population of Haitians in New York, the political orientation and culture
created by the exile community, and the development Haitian cultural institutions, community
organizations, and churches all contributed to a developing sense of a Haitian community.97 A
growing sense of community did not, however, mean that Haitians in New York were united.
Despite some successful efforts to build political coalitions (which has already been discussed),
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political rivalries among groups loyal to competing Haitian politicians as well as other sources of
difference contributed to persistent divisions within the community.98
In Haitian New York, as in Haiti, categories of class, often delineated by skin color,
fractured the immigrant community. In fact, in the early years of Haitian New York, these class
divisions were “more salient to Haitians than any idea of common cause based on common
origins in Haiti,” Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc observe. More
privileged Haitians often avoided any public organization or identification with those they
considered below them, seeking “to preserve their class status in Haiti through their
comportment in the United States and their maintenance, while away from home, of markers of
social differentiation.” For this reason, those of bourgeois background erected high barriers to
the social clubs of Queens and even attempted to maintain their separation in the words they
chose for the Haitian settlement in New York; it was a “colonie,” not a “community.”99
Despite such deep divisions, there were halting efforts in the mid-1960s to overcome
these differences and to create a unified Haitian community. Some of these efforts centered on
creating service organizations that promoted the concept of a single Haitian community and
downplayed the fractured reality of the Haitian settlement in the city. Most of these community
service organizations were initiated and supported by American institutions like the Catholic
Archdiocese, the Episcopalian Archdiocese of Brooklyn, and the New York City Community
Development Corporation. In 1967, as part of the national War on Poverty measures instituted
by the Johnson administration three years earlier, the New York City Metropolitan Mobility
Program initiated a pilot project that would become the Haitian Community Program, an
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organization that provided New York Haitians with support in locating employment, housing,
and other community services.100 A similar organization, the Haitian Neighborhood Service
Center, opened the same year in Manhattan. Led by Lyderic Bonaventure, a president of the
Haitian Transport Workers Union before fleeing attempts on his life in Haiti, the Haitian
Neighborhood Service Center also provided employment and other types of community services.
Two years after the establishment of the Haitian Neighborhood Service Center, Bonaventure
moved to Brooklyn to establish another Haitian community organization called Centre
Communautaire.101
Another attempt to overcome divisions among New York Haitians grew out of a desire to
increase Haitians’ collective power in the American political system. In 1968 Henrique Douglas,
an immigrant who had come to New York from Haiti years before the anti-Duvalier exodus
began, started laying the groundwork for the Haitian American Political Organization (HAPO),
also referred to in some sources as the Haitian American Citizens Society (HACSO). Amid the
tumult of the student and anti-Vietnam War movements, urban rebellions, and the continuing
demands of the multiple liberation movements of the period, the embattled Democratic Party in
1968 began courting the ethnic vote. Seeing the expanding Haitian population as a potential
addition to its base, the Nationalities Division of the Democratic National Committee invited
Douglas to create a Haitian political organization that could be mobilized to support the
Democratic Party. In response, Douglas and other middle-income Haitians, motivated both by a
desire to advance the Haitian community as well as their own status in it, created the Haitian
American Political Organization. To try to overcome the barriers that divided Haitians in New
100
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York, the founders of HAPO promoted the idea of a single Haitian community. And to promote
unity, the organization decided to host a dance in Manhattan that would be open to all New York
Haitians. But the effort failed as a community-bridging event because the HAPO leadership
failed to reach out effectively to the largely working-class Haitian community in Brooklyn and
because even leading members of HAPO refused to sell tickets or attend the event, indicating
their extreme ambivalence about socializing and working with their working-class
compatriots.102
While the attempt to create a cross-class political organization like HAPO had little
success in the late 1960s, much more influential were radical student groups that began gathering
an increasingly large following among New York Haitians. These student groups, which were
influenced in part by young people who had participated in the student movements of Montreal
and Paris as well as the student and black liberation movements in the United States, promoted a
nationalist message of revolution and anti-imperialism for Haiti. Through the mediums of radio
and theater, they encouraged New York Haitians to embrace a form of Haitian nationalism that
highlighted their cultural connections to Africa and the country’s common mode of
communication, Creole. Though the membership numbers in the many leftist organizations
forming in New York in the late 1960s remained small, their political influence among New
York Haitians was significant, not least in the major challenge they posed to the exiled political
leaders like Magloire, Dejoie and Fignole, who had until this point largely controlled politics in
the community.103
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The year 1969 saw a remarkable intersection of developments, the outcome of which
would have a long-term impact both in New York and in Haiti. Two significant and interrelated
developments in 1969 were critical to the growing power of the young radicals in the
community. The first was the formation of Troupe Kouidor, a leading theater group that used
drama and cultural presentations to promote Haitian nationalism and anti-Duvalier resistance.
The other was the beginning of the weekly radio show L’Heure Haitienne (known to most as L’
Ayisyen), a program that developed a wide following and would have a substantial influence on
the politics of New York’s Haitian community for decades to follow. From the beginning,
Troupe Kouidor and L’Ayisyen worked closely, linked as they were by the same founding
members.104
Daniel Huttinot was one of the young people involved in the creation of both Troupe
Kouidor and L’Ayisyen. Huttinot had arrived in New York in 1963 at the age of eighteen when
he and his family joined his father in the city. (Huttinot’s father had been a civil servant in Haiti
who had supported one of Duvalier’s opponents in the campaign of 1957. He had been fired and
forced to flee the country once Duvalier came to power.) Like most Haitians in New York,
Daniel Huttinot had to immediately begin working. But he also continued with his education,
attending Pace University in the evenings after work.105
As with many other young Haitians arriving in New York in the 1960s, Huttinot’s
political outlook was shaped by his experience in Haiti. Inheriting his father’s opposition to
Duvalier, Huttinot immersed himself in the student political activity around him while he was
still in Haiti, joining Bibliotec de Jen (Youth Library), a discussion group started by young
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Haitian priests recently returned from Europe. Other international and domestic currents also
shaped his experience. “All university students and secondary students were very much involved
in discussions about the Cuban Revolution,” Huttinot recalls. “And you also had in Haiti at the
time under the dictatorship, underground left-wing activities that were going on. So you were
caught in the midst of all those activities.”106
Huttinot’s move to New York did not sever his connection with the student and antiDuvalier movements in Haiti. Although it was dangerous, he remembers, “We did maintain
contact one way or another with those who remained politically active in Haiti.” It was this close
contact with the ongoing struggle back home that had a decisive impact on Huttinot’s political
trajectory in New York. He recalls receiving the terrible news that his friend, an employee at the
Bank of Agriculture and an active member of the movement against Duvalier, had been arrested
while leaving work. In another incident, a member of Huttinot’s network in New York “lost his
brother-in-law and his wife’s cousins who were very active in the underground movement in
Haiti.” News of the arrest and killing of close associates and friends in Haiti spurred Huttinot
and those around him to action. “When we learned of those news, we were very much affected
here in New York, and we were saying to ourselves that we should do something. The struggle
will continue. We cannot stay with our arms crossed.”107
The major obstacle, as Huttinot and others saw it, was the fear of Haitians in New York,
which kept them from speaking out against Papa Doc. The Haitian community “was so much
afraid, even here outside of the country of Duvalier’s dictatorship. They were even afraid of
naming Duvalier’s name, thinking that if they would name Duvalier’s name, their families back
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home would be affected . . . So we said we have to do something in order to move that
community.” To break the fear that silenced so many, Huttinot and others turned to cultural
performances, an activity fearful Haitians might not interpret as explicitly political. When a
friend “who was a poet and was very active in the theater movement in Haiti” joined Huttinot
and others in New York, “the idea came up to start a theater group in order to have cultural
activities in the community . . . Thinking that they were coming to a cultural activity,” Huttinot
and his friends reasoned, “the people could start coming out and would not be afraid.” Another
friend of Huttinot who had been active in theater in Haiti and France before coming to New York
introduced the theories of Bertolt Brecht and worked to train Haitian high school students for the
cultural performances. “That’s how in 1969 we founded a theater group called Troupe Kouidor,”
Huttinot recalls.108
As one of the groups that pioneered the use of theater and culture to educate and activate
the Haitian community, Troupe Kouidor played a key role in popularizing a more radical
political message throughout the community. These cultural performances presented the
community with a broad political critique. For example, one performance featured “skits
ridiculing what they saw as Haitian ‘bourgeois pretensions’ and ‘French mannerisms’ and sang
songs bespeaking the need to liberate Haiti.” As one group of scholars notes, performances of
this sort were “initially greeted with mixed reactions,” exciting and encouraging some while
making others “uncomfortable with the attack on their lifestyle” or “frightened at being present
at an event which publicly attacked the Haitian government.” But as the voice of radical young
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Haitians gained a broader following in subsequent years, cultural groups like Troupe Kouidor
multiplied.109
Working closely with Huttinot in Troupe Kouidor was Lionel Legros, a founder of the
weekly radio program L’Heure Haitienne, or L’Ayisyen. Like Huttinot, Legros, who had arrived
in New York in 1966, came from a family that opposed Duvalier, with one part supporting the
bourgeois-backed Louis Dejoie and the other backing the populist labor leader Daniel Fignole.
When he was a young man, Legros’ parents sent him to their home in the countryside during
periods of heightened political instability and violence in Port-au-Prince. While he was there, he
spent time with students renting the house from his parents and joined them in political
discussions and listening sessions when they gathered around the short-wave radio transmitting
from Cuba.110
While family political debates and contact with Haitian university students initiated his
early politicization, Legros says, “My political awakening came when in ’66, I came here,” to
New York. His mother, employed as a domestic worker for a lawyer in the city, noticed that the
children of the family she served attended college. “And my mother . . . [wanting] the best for
me, actually asked [her employer] where that school was.” Legros reflects, “I just came here in
September ’66, and she said where are you going to go to school?” The school Legros’ mother
was asking her employer about was Columbia University, and with her encouragement, Legros
enrolled in night school at the university soon after his arrival.111
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Being at Columbia in the late 1960s continued Legros’ political evolution. As Legros
recalls, “Columbia was really the center of [the] explosive 1968 years, the student occupation,
the proximity to Harlem.” It was a moment when “racism [was] a very active question.” And in
response to the pressure applied by the student movement in New York City in those years,
Columbia University informed the community that “the radio was going to be opened up” to
minority voices and perspectives. Working at the library at the time, Legros met the engineer of
the university radio station who invited him to create a program. Initially the idea was to do
“something very soft -- a postcard kind of radio show where we speak about different parts of the
country,” Legros recalls. “We’ll call it ‘Haiti Unknown’ or something like that where we’ll play
rare, nostalgic songs, and so on.” But it was at that time “that we got a new crowd of people
that were more seeing things politically,” which channeled the show in a more radical direction.
After this change, “some people left voluntarily because they did not want anything to do with
anything political, because their parents were [in Haiti].” But those who stayed, including
Legros, decided to go public with their opposition to the dictatorship and to turn the show into a
tool to support the resistance. “So at that time it was done. I was going to be politically
involved,” Legros decided, “and known by the [Haitian] government, also.” L’Ayisyen soon
became a platform for “people to really tell us what they suffered under the regime. People
would call us and we would read what they said.”112
Like Troupe Kouidor, L’Ayisyen advanced a radical, anti-imperialist and anti-Duvalier
message and developed a wide following. As Carole Charles observes, “For most members of
the community, whatever their politics, L’Heure Haitienne was ti radio (our little radio).”113 The
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Sunday morning discussions in Kreyol of Haitian politics attracted thousands of listeners.114 And
the Haitian government, too, soon took notice, directing the Haitian consulate in New York to
contact the University to ask for equal time and to protest the show’s harmful impact on Haitian
tourism.115 With its substantial audience and growing influence among Haitians of New York,
L’Ayisyen, along with Troupe Kouidor, was an important part of the changing politics of Haitian
New York in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The year 1969 also marked another coordinated attempt to topple the Duvalier regime in
Haiti, a campaign in which Haitians outside of the country played a significant role. In the mid1960s revolutionary organizations both inside and outside Haiti gathered their forces with the
intention of launching a coordinated attack on the dictatorship. Underground student
organizations, including the Union Nationale des Etudiants Haitiens (National Union of Haitian
Students) and Haiti-Progres, maintained the resistance in Haiti and were linked to international
opposition organizations like the Federation des Etudiants Haitiens d’Europe (Federation of
Haitian Students of Europe, or FEHE). In 1968, two of the leading Communist parties, Le Parti
Populaire de Liberation Naitonal (PPLN) and Le Parti de l’Entente Populaire (PEP), merged to
create Le Parti Unifie des Commnistes Haitiens (the Unified Party of Haitian Communists, or
PUCH).116 At the same time, young Haitians connected to the radical student organizations
linking Haiti, Europe, Montreal, and New York were recruited to return to Haiti to join a guerilla
campaign aimed at ousting Duvalier. In the spring of 1969, working under the banner of the
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newly united Haitian Communist Party, the revolutionaries launched their insurrection, an effort
that had some minor victories but that ultimately was crushed by Duvalier.117
Although the guerilla campaign in the spring of 1969 gave Duvalier another chance to
eliminate his opponents, much more important to the Haitian leader was the opportunity it
represented for Haiti to seek strengthened ties to the United States. The US State Department’s
Director of Intelligence and Research noted in May 1969 that “PUCH lacks sufficient resources
to do more than organize sporadic acts of violence” and that “the Communists in Haiti are few in
number and constitute no real threat to the [Duvalier] regime.”118 However, Duvalier treated his
counterinsurgency campaign as a response to a major threat. This was, according to the State
Department official, Duvalier’s attempt “to project an image of his country as ‘the most solid
bastion against Communism in the Caribbean’,” the purpose of which was to secure the
resumption of direct aid from the United States. The Director of Intelligence and Research
further noted,
As arrests were being made, the Haitian Government launched a propaganda effort to
promote its new anti-communist image and press for a resumption of US aid. Editorials
in the Duvalier-controlled press expressed cautious hope that there would be an
improvement in relations and Duvalier himself made mention in official pronouncements
of the desirability of renewed economic assistance . . . In a conversation with our
ambassador, Duvalier noted the danger of the "cancer of communism," and emphasized
the international connections of Haitian communists . . . The Haitian press also hailed the
discovery and capture by Florida police of a group of Haitian exiles in a training camp
deep in the everglades as a victory over "communists agitators and agents."119
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The State Department report concluded, “A crackdown on communists to coincide with the
advent of a new administration in Washington probably seemed to him to offer reasonably good
prospects. At the same time there is no indication that the ‘President for Life’ is any more
prepared now than previously to change the brutal and corrupt practices of his regime.”120
Despite the State Department’s acknowledgment of the ongoing brutality and corruption
of the Duvalier regime, the Nixon administration was, as the Haitian president had hoped it
would be, willing to strengthen its ties to Haiti. Soon after Duvalier executed his anti-communist
campaign, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger informed the National Security Council that
President Nixon wanted “the United States [to] encourage multilateral assistance for economic
development in Haiti . . . [to] continue to provide humanitarian assistance to the Haitian people
primarily though multilateral and private channels” but also to provide “an additional $100,000
of AID funds” directly to the Haitian government, part of the eventual restoration of full aid to
Haiti that Nixon would oversee.121 In May 1969 American officials also terminated their support
for the Haitian Coalition and the organization’s anti-Duvalier radio broadcast. Although
transmission of the Haitian Coalition’s Radio Vonvon had been suspended in 1968, one year later
the US ambassador to Haiti determined that “the resumption of the currently suspended
broadcasts could interfere with the Embassy's cautious steps toward attaining a worthwhile
dialogue with Duvalier.” Believing that “the ending of the broadcasts would in all likelihood
also mean the end of the Coalition,” a body that now seemed of little use to the U.S. government
since “in case of a power struggle in Haiti . . . the Coalition’s ability to affect events in Haiti
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would be marginal at best,” the US government decided that it was time to end assistance to the
Haitian exiles.122

The Nixon administration also sent New York State Governor Nelson

Rockefeller to Haiti to meet personally with Francois Duvalier, and licensed the export and sale
of arms, six 65-foot patrol boats, and an F-51 fighter to Haiti, other symbols of strengthening
US-Haitian ties.123
The failed insurrection and subsequent crackdown in 1969 produced more than just a
change in diplomatic relations. The renewed repression also produced a new wave of refugees to
New York. In August 1969 Duvalier forced nine priests, faculty members at a Catholic school
and advocates of liberation theology, to leave the country. The Haitian Fathers, as they came to
be known in New York, included Antoine Adrien, Paul and Yves DeJean, and William Smarth.
After a period in Africa and Europe, the priests joined the Haitian community of New York,
where they moved into a house in the middle of the Haitian community of Brooklyn. Like the
foundation of Troupe Kouidor and L’Ayisyen, the arrival of the Haitian Fathers made 1969 a
watershed moment in the history of the New York Haitian community. While earlier efforts to
establish a Catholic mission ministering to the Haitian community in New York had foundered
on class, color, and political divisions, when Adrien, Smarth, and the other Brooklyn-based
priests came to New York, they began building a lasting movement that Georges Fouron calls
“the Haitian Catholic Church in exile.” The choice to live in the community rather than to
separate themselves, as most other religious leaders did, placed them close to the social and
political currents on the ground. Another significant factor in the priests’ influence was “the fact
that they were themselves political exiles [which] gave them credentials in the Haitian diaspora.”
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From 1969 onward, the presence of the Haitian Fathers represented an important element driving
the changing political orientation of Haitian New York.124
By the late 1960s the increasing proportion of working-class Haitians, the growing
strength of progressive and radical voices in the New York community, and the cutoff of CIA
and State Department support for the Haitian Coalition contributed to the declining authority of
traditional Haitian politicians in the New York community. Evidence of this shift among
activists and the declining influence of earlier political exiles came in 1970 when The Haitian
Coalition disbanded and some of its members joined with a number of the new groups that were
part of the growing progressive-Left in order to launch La Resistance Haitienne (the Haitian
Resistance).125

Political Conflict and Community Change, 1971-1973
In the first months of 1971, it was rumored that Francois Duvalier was near death and
that he was preparing to put forth his nineteen-year-old son, Jean-Claude, as his successor. In
January the new coalition group La Resistance Haitienne held what Carolle Charles calls “the
first large anti-Duvalier demonstration in front of the United Nations in New York,” the purpose
of which was to try to block Duvalier from installing his son as leader of the regime. This
protest, Charles argues, “marked the beginning of the hegemony of the anti-Duvalier Left in the
community.”126 It also showcased Haitian exiles’ anticipation of Papa Doc’s death as an
opportunity to press for political change as well as their recognition that the international
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community, the United States in particular, could be instrumental in blocking the continuation of
the Duvalier dictatorship.
After Duvalier’s death the following April, Haitians in New York were not only excited
and hopeful but also worried that the United States was preparing to support the presidency of
Jean-Claude Duvalier. “We are scared that the state department will help the son,” said Fitz
Delince.127 To some it was already clear what Washington’s position would be. Lionel Legros
interprets Nelson Rockefeller’s 1969 visit with Francois Duvalier as a clear signal that the United
States intended to support the Duvalier family’s continuing in power. Legros also remembers
that at the time of Duvalier’s funeral, the American ambassador to Haiti, Clinton Knox, was
wearing a button bearing an image of a seated Jean-Claude with his father standing behind him,
hand on his son’s shoulder. To Legros this “was a statement that the U.S. government was
supporting the transition.”128 When Jean-Claude Duvalier became the second Duvalier to take
the position of president for life, the Haitian Resistance called a press conference in New York at
which they reasserted their demand that the United States withdraw its support for the younger
Duvalier and “cease all interference in Haitian affairs.”129
Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier’s coming to power did not precipitate a change in USHaiti relations, as many in New York had hoped it would, at least not in terms of American
withdrawal of support. In fact, under Baby Doc’s leadership, political and economic ties
between Haiti and the United States grew much stronger. US Ambassador to Haiti Clinton Knox
was one of the key supporters of continuing US support for the Duvalier regime; even before
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Francois Duvalier’s death, Knox called for an “alternative policy embodying closer cooperation
[between the United States and Haiti].” Once Jean-Claude Duvalier took power, Knox identified
“a general trend toward liberalization” that warranted increased US support.130 With the
increased US assistance that Knox helped deliver, Jean-Claude Duvalier oversaw a significant
growth in Haiti’s manufacturing sector and reoriented the country’s agricultural production,
structural changes that ultimately had a major influence on migration to the United States.
Throughout the 1970s, manufacturing in Haiti grew by an average of 7 percent per year,
more than ten times the growth rate of the previous decade. By 1978 manufactured products had
surpassed coffee as Haiti’s top export, and by the early 1980s manufacturing accounted for more
than 50 percent of the value of all exported items.131 Rather than engaging in traditional
industrial production, however, like that of the auto or steel industry in the United States, Haiti’s
manufacturing sector took the form of the off-shore assembly industry. According to this
formula, Haiti received pre-made goods, assembled them, and exported them to their final
destination, often sending them back to their country of origin. American companies like
Rawlings Sporting Goods, for example, reaped big profits by sending baseball parts to Haiti,
cheaply shipped across international borders thanks to tariff concessions, to be hand-stitched
together by factory workers in Port-au-Prince, costing a small fraction of what it would have cost
to buy American labor. Electronic equipment was another common product assembled in Haiti’s
factories. Almost two-thirds of electronics assembled in Haiti saved their companies 20 to 40
percent and a fifth saved 40 to 60 percent over what it would have cost to produce the same
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products in the United States. In addition, the Haitian government promised that the profits of
international investors would be tax exempt. Cheap labor along with tariff and tax concessions
made Haiti an extremely profitable location for American manufacturers.132
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was the American
institution that had the greatest role in shaping Haiti’s restructured economy. In addition to the
development of the assembly industry, USAID promoted export-oriented agriculture for Haiti. It
did this by applying pressure on Haitian farmers to abandon production for local and domestic
consumption and to specialize in a few specific crops for export. USAID also increased the flow
of aid to Haiti for the development of agro-processing and other development projects that would
enable the growth of commercial agriculture for export. The United States and international
institutions like the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank justified this exportoriented development model for Haiti by reasoning that if Haiti were to continue producing
agricultural products and manufactured goods primarily for domestic consumption, it would
never escape poverty since the country was much too poor to absorb the expanded production
that was required for economic growth to take place. The solution, therefore, was to plug Haiti
into the global economy where it could sell its cheap labor and key agricultural commodities to
those who could afford to buy them. While this economic model never delivered the sort of
economic development its advocates promised for Haiti, it did for a time produce tremendous
profits for international investors and elements of the Haitian elite. What’s more, Haiti’s new
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economy also produced a massive surge in Haitian migration to the United States, an outcome
US policymakers were less prepared for.133
Lured by the economic opportunities represented by the low-wage assembly industry and
by Jean-Claude Duvalier’s pledge to initiate a process of political liberalization, a segment of the
wealthiest New York Haitians, perhaps including a substantial number of the light-skinned
bourgeoisie, chose to return to Haiti in the early 1970s. Believing that the darkest days of
Duvalierism were over, these “technocrats, engineers, managers, bankers, and technicians” saw
the arrival of Baby Doc as a chance to regain their lost status.134 The new Haitian president
publicly welcomed the return of those in exile, proclaiming his desire to “extend the olive
branch” to Haitians living abroad. However, in his first address to the Haitian National
Assembly, Duvalier warned that he would “admit no supporter of international communism or
any troublemaker” and pledged to “continue the struggle of my father against communist
subversion.”135
At the same time that some of the middle- and upper-class Haitians were returning to
their home country, the economic transformation of Haiti and persistent political repression
under Jean-Claude Duvalier increased the number of working-class and poor Haitians leaving for
the United States, a development that will receive more attention in the next chapter. As a result,
at a moment when the traditional Haitian politicians were losing their status in the Haitian
community in New York, the proportion of upper- and middle-class Haitians in New York was
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also declining, factors that accelerated the cultural and political transformation already underway
in the community.
Central to this cultural and political transformation in the 1970s was the proliferation of
leftist-revolutionary organizations in the Haitian community. As mentioned earlier, the
replacement of the Magloire-led Haitian Coalition with La Resistance Haitienne and the group’s
debut in front of the United Nations in January of 1971 marked a turn to the Left in the politics
of the Haitian community. So did the sheer number of leftist organizations that were active in
New York in the 1970s, organizations of which there were dozens by the end of the decade.
Some of these were organizations that had been active in Haiti, such as the United Party of
Haitian Communists (PUCH) and the Party of Haitian Workers (PTA), organizations that
remained active in New York even after they were virtually wiped out during Duvalier’s
crackdown of 1969. In addition to their connections to the underground movement in Haiti,
many of these organizations maintained connections to, and membership in, organizations in
Europe, Montreal, and Latin America as well as in New York City.136
Situated as they were in the milieu of the international student-Left of the late 1960s and
early 1970s, many of the radical Haitian organizations operating in New York City adopted a
vision and rhetoric similar to that being employed by the Black Power and third world liberation
movements of the period. An April 1971 article entitled “Armed Struggle Remains the Only
Solution” by Voie Democratique, an organization closely linked to PUCH and the PTA, typified
much of the writing produced by the leftist-revolutionary groups of the period. Like its earlier,
more conservative predecessors, such as the Magloire-led Haitian Coalition, Voie Democratique
espoused armed insurrection to topple Duvalier. However, unlike the earlier exiles, Voie
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Democratique hoped its revolution would make way for a socialist state. Crediting Fidel Castro
and the Cuban revolution with triggering a rising tide of revolution in the Americas, the piece
argued Haitians must draw upon the revolutionary lessons of Vietnam, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina,
Venezuela, Cuba, and China and apply these “objectives, tactics, and strategies” to the “specific
features of the Haitian reality.”137
This sort of embrace of third world revolutions pervaded the Haitian political culture of
the 1970s, forcing Francois Benoit, a former Haitian Army lieutenant and leader of the Haitian
Resistance to take a careful position on the political location of his coalition (which included
both traditional opponents of Duvalier as well as some young radicals). “We are part of the third
world but we are nationalists first. The Haitian solution must come from Haiti,” argued Benoit, a
somewhat perplexing statement from the leader of an organization seeking to build a rebellion
from outside the country.138 Others members of the old guard were more dismissive of the
growing embrace of third world revolutions. “We have nothing in common with such a group,
other than that we are both anti-Duvalier. I’m interested in a Haitian solution, not a Cuban
solution, a Chinese solution, or a Muscovite solution. And these guys, the way I read them,
that’s what they want,” said one of the leaders of the Haitian Coalition.139
The origins of another organization, the Mouvement Haitien d’Action Patriotique
(MHAP), also illustrate how the burgeoning Left in New York was inspired by its connections to
international liberation movements and, at the same time, was a reaction against the type of
Haitian politics that had been dominant in New York in the earlier period. Growing out of the
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same networks that had produced Troupe Kouidor and L’Ayisyen as well as an organization
called En Avant, MHAP aimed to reshape and radicalize the political scene in the city.140
Inspiring MHAP’s creation was “a new wave of students coming from Europe [who were]
influenced by the Chinese revolution and [the global rebellions of] ’68,” Lionel Legros recalls.
Members of MHAP “decided that they were going to do some political work, openly,” aiming to
“isolate the whole kind of leadership that did the meetings

. . . and plan[ned] their invasion[s]”

secretly. The young activists opposed the “big, ex-general or ex-deputy . . . [like Paul] Magloire,
that whole guard of kind of politicians . . . [Daniel] Fignole, [Clement] Jumelle, and so forth . . .
these people [that] had the gatherings that would invite a small group of people, clandestine[ly].”
Rejecting what they saw as the tactics of the conservative old guard, activists from MHAP “said
we’re going to do work openly. And we isolated [the old leadership] through that.”141
The articles and images in MHAP’s newsletter, Le Patriote Haitien, illustrate the strong
influence of the Black Power and third world liberation movements on this New York-based
Haitian organization. In late January 1972, Le Patriote Haitien featured a piece on Angela Davis
entitled “Portrait of a Revolutionary,” which closed with the exclamations, “Death to American
imperialism! The revolution will triumph!” The next month an article entitled “Les Noirs
Americains, Un Peuple Frere” urged “patriotic Haitians” to “unite with black Americans to
defeat American imperialists and their lackeys in the world.” In addition to using similar diction,
MHAP used the same imagery as many other radical student and Black Power publications of
the time. Guns were omnipresent in the pages of Le Patriote Haitien. An April 1972 issue of Le
Patriote Haitien featured a full-page picture of a young black woman, head wrapped, with an
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infant on her left arm and an M-16 on her right. MHAP also displayed its internationalism
through its connection to the Organisation Revolutionnaire 18 Mai (OR Mai 18), a Europeanbased Marxist-Maoist organization.142
The international currents stimulating radical political activity among New York Haitians
also inspired the creation of feminist organizations within the New York community. In the
early 1970s the Union of Patriotic Haitian Women (UFAP) began organizing women to support
the struggle to liberate Haiti from the Duvalier dictatorship. Created by political exiles and
activists formerly with the Haitian communist party, UFAP maintained close connections with
the Montreal-based Rally of Haitian Women (RAFA), itself an outgrowth of Union des Femmes
Haitiennes, an underground women’s organization in Haiti. UFAP, like other radical feminist
organizations of the period, “rejected all ‘liberal’ forms of feminism, which were, it claimed,
based on a denial of class exploitation. For UFAP, only revolution would end women's
oppression,” Carolle Charles explains. “A women's movement had to work first for the liberation
of Haiti as a basis for women's liberation.”143
With the rapid growth of the Left came much division and a period of intense political
conflict between warring leftist groups as well as between radicals and more conservative voices
in the community. Each organization or political tendency had its organ from which it launched
lengthy polemics attacking conservatives in the Haitian community as well as its enemies on the
Left. Michel Laguerre offers a critical assessment of the Haitian Left in the 1970s:
The Marxist-Leninist and Marxist-Maoist groups have very few members, most of them
no more than four or five. The leftist intellectuals who form them have a great capacity
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for political literary production. Their newspapers and other occasional publications
show more familiarity with standard Marxist thought than with Haitian empirical reality
. . . [They are] filled with revolutionary slogans and political rhetoric but with little
systematic analysis of the current Haitian situation.144
Laguerre underestimates the participation in and significance of these organizations, and a broad
reading of the different newsletters reveals a more systematic analysis of the situation in Haiti
than Laguerre recognizes. Still, he is right to observe the overwhelming dogmatism of the
writings, many of which devoted substantial space to sectarian squabbles, a phenomenon that
could be found throughout the international Left in the 1960s and 1970s, splintered as it was
among the Moscow-, China-, and Cuba-oriented Communists as well as other organizations with
a whole range of ideological differences.145
So many organizations were formed and disbanded during this contentious period that it
is difficult to know how many separate organizations with their own membership existed,
particularly because there seems to have been a significant amount of overlap among the
membership of different organizations. It is possible, however, to trace the political splits that
had lasting significance for the politics of the Haitian community. Two offshoots in particular
are noteworthy. After La Resistance Haitien replaced the Haitian Coalition, conflict arose
between the radicals in the group and the anti-communists remaining from the previous coalition.
In 1971, unwilling to work with communists, Raymond Joseph, who had been a leader in the
Haitian Coalition, left the Haitian Resistance and founded the Haitian community’s first weekly
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newspaper, Haiti Observateur.146 In contrast, some on the Left refused to work with La
Resistance Haitien because it included former Duvalierists and individuals (like Joseph) who had
collaborated with the CIA and the State Department. Benjamin Dupuy, a leading figure in the
Mouvement Haitien Liberation (MHL), was one who condemned such collaboration:
There are progressive groups within the Resistance but they consider it ‘practical’ to
cooperate with certain people who participate in the reign of terror. They say these
people are necessary to convince the American State Department that we are not
revolutionary leftists. But why should we collaborate with such people? No program can
be genuine if it depends on the approval of the State Department.147
As time went by, Dupuy maintained his work with the MHL and its partner organization, the
Association of Haitian Workers, and in 1983 founded Haiti Progres, a left-wing alternative to
the anti-communist Haiti Observateur.148
In 1973 a political event in Haiti electrified the New York Haitian community and gave
further impetus to the growth of the leftist-revolutionary organizations rapidly spreading at that
time. On January 23, three people, later reported to be members of the Mouvement AntiDuvalieriste, kidnapped the US Ambassador to Haiti, Clinton Knox, a supporter of Duvalier and
advocate of close US-Haiti relations, and the US Consul Ward Christensen. In return for the
release of the hostages, the kidnappers demanded freedom for thirty-one known political
prisoners and a $500,000 ransom payment. After twenty hours of negotiations, Knox and
Christensen were released in exchange for $70,000, the release of twelve political prisoners (the
Haitian government claimed the other nineteen originally identified were not in the prison), and
safe passage to Mexico City where the Mexican government granted political asylum to the three
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kidnappers and twelve prisoners.149 One Haitian exile organization in New York issued a
statement that celebrated the release of political prisoners “that have been under constant threat
to be eliminated in case of any disorder in the country. But disorder there will be,” as the Knox
kidnapping demonstrated. “The actual, archaic, farcical government led by Clinton Knox and
the State Department, must go,” the statement proclaimed.150 En Avant devoted three pages to
the Knox kidnapping, arguing that “it should be analyzed in its various aspects in order to draw
lessons for the struggle.”151 The Voice of Haiti, a newsletter published by the Friends of Haiti
and affiliated with Benjamin Dupuy’s Haitian Liberation Movement (MHL), called the
kidnapping a “heroic political action” and claimed that it proved “that, in spite of the present
regime’s being sustained in power by the US State Department, the Haitian people will be able to
liberate themselves no matter what the price, following the example of the heroic people of
Vietnam.”152
In response to the energy and debate stimulated by the kidnapping, the Haitian Fathers,
the exiled priests who had arrived in New York in 1969, joined with the young radicals grouped
around L’Ayisyen and Mouvement Haitien d’Action Patriotique (MHAP), the Union of Patriotic
Haitian Women (UFAP), En Avant, and the Rassemblement des Forces Progressistes Haitiennes,
to create the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Haitian People (Komite K’ap Defann
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Doua pep Ayisyen), or KODDPA.153 Among the many different leftist coalitions organized in
this period, KODDPA was among the most significant, particularly for the role it would play in
mobilizing the community around the issue of defending the Haitian refugees.
Despite the growing strength of the Haitian Left and the overwhelming anti-Duvalier
orientation of Haitians in New York, there were those who opposed the widespread anti-Duvalier
activity in the community. One such organization, the Committee for Unity, insisted on the need
to overcome division, both among Haitians in New York and between Haitians abroad and those
still in Haiti. Opposed to the anti-Duvalierist opposition, these advocates of “unity” stressed that
“it is necessary to maintain a dialogue with Haiti,” calling the activity of the opposition in exile
“fruitless exercises of Haitian politicians who are influenced by foreign interests.” In addition,
they stressed, “We don’t want to engage in any activity which prevents us from traveling in
Haiti.”154
Louis Brun, president of the Haitian Unity Council, was an appropriate representative of
this tendency in Haitian New York. Brun had been a leading voice in the drive to increase the
Haitian presence in American politics, serving in 1972 as part of the New York State delegation
to the National Black Political Convention and in the same year running for state assemblyman
for the 53rd District.155 Like Brun, many of members of the Haitian Unity Council were
interested in breaking into American politics, wanting “to establish a power base for Haitians . . .
to claim their rights as American citizens.” With these political goals, it was necessary to
differentiate themselves from Haitians on the Left. While publications like Le Patriote Haitien
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decried American imperialism, Unite, the publication of the Committee for Unity, issued a
Fourth of July declaration that proclaimed, “Long live America!”156 To further accentuate the
difference between their program and that of others in the community, the president of the
Committee for Unity explained in a public address, “I am not talking about returning to Haiti or
of overthrowing Duvalier . . . We are interested in integrating into American society and in
aligning culturally and politically with Black Americans.”157
Although groups like the Haitian Unity Council couched their criticism of the antiDuvalier opposition in arguments stressing the need for unity, many in the Haitian community of
New York saw them simply as Duvalier supporters or macoutes (shorthand for Duvalier’s
Tonton Macoutes). It was rumored that the Haitian government financed the organization and
funded its activities, and the frequent attacks on anti-Duvalier groups published in the pages of
Unite seemed to confirm this connection. Amid the newspaper’s frequent calls for reconciliation
and cooperation, there occasionally appeared even more open statements of support for the
dictator. In February 1976 the Haitian Unity Council summarized the address Jean-Claude
Duvalier had made to the people of Haiti the previous month, commenting that “Unite wishes
that all the programs envisaged by the President be fully implemented for a betterment of the
general welfare of the people of Haiti.”158 In September 1977 Unite promoted the idea that
Duvalier was implementing the political liberalization he had promised with the huge front-page
headline, “104 Political Prisoners Freed in Haiti.”159 And the following December, next to a
Christmas editorial that reminded the exile community of Christ’s instructions to “love one
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another” and “forgive those who have offended you,” Unite featured a large picture of a smiling,
medal-clad Jean-Claude beneath the caption, “President Jean-Claude Duvalier Winner of Special
Latin American Human Rights Award.”160
Despite the existence of groups like the Haitian Unity Council, a diverse and increasingly
radical anti-Duvalier opposition exerted the greatest influence on Haitian politics in New York.
And though these groups were divided politically and ideologically, there was enough cohesion
that by the early 1970s, it is possible to identify what one scholar has called “a general
opposition movement in exile.”161 Because of their international orientation and their
connections to the anti-Duvalier resistance in Haiti, and through new coalition organizations like
KODDPA that replaced the political organizations of the old guard of the exile community,
young radicals like the members of MHAP and En Avant, along with progressive activists like
the Haitian Fathers, reshaped Haitian politics in the New York community.
Between 1957 and 1973 the political orientation of Haitian activists in New York evolved
significantly. Through their anti-Duvalier activity, the first politicians and political activists
forced into exile in the late 1950s and the 1960s rooted the Haitian community of New York
firmly in Haiti-focused political activism. Later generations of activists would maintain this
orientation. However, while the earliest politicians and activists determined the centrality of
Haiti-focused political action, it was the subsequent arrival of young people with connections to
the anti-Duvalier resistance in Haiti and other international cultural and political movements as
well as the forced exile of other anti-Duvalier activists, more progressive in their orientation than
the first exiles, that changed the dynamic of the anti-Duvalier exile movement and laid the
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groundwork for the trans-regional and transnational movement that would develop in the 1970s
and 1980s.

67
Chapter 2
The Refugee Crisis and the Formation of Haitian Miami, 1973-1980
On December 13, 1972, Yvon Bruno, a barge operator from Port-au-Prince, and sixtythree other Haitians landed their fifty-six-foot sailboat on the shores of Pompano Beach, Florida.
Three weeks earlier Bruno had been sitting in a jail cell in Port-au-Prince. Three of the other
prisoners sharing the cell with Bruno had recently been removed and had not returned, an
ominous sign for those who remained. After the disappearance of the three prisoners, “we
decided it was time to leave,” said Bruno, whose father, also in the cell, then bribed the guard to
secure their freedom. Deciding it would be too dangerous to remain in the country, they
gathered their family and friends, a group including forty-two men, twenty women, and three
children, and launched out for what would be a three-week journey that took them to Cuba, the
Bahamas, and finally the United States. In the week it took the group to sail from Cuba to the
Bahamian island of Bimini, they had to bail water around the clock and operate a hand pump just
to keep their leaking vessel afloat. When they finally made it to Florida, the New York Times
reported, the Haitians were “greeted by local residents who set up a beachfront kitchen to feed
them. Later they were interviewed by immigration officials who took them to the Cuban
Refugee Center in Miami until higher officials decided what their final reception would be.”
They were ultimately denied asylum.162
The Haitian refugees’ appearance on the Florida shore in mid-December 1972 was an
unusual occurrence. Though not the first refugees to travel by boat from Haiti to the United
States (an earlier group had made the trip in 1963), the phenomenon was at that time all but
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unknown, which explains the cheerful welcome the Haitians’ received from Florida residents as
well as the initially uncertain response of Florida immigration officials.163 However, the arrival
on Florida shores of boats full of Haitian refugees soon became a common sight; the beginning
of the exodus of Haitian “boat people” to the United States began a new chapter in the history of
Haiti and the United States.
A steady stream of Haitians attempting to reach the United States by boat followed the
December 1972 landing. One hundred and seventeen Haitians came to the United States by boat
between December 1972 and April 1973. By 1976, 2,000 to 3,000 had made the trip.164 And in
1977 the steady stream of Haitians widened into a great river. From November 1977 through
July 1978, more than 1,000 Haitians in fifty boats landed in South Florida. Hundreds more
arrived each month the following year, with 637 arriving in October 1979. In 1980 the flow
became a full scale flood of refugees with a then record 1,366 coming in March 1980, and 326
Haitians in four boats arriving in a single day the following month.165 By the time the deluge of
refugees slowed in late 1981, the number of Haitians who had fled to South Florida had reached
anywhere from 30,000 to 40,000 and might have reached as high as 80,000 by 1982 if some
estimates are correct.166
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Several factors contributed to this new exodus of Haitian refugees. One was the effect of
the economic restructuring of Haiti initiated by Jean-Claude Duvalier and his partners in the
international community, as has already been discussed. The Haitian government, working with
institutions like the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), transformed
Haiti’s economy in the 1970s and 1980s. According to USAID officials, “the majority of AID
activities in Haiti are designed to improve the well-being of the rural poor,” but in its attempt to
reach that goal, when the agency began its activities in the country in 1973, it confronted a host
of difficult problems: “limited availability of financial, human, and natural resources in the
country,” a situation “further aggravated by an extremely poor and deteriorating agricultural
base, high rates of unemployment, increasing population pressure, a high incidence of basic
health problems and weak institutions.” Therefore, USAID officials argued, addressing the
problems of deforestation, soil erosion, and inefficiency in agricultural production required land
reform and restructuring of the rural economy. And the unemployment and economic crisis in
Haiti could best be addressed by “providing sound foundations for sustained growth in the
private sector” and “gainful employment” through “investment in the export-oriented assembly
manufacturing sector while concurrently promoting the development of capital markets and other
support institutions for continued business and industrial expansion.”167 In other words, the best
way forward for Haiti was an export-oriented economy driven by the assembly industry in
Haitian cities and commercial agriculture in the countryside.
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Critics of the economic plan pointed out that promoting export-oriented commercial
agriculture concentrated land holdings into fewer and fewer hands, discouraging production for
local markets and encouraging importation of food from international producers. This process
threatened the means by which Haitian peasants eked out a meager living. At the same time, the
provision of “surplus food aid” to Haiti from the United States, accounting for one half of US
assistance to Haiti from 1973 to 1981, drove down food prices.168 The displacement of huge
portions of the peasantry created waves of migrants from Haiti’s mountains and plains to its
cities where they hoped to obtain work in the assembly industry, the supposed new economic
engine for the Haitian economy.169
However, after Haitian peasants made the trip to the city, they discovered that there were
not enough jobs to go around, especially as they were joining an already sizable population of
urban poor people. In the 1970s and 1980s urban unemployment always far exceeded job
creation by the new assembly industry. In 1982 after a decade of growth for the manufacturing
sector, unemployment in the Haitian capital and chief industrial city of Port-au-Prince still stood
at 38 percent with more than half of the city’s residents unemployed or underemployed.170
Even those who managed to beat out the competition and obtain factory work struggled
for survival. Contrary to international agencies’ promises to those employed in the assembly
industry, factory workers remained mired in poverty. In the late 1970s assembly workers
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labored for as a little as $1.60 a day, less than one-tenth of what employers paid American
workers. Confronting charges that “we are trying to keep wage rates in Haiti as low as possible
for American companies,” Gerald Zarr, Director of USAID in Haiti insisted, “This is not true.
The issue for most Haitians is not a high-paying job versus a low-paying job. Rather, it is a job
versus no job.” Zarr claimed, “As the economy progresses, wages will increase.”171 And World
Bank officials pointed out that the $3.00 a day that a factory worker might have made in the
early to the mid-1980s amounted to an income that was more than twice that of rural Haitians.
However, many workers were not employed for full weeks and went through regular lay-offs.
Workers were often hired on a probationary basis or as trainees and then dismissed just before
this temporary status expired. Furthermore, with the much higher cost of living in the cities, this
income was actually less than what rural people made. As inflation climbed in the early 1980s,
years when the Haitian government had frozen the minimum wage for manufacturing workers,
the real value of wages continued to collapse. As Josh DeWind and David Kinley show, by 1984
the real value of the minimum wage in Haiti was 21 percent lower than the minimum wage had
been in 1971.172
Whether employed or unemployed, rural migrants or urban natives, few Haitians
experienced the rising standard of living that was supposed to accompany the country’s new
economic orientation. Two-thirds of urban dwellers were crowded into slums, often without
basic services such as sewage disposal, water and electricity. To survive, the urban poor,
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especially those unable to get a factory job, had to rely on two alternative sources of support.
One of these sources was income from the informal sector, which included a wide range of work
activities including street work such as selling food, art and other products, cleaning,
construction and repair work in private homes, or running an informal business such as a
restaurant or a beauty parlor out of one’s own home. By the mid-1980s roughly 60 percent of
the urban population relied on the informal sector for survival. The other alternative source of
support was the money flowing from Haitian family members and friends living abroad. The
importance of these remittances grew throughout the 1970s and 1980s, expanding along with the
Haitian diaspora. From $15 million in 1970, remittances to Haiti grew to $52 million in 1980.
But even with the critical support provided by the informal sector and remittances from abroad,
the World Bank observed that in 1983 60 percent of Haitian city dwellers remained in “absolute
poverty.”173
Deteriorating conditions both in the countryside and in Haitian cities, and the disruption
caused by the implementation of the export-oriented economy drove the wave of refugees to US
shores in the 1970s and early 1980s. Perceived opportunities in America also pulled Haitians to
South Florida. Those who had been on the receiving end of remittances from the United States
calculated that they too might be able to get a job in America and then send back money to
support their families and communities. A social worker in a northwestern province of Haiti
explained the attraction of the United States. “Say you are a young man and you want to get
ahead, but you have no hope . . . You have heard about this wonderful place called Miami where
you get paid a phenomenal sum of $80 a week. Jesus! Eighty dollars a week?” But opportunity
to earn was not the only reason to emigrate. “We know people who have gone,” explained a
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young Haitian man. “They write and tell us life is easier there.” Besides, “It’s very hard to find
work here . . . You get up Monday morning and look at the sea, that’s all.”174
Fear of political persecution, an everyday threat for many Haitians, intertwined with
Haitians’ economic motivations to drive refugees to Florida’s shores. The interlocking nature of
economic hardship and political persecution is illustrated through the experience of three
refugees. Joseph Petit came to Miami in 1980. Five years earlier he had been standing on a
street corner, complaining about life in Haiti, when he was overheard by a member of the
Tontons Macoutes. The man returned with a group of thugs to deliver a severe beating to Petit,
leaving him toothless and with a deep scar on his cheek. Petit decided to flee to the Bahamas
and in 1980 to Miami. Andre Pierre was reading in a public park when he was arrested by
Haitian police for “studying politics.” Marie Marthe Sannon was reported to Haitian authorities
by a neighbor with whom she had had a routine argument. Sannon’s whole family was arrested.
As common as the threat of hunger or unemployment was the everyday danger of political
violence. As Joseph Petit reflected, Haitians are hungry, but “if you say you are hungry, they
beat you. If you talk wrong about the government, they beat you.” Whether pursued by
government agents or by hunger, Haitian refugees like Petit were certain that “we die if they
send us back to Haiti.”175
This apparently arbitrary political violence was backed up by the repressive capacity of
formal state institutions like the Haitian army and the Leopards, Baby Doc’s personal security
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force that was a revamped version of his father’s tontons macoutes. Throughout the 1970s
Duvalier was able to beef up security forces through military aid delivered by the US
government as well as collaboration with private US companies specializing in the arms trade.
In 1971 and 1972, for example, Luckner Cambronne, defense minister under Duvalier, brokered
a deal with Aerotrade, a Miami-based company, for $200,000 in arms and the services of
contractors, former U.S. Marines, to train military and security forces in Haiti.176
In addition to flight from political violence, some of the Haitians that arrived in Florida in
the 1970s did so because they were expelled from other locations outside of Haiti. In June 1978,
for example, in an attempt to address the 23 percent native unemployment rate in their country,
Bahamian authorities threatened to deport Haitians living in the Bahamas. Facing imprisonment
and forced return to Haiti, thousands of Haitians boarded boats for South Florida and joined the
masses of people sailing to the United States from Haiti in the late 1970s.177
Pushed by poverty and violence in Haiti and pulled by the hope of work and safety in the
United States, tens of thousands took to the sea in the 1970s. Some may have underestimated the
danger of the voyage while others surely knew the risks of the treacherous sea journey. Yvon
Bruno and the sixty-three others who arrived in December 1972 barely escaped death. Many
others were not so lucky. In 1978 twenty-three men, women, and children drowned off the coast
of Freeport, Bahamas. The following January 19, more people drowned between the Bahamas
and the United States. On a Sunday afternoon in 1980, the sea deposited the dead bodies of two
people, a man and a woman, on a Florida beach. The Haitian woman wore a yellow skirt and a
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matching vest. In her pocket was the evidence of what had inspired her to make the deadly trip:
a letter written in Creole saying, “Darling, don’t cry anymore. Be patient. You have come to
Miami. It’s good. It’s beautiful.”178
To avoid the peril of an overcrowded sailboat, Haitians without visas (and therefore
unable to travel by airplane to the United States) sometimes employed the services of smugglers
to transport them to Florida. Although it cost anywhere from $500 to $2000 per person to be
part of such clandestine trips, in some cases it was a more reliable way to get to America. From
1972 onward, the refugee-smuggling business boomed in Haiti, centered especially in the
northern coastal city of Port-de-Paix. Some of those able to pay were packed into hidden
compartments aboard motorized boats. Others were taken aboard US-bound freighters like the
Panamanian Tango Express on which eight Haitians were discovered packed into the ship’s
crawl spaces and bathrooms.179
But paying a smuggler was no guarantee of a safe voyage to America. Individuals unable
to pay hundreds or even thousands of dollars for an individual spot on a motorized boat or freight
ship sometimes opted to join a more affordable, but overcrowded and less safe vessel. To avoid
run-ins with police or immigration officials in the United States, smugglers sometimes
abandoned their contraband before reaching American shores. In 1979 Betty Wiggs,
spokesperson for the Haitian Refugee Center in Miami, reported that “we have many cases of
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people being dropped off on somebody’s island and being told they were in Miami when they
were nowhere near Miami.”180
The story of the Lorfils family demonstrates that traveling with smugglers could be just
as deadly as making the trip independently. At dawn on August 13, 1979, police on shore
spotted a boat off the Florida coast. Realizing that they faced discovery by the police, the
smugglers tried to dump their human cargo and escape, firing shotguns into the air to scare the
refugees into the water. When some would still not leave the boat, the smugglers threw the
refugees’ children overboard, forcing terrified parents to go in after their children. A young
mother named Eliane Lorfils begged the smugglers to allow her and her five children to stay on
the boat, but the family was forced off at gunpoint. Police officers on shore who heard the
screams quickly made their way out to the refugees in a raft, but Eliane Lorfils and her five
children, aged four to eleven, had already drowned. Word of the murdered refugees quickly
spread throughout the Haitian community in Miami. Although Dieumerci Lorfils normally
might have heard such news from the two other Haitians he worked with in his job as a
groundskeeper at a golf course, this time he read the news after he got home from work,
discovering that the six dead were his wife Eliane and his five children, Demaby, Yvonne,
Kewvis, Anoinette, and his youngest, four-year-old Michelle.181
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For Haitians who made it safely to South Florida in the 1970s and early 1980s, it might
have seemed the worst was behind them. It was a triumph to have successfully escaped Haiti
and to have survived the dangerous trip to America. After hunger in rural villages, poverty in
Haitian cities, and violence and terror all along the way, the hope and opportunity-filled life in
America was finally set to begin. But confronting this fantasy of America was the reality of life
for Haitians in Miami. For many of the new arrivals, poverty, unemployment, exploitation, and
even violence remained the central features of life. And the immediate and largest obstacle to
survival in the United States was the American government. From the start of the migration
wave in the early 1970s, American authorities initiated a program to block the boat people’s
entrance and to imprison and deport undocumented Haitians. While the challenges to survival
for Haitians in South Florida were many, they began with refugees’ struggle to stay out of jail
and to remain in the United States.

Campaigning for Freedom and Asylum
Most Haitians captured by the Miami police or the Florida Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) in the 1970s were sent to detention facilities in Immokalee and
throughout South Florida and, in some cases, as far away as El Paso, Texas. Refugees who were
unable to produce the money for bond, which was often set at a minimum of $500, had to remain
imprisoned under deteriorating conditions that throughout the 1970s grew rapidly worse as
facilities filled up with more and more undocumented Haitians. Even children were sometimes
subjected to imprisonment if they arrived illegally. In November 1978 eight-year-old Roselene
Dorsainvil spent weeks in a city jail in West Palm Beach. Local authorities claimed they had
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“mistakenly” jailed the child, who was kept among adult inmates and separated from her father,
who occupied another cell in the same facility.182
Haitians able to come up with bond were free until their court hearing, which would
decide whether they could remain in the United States. Once they were released, the refugees
had to find a place to live in an unfamiliar city. Many made their way to makeshift shelters like
the one opened up in the basement of the Biscayne Boulevard Lutheran Church of Miami. Work
was a bigger problem. For the first five years after the Haitians’ arrival in South Florida, the INS
denied them permission to work, forcing them to work illegally or to rely upon the meager
assistance available from charity and community groups. This policy by immigration officials
put a strain on organizations supporting the Haitians and made it difficult for the Haitians to
survive. Miamians like the Reverend John Merz from the Biscayne Boulevard Lutheran Church
could help house the refugees, but as he said, by barring them from work, the US government
was telling the Haitians to “beg, steal, starve, or go to jail.”183
Even if Haitians managed to secure release from the immigration facilities and to find a
place to stay and an illegal job, they still faced the likely prospect of deportation. In addition to
denying work permits to Haitians, the INS had, since the beginning of the refugee influx, sought
various methods to return the Haitians to their home country. These methods included coercing
refugees into signing English language documents that they did not understand, failing to inform
them of their right to representation or their right to claim asylum, and even forging signatures
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authorizing refugees’ voluntary return to Haiti.184 Throughout the 1970s the INS maintained a
policy of almost complete denial of asylum to Haitian refugees. Out of the approximately fifty
thousand asylum claims Haitians refugees filed from 1972 to 1980, US immigration authorities
granted only twenty-five.185
Immigration officials justified this treatment of the Haitian boat people by arguing that
the Haitians were not political refugees, but immigrants coming to the United States for
economic reasons. Their status was “no different than that of the illegal Mexican alien who
crosses the border on foot,” argued INS Deputy Commissioner Mario Noto. And since the
Haitians were driven by economic concerns rather than a “well-founded fear of persecution,” the
necessary criteria to qualify as a political refugee, they were not entitled to asylum or any other
status that would allow them to legally remain in the country. Responding to the National
Council of Churches (NCC) and other advocacy organizations that called for refugee status for
the Haitians, Carol C. Laise, assistant secretary for public affairs, observed,
[Such groups] appear to argue that any Haitian that requests refugee status should receive
such status. We do not agree. For example, some of the boats came to Florida from the
Bahamas and carried people who lived in the islands for many years and were leaving
because their work permits had been revoked. Are all these people refugees? Further,
others enter the United States as tourists bearing Haitian passports, find illegal
employment, and then claim to be refugees when faced with deportation. Are all these
refugees? We do not believe so.186
“Ninety percent of the Haitians come here looking for work,” concurred Richard Gullage,
INS deputy district director in Miami. “Most of the political asylum applicants do not even
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come close to meeting the United Nations definition of a refugee.” Furthermore, US officials
believed that if the INS opened the door to the Haitians, America would soon be inundated with
economic migrants from all over the developing world.187
The Cold War context also exerted a powerful influence on US policy toward the
Haitians. Since 1956 the United States had maintained a refugee policy that gave preferential
status to people fleeing communist countries. As part of this Cold War-influenced
implementation of refugee policy, American officials developed the practice of distinguishing
between totalitarian regimes (a term usually reserved for communist-controlled countries) and
authoritarian regimes (repressive but non-communist governments). Fleeing a totalitarian
regime usually accorded a person asylum while fleeing an authoritarian regime usually did not.
In addition, special legislation like the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act and the 1975 Indochina
Migration and Refugee Assistance Act also aimed to ensure that people fleeing specific
communist-controlled countries considered hostile to the United States be granted asylum.188
Furthermore, the United States considered Duvalier’s Haiti a strategic ally against communist
Cuba in the Caribbean and in the Organization of American States and was by the early 1970s
strengthening its economic ties with the country as well. To grant the Haitians political asylum
would have been an acknowledgement of repression in Haiti, a move that would have damaged
relations between the two countries.189
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The Haitian refugees, however, rejected the US government’s rationale for their
exclusion and viewed the differential treatment offered Cubans and Haitians as the greatest
symbol of what they saw as an unjust and discriminatory policy. “The Cuban people come and
they are welcome. When the Haitian people arrive, they send us right back where we came
from,” observes Rose Micheline Saint Jean, who fled from Haiti to Florida in 1978. “It is unfair
the way they treat us. They don’t treat us like a human being,” she declares, voicing a sentiment
commonly held among the refugees.190 Echoing the same grievance, a flyer for an early
demonstration in support of the Haitian refugees in New York observed that “Cubans arriving by
plane are given residence. Why jail for Haitian refugees?” it asked.191
Sharing the new refugees’ sense of injustice over the government’s treatment of the
Haitian refugees, Haitians in New York began building a campaign to obtain freedom and
asylum for their newly arrived compatriots. The Haitian Fathers, the progressive priests forced
to flee Haiti in 1969, were at the center of this campaign from the start. From their apartment in
the heart of the Haitian community of Brooklyn, Father Antoine Adrien and the other Haitian
Fathers organized protests and picket lines, letter-writing campaigns, and other actions to
mobilize the Haitian community. Their residence became the meeting space for frequent ad hoc
and coalition meetings to formulate campaign strategy. And their publication, Sel, became one
of the main community newsletters that aided in the education and mobilization of New York
Haitians around the refugee issue.192
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Much of this work took place under the auspices of KODDPA, the Committee for the
Defense of the Rights of Haitian People, an organization in which the Fathers partnered with
young radicals from groups like En Avant and Mouvement Haitien d’Action Patriotique
(MHAP). KODDPA sponsored one of the first events of the refugee campaign. On July 1,
1973, approximately 250 people congregated outside St. Patrick’s Cathedral on Fifth Avenue in
Manhattan to listen to speeches, to sing songs, and “to manifest their support for the Haitian
refugees in Miami.” The demonstrators then marched down to East Forty-second Street and the
Haitian consulate where, according to Haiti Observateur, they “chanted anti-Duvalier slogans
. . . sang ‘The Dessalinienne,’ [Haiti’s national anthem] and unfurled the ‘Red-and-blue’ preDuvalier flag.”193
As this early demonstration in support of the refugees illustrates, from the start Haitian
activists in the United States established multiple targets in their campaign: US immigration
officials who denied asylum to the refugees, the US State Department, which maintained its
support for the dictatorship in Haiti, and the Duvalier regime itself.
While the July 1973 demonstration culminated in front of the Haitian consulate, a
demonstration the following February, which drew five hundred people and was sponsored by
the Haitian Ad Hoc Committee for the Defense of the Haitian Refugees (another coalition in
which the Haitian Fathers played a leading role), occurred outside the offices of the US State
Department regional office in New York City. Illustrating the activists’ view of who was
responsible for the crisis, the demonstration featured a group of protesters in chains, watched

193

“Demonstration in New York,” Haiti Observateur, July 6-13, 1973, 4.

83
over by a guard wearing an American flag, and followed by another man dressed as a Tonton
Macoutes.194
It was this multidimensional quality of the refugee campaign that made it such a powerful
tool in mobilizing the Haitian community. Mobilizing the community in favor of asylum for the
Haitian boat people resonated with those who felt compelled to speak out against what they saw
as a biased US policy. Some Haitians were also motivated to participate in the movement
because they identified with the boat people’s experience of being undocumented. As Ray
Laforest explains, “During that moment, there were Haitians that were not into politics [but that]
might have joined a demonstration for immigration because even though they were doing okay
here, they had come ‘illegally’.”195 At the same time, the refugee issue offered an excellent
opportunity to agitate for the discontinuation of US support for Duvalier. If the movement
convinced the US government to grant the refugees asylum, it would necessitate a change in the
diplomatic relations between the United States and Haiti. A statement by Father Guy Sansaricq,
one of the priests doing organizing in the community, explained the work of the Haitian Fathers
within this context:
The Haitian refugees appear as a sign of the times – poor, persecuted, helpless. Their
poignant distress belies the Haitian government propaganda about so called
“liberalization policies” of the present regime . . . The great hoax that the Haitian
government had liberalized its policy was something that [the Haitian Fathers] had to
denounce . . . The involvement of the State Department in the Haitian situation was also a
painful fact that needed exposure.196

194

“Grand Manifestation a la 5eme Avenue,” Haiti Observateur, Feb. 22-Mar., 1974, 1, 4, 6, 9; Laguerre, American
Odyssey, 174.
195

Ray Laforest, Interview with author, New York, Apr. 10, 2010.

196

Sansaricq, “The Haitian Apostolate in Brooklyn,” 25.

84
Many examples of this line of thinking also appear in the Haitian publications of the
period. To provide just one illustration, in the spring of 1975, Le Patriote Haitien published an
article entitled “The Illegal Alien Question and the Haitian Community,” in which it argued that
KODDPA and the other organizations “struggling for the democratic rights of the Haitians
abroad and at home . . . devote themselves above all to exposing through the [protest] events, the
true nature of U.S. imperialism and to making the Haitian community realize that the main and
determinant struggle is the one to overthrow the U.S. supported Duvalier regime in Haiti.” To
that end, Le Patriote Haitien called on Haitians to continue to support the anti-Duvalier
resistance and to “demand that the Ford administration immediately put an end to its policy of
support to the Duvalier dictatorship.”197
However, the refugee campaign, which attracted support precisely because it challenged
both US policy and the dictatorship in Haiti, engendered fear and resistance in the Haitian
community for the same reason. According to Susan Buchanan, the priests and other members
of the refugee movement encountered resistance from people who were afraid of engaging in
politics and wanted to avoid association with the anti-Duvalier exile groups. Others avoided the
refugee issue out of a desire to avoid association with the desperate boat people.198
To overcome this fear and resistance, activists utilized the same tools they had employed
in their earlier campaigns to encourage Haitians to step out of the shadows and join the antiDuvalier movement. L’Ayisyen, the Sunday morning radio program with such a large following,
took up the refugee movement as a central focus of its programming. As Daniel Huttinot
remembers, “Since 1972 when the first group of Haitian refugees arrived, we have been working
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with the Haitian Fathers on the defense of the Haitian refugees.” In addition to defending the
Haitian refugees, the activists associated with L’Ayisyen used the radio show as a tool for
mobilization. L’ Heure Haitienne, also the official name of the radio program, was one of the
groups that made up KODDPA (the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Haitian
People), a coalition that also included the Haitian Fathers’ organization, Sel.199
Music, theater, and other cultural expressions also continued to be important tools that
activists like Huttinot used to educate and activate the Haitian community. As Marie Lily Cerat
recalls,
The music was engaged music, and it was the quickest way to communicate to a group of
people who did not read necessarily. I mean when you have . . . a show in Creole,
everybody can see, they can participate, they can get the message. If the music of
[Haitian musician and political activist] Manno Charlemagne comes out, plays on the
radio through L’Ayisyen, you hear the message, it is immediate . . . because you don’t
have the literate people who are going to wait for the books to come out.200
Music and theater could also be a way to try to overcome class divisions in the Haitian
community and to encourage unity around issues like asylum for the refugees. According to
Cerat, cultural events “brought together a large swath . . . of people from different segments -literate, illiterate, workers, professionals.” The events “offered something for everyone” and
thus represented an effective tool for outreach and mobilization.201
The 1975 release of Haiti: Ki Sa Pou-n Fe? What is to be done?, a record album
produced by Atis Indepandan, a musical group linked to L’Ayisyen, exemplified the combined
cultural and political work taking place in the Haitian community at the time. In addition to the
printed Creole and English lyrics of each song, the album insert included a five-page political
199

Huttinot, Legros, and another member of SELA, interview; “Emergency! Save the Haitian Refugees,” flyer.

200

Marie Lily Cerat, Interview with author, Brooklyn, NY, July 14, 2010.

201

Cerat, interview.

86
statement from the artists that ranged broadly through Haitian history, culture, and politics and
that provided a bibliography of suggested readings and “recommended sources of information,”
a bibliography that included the bulletins of En Avant and publications of KODDPA. The goal
of Atis Indepandan’s work, the statement concluded, was “to help in developing a new
democratic, popular, revolutionary, proletarian culture.”202
An examination of Atis Indepandan’s lyrics also reveals the sort of message that culturalpolitical groups were putting out about the refugee issue. One song entitled “Papa-m Monte Oun
Bato” (My Father Left on a Boat) presents the despair as well as the ongoing determination of
those left behind when a family member fled Haiti.
My father left on a boat
I’ve heard he went to Nassau
To find some way to make a living,
Because in Haiti we have no food or money.
My mother is so poor she had to cut up an old dress
To make a pair of pants for Ti Rouj.
My father worked hard to provide for us,
But the Tonton Macoutes came and stole his land.
He had no choice but to flee,
And still we have no news from him
My mother had to send the youngest child, Ti Rouj,
To work hard for no pay in the big house in town.
Nobody knows where my father is.
My mother passed away, after suffering from T.B.
Misery lies on all of us in my country,
But our courage is stronger than all our tears.203
The music of Atis Indepandan, like much of the Haitian music and theater of the period, was
remarkable for its ability, in a few short stanzas, to present a powerful critique of institutions
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both in Haiti and in the United States. Another song entitled “La Mize” (Misery) opens with an
indictment of the economic restructuring of Haiti under Baby Doc.
Poverty is strangling my country.
Terror grips the land
Feudalism in the countryside
And the bourgeoisie in the cities
Have broken the peasants.
Those who haven’t fled to nearby places
Can’t afford to work the land any more.
Food is scarce for them,
And they must buy their meager rice and beans from others.
The song goes on to introduce the impact of the refugee exodus in Haiti and the injustice faced
by Haitians outside the country.
These days wherever you go in the world,
You will find Haitian exiles,
My countrymen, workers, peasants, intellectuals and progressives.
This hemorrhaging has left Haiti weak and in agony,
While the Tontons Macoute do as they please.
My country is dying like a wounded man left alone.
(chorus)
In the Miami jails
In the canefields of the Dominican Republic
And in the Canadian hell,
Nothing is going right.
In Nassau and the Bahamas,
In Europe and in Africa,
Anywhere we go, we Haitians have it the hard way. 204
While theater and music were uniquely accessible and immediate in their capability to
educate and mobilize New York Haitians, print media also played a critical role in the refugee
movement. Haiti Observateur, the first full-length weekly newspaper published in the Haitian
community of New York, became the principal publication to take up the refugee campaign in
the 1970s. Founded in 1971 by Raymond Joseph and his brother, Leopold, Haiti Observateur
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was from the beginning envisioned by its founders as a tool of the anti-Duvalier opposition in
exile.205 And its circulation of thirty thousand was, according to one source, “the largest of any
Haitian newspaper in Haiti or abroad,” giving it substantial reach.206 From the point when
Haitian refugees began arriving in Florida in December 1972, Haiti Observateur devoted much
of its space to reporting on the unfolding refugee movement and the corresponding campaign for
asylum. Just as other participants in the refugee campaign had done, the publishers of Haiti
Observateur recognized that the refugee issue represented an exceptional opportunity to
encourage Haitians in the United States to mobilize in defense of their compatriots as well as to
join the anti-Duvalier opposition. Week after week, in articles and editorials, Ray and Leo
Joseph used the pages of Haiti Observateur to attack the regime in Haiti that produced the wave
of refugees. The newspaper also skewered US officials for their treatment of the Haitian boat
people and urged the Haitian community to join the refugee movement, printing meeting
announcements and calls to action, raising funds for the asylum campaign, and publishing
petitions calling on American officials to grant asylum to the Haitian refugees.207
As the refugee campaign was developing in New York, another branch of the movement
was taking root in Miami. The first to respond to the refugee crisis in South Florida were the
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Protestant churches rooted in the African American community that neighbored the northeastern
part of the city, the area that would ultimately become known as Little Haiti. While some black
residents of Miami were hostile toward the new arrivals, the Black Baptist Alliance and the
Baptist Ministers Council responded by raising support for the refugees in the form of food,
clothing, and shelter. The Reverend James Jenkins, minister of the Friendship Baptist Church in
Miami and president of the Baptist Ministers Council of Miami and Vicinity, and Rev.
Mompremier, associate minister of Friendship Baptist Church, were among the first to assist the
newly arrived Haitian refugees. Jenkins and Mompremier became some of the first leaders of
the South Florida community’s political campaign for the refugees as well, soon drawing in other
leading members of Miami’s African American community, including the Reverend W.E. Sims
of the Baptist Ministers Council, and Ray Fauntroy, leader of the Dade County chapter of the
Southern Christian Leadership Council.208
The work of these local churches and religious leaders was also buttressed by nationwide
religious organizations, like the National Council of Churches, the United Methodist Church, and
Church World Service, as well as labor unions, like the AFL-CIO and the Laborers Union Local
478, which together in 1973 funded the creation of the new Haitian Refugee Center in Miami
(initially called the Haitian Refugee Information Center). Like the Baptist church organizations,
the Haitian Refugee Center worked to meet the immediate needs of the new arrivals, helping
them to locate clothing, food, and shelter. But the most important service the Haitian Refugee
Center contributed to the asylum campaign came in the form of legal assistance and advocacy.
Initially depending on the direction of the Reverend Jacques Mompremier but soon relying on
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the legal expertise of immigration attorney Ira Kurzban, the Haitian Refugee Center provided
legal assistance to refugees hoping to gain asylum and the right to work.209 Regular Saturday
night meetings at the Center presented the nascent refugee community with opportunities to hear
updates on legal developments concerning the refugees, and center staff performed role-playing
skits with refugees to prepare them to present themselves as political refugees during their
immigration interviews.210
The National Council of Churches (NCC) soon became the leading national organization
to take up the cause of the Haitian refugees. In February 1974 the Governing Board of the NCC
adopted a resolution that expressed “profound disquiet for what appears to be a fundamental
violation of United States due process of law.” The resolution also commended its partner
organizations in the Haitian refugee campaign for their “well-coordinated efforts,” called upon
“NCC’s member communions” to provide “urgent and continuing financial and legal assistance”
to those groups working on the campaign, groups that included the Haitian Refugee Information
Center in Miami and the Committee for the Defense of Haitian Refugees in New York City, and
authorized the president of the Council to appoint a task force “to research the issue of Haitian
refugees to the United States.211 The resulting task force interviewed three hundred Haitians and
submitted affidavits to the INS that the task force claimed established “the well-founded fear of
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political persecution entitling [the Haitians] to asylum under the refugee law” (U.N. Protocol).212
In May of the same year, the NCC brought together more than five hundred people representing
political, religious, community, and labor groups in South Florida to formulate a response to the
Haitian refugee crisis. In addition, working closely with the legal staff at the Haitian Refugee
Center, the NCC filed a motion in federal court that sought the release of Haitians awaiting
asylum hearings and requested that those released be granted work permits.213
Reporting from New York, Haiti Observateur applauded the leadership of the National
Council of Churches in the refugee campaign and predicted that the NCC’s involvement meant
that more Americans were becoming aware of the plight of the Haitian refugees. “The problem
of the Haitian refugees in Miami finally is getting the attention it deserves,” an editorial in Haiti
Observateur observed. “That the approximately 50 representatives on the fact-finding mission
represent organizations with a combined membership of some 20 millions [sic] is indeed
reassuring. In other words, the case of the Haitian refugees is no longer the concern of a few
Haitian immigrants and exiles in New York.”214
While Haiti Observateur’s hope that the NCC’s initiatives would “force a change of
policy in favor of the Haitian refugees” was not to be immediately realized, the editorialist
correctly observed that the movement was growing beyond its origins among the opposition in
exile of New York City. An escalating series of demonstrations in 1974, drawn from a broad
range of individuals and organizations, particularly from labor unions and the labor movement,
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showcased the growing support for the Haitian refugee cause. In fact, as early as November
1972, E.T. Stephenson, president of the Dade County [Miami] Federation of Labor, issued a
statement that articulated the belief “that [the Haitian refugees’] presence in our community in no
way affects the livelihood of those presently employed in Dade County.” Stephenson further
declared that “these people have a right to earn a livelihood and that they should be granted the
democratic right of an appeal in order to remain here.”215
Building on Stephenson’s support, the campaign for Haitian refugees captured the
support of many other labor leaders, unions, and political organizations in New York and across
the country in the spring and summer of 1974. In January, Patrick E. Gorman, secretarytreasurer of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, wrote to
President Richard Nixon asking the president “to intercede in a situation that is of deep concern
to the undersigned as well as our 550,000 members by recommending that asylum in this free
country of ours be given to the Haitian refugees who fled the terror and despotism that exists in
Haiti and have been ordered to return.”216 Henry Foner, president of the Joint Board of the Fur,
Leather, and Machine Workers Union, writing “on behalf of the 6,500 members of our union,”
exhorted US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to “treat these refugees as refugees under the
guidelines of the United Nations” and to “call a halt to the continued harassment of these
individuals.” Foner also pointed out “the heartless manner in which Haitian refugees are
received as compared with the ‘red carpet’ treatment accorded to refugees from Cuba.”217 In a
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letter to Senator John V. Tunney of California, Cesar Chavez, president of the United
Farmworkers Union, urged support for asylum for the Haitian refugees. “Can we not do as much
for the Haitians as we did for the Cubans?” Chavez asked.218 In a letter to Dr. Paul Lehman,
chairman of the American Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born, another
organization that had taken a leading role in the refugee campaign, leaders of the Illinois Chapter
of the American Indian Movement offered their support to help secure asylum for Haitian
refugees in the United States, proposing that if the campaign for asylum failed, “perhaps it is not
inconceivable that as a sovereign nation the Anishnawbe Nation (Ojibwa-Chippewa) would
consider granting political asylum to the Haitian refugees.”219
While the refugee campaign was gaining the support of a wide range of unions and other
organizations, the National Union of Hospital and Healthcare Employees was particularly
involved in the campaign for the Haitian refugees. In May 1974, Local 1199 submitted a
resolution expressing support for the Haitian refugees. “Many of the Haitian refugees have
found work in our shops and in hospitals under contract with our Hospital Division in New York
and other cities. As Americans and as fellow workers of these refugees we call upon the
Immigration and Naturalization Service and the State Department to grant them refugee status
under our laws,” the resolution stated. Union leaders and staff from 1199 also represented the
union at a rally in June in support of asylum for the Haitian refugees and co-sponsored an event,
a Community Speak-Out to Save the Haitian Refugees. Later that summer Leon Davis, the 1199
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union president, joined other labor and religious leaders in signing an open letter on behalf of the
Haitian refugees’ campaign for asylum.220
The growing support from labor and other segments of the American population was just
one way in which the campaign for the Haitian refugees was gaining momentum in 1974.
Another way that the campaign for the refugees advanced came in the increasingly close
coordination of the different participants based in New York, Miami, and elsewhere. On
November 20, 1974, the Rescue Committee for Haitian Refugees, an organization led by the
Haitian Fathers and the American Committee for the Protection of Foreign Born, staged a day of
protest in Washington, DC, that highlighted the increasing coordination of movement activists
from around the country. The day’s activities, held to protest the “starvation order of U.S.
Immigration officials” that “barred the refugees from obtaining a livelihood while awaiting a
decision on their asylum applications,” began with a demonstration in front of the White House,
then moved to a picket line outside the Justice Department, followed by a rally at the Capitol and
visits to more than sixty Senators and members of Congress. The rally was chaired by the
Reverend J.E. Jenks, pastor of the Friendship Missionary Baptist Church in Miami; it included
seven recently arrived refugees from Haiti and drew supporters from New York and Miami as
well as Boston and Baltimore. In addition, the day of action featured members of Congress
Charles Rangel and Shirley Chisholm of New York and Cardiss Collins and Ralph Metcalf of
Illinois, all members of the Congressional Black Caucus, who joined with Congressman Claude
Pepper of Florida in endorsing the activists’ demands for asylum and fair treatment for the
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Haitian refugees.221 In this first “March on Washington” by the Haitian refugees and their
supporters, coordinated action among the various branches of the refugee campaign and the
participation and support of members of Congress suggested that the movement was beginning
to gain momentum.222
Another political development that seemed to bode well for the refugee campaign was the
1976 presidential election of Jimmy Carter. Haitians in the United States had been arguing all
along that to solve the refugee crisis, the US government needed to address it at its root and
cease its support for the Duvalier dictatorship. This seemed a distinct possibility when Carter
entered office since, as Odd Arne Westad observes, “Carter wanted to emphasize human rights
and what he saw as American ideological principles in combating Communism and other forms
of authoritarian government,” a stance that suggested that the United States might reconsider its
support for the Haitian dictatorship.223 In a letter to the newly elected president, Haiti
Observateur publisher Raymond Joseph claimed to be “heartened by your concern for human
rights” and urged Carter “to exert your influence in the defense of Haitian refugees. Moreover,”
Joseph continued, “I think a review of the American government’s dealing with the government
of the Duvaliers is of utmost importance.”224
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Indeed, the Carter administration did soon press Duvalier to respond to human rights
concerns and threatened to withhold US aid to Haiti if reforms were not made. In response, the
Haitian government set free some political prisoners, slightly loosened its grip on the country’s
media, and permitted the Inter-American Human Rights Commission to enter Haiti for an
investigation in 1978. According to Lionel Legros, the opposition movement in Haiti and in the
United States perceived this process as a “valve opening,” releasing some of the pressure from
the dictatorship and giving political activists and opposition groups slightly more room to
operate. Still, Legros also remembers that Haitian journalist and political dissident Jean
Dominique advised his radio listeners to exercise caution, reminding them that “when the
porridge is too hot you have to eat around the edge.”225
To support the budding resistance movement that the slight opening in Haiti had created,
Haitian activists launched a new phase of their campaign. By 1977 Benjamin Dupuy’s Haitian
Liberation Movement (MHL) claimed to have branches of the organization working both inside
and outside Haiti. In May of that year, the interior front of the MHL obtained a confidential
report of the World Bank that contained evidence that the Duvalier regime had siphoned off $50
million of the total $95 million in government revenue for fiscal year 1975. Agence France
Press and Haiti Observateur published the report, prompting World Bank spokesmen to swiftly
deny any knowledge of Duvalier’s looting of public funds.226
Other groups also found ways to work with and to support the resistance movement
inside Haiti. “For once the movement was not something that was going to be coming from the
outside,” Lionel Legros recalls. “We understood from our viewpoint that . . . things need to
225
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change from within. So we encourage that kind of movement.” To do so, Legros and the other
directors of L’Ayisyen used the radio show to promote the voice of Haiti’s domestic opposition
movement, obtaining cassette tapes of Jean Dominique and other opposition journalists and
playing them during their weekly radio program for the New York community.227
While the slight loosening of Duvalier’s control in the late 1970s did invigorate the
resistance movement inside and outside Haiti, it did not stem the flow of refugees. The political
and economic crises in Haiti were far too deep to stop the exodus with the sort of superficial
changes engineered by the Haitian government in the period.

As a result of the ongoing crises

in Haiti, the flow of Haitian boat people traveling to US shores increased significantly in 1977.
From November to the following July, fifty boats carrying more than one thousand people
landed on the beaches of Florida, and each ensuing month hundreds more made the dangerous
journey.228
In response to the intensifying refugee crisis and to counter Duvalier’s claims of
liberalization, Haitian activists in the United States decided to stage a new March on
Washington. In January 1977 activists in New York, working with partners in Montreal, formed
the Comite Haitien Organize pour Les Manifestations des Washington, or CHOMAWASH, to
carry out the action. To prepare for the march, which was to take place on April 4,
CHOMAWASH established committees to handle the various aspects of the event and
mobilization teams based in Miami, Newark, Boston, and Rockland County, New York. As in
earlier campaign actions, Haiti Observateur provided critical support for the mobilization by
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offering its pages in support of the mobilization and fundraising effort.229 Haiti Observatuer also
presented readers with the aims of the march:
1) Protest against the plight of Haitian refugees, a great number of whom are jailed in
Miami and in El Paso, Texas.
2) Protest against the recommendation of a State Department commission . . . that the
Duvalier regime receive financial and military aid.
3) Protest against an insidious propaganda fed by some press organs and espoused by
certain American officials alleging that the Jean-Claude Duvalier regime is
liberalizing.
4) Denounce once more the continued violation of human rights and democratic
freedoms in Haiti.
5) Protest against the tolerance shown by the Organization of American States (OAS)
toward the hereditary regime of jean-Claude Duvalier in violation of the OAS Charter
which, among other things, stipulates that periodic elections be held.230
“Your participation in the march,” the editors told their readers, “will carry much weight in the
present international climate where great emphasis is put on human rights.”231
On the day of the march, Haitians and their American supporters, coming from New
York, Miami, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, Canada, and even Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands, converged on Washington to march from the Capitol to the White House. The march
was followed by a press conference at the Capital Hilton, where march organizers presented the
findings of a sixteen-page white paper on human rights violations in Haiti, which they reported
would be delivered to US Ambassador to the United Nations Andrew Young as well as to
representatives of the Organization of American States and to the Commission on Human Rights
in Geneva. The March on Washington, which three years earlier had drawn only 120 people, in
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1977 attracted more than 2,000, a turnout that was hailed by march organizers as a major
success. “Twelve buses [and] more than 50 cars” had transported people to Washington, Haiti
Observateur proudly proclaimed. The success of the event can also be gauged by the response
of the Haitian government, which seemed to view the March on Washington as a substantial
threat. On state-run radio, the Duvalier regime attempted to discredit the march by
characterizing its organizers as enemies of the nation who were maneuvering to “get favor” from
President Carter and the American government. Haitians in the United States also learned that
the Duvalier regime intended to have its own demonstration outside the US embassy in Port-auPrince, though it would have to bring in peasants from the countryside to pose as protesters.232
While the March on Washington demonstrated the growing strength of the joint refugee
and anti-Duvalier campaign, it also stirred up conflict in the Haitian community of New York.
The pro-Duvalier Haitian Unity Council opposed the March on Washington, warning Haitians
that the event was really “an intervention in their country’s internal affairs under the pretense of
defending ‘human rights’,” and urged the community not to be “manipulated” by the “ ‘worn
out’ politicians” who were organizing the event. Instead of using the United States as a base to
attack the Haitian government, the Haitian Unity Council argued, Haitians should be seeking to
improve their country bit by bit. “To improve, add and gradually replace the bad by the good is
our aspiration,” it claimed. And once again, seeking to differentiate itself from those groups that
criticized the American government for its policy toward Haiti and the Haitian refugees, it
reminded readers of its “satisfaction to have observed the practice of the principles upon which
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the American democracy rests,” particularly “the right of free speech” being exercised by its
political opponents in Washington. 233
Organizations on the Left also opposed the March on Washington, though their
opposition stemmed from concern over the motives of some of the members of CHOMAWASH.
The Haitian Liberation Movement (MHL) was one of the fiercest critics from the Left of the
March on Washington movement. The “traditional sectors,” as the MHL called the former
Haitian leaders and politicians that were now part of the opposition in exile, were political
opportunists who were using the March on Washington in a maneuver to “replace the Duvalier
dictatorship with their own dictatorship,” it claimed. The MHL also opposed the way the march
framed its political appeal to the U.S. government. CHOMAWASH needed to do away with the
“servile attitude” it had adopted toward the Carter administration. Both Republicans and
Democrats, the MHL argued, were “the exploiters of the Haitian people” and responsible for “the
economic plundering of resources and manpower of our country.” At the conclusion of its twopage explanation of why it was opposing the March on Washington, the MHL presented a
graphic illustration of its interpretation of the march. Facing a grotesque image of a grinning
Jimmy Carter was a small group of faceless, black figures carrying a sign reading, “Saint Carter
. . . Save us!!!”234
Despite the ongoing divisions among Haitians in the United States, the refugee
movement was gaining strength and starting to have an impact on policy. In November 1977,
facing a lawsuit filed on behalf of the Haitian refugees by the National Council of Churches and
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its partner organization, the Haitian Refugee Center, and amid an expanding campaign by
Haitians and their supporters, the INS finally agreed to release Haitians without bond, to issue
work permits to the refugees, and to allow them full asylum hearings before an immigration
judge. This was a major victory for Haitians in Miami and for the refugee campaign, striking a
blow against the three greatest obstacles to the refugees’ survival in the United States:
imprisonment, unemployment, and deportation. “Prolonged legal action and pressures by
religious, civil rights, social service agencies, trade unions, and community groups” were the
forces that had accomplished this policy change, a NCC report observed.235 Though not all
refugees in detention were freed immediately (the federal government continued to hold a group
of sixty-five in an Everglades stockade because officials could not find friends or family to take
them in), the policy change represented an exciting achievement for the refugee campaign. 236
The hope created by the policy change did not last long, however. The initial relaxation
of restrictions regarding the Haitians had come in the form of a settlement with the National
Council of Churches and the Haitian Refugee Center, the plaintiffs in a lawsuit on behalf of the
Haitian refugees. But political pressure from those opposed to a more inclusive policy as well as
the apparent dissatisfaction by the INS over concessions it had been forced to make to the
refugees and their advocates led the agency to reverse its policy in June 1978, revoking the
opportunity for the refugees to receive work permits. Immigration officials argued that in fact
the legal agreement with the NCC and the Haitian Refugee Center had only authorized work
permits for Haitians with asylum requests already in process. And after this clarification, the
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INS began denying work permits to Haitians altogether. This change had serious consequences
for Haitians like Evodise Lacroix, who had come to Florida in 1978, had obtained a work permit,
and was working as a cook for a Miami Beach couple. Lacroix’s job had enabled her to move
herself and her five children into a $195-a-month apartment. But with the change in policy,
Evodise Lacroix lost her job; as a result, the family of six faced eviction. To make matters
worse, the INS used the information provided by the four to five thousand Haitians that had
applied for work permits after the apparent policy change to carry out deportation proceedings
against them.237
One month after the INS revoked Haitians’ work permits, the government began the
Haitian Program, a plan to speed up the processing, immigration hearings, and deportation
proceedings of the refugees. The Haitian Program was a response to the growing backlog of
Haitian deportation cases, which by the spring of 1978 had reached 6,000 to 7,000, and hundreds
of new refugees were arriving every month. The new program once again began detaining all
Haitians upon arrival, and it threw deportation proceedings into overdrive, escalating the pace
from 10 to 150 per day. With proceedings taking place at such a rapid rate, the likelihood of
receiving a full and fair hearing was greatly diminished.238 In a virtual deportation assembly
line, ill-prepared defense lawyers paraded their clients before judges, at which point they were
sometimes presented with pre-signed forms denying them asylum.

Judges shortened the

allotted time to fill out the required I-589 asylum form and even carried out deportation hearings
without entertaining asylum claims, a violation of the established process. With the initiation of
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the Haitian Program, undocumented Haitians in Miami were once again threatened with
immediate expulsion from the United States.239
The US government’s reversal of its policy on work permits and the initiation of the
Haitian Program stimulated further action by the refugees and their supporters. In particular, a
growing number of African American leaders and organizations, driven by the belief that
American officials treated Haitians differently (than, for example, Cuban refugees) because they
were black, began to treat the fight for Haitian refugees as a civil rights issue. An April 1979
demonstration in Miami that drew 1,600 participants highlighted the fact that a growing number
of African Americans from the Miami chapter of the NAACP were taking a leading role in
mobilizing black Americans of South Florida around the Haitian issue.240 Vernon E. Jordan Jr.,
president of the National Urban League, issued a statement that pointed out that the Haitians
were “clearly as much political refugees as were the Hungarians, the Cubans, and the
Vietnamese” to whom the American government offered both asylum and resettlement
assistance. “For [the Haitians] to be denied access to due process in the effort to prove their
status raises the question of whether the color of their skin makes them somehow different in the
eyes of our government.”241 Although INS Deputy Commissioner Mario Noto protested, “We
resent any implications that these Haitians are being treated differently because of their color,”
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critics refused to believe that race was not a factor in US policy toward the Haitians because of
the much different reception of lighter-skinned Cuban refugees.242
While local and national civil rights organizations increasingly joined the refugee
campaign at the end of the 1970s, the campaign’s legal action continued. In the summer of 1979
the National Council of Churches and the Haitian Refugee Center maintained their legal
challenge to the government’s Haitian refugee policy and in July achieved another victory.
While hundreds of people demonstrated in favor of the refugees outside a federal courthouse in
Miami, District Court Judge William M. Hoeveler issued an injunction against immigration
officials’ most recent actions, ordering them to reinstate the work permits they had recently
revoked. The ruling marked another significant, though short-lived, victory in the ongoing tugof-war between the refugees and their supporters and the US government.243
By the end of the 1970s the campaign for the Haitian refugees had grown into a major
movement, linking multiple communities in the United States and Canada and bringing together
Haitian and American activists. By 1979 the refugee movement was also gaining much national
attention. In May the Washington Post told readers that “the case of the Haitian Refugees has
taken on a new impact.” Haitians have “increased their marches and demonstrations in Miami,
stepped up their criticism of the Haitian government and worked with their lawyers to wage a
full-scale legal battle against deportation proceedings . . . In short,” the Post reported, “they have
started a new civil rights movement in South Florida.”244
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While the focus of much of the activism was on South Florida as the place where most of
the Haitian refugees were arriving and were being imprisoned, the center of the refugee
campaign throughout the 1970s was New York. Leading this campaign in New York were the
same activists who had reshaped Haitian politics in the city in the late 1960s, activists like
Antoine Adrien and the Haitian Fathers and the radical young artists and musicians associated
with L’Ayisyen and Troupe Kouidor. The coalition of activists leading the refugee campaign
also included a prominent member of the old guard, Raymond Joseph, who brought a key tool to
the movement, the Haitian weekly Haiti Observateur. These activists built a movement that
simultaneously pushed for asylum for Haitian refugees and for the discontinuance of US support
for Duvalier. Activists in the refugee campaign also managed to win broad backing from
influential American religious, labor, and civil rights organizations, evidence that the refugee
movement was gaining substantial momentum in the mid-1970s. Furthermore, the connections
forged in these first years of the Haitian refugee campaign provided the foundation upon which
further political action -- the defense of new waves of refugees and the support for political
change in Haiti -- would take place.

Struggling for Survival: Life and Labor in Haitian Miami
Alongside the political campaign for freedom and asylum for the refugees grew the new
Haitian community of South Florida. Haitian life in Miami centered in a neighborhood in the
northeastern part of the city that in time came to be known as Little Haiti. Called Edison-Little
River before the Haitians’ arrival, the neighborhood had undergone major demographic and
economic changes in the postwar years. Throughout the 1950s Edison-Little River, which sat
adjacent to the more well-to-do bayside neighborhood of Buena Vista, was a stable, white,
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working-class neighborhood with a small population of blacks living on the western edge of the
community. In the 1960s, however, Edison-Little River began to change, the first stage in the
transformation that would ultimately produce Little Haiti.245
Two new groups started settling in Edison-Little River in the 1960s. African Americans
displaced by the demolition of their homes (a phase in the redevelopment campaign of the
historic black neighborhood of Overtown) made their way to Edison-Little River. Other African
Americans, uprooted by the construction of Interstate 95, were also forced to relocate in EdisonLittle River and the surrounding neighborhoods of Brownsville and Liberty City. In addition,
Cubans increasingly made their home in the neighborhood in the 1960s, joining the growing
number of low-income blacks. White residents’ response was to flee, leaving only the poorest
and the most elderly whites in the neighborhood. Many businesses followed, taking with them
the economic foundation of the community. The once mainly white neighborhood had become
more than one-third Latin and black by 1970. By 1980, Edison-Little River had shifted further
from the “tri-ethnic community” it had been a decade earlier to an area that had become 70 to 80
percent black.246
The addition of Haitians to Edison-Little River was a significant cause of the sizable
increase of black residents throughout the 1970s. By the end of the decade, there were eight
thousand Haitian households in the neighborhood, making Haitians 40 to 50 percent of the
overall black population of Edison-Little River. Although the neighborhood was impoverished
and crowded, the high concentration of blacks and Cubans made Edison-Little River more open
245

Alex Stepick, The Business Community of Little Haiti, Occasional Papers Series, Dialogues 32 (Miami: Latin
American and Caribbean Center, Florida International University, Feb. 1984), 8.
246

Behavioral Science Research Institute, Demography, Social Status, Housing and Social Needs of the Haitian
Population of Edison-Little River (Miami, FL: City of Miami, 1983), 1-3; Yetta Deckelbaum, “Little Haiti: The
Evolution of a Community” (master’s thesis, Florida Atlantic University, Aug. 1983), 45, 47; Stepick, Business
Community of Little Haiti, 8.

107
to Haitians than many other Miami neighborhoods. Furthermore, the exodus of white residents
and the accompanying capital flight in the 1960s and 1970s had lowered real estate values,
making Edison-Little River one of the most affordable neighborhoods for Haitians arriving in the
1970s. With the Haitian population booming after 1977, Edison-Little River began the next
stage in its metamorphosis. The landscape of the neighborhood began to reflect the emergence
of Little Haiti. Notre Dame Academy, a Catholic girls’ school and convent, became the Notre
Dame D’Haiti. The Grace Methodist Church became Eglise Baptiste Haitienne Emmenual, and
the formerly white, middle-class residential complex, the Sabal Palm Villas, became the Haitian
Village. By the early 1980s, the Miami neighborhood of Little Haiti had become well known as
the center of Haitian life in South Florida.247
The population growth of Little Haiti and the surrounding neighborhoods put pressure on
an already troubled housing situation. One result was that Haitians arriving in the late 1970s and
early 1980s were forced to pay high rental rates for the limited number of available units.248 To
negotiate this difficult housing situation, Haitians shared apartments with friends and relatives.
In addition to overcrowding and high rental costs, a large number of the newly arrived refugees
cited vermin infestation as the worst housing problem they faced (54 percent in one group of
fifty-four Haitians and 62 percent in another group of fifty-two). One-quarter to one-third
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identified the poor condition of their housing as a major problem and roughly one in five claimed
that the dangerous neighborhood was a problem for them in Miami.249
However, beyond the significant problems related to housing, an even greater problem
for Haitians was employment or rather, unemployment. In a 1983 profile of the Haitian
population living in the Edison-Little River area, the Miami Behavioral Science Research
Institute reported that approximately one-third to one-half of Haitians able to work were
unemployed.250 This estimate did not include the huge wave of Haitians that came during the
Cuban-Haitian influx of 1980 (discussed below); for them, the unemployment level exceeded 50
percent. Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick placed the unemployment number at 58.5 percent
among 1980 Haitian entrants and noted that Haitian women were disproportionately represented
among the jobless. (Eighty percent of Haitian women among the 1980 entrants were
unemployed as compared to one-third of Haitian men.)251 Part of the problem, as identified by
investigators from Metropolitan Dade County, was that Haitians arriving in 1980 were “poorly
trained in job skills that are necessary for anything but the most rudimentary positions . . . [and
they possessed] few marketable skills and little proficiency in English.”252 It also didn’t help that
the arrival of the 1980 Cubans and Haitians coincided with an economic recession, another likely
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cause for the climbing unemployment rate throughout Miami. Unemployment in Dade County
went from 6.3 percent in 1979 to 10.5 percent in July 1980, and even before that spike, in 1979
non-white Miamians (not counting Hispanics) were already disproportionately unemployed at
9.3 percent.253
Considering these unemployment levels among Miami Haitians, it is not surprising that
two-thirds of those targeted in one 1982 study of the Haitian community reported “finding work”
as their biggest problem in the United States.254 Still, these unemployment figures might not
give an entirely accurate picture of the work experience of those Haitians that self-identified as
“unemployed.” Many of these Haitians, this same study reports, were not unemployed but
underemployed, working in the informal sector, doing small-scale work, or laboring on a
temporary or job-by-job basis. Since many Haitians did not consider such short-term, seasonal,
or informal work to be “having a job,” they described themselves as unemployed.255
With no clear division between unemployment and underemployment in the Haitian
community, it is hard to tell how many Haitians could find no work at all. What is clear is that at
least two-thirds of the Haitians in the workforce were either unemployed or underemployed.
Underemployed Haitians were concentrated overwhelmingly in either the secondary sector or the
informal sector: 84.2 percent of employed Haitians held a job in one of these two employment
sectors in the early 1980s.256 Secondary sector employment in manufacturing consisted of
working in small and medium-sized firms that were usually non-union, doing low-wage, labor-
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intensive work, like operating a sewing machine in Miami’s garment industry. Certain service
jobs, including unskilled, low-wage positions in hotels and restaurants, were also considered to
be secondary sector employment.257
The informal sector also relied upon low-wage, unskilled and semi-skilled labor, but it
was even more remote than secondary sector employment was from regulatory, legitimizing
institutions like the Department of Labor or the Internal Revenue Service. Informal operations
typically held no business license, paid no taxes, and remained invisible to the governmental
agencies responsible for regulating wages, hours, and workplace safety. Manufacturing workers
in the informal sector worked in Miami sweatshops where, as in the garment industry, they might
get paid by piecework rather than by hourly wage. Illegal employment existed in agricultural
work, of course, as well as in service positions in restaurants, hotels, and homes. Carpenters,
auto mechanics, laborers, farm workers, cooks, maids, factory workers, self-employed street
vendors, and many other positions represented typical jobs in Miami’s informal sector.258
Even though there was no well-developed informal sector for them to fit into when the
Haitians arrived in Miami in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the large number of both Haitians
and Cubans who arrived in 1980 were able to find work in the informal economy and so
contributed significantly to its development. With unemployment on the rise city-wide and a
large pool of undocumented and desperate refugees looking for work, the sweatshop-driven
garment industry flourished, restaurants and hotels increasingly staffed positions through “underthe-counter hiring,” and the construction industry shifted to labor provided by the informal
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sector, which allowed construction companies to go non-union. As a result, unionized labor in
Miami construction starts decreased from 90 percent to less than 10 percent in 1985.259
Haitians’ concentration in secondary and informal sector manufacturing and service jobs
meant that most worked non-union jobs for low wages. One study of the Haitian community in
the early 1980s reported that 76.9 percent of Haitians had no union at work, though 19.2 percent
of Haitians in the sample were unionized.260 In addition, Haitian workers received low wages.
The Miami Behavioral Science Research Institute found that only 12 percent of Haitian heads of
households earned more than $200 per week, 21 percent earned $150 to $199 per week, 32
percent earned $100 to $149 per week, and a full 35 percent earned less that $99 per week.261
According to these figures, almost 90 percent of Haitian heads of households earned less than
$10,400 per year ($23,500 in 2011) with the bottom 65 percent earning less than $7,748
($17,500 in 2011) per year, and the bottom third earning less than $5,148 ($11,600 in 2011)
annually. But even these calculations may overestimate the annual income of employed heads of
households since the majority of Haitians employed in the secondary and informal sectors spent
many weeks and months of the year unemployed (in the traditional sense).262 In their profile of
the South Florida Haitian community in the early 1980s, Alex Stepick and Alejandro Portes put
the median annual income among employed Haitians at just over $6700 ($15,100 in 2011).263
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Even when they combined their earnings with those of other family members or
housemates, Haitian workers rarely made enough to escape poverty. Portes and Stepick found
that 61 percent of Haitian families arriving in 1980 lived below the poverty line with almost as
many families in the broader Miami Haitian community in poverty. Such a high poverty rate
reveals that the Miami Haitian community was significantly worse off than Haitians in other
parts of the state and the country in the same period. The estimated median annual income of
$6700 for Miami Haitians was only two-thirds of Haitian incomes in other parts of Florida in
1980 and less than half of the median annual income of Haitians nationwide. Similarly, while
nearly 60 percent of Haitian families in Miami lived below the poverty line, only 40 percent of
Haitian households in other parts of the state and 25 percent nationwide lived in poverty.264
Facing such a difficult life in Miami, Haitians relied on social services and support from
organizations like the Haitian Catholic Center to find work and housing, to learn English, and to
receive childcare. In addition, new arrivals turned to family and friends already embedded in the
social networks of the Miami community. These social networks provided critical assistance in
finding jobs and housing in the city. Family and friends also provided transportation, child care
and other essential types of assistance for their newly arrived kin. Financial support (through
individual loans, in addition to those available from community credit associations) and
emotional support made kinship networks indispensible to new refugees.265 And the support of
Haitians for their friends and family was not limited to additions to the Miami community but
extended to family who remained in Haiti. Despite poverty wages and miniscule household
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incomes, one study reported that 79 percent of Miami Haitians continued to send money to
relatives back home.266
But even with the support of friends and family, Haitians struggled to survive in a city
where they saw discrimination wherever they turned. Examining Haitian refugees’ perception of
discrimination, Dade County officials reported that Haitians felt most discriminated against in
the areas of employment (hiring and wages) and housing. Half of the refugees in one group
reported experiencing discrimination when looking for employment.267 What’s more, Haitians
perceived discrimination from all Americans, not just white Americans. For those Haitians with
sufficient exposure to non-Haitians to have a basis for judgment, 39 percent reported
discrimination from black Americans with only slightly more reporting discrimination from
white Americans (41.4 percent).268
Native born Miamians’ hostility toward the Haitians stemmed from anxiety about their
place in a city fraught with ethnic and racial tension. Many saw the Haitians as yet another
faction that would compete for power, jobs, and resources and further destabilize and divide the
already fractious city. Many of Miami’s white Americans feared the growing number and power
of the city’s Cubans and did not welcome another non-American and non-white group to the city.
At the same time, many black Americans in Miami already felt themselves to be third-class
citizens in this historically white-dominated and more recently, immigrant-dominated city.
Adding another immigrant group to the mix, many native-born blacks feared, would only lessen
their chances for advancement. A tuberculosis scare that swept Miami in the late 1970s gave
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native-born residents further reason to fear the growing Haitian population. Rumors flew around
the city that the growing population of newly arrived Haitians carried tuberculosis and would
spread the disease. Business owners quickly fired the Haitians they had hired to work in their
restaurants and hotels, magnifying the image of Haitians as disease-ridden and dangerous.269
But conflict and mistreatment of Haitians on the job existed well before the tuberculosis
scare. As early as 1975 the New York Times reported that “tales of exploitation are common”
among Haitians: “a man promised $8 a day wages for farm work drives off with a truckload of
Haitians who later report they are paid almost nothing.”270 As soon as they began offering legal
services, organizations serving the Haitian community were flooded with complaints from
Haitian workers that they had been underpaid or not paid at all, that they had gone up to a month
working in a local factory without being paid, or that they had been fired just before they became
eligible for vacation.271
As at work, in school young Haitians encountered discrimination. In his study of a high
school sitting on the border between Little Haiti and the neighborhood of Liberty City, a
predominantly African American neighborhood, Alex Stepick found that “students severely
ridiculed and beat up anyone who looked Haitian or spoke Creole or accented English. African
American students mocked newly arrived Haitian boys for playing soccer instead of football and
basketball.” In periods of the most extreme anti-Haitian discrimination, this sort of treatment led
many young people to try to cover up their Haitian origins and to pass as African American. 272
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For Haitians in Miami in the 1970s and early 1980s, life was difficult. Poor housing and
working conditions, unemployment and underemployment, low wages, poverty, and
discrimination were everyday challenges. And added to this was the fear of arrest and
deportation. At the end of the 1970s, life in Miami was for most Haitians a precarious existence.

1980: A Moment of Crisis and Advance
In 1980 the current of Haitian boat people flowing to Miami surged. As has already been
observed, in March alone 1,366 Haitians arrived in Florida and 326 arrived in a single day in
April.273 By the time the flood of refugees slowed, as many as 30,000 more Haitians had settled
in South Florida. In the same year 130,000 Cuban refugees also arrived in Miami, a parallel
migration that had a tremendous impact on local and national politics and assisted the asylum
campaign in winning some consequential legal and political victories.274 In the history of
Haitians in the United States, 1980 was a signal year.
Part of what set the stage for the massive influx of Haitian and Cuban refugees was the
passage of a new piece of legislation that raised the cap on refugee admissions, more than
doubling the number allowed in the country, and that redefined the category of refugee to include
“anyone who had a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion in their home nation.” This change
was designed to bring US refugee law in line with international standards as determined by the
United Nations Protocol and Convention on Refugees. It was also an attempt to placate Haitian
asylum activists and others who repeatedly objected to US refugee policy for its bias in favor of
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those fleeing communist countries and against those escaping nations controlled by US allies.
Although the Refugee Act of 1980 did away with the preference given to those fleeing
communist countries in the law, this preference continued in policy.275
In the spring of 1980, under pressure from tens of thousands clamoring to leave Cuba,
President Fidel Castro authorized their exit, dismissing the would-be refugees as “the scum of
the country.” This opening created a mass exodus of Cubans to the United States, most of whom
traveled through the port of Mariel, which earned them the nickname marielitos. The Carter
administration’s initial response toward the new refugees might best be characterized as
ambivalent. Ronald Copeland, a staff member working for the US coordinator for refugee affairs
when the Cuban refugee crisis occurred, explained that the administration was “uncertain
whether to exploit the boatlift because it offered a propaganda edge over Cuban Premier Fidel
Castro or to discourage it because it presented an unlawful and unmanageable situation for the
government.” Thus, the US government initially withheld refugee status for the Cuban
marielitos but allowed their entry.276 However, the local response to the Cuban refugees seemed
less ambivalent as officials mobilized to receive them. Florida Governor Bob Graham declared a
state of emergency. Centers to process and assist the refugees were erected around Miami. The
city’s football stadium was converted to a massive processing and aid center. Ultimately
President Carter lifted the cap on refugees just established by the new refugee law to
accommodate the marielitos. “We’ll continue to provide an open heart and open arms to
refugees seeking freedom from Communist domination and from the economic deprivation
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brought about by Fidel Castro and his government,” Carter proclaimed.277
Thousands of Haitians were also seeking refuge in Miami each month in the spring of
1980, and with US expansion of its refugee definition, Haitians wanted to know if immigration
officials and the Carter administration were prepared to give the Haitians as warm a welcome as
they were giving to the Cuban marielitos. To press their case, in May, Haitian activists returned
to Washington to stage a protest outside the White House. Building on the momentum of the
growing asylum campaign, members of the refugee movement sought to take advantage of this
exceptional moment when the president of the United States was ignoring the just established
limits on refugee admission and was calling America “a country of refugees.”278 If the United
States was willing to embrace those fleeing “Communist domination and . . . economic
deprivation brought about by Fidel Castro and his government,” what about those fleeing
violence and economic ruin in Haiti? Antoine Adrien of the Haitian Fathers, one of the
organizers of the May demonstration in front of the White House, explained the movement’s
indignation at the ongoing exclusion of Haitians. "For eight years, 13,000 Haitians have been
knocking at America's door. Within 10 days, 25,000 Cubans have arrived and have been granted
everything. We simply cannot understand Mr. Carter.”279
As in Washington, in Miami the refugee campaign was elevating its profile, in part
through support from an increasingly diverse set of city leaders. In March 1980 the Puerto Rican
mayor of Miami, Maurice Ferre, sent an urgent telegram to President Carter, enjoining him to
instruct his attorney general to “exercise his parole authority to grant group refugee status –
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political asylum to South Florida’s approximately 10,000 Haitian refugees [emphasis in the
original].” Carter needed to listen to the voices of “black, Hispanic, religious, and political
leaders [that] have each called forcefully for political asylum,” Ferre insisted, citing
“uncontradicted, massive evidence presented before U.S. District Court, the Organization of
American States, the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy and U.S. Congress
[that] confirms Haitians are ‘political’ not ‘economic’ refugees subject to severe persecution –
imprisonment and even death – upon deportation.” Ferre’s statement also revealed concern over
the economic impact of ten thousand undocumented Haitians, unable to work legally in the city:
“starvation is now the primary health problem in the local South Florida Haitian community.”
Ferre argued that “political asylum is the only practical and moral solution to these
problems.”280 A statement issued by Lucrezia Granda, president of the YWCA of Greater Miami
and Dade County and executive committee member of the Spanish-American League against
Discrimination, also shows that some Cubans backed the Haitians’ bid for asylum and
illuminates their motives in doing so:
As a Cuban who has been through the process of being a political exile myself, I have the
most profound sympathy for the unfortunate situation of the Haitian refugees. It is the
tradition of the United States to receive and welcome refugees in flight from persecution–
political refugees – and in accord with this excellent tradition, the Haitians should be
granted political asylum. They should, quite simply, be treated in the same manner in
which other groups of refugees, including but not limited to the Cuban refugees, have
been treated.281
The Haitian refugee campaign also continued to cultivate its growing partnership with
African American leaders and organizations. Less than a year earlier, the Washington Post had
reported that Haitians and their black American allies were forging “a new civil rights
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movement” in South Florida. As the campaign escalated in the spring of 1980, it continued to
receive support from leading African Americans. In mid-April, Vernon Jordan Jr., president of
the National Urban League, sent a telegram to the White House urging President Carter to “move
immediately to exercise your emergency powers to grant political refugee status to the thousands
of Haitians who have arrived and will continue to arrive in this country in flight from their native
land.”282 At the same time, Jesse Jackson arrived in Miami to support the Haitians’ cause. On
two consecutive days of protest, more than 1,000 people jammed the streets of Miami to call for
asylum for the Haitian boat people, of whom a record 975 had arrived in the previous ten days.
Continuing to capitalize on a racial explanation for the refugee crisis that brought Haitians and
black Americans together, Jackson told a crowd of 1,100 people gathered at the Mount Zion
Baptist Church that US policy toward the Haitians was not determined by “politics or economics
. . . [T]he distinction is whether you’re black or whether you’re white.” The gathering also sang
“We Shall Overcome,” a program choice that would have carried more meaning for the African
Americans in attendance than for the Haitians.283
In the spring of 1980, the refugee campaign wasn’t the only thing animating black
residents of Miami. In an extraordinary confluence of events, the mass arrival of Cuban and
Haitian refugees in Miami occurred just as another event was about to enflame racial and ethnic
tensions in an already divided city. On May 17, jury members delivered a verdict in the trial of
four Miami police officers charged with the death of Arthur McDuffie, a thirty-three-year-old
black insurance agent who five months earlier had been chased, arrested, and brutally beaten to
death after he had rolled through a red light and allegedly had made “an obscene gesture” toward
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nearby police. The four police officers were declared not guilty and acquitted of all charges.
With black unemployment at 17 percent (double the rate of white unemployment), and with
anger growing over incident after incident of police abuse, the police officers’ acquittal was the
last straw for black Americans in Miami. In several days of violence and destruction, black
Miamians unleashed their rage on the city. When the “McDuffie riots” were finally over,
eighteen people were dead and rioters had caused millions of dollars of damage.284
Black Americans cited the privileged status of Cubans and the unequal treatment of
Haitians in comparison as part of what triggered their uprising. Wellington Rolle, a community
activist in Miami, explained how he thought the Cubans contributed to black marginalization.
“We are third-class citizens in our own country,” he said. “At least in other cities blacks are
second class. But here, we’re not even up to that.” James McQueen, a black attorney in Miami,
agreed. "The Cubans have been given everything by the government. But the Haitians have
been shuttled off to jails and detention centers, denied the right to work, and treated like trash.
Black people here see that, and they figure that the only reason Haitians get that kind of
treatment is because they're black, too. The people know it's not fair."285
In the wake of the “McDuffie Riots,” Haitians and black Americans continued to find
common cause. When President Jimmy Carter visited Miami less than two months after the riot,
Haitians joined black and white Americans for a protest organized by the Miami Coalition for
Racial Justice. Chanting in English and Creole, the group called on Carter to increase assistance
to the city beyond the $71 million pledged for federal aid for riot recovery. Members of the
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group linked the problems facing Haitians and black Americans. "We need political asylum for
Haitians. We need jobs for blacks,” declared Christian Louis, a twenty-year-old Haitian refugee.
The Miami Coalition also criticized the NAACP for choosing to hold its national convention in
Miami after the May riots had exposed the racial injustice of the city.286
The Haitian refugee movement also continued to receive support from African American
leaders in Washington, another valuable tool in the campaign to pressure the Carter
administration into a policy change. In an “Open Letter to the Haitian Community,” Shirley
Chisholm, the chairperson of the Congressional Black Caucus’s Task Force on Haitian Refugees,
castigated President Carter for failing to grant Haitians refugee status by the May 15 deadline
“when his power to parole the Haitians into the U.S. as political refugees expired.” According to
Chisholm,
The President’s inaction is only a further indication of the discriminatory treatment his
administration has directed toward the Haitians in stark contrast to the hospitality shown
other refugees. Further, the connection between the racist treatment of the Haitians and
this government’s lack of concern for the injustices suffered by Black Americans is clear
and of tragic proportions.287
With the May 15 deadline past, “only new legislation can now give the Haitians currently in the
U.S. political refugee status,” Chisholm explained. “The Black Caucus is committed to
obtaining political refugee status for Haitians,” she argued, since “we believe as a matter of
principle that Haitians are as deserving of political refugee status as persons from Cuba, Indo-
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China or the Soviet Union.”288 Chisholm also demonstrated her support for the movement by
attending a demonstration in New York that drew more than one thousand people.289
Under pressure from Haitian and African American communities, confronted with the
contradiction between the treatment of the Cuban refugees and that of the Haitians, and heading
toward the homestretch of his presidential reelection campaign, President Carter agreed to a
policy change. In June 1980 Carter formed a Cuban-Haitian Task Force, which linked policies
governing the two groups of refugees and created a new “Cuban-Haitian entrant” status for those
who arrived in the spring’s flood of refugees. Equalizing their status gave both Cuban and
Haitian “entrants” access to federal benefits, resources for resettlement and training, the ability to
receive medical and financial support, and the ever critical right to work.290 While some in the
Haitian community dismissed Carter’s action as a “wishy-washy policy” that aimed “to avoid
upsetting any voting constituency before the November elections” and while the action applied
to a limited number of refugees – only those arriving before June 19, 1980, were eligible for
“entrant” status, the creation of the Cuban-Haitian entrant program was nonetheless a crucial step
forward for the asylum campaign for Haitian refugees.291
Carter’s creation of the Cuban-Haitian entrant program was also the administration’s
effort to prepare for a much anticipated legal ruling on the status of the Haitian refugees that was
expected later that summer. In Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, refugee advocates challenged
the legality of the Haitian Program, the government’s measure that aimed at dispatching the
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growing backlog of Haitian asylum cases by accelerating hearings and deportation proceedings.
Attorneys from the Haitian Refugee Center and the National Center for Immigrants Rights
claimed the US government was guilty of
systematic violation of regulation in the attempt to rush the Haitians through asylum and
deportation hearings, deprivation of counsel by mass scheduling of asylum interviews
and deportation hearings, failure to inform the Haitians of their right to counsel and
remain silent before interrogation [as well as] failure to maintain prior asylum decisions
[and] incarcerations of Haitians who asserted their Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination.292
In July 1979 District Court Judge William M. Hoeveler had issued a restraining order
temporarily halting the Haitian Program. Now, in July of 1980, Judge James L. King was
prepared to issue a ruling in Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti.293
When Judge King’s ruling finally was delivered, it was a major victory for the Haitian
refugees. The government’s treatment of the Haitians revealed a “pattern of discrimination,” the
court ruled. “Much of the evidence is both shocking and brutal, populated by the ghosts of
individual Haitians – including those who have been returned from the U.S. – who have been
beaten, tortured and left to die in Haitian prisons.” This “callous” policy toward the Haitians,
Judge King ruled, ignored the truth that Haitians’ “economic situation is a political condition . . .
The manner in which INS treated the more than 4,000 Haitian plaintiffs violated the
Constitution, the immigration statues, international agreements, INS regulations and INS
operating procedures. It must stop,” ruled Judge King. Based on this conclusion, the court
halted Haitian deportations and ordered the INS to initiate hearings to revisit the Haitian cases
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that had received less than fair treatment.294 Following Judge King’s ruling, the legal system
continued to favor the refugees when in October another federal court ruling restored Haitians’
right to work in Florida.295
By the fall things looked hopeful for Haitian refugees and their advocates. The new
refugee law, the growing backing for the refugee campaign, Carter’s move to equalize Cuban
and Haitian entrants, and especially the movement’s legal victories further established that the
cause of Haitian refugees had grown into a formidable social and political movement. Assessing
the state of the campaign for the Haitian refugees in September 1980, Phillip Buskirk of the
American Friends Service Committee observed,
Led by the Congressional Black Caucus, National Council of Churches, National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the Archbishop of Miami – and
backed by most of the Florida Congressional delegation, many national denominations,
the Dade County Commission, the Greater Miami Jewish Federation – and groups
throughout the country, “Asylum for Haitian Refugees” has become a movement of some
power.296
At the same time, there were signs that the international opposition to Duvalier was becoming
increasingly coordinated. In May 1980 activists representing Haitian exile organizations
throughout the Americas, including organizations in New York, Miami, Canada, Mexico, and the
Dominican Republic, met in Mexico City to plan the “First Inter-Continental Conference of
Solidarity with Haiti,” calling upon “Haitians of all countries, including those born abroad . . . to
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hold hands, think together, combine our forces and work as one body toward the liberation of our
dear mother country.”297
If in the spring of 1980 the refugee campaign and the anti-Duvalier opposition in exile
seemed to be gathering real strength, it was the result of the activism of the past decade that had
brought the related movements to that point. In the1970s a refugee crisis had reshaped the
terrain of Haitian politics in the United States and had drawn many of the leading activists in
New York into the campaign to obtain refuge for those fleeing Haiti. In the course of the
campaign, these activists put together a broad coalition of religious, labor, and civil rights
organizations. Though committed to defending their compatriots from what they saw as abuse
by the US government, activists in New York and the developing Haitian community of Miami
also recognized the refugee movement as a useful political tool to press for political change in
Haiti. This recognition was the beginning of the movement that treated refugee rights in the
United States and political change in Haiti as intertwined parts of a single political movement.
From 1976 to 1980, activists in New York and Miami strengthened their ties through their
cooperation in the refugee movement; at the same time, a slight political opening that coincided
with the Carter presidency allowed increased action by anti-Duvalier activists in Haiti and an
accompanying strengthening of ties between movement activists in Haiti and in the United
States. A movement that would connect New York, Miami, and Haiti was beginning to form.
Just as the plight of the Haitian refugees in the 1970s had given Haitian activists in the
United States new opportunities for political action, the refugee crisis of 1980 gave them the
opportunity to highlight the disparity between the US government’s treatment of Cuban and
Haitian refugees and, in the process, to continue to cultivate support from black Americans,
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many of whom joined forces with the Haitians in response to what they saw as racist and
discriminatory policies at both the local and the federal levels. In 1980 the refugee movement
achieved some significant legislative and legal victories. Along with the burgeoning resistance
movement that was developing in Haiti and that was supported by the Haitian communities in
the United States, a new day seemed finally to be dawning for Haitians.
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Chapter 3
Building the Opposition, Uprooting the Dictator: Resistance and Revolution in
New York, Miami, and Haiti, 1980-1986
On the morning of Sunday, November 30, 1980, the streets of Port-au-Prince were
unusually quiet: “deserted,” in fact, according to one report. The government was arresting
political dissidents, people said. Haitians listening to Radio Haiti-Inter, the station featuring the
popular opposition journalist Jean Dominique, had heard reports that Dominique had disappeared
at 11 a.m. the previous Friday and that the Haiti-Inter’s station manager, Richard Brisson, had
been arrested hours later. After Radio Haiti-Inter began reporting on the disappearance of
Dominique and the arrest of Brisson, the Haitian military arrived and arrested everyone in the
building. This time listeners heard no report of the arrests since there was no one left to deliver
the information. The album that was playing at the time simply came to an end; for forty-five
minutes listeners heard the eerie sound of a record spinning, until the station went off the air.
Though there were few other official reports of the wave of arrests sweeping Port-au-Prince that
weekend, word of the crackdown spread quickly by word of mouth. The opening for opposition
activity that had developed in the late 1970s, best symbolized by the outspoken criticism of the
Duvalier regime by radio journalists like Jean Dominique, was over, it seemed. And since no
one knew how extensive the government’s crackdown would be, it was best to stay indoors for
the time being.298
The Arrival of Reagan: “the Dance is Over”
On November 4, 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected president of the United States, an
election that was to have a substantial impact in Haiti. When it came to Haiti’s economic
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program, the Reagan administration maintained the policy the United States had had since the
late 1960s, still promoting agricultural production and manufacturing for export. But Reagan’s
economic vision for Haiti’s total international orientation and economic liberalization was more
extreme than his predecessors’, and he pursued initiatives to fulfill this vision in Haiti and
throughout the Caribbean. The major tool Reagan used to advance this program in Haiti and the
Caribbean was the Caribbean Basin Initiative of 1980.
The Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) aimed to promote foreign investment in countries
like Haiti, to increase international trade between the United States and the Caribbean, and to
overhaul Caribbean nations’ economies in the neoliberal model, stripping import substitution
industries and other state-subsidized operations, to promote production for export, and to
dismantle the public sector.299 To encourage Caribbean nations to increase the flow of trade to
the United States, the CBI offered duty-free access to American markets. To foreign investors,
the CBI granted tax and tariff exemptions as part of its creation of Caribbean Free Trade Zones
throughout the region. The United States also sponsored “investment opportunity missions” to
promote foreign investment, according to the CBI plan. And Haiti, American planners argued,
was a perfect model for the potential of investment and neoliberal adjustment that the initiative
advertised: the structural transformation that moved Haiti toward export-oriented agriculture and
the assembly industry was already well under way, Haiti had an abundant supply of
impoverished people, giving it a substantial “comparative advantage” in the form of cheap labor,
and it was ruled by an anti-communist strongman who ensured a pro-business environment and
political stability in the country.300
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International agencies also partnered with the US government to promote the CBI vision
for Haiti. In November 1981 the World Bank, working with the United States Agency for
International Development, the International Monetary Fund, and the Inter-American
Development Bank, created the Ad-Hoc Subgroup on Haiti, an organization with the goal of
increasing foreign investment in Haiti and of speeding the country down the path toward
privatization. In the same month the Overseas Private Investment Corporation sponsored an
“investment opportunity mission,” which brought the representatives of twenty US-based
corporations to the country. The National Office for Promotion of Investments, joining the effort
to paint Haiti as an ideal place for foreign investment, reminded corporate representatives that in
Haiti “strikes are almost unheard of, and trade unions . . . are of little importance in the
manufacturing industry.” Florida Governor Bob Graham even pitched foreign investment in
Haiti as a potential solution to the refugee crisis in Florida, claiming that the sort of economic
development promised by the CBI and the Ad-Hoc Subgroup on Haiti might be the key to
stemming the flood of refugees to US shores.301
While the Reagan administration’s initiatives under the CBI did succeed in carving out a
greater portion of Haiti for foreign investment, it did not substantially improve the lives of
ordinary Haitians nor did it fulfill Governor Graham’s hopes for a solution to the refugee crisis.
In fact, the increased foreign investment and international orientation merely intensified the push
factors that had been forcing Haitians to flee the country since the early 1970s.
The election of Reagan and the departure of Carter also invited a change in the political
orientation of the Duvalier regime, another factor that had major implications for the flow of
Haitians attempting to reach the United States. Highly critical of the Carter administration’s
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attempts to employ the principle of human rights in its policy toward Latin America and the
world, the Reagan administration pledged to get tough on leftist governments and to reinstitute
support for the United States’ anti-communist allies. In the Western Hemisphere the
administration’s primary focus was on Central America, where Reagan sought to reverse the
revolution in Nicaragua by helping to strengthen the right-wing forces in neighboring El
Salvador as well as in Guatemala. “Central America was a gauge of the United States’ global
position,” Odd Arne Westad observes. “If it failed there, the Cold War in the Third World was
lost.”302 President Reagan, in a meeting with Cuban-American leaders, put it this way: “Central
America and the Caribbean are of utmost strategic importance to the United States. If we don’t
give friends so close to home the means to defend themselves against Soviet-supported
insurgents, who will trust us anywhere in the world, especially in the Middle East and
Europe?”303 American officials had also been warily monitoring other developments in the
Caribbean, such as the ascendance for a period in the 1970s of the left-leaning People’s National
Party in Jamaica and the seizing of power by radical leaders in Grenada in 1979.304
Reagan’s commitment to roll back the Nicaraguan revolution and the broader leftward tilt
in the region, and his repudiation of Carter’s human rights-oriented foreign policy had a major
impact on Latin America and the Caribbean; Haiti was no exception. With Reagan’s election,
the slight opening the opposition movement had experienced during the Carter years slammed
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shut. As Daniel Huttinot recalls, “Carter loses, Reagan comes, and the Haitian government says,
‘The dance is over’.”305
At the end of November, just weeks after Reagan won the presidency, Duvalier
unleashed a massive crackdown on opposition organizations and the independent press.
Announcing that it was responding to a “communist plot,” part of which was being advanced by
“two Cuban agents” who, it reported, had been arrested, the Haitian government attacked and
arrested opposition figures and forced a new wave of political exiles to flee Haiti for safe haven
abroad. The Centre Autonome des Travailleurs Haitien (CATH), a leading Haitian labor union
that had been rebuilding, came again under attack and CATH leaders were forced into exile. The
independent press, which had been nurturing the nascent grassroots movement, became a
particular target. Many of the leading voices of the opposition were forced to leave Haiti, joining
the Haitian community in exile during the months following Reagan’s election.306
To Jean-Claude Duvalier, as to those targeted in the wave of repression, the implications
of Reagan’s election were clear. Michele Montas, one of the journalists to take refuge in New
York, told Haiti Observateur that “the election of Ronald Reagan . . . is perceived by Haitian
officials as ‘the death of human rights’.” Speaking to an assembly of the government’s internal
security force, the Volontaires de la securite nationale (VSN), Jean-Claude Duvalier signaled
that what had been tolerated during the Carter years was finished. “We must straighten out all
those who think that liberalization means free rein, who understand democratization to mean
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anarchy, as if anyone can do what they please,” declared Duvalier.307 In an end-of-the-year
retrospective entitled “1980, the Year of Repression,” the editors of Haiti Observateur declared
that “history books will record that Haiti’s so-called liberalization program came to a screeching
halt at year-end 1980 as the Duvalier regime unleashed a wave of repression to silence its
critics.”308
While the massive crackdown of 1980 and 1981 had a devastating effect on the budding
opposition movement in Haiti, it stimulated an even closer connection between the domestic
resistance movement and the anti-Duvalier opposition in exile. When the Haitian government
deported twenty-three leading dissidents and many others fled on their own, the Haitian
community in New York received and supported the exiled journalists and activists forced to flee
their country, remembers Marie Lily Cerat.309 Duvalier’s 1980 crackdown and the subsequent
flight of activists to New York produced what Kim Ives called “the first really major crosspollination of the internal struggle and the external [movement].”310 Figures like Gregoire
Eugene and Jean-Jacques Honorat, activists associated with the anti-Duvalier resistance in Haiti,
joined the resistance in exile. Also forced into exile, Marcus Garcia, dissident journalist and
chief editor of Radio Metropole, carried his political and journalistic skills to the United States,
founding in 1986 the Miami-based newspaper Haiti en Marche, a publication which, like Haiti
Observateur and Haiti Progres, maintained a narrow focus on Haiti and facilitated the
communication between Haitians inside and outside the country. Furthermore, Haitian activists

307

Dupuy, Haiti in the World Economy, 185; DeWind and Kinley, Aiding Migration, 135.

308

“Retrospectives: 1980, the Year of Repression.” See also Trouillot, Haiti: State against Nation, 242.

309

Cerat, interview; Greg Chamberlain, “Up by the Roots,” NACLA Report on the Americas, May/June 1987, 20,
box 1, folder 2, Amy Wilentz Collection.
310

Ives, interview.

133
in New York who had been hearing reports and commentary by Jean Dominique on L’Ayisyen
now had Dominique and his wife and fellow journalist, Michele Montas, alongside them at
meetings and demonstrations.311
The combined effect of Reagan’s economic policies toward Haiti and the intensified
repression that accompanied Reagan’s election to office created the conditions for an even
greater surge in the number of Haitian refugees than the one that had occurred from the late
1970s through 1980. To deal with the continuing flood of Haitian boat people attempting to
reach American shores, the Reagan administration decided to implement another policy
regarding Haitians. In September 1981, President Reagan issued an executive order instructing
the US Coast Guard to patrol the sea passage between Haiti and Florida and to interdict boats of
refugees attempting to reach the United States. Captured refugees were to be brought aboard the
US vessel, interviewed (without access to legal counsel), and, depending on their eligibility for
asylum, either be allowed to enter the United States or be returned to Haiti. Michel Laguerre has
documented that in the first ten years following the creation of Reagan’s “interdiction” program,
American officials conducted twenty-four thousand such asylum interviews at sea. Only twentyeight refugees were allowed to enter the United States to pursue asylum. The rest were returned
immediately to Haiti.312 As a result of Reagan’s interdiction program as well as of the
administration’s determination to intensify efforts to jail and deport virtually all undocumented
Haitians already in the United States, the number of Haitians attempting to reach Florida by boat
311
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declined substantially in 1981 from many thousands the previous year to only hundreds annually
for much of the rest of the decade.313
The Reagan administration’s new interdiction program, its increased efforts to imprison
and deport undocumented Haitians, and the belief that the US government was backing
Duvalier’s campaign of repression spurred Haitians in the United States to take action. In New
York the Haitian Fathers, members of En Avant and producers of L’ Heure Haitienne (or
L’Ayisyen), Raymond Joseph’s Haiti Observateur, and nine other leading political organizations
came together under the banner of the Ad Hoc Committee Against Repression in Haiti.314 On
December 6, 1980, members of the Ad Hoc Committee, along with others groups, including
Benjamin Dupuy’s Mouvement Haitien Liberation (MHL), staged a demonstration in Brooklyn
to “protest against the repression now taking place in Haiti . . . [to] underline the terrible
consequences of [President Reagan’s] statements on human rights” and to urge “Amnesty
International and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to protect the lives of Haitian
political prisoners and all Haitian people.”315 In Miami, Haitian activists continued to build upon
the partnership they had forged with members of the black American community, holding their
own demonstration to call on the US government to reestablish its commitment to human rights,
to end its support for the Duvalier dictatorship, and to grant asylum to Haitian refugees.
Marching through downtown Miami, demonstrators chanted, "Freedom for Haitian people.
Freedom for black people. Freedom for all people.” Bill Perry, president of the local NAACP
chapter, announced, "We [have] joined not only to support Haitian efforts for political asylum,
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but to get our country to use its policies with Haiti to relieve pressure on the Haitians." The
Reverend Gerard Jean-Juste of the Haitian Refugee Center affirmed the unity of Haitians and
black Americans that the asylum campaign had been cultivating. "More and more black
Americans understand that the Haitian struggle is their struggle and we understand that the black
struggle is our struggle," said Jean-Juste. "We can't let the struggle be lost."316
At the national level, too, Reagan’s policy toward Haiti and Haitian refugees caused
African American leaders to publicly challenge the administration. The Congressional Black
Caucus, whose members had been among the first political leaders to support the refugees’
cause, sent a letter to President Reagan protesting the policy of interdiction. At the same time,
the CBC issued a press release with the title “Congressional Black Caucus Charges Interdiction
Racist and Inhumane.” Congressman Walter E. Fauntroy, chairman of the Caucus, stated, “It
seems hypocritical to urge Southeast Asian nations to fulfill their commitments as countries of
first asylum . . . while the U.S. intercepts Black refugees on the high seas.” He added that the
CBC was weighing the possibility of legal action against the new policy.317 The NAACP also
sought to apply pressure on the Reagan administration to reverse its policies toward the Haitians.
In a November 1981 letter to President Reagan, Benjamin L Hooks, executive director of the
NAACP, called the president’s Haitian policy “clearly discriminatory, because it amplifies a
pattern which, for the last five years has singled out Haitian refugees for special and harsh
treatment unlike any other refugees and in spite of the fact that we have welcomed more than a
half million refugees from elsewhere in the past two years.” Hooks concluded by urging the
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president “to reverse your announced order and give asylum to Haitian refugees . . . [and to]
cease the blanket reference to Haitians as illegal immigrants.”318
As the movement to challenge the Reagan administration’s foreign and immigration
policies escalated in the early 1980s, the Krome Avenue Detention Center in the Florida
Everglades, just southwest of the city of Miami, became a central site in the struggle. A
decommissioned US Air Force base, Krome was turned into an immigration detention center in
1980 in order to handle the influx of Cuban and Haitian refugees that arrived in Miami in the
spring of that year. In the same year, the Dade County Department of Health ordered Krome
closed due to overcrowding and poor health conditions within the center, but the federal
government refused to follow the directive and continued to use the facility to house people who
were charged with immigration violations or who were awaiting hearings. As the Reagan
administration stepped up its efforts to detain those who were in the country illegally, the Krome
Avenue Detention Center filled up with Haitians and thus became the locus of struggle in South
Florida for Haitian activists and their American supporters.319
A key participant in the campaign for freedom and fair treatment for the Haitians
imprisoned at Krome was the Reverend Gerard Jean-Juste. Jean-Juste had come to the United
States by way of Canada after leaving Haiti at the age of fourteen. In 1971 Jean-Juste was
ordained into the priesthood of the Catholic Church in New York City, making him the first
Haitian priest to be ordained in the United States. He returned to Haiti soon after Francois
Duvalier’s death, where he immediately threw himself into politics, supporting a campaign by
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striking bus drivers. The next year Jean-Juste left Haiti again, traveling to New York and then to
Boston. In 1977 he made his way to Miami, where he promptly joined the asylum fight for the
Haitian boat people. Hoping to serve the community as a Catholic priest, Jean-Juste applied
twice for a parish assignment in South Florida, but he was denied both times, an outcome that he
attributed to “religious racism” but that was more likely the result of alienation from church
leaders over Jean-Juste’s criticism of the local archbishop for not doing more to help the Haitian
refugees. The Catholic hierarchy subsequently barred Jean-Juste from saying mass. Without a
parish to serve as his base in the community, Jean-Juste directed his energy entirely toward
community organizing and building the refugee movement. In 1978 he formed Combit Liberte, a
grassroots political organization based in Little Haiti, and soon after he became the director of
the Haitian Refugee Center of Miami.320
As the director of the Haitian Refugee Center and the leader of Combit Liberte, JeanJuste continued to be the focus of much conflict and controversy. In September 1980 the
Christian Community Service Agency, the organization responsible for Miami’s Haitian Refugee
Center, fired Jean-Juste as director of the center for “incompetence and insubordination.” With
characteristic defiance, Jean-Juste challenged his dismissal, claiming his firing was more about
politics and financial control of the Haitian Refugee Center than it was about job performance.
In the campaign to win his job back, Jean-Juste and his supporters gained the backing of the
majority of the steering committee of the Haitian Refugee Center, the center’s attorneys, and key
support from leaders of the black American community, including the leaders of the local SCLC
and NAACP chapters and Congresspersons Shirley Chisholm and Walter Fauntroy, not to
mention the support of many ordinary people in the Haitian community of South Florida. With
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such broad backing, Jean-Juste launched his own, independent Haitian Refugee Center in the
heart of Little Haiti.321
As much as Jean-Juste’s stubborn outspokenness stirred up conflict, his willingness to
challenge authority also earned him a reputation among his compatriots as a fearless defender of
the Haitian people. Furthermore, the Haitian Refugee Center under the leadership of Jean-Juste
and its partner organization, Combit Libete, stood out as the leading voices for the Haitian
community of South Florida throughout the tumultuous years of the 1980s.
The Haitian Refugee Center was not the only Haitian organization providing service and
support to the community. The Haitian American Community Agency of Dade (HACAD), led
by Roger Biamby, provided legal assistance, job training, English language classes, and other
services that overlapped with the work of the Haitian Refugee Center. In fact, HACAD was able
to enlarge its role in the community precisely because of the political activism and positions
taken by Jean-Juste and the Haitian Refugee Center. Alex Stepick notes that although HACAD
was founded in 1974, its impact remained small until the “Dade County government began to
patronize it as a politically acceptable alternative to [the Haitian Refugee Center].” After that,
HACAD began to rival the Haitian Refugee Center in terms of services it provided the Haitian
community of Miami.322
But it was leaders and activists linked to the Haitian Refugee Center that led the political
activity of South Florida Haitians, and in the early 1980s, political activism centered on the
campaign to challenge the prolonged incarceration of Haitian refugees at the Krome Avenue
Detention Center. Marleine Bastien, who would in time become a leading voice of Miami’s
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Haitian community, participated in the Haitian Refugee Center’s campaign to free the Haitians at
Krome. Coming to the United States from Haiti in 1981, Bastien got involved in the politics of
the South Florida community as soon as she arrived. Part of her motivation to join the refugee
campaign came from her shock at witnessing the treatment and the experiences of Haitians in the
United States. “When I was in Haiti, I was always so interested in the US. I could recite all of
Martin Luther King’s [speeches]. I knew songs in English. I always felt so close to the US . . . I
was very close to the culture. And I thought it was such a big democracy. I really believed it,”
Bastien recalls.
So two days after I came here, I volunteered at the Haitian Refugee Center. My dad
brought me to Father Gerard Jean-Juste and said, “Here is my daughter, she is very smart.
Put her to work.” The next day I was working . . . And they were so happy to see me
because I came -- a newly arrived refugee -- and I could speak English. So, of course, the
same week I was at Krome.323
What she saw at Krome shocked and angered Bastien even more:
Big compounds. Haitians there being treated so harshly, and I could see the discrepancy
in the treatment right there. The Cubans would be released . . . a few days after they
arrived, and the Haitians were there – placed in isolation for speaking Creole or not
obeying an order quick enough because they didn’t understand.324
Conditions at Krome soon led to an escalation in the struggle against the federal
government and its treatment of the Haitian refugees. By the summer of 1981 Krome, which had
a capacity of 581, housed more than 1,000 Haitian refugees, and local and state officials
continued to press for the facility’s closure. In July Florida Governor Bob Graham sued to close
the Krome Avenue Center, but he was again rebuffed by federal authorities.325 Frustration over
deteriorating conditions and their prolonged incarceration soon roused the detainees to action.
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Another factor contributing to the fear and anger within Krome was the authorities’ decision to
transfer a growing number of Haitians to Fort Allen, a detention facility in Puerto Rico. At the
end of August, one hundred Haitians detained at Krome staged a hunger strike to protest their
ongoing incarceration. Days later, the protest turned into a full-scale uprising. To put down an
angry protest of one thousand Haitian detainees in an outdoor yard, guards fired tear gas on the
demonstrators. After forcing the guards to retreat, the Haitians rushed a rear fence, tearing it
down and pouring into the shallow Everglades water that surrounded the camp. Miami
authorities were able to recapture the Haitians, transfer the leaders of the rebellion to a “secure
area,” and ensure future stability by bringing in “riot-equipped guards” and a fifty-member
“reaction team” on loan from a Dade county federal corrections facility and the US border patrol.
Even though it was quickly subdued, the Haitian rebellion at Krome worried local authorities and
emboldened the Haitian community in their struggle for the prisoners’ freedom.326
In the next month of September, after the bodies of thirty-three Haitian refugees washed
ashore in Florida and after increasingly violent confrontations broke out at the overcrowded
Krome Avenue facility, forty-five Miami clergy representing the Greater Miami Religious
Community sent a letter to President Ronald Reagan, condemning the “concentration camp” at
Krome. “Why has the Administration allowed so many human beings to be stacked up like
dishes? Are these people being used as pawns in a political game?'' they asked. Prominent
signatories included Monsignor Bryan Walsh, executive director of the Catholic Service Bureau,
Frank Magrath, regional director of the National Conference of Christians and Jews, and the
Most Reverend Edward A. McCarthy, Archbishop of the Catholic Archdiocese of Miami. Rev.
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Conrad R. Willard, pastor of Miami's Central Baptist Church, called the imprisonment and
treatment of Haitians at Krome ''deplorable.”327
Other religious groups were also joining the outcry against the government’s treatment of
Haitian refugees. On October 30, 1981, the Inter-Religious Council, led by Dr. Claire Randall,
general secretary of the National Council of Churches, Bishop Thomas C. Kelley, general
secretary of the US Catholic Conference of Bishops, and Rabbi Bernard Mandelbaum, general
secretary of the Synagogue Council of America, sent a letter of protest to President Reagan.
“Mr. President, we deplore the return to Haiti of 56 Haitian ‘boat people’ by the U.S. Coast
Guard on October 26,” the letter stated. It went on, “The recently announced policy of
‘interdicting’ small boats from Haiti also violated the fundamental principles for which this
nation stands. We recall clearly the outcry from the United States and the world community
when the governments of Malaysia and Thailand ‘interdicted’ small leaky boats fleeing from
Vietnam.” The religious leaders also addressed the government’s treatment of Haitians
imprisoned in Krome and other facilities throughout the United States. “Certainly, fundamental
ideals of this country have been forgotten when Haitian asylum seekers are incarcerated on a
long-term basis in Federal prisons or on isolated military facilities. This action is unprecedented
in our nation’s history and it is clearly discriminatory.”328
In the last days of December, another violent confrontation between guards and
Haitian prisoners further spotlighted the crisis at the Krome Avenue facility, which, according
to some, portended a growing rebellion within the larger Haitian community. On Christmas
Eve, 650 prisoners at Krome launched another hunger strike. To support the action, activists
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gathered outside the facility’s gates, insisting on access to the hunger strikers to ensure their
health and safety. When the activists were denied entrance, more than two hundred broke
through the security divide and had begun to tear down the outer fence before they were met
by riot police with clubs and tear gas. In the melee more than 100 imprisoned Haitians
escaped and twelve acres of land surrounding the facility were set ablaze.329
Haitian Miami was about to explode, community leaders warned. "The frustration is
getting over the limit . . . it’s overboard now,” said Rev. Gerard Jean-Juste. Viter Juste, a
business owner and well-known leader of Haitian Miami, agreed. Though Haitians were “hard
working” and “cooperative,” an exasperated Juste explained, “our backs are against the wall.
We have come to the point where only violence will make them understand."330 Newsweek
informed readers that the Haitian movement in South Florida was growing in size and
intensifying in violence. The magazine also reported that “outside pressure groups” and
“national civil rights figures” were joining the Haitians in their campaign. “Haitians’ Anger
Reaches a Boiling Point” proclaimed the Associated Press.331
Despite the expanding asylum campaign, the Reagan administration was determined
to maintain its policy toward the Haitians. A “fair but firm decision on how the law should be
applied” was the best way to defuse the explosive situation argued Associate Attorney
General Rudolph Giuliani. What’s more, the administration’s policies had demonstrated
success, Giuliani claimed, and the numbers spoke for themselves. A mere 47 Haitians had
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been apprehended on Florida’s shores in November 1981, down from 1,021 one year earlier.
This fact demonstrated that the Reagan administration’s interdiction policy, combined with its
refusal to release undocumented Haitians into the community, was having the intended
impact. People in Haiti knew that they would not be granted freedom in the United States, he
continued, even if they were able to make it past the Coast Guard stationed off the Haitian
coast. Denying accusations of bias, Giuliani argued that Haitians did not qualify under the
law for asylum. Haitians “came to the United States in search of better jobs and housing, not
to flee political persecution,” he claimed. And, Giuliani wondered, what would happen if the
United States started granting asylum to all international migrants fleeing economic disaster?
"We don't have the space to take care of the two-thirds of the world which has severe
economic problems. We have to take care of our own people,” he argued.332
To heighten the pressure on the Reagan administration, Haitians activists and their
American allies coordinated another demonstration in Washington on December 12, 1981. An
NAACP press release publicized the event: “Characterizing the Reagan administration’s
interdiction policy for Haitian refugees as ‘a barbaric assault on human freedom,’ the NAACP,
as part of its campaign to free the 2700 Haitian refugees now being held in detention centers,
joined forces with the Coalition for the Defense of Haitian Refugees to secure their release
before Christmas.”333 The demonstration attracted a sizable turnout of ten thousand people, the
largest yet in the refugee campaign. Members of the Miami and the New York Haitian
communities as well as members of the Congressional Black Caucus and NAACP head
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Benjamin Hooks marched from the Capitol to the Washington Monument, calling on the Reagan
administration to “free the refugees” and “stop supporting Duvalier.”334 Although the action
failed in its stated objective to secure the refugees’ release before Christmas, it drew
unprecedented numbers and national attention and was the capstone of a series of escalating
mobilizations that had occurred throughout the year.335
The policies of the Reagan administration had set back the movement for freedom and
asylum for the Haitian refugees. However, the US government’s ongoing exclusion and
imprisonment of the boat people, and its continuing support for the Duvalier dictatorship had
also roused Haitian activists in the United States to an unprecedented level of militancy and
mobilization.

Ongoing Resistance in Haiti and the U.S.
In the first half of the 1980s, despite major setbacks, the grassroots resistance both in
Haiti and in the United States kept growing, continuing in both places the significant advances
that had occurred in the late 1970s. The asylum campaign continued to build momentum. On
January 2, 1982, a demonstration, followed by a march down Eastern Parkway, in Brooklyn
drew, according to one source, as many as five thousand people, marking it the largest yet
mobilization of New York Haitians in the asylum campaign.336
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The surging support for the Haitian refugee movement and the ongoing political
evolution of Haitian New York also stimulated the creation of organizations that would become
key players in future political struggles. On March 2, 1982, members of forty-five organizations
that included Haitian, religious, labor, legal, and civil and human rights groups assembled at the
Interchurch Center in Manhattan to found the National Emergency Coalition for Haitian
Refugees (later called the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees).337 The outreach materials
for the new organization identified the cause for its formation and stated its goals: “The National
Emergency Coalition for Haitian Refugees was formed in response to an emergency: the jailing
by order of the Attorney General on July 31, 1981, of all the Haitian ‘boat people’ who had fled
across 800 miles of open seas to seek asylum in the United States.” The NECHR aimed to win
“fair treatment and procedural and substantive due process” for the Haitian refugees, to “further
public consideration of the necessity of an administrative solution of the legal status dilemma of
the Haitian ‘boat people,” and to “obtain an end to our government’s policy of intercepting on
the high seas and forcibly returning to Haiti the small sailboats in which these asylum seekers
have fled (interdiction).” To achieve these goals, the NECHR outlined its plan: to 1) “act as a
clearinghouse for information between legal groups, national voluntary agencies, Haitian and
local groups and the refugees themselves . . . 2) stimulate the involvement of local members of
national organizations belonging to the Coalition . . . [and] 3) compile and distribute to coalition
members and a wide range of interested public actors information concerning the plight of the
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Haitian ‘boat people’ in the United States, their reasons for leaving Haiti and possible solutions
to this contemporary tragedy.”338
The creation of the National Emergency Coalition for Haitian Refugees was a landmark
event. Although it was not the first time national organizations had coordinated on behalf of
Haitian refugees, the founding of the NECHR brought together a group made up of individuals,
and national and local organizations that was unparalleled in both size and influence. Chaired by
Bishop Anthony J. Bevilacqua, the NECHR’s thirteen-member executive committee included
Father Antoine Adrien of the Haitian Fathers, Ira Gollobin, attorney for the National Council of
Churches, Jay Mazur, vice president of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, Rabbi
Marc Tanenbaum of the American Jewish Committee, Michael Posner, executive director of the
Lawyers Committee for International Human Rights, and, representing the A. Philip Randolph
Educational Fund, longtime civil rights activist Bayard Rustin.339 The new organization counted
among its membership twenty-four national organizations, including labor unions like the AFLCIO and the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU), religious organizations like
the American Jewish Committee, the Church World Service of the National Council of
Churches, and the US National Catholics Conference, and civil rights groups like the NAACP
and the American Civil Liberties Union. The more than twenty state and regional organizations
that joined the NECHR represented New York City and New York State, Miami, Detroit,
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Philadelphia, New Orleans, Washington, DC, and the states of New Jersey, West Virginia, and
Delaware.340
In the same year that the National Emergency Coalition for Haitian Refugees was
founded, the community activists responsible for the weekly radio program Le Heure Haitien, or
L’Ayisyen, launched a new project: the Haitian Information and Documentation Center. To
extend the political work they were already doing through their radio show, Lionel Legros
explains, they now aimed for something that was “more open toward organizing the Haitian
community. So we started the center in 1982.” But the Haitian Information and Documentation
Center was the initiative of more than the L’Ayisyen activists. The opening of the center “was an
instigation of the listeners of the radio show. They said, ‘That’s not enough to hear you guys on
Sunday morning . . . We [have to be able to] contact you for the rest of the week’ . . . And they
supported it all the way through,” the center’s founders recall. Community members also
determined what the new center would be called. “The Haitian Information and Documentation
Center did not mean anything to the people in the community. To them, it was the Center of
L’Ayisyen,” the Sunday morning radio program. As a result, the Haitian Information and
Documentation Center became Sant Enfomasyon L’Ayisyen, or SELA.341
Like the formation of the National Emergency Coalition for Haitian Refugees, the
founding of SELA reflected the expanding politicization and mobilization of the Haitian
community. The years from 1982 to 1986 were, in the words of one member, “the formative
years” of SELA. Located in Brooklyn, SELA provided a space for open discussion and political
organizing, a library, film screenings, performances by singers and poets, and forums to discuss
340
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and connect with other struggles in Latin America and the Caribbean, including the conflicts in
Nicaragua and El Salvador. In addition to political work, SELA soon expanded to provide other
services to the community. By 1986, Lionel Legros remembers, “Learning the computer was
very important, so we started to buy computers and have schools.” The center hosted a GED
program and offered assistance with immigration and other legal services, among other things.
Those first years of SELA were “very alive,” Legros recalls.342
One year after the founding of SELA, the New York community produced yet another
institution that would have a lasting impact on the political history of Haiti and Haitians in the
United States. In 1983, Benjamin Dupuy, leader of the Mouvement Haitien Liberation (MHL),
founded the newspaper Haiti Progres. According to Kim Ives, future Haiti Progres
correspondent and stepson to Dupuy, “Haiti Progres was formed by MHL as an alternative to
[the other existing Haitian weekly] Haiti Observateur.” In contrast to Observateur’s “fairly
conservative orientation and claims to present objective journalism,” Haiti Progres maintained a
“definite radical political orientation,” Carolle Charles notes. It “opposes Haitian integration into
U.S. society,” and “concentrates on analyses of historical experiences of third world and
progressive societies, and on criticism of U.S. imperialist intervention.”343
Assessments of Haiti Progres’ influence and place in the Haitian community vary.
While Michel Laguerre somewhat dismissively characterizes Haiti Progres as a “niche” paper
with a “leftist banner” (as opposed to the “more ecumenical” Haiti Observateur), Kim Ives
claims that Dupuy’s newspaper became “the new left-wing rallying point” and “the journal of
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record of [the] anti-imperialist movement” that crossed the boundaries between Haiti and the
United States in the 1980s and beyond.344 According to political activist and labor organizer Ray
Laforest,
Some people might buy the paper not because they necessarily accept its conclusion that
you needed a Fidel Castro type society in Haiti. But they knew that the news they were
getting there was the truth . . . They had credibility. So even if you didn’t necessarily buy
all the agenda, most of the Haitians here who were involved in politics in one way or
another accepted the legitimacy of Haiti Progres.345
On the other hand, Laforest allows, “There were some people who never did [accept the paper’s
legitimacy], I’m assuming.” Laforest adds, “If you were a businessman, maybe you would put
an ad in Haiti Progres only because you know people were going to see it, but it doesn’t
necessarily mean that you accepted the line.” Laforest’s comment suggests that even those who
might have opposed the newspaper’s political agenda recognized its reach into the community.346
The early 1980s featured the formation of new organizations in Miami as well as in New
York, but there they were reflective of the increasing class diversity of the South Florida Haitian
community. By the early 1980s Dade and Broward counties were becoming home to a
substantial number of middle-class Haitians, many of whom had originally settled in other cities,
such as New York and Boston, and who relocated to South Florida. These people were more
likely to be better educated and to be legal residents or US citizens than those migrating to
Miami directly from Haiti. In 1982 members of this growing Haitian middle class founded the
Haitian American Chamber of Commerce and the Haitian Task Force. Both organizations
functioned to support Haitian entrepreneurs and small business owners in Miami. The Haitian
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Task Force, which received funding from the City of Miami and the Ford Foundation, provided
loans to Haitian business owners and supported cultural events for the South Florida Haitian
community.347
As the asylum campaign grew and added organizations, it also maintained its strategic
approach of combining mass mobilization with challenges through the legal system. In June
1982 Federal District Judge Spellman admonished the Reagan administration for denying the
Haitian refugees due process and for unlawfully detaining them for more than a year; he ordered
the Haitian detainees to be released on parole. The Haitian Refugee Center celebrated the ruling
as a “historic legal decision.”348 In a visit to the Haitians detained at the Krome Avenue
Detention Center, Archibishop of Miami Edward A. McCarthy addressed the Spellman ruling
and urged immigration officials’ immediate compliance with the ruling. “We thank God for the
court’s decision that mandated the release of these people ‘forthwith’ . . . Many have been here
behind barbed wired for thirteen months. It would be truly disheartening to see the day of
freedom delayed because of any unnecessary ‘foot-dragging’,”349 the archbishop declared.
Though the Spellman ruling was less of an achievement than the earlier King ruling, since it
cited immigration officials for misconduct in administrative duties rather than the more sweeping
charge of bias and discriminatory treatment, it was nonetheless another landmark in the Haitian
asylum campaign.350
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While much of the attention and energy of activists and community organizers continued
to focus on the defense of refugees in the early 1980s, Haitians in the United States encountered
a new obstacle. In July 1982 the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) disclosed that thirty-four
Haitian immigrants in the United States were among those diagnosed with infections
characteristic of a puzzling new syndrome that seemed to lead to a breakdown of the immune
system. Scientists observed high rates of infections among homosexuals, heroine users, and
hemophiliacs, but the Haitians diagnosed with the deadly new virus denied they had engaged in
homosexual activity or had taken intravenous drugs and reported that they had never had a blood
transfusion, leaving researchers baffled about the relationship between Haitians and the disease.
Even so, the CDC concluded that because Haitians appeared to be among those groups that were
particularly likely to spread the disease, which would come to be known as AIDS, it placed
Haitians on the list of high-risk groups in March 1983, along with homosexuals, hemophiliacs,
and intravenous drug users (a grouping soon to be called the “4 H Club”).351 After the CDC’s
ruling that all Haitians in the United States were in the high-risk category for AIDS, the theory
that Haiti was the source of AIDS began to appear frequently in both scholarly and medical
journals as well as in the popular press. Despite substantial evidence to support the conclusion
that HIV, the virus that causes AIDS, was making its first appearance in Haiti at that same time
that it was emerging in other areas of the Americas, the myth that Haiti was the origin of AIDS
proved remarkably resilient.352
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The idea that the United States had gotten AIDS from Haiti and the CDC’s
designation of all Haitians at high risk for contracting the disease had a disastrous impact on
Haitians in the United States. Haitian immigrants, already associated by many with the
stigma of the poor and desperate boat people, became the target of exclusion and attack.
Haitian students were shunned by teachers and students and even became the victims of
violence in New York City schools. Customers stopped patronizing Haitian businesses,
causing them to fail. Haitian tenants were evicted, and Haitian employees lost their jobs.353
Haitians viewed their community’s label as a high risk for AIDS as the result of
racism and the ongoing anti-Haitian bias. ''They have blown this thing out of proportion so
much that there's no other reason for it than to indicate a subtle form of racism,” argued Roger
Biamby of the Haitian-American Community Association of Dade. Yves Savain of the
Haitian Task Force also saw anti-Haitian discrimination at work. "We have always been an
easy target for anything mysterious,” declared Savain. The Reverend Gerard Jean-Juste feared
that the AIDS stigma was being used as a tool by those already prejudiced against Haitians to
justify continuing to exclude them. “Those who did not like the Haitians have found a new
element . . . saying they do not want Haitians here because they are AIDS carriers.''354
Their association with AIDS produced divergent responses among Haitians in the
United States. Just as some had distanced themselves from the Haitian community to avoid
the stigma brought by the Haitian boat people, so did some Haitians avoid any public
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identification with their compatriots out of shame and fear over the AIDS association.355
Others, however, mounted a campaign to try to counter the AIDS stigma. Haitian community
leaders, including many Haitian physicians, began mobilizing and presenting information that
contradicted the notion that Haitians were a particularly high-risk group. In July 1983 the
Miami Herald reported that only 1 percent of Haitians in Miami-Dade County were diagnosed
as AIDS carriers. The Associated Press estimated the number of Haitian AIDS victims in
Dade County to be much lower, a mere one-tenth of 1 percent. Nonetheless, as the Miami
Herald and most other observers recognized, “Fear causes people to view Haitians as disease
spreaders. Little Haiti's community representatives have been stymied in their effort to
downplay the unexplained connection between AIDS and Haitians.”356
Later that month, New York City officials, acknowledging how much damage the
AIDS stigma had done to the Haitian community, announced the city would be removing
Haitians from the “at-risk” category. ''There is no reason to continue to stigmatize Haitians at
a time when they already face considerable job and housing discrimination,'' announced Dr.
David J. Senser, New York City health commissioner. This announcement was a victory for
Haitians, to be sure, but the nationwide CDC designation remained. In fact, the change in
New York City’s policy called forth the national body’s defense of its decision to keep
Haitians on the list. Dr. James Curran, head of the AIDS task force at the Federal Centers for
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Disease Control, insisted that while Haitians made up only 0.3 percent of the population, they
represented approximately 6 percent of the reported AIDS cases.357
Despite New York City’s change, the federal position remained the same until April
1985 when the Centers for Disease Control announced that it was removing Haitians from the
“at-risk” group but gave no explanation for its actions.358 It is likely that a combination of
factors led to the change. Scientists had learned more about the disease and how it was
transmitted. They had also learned more about the Haitian community, concluding that those
Haitians who were diagnosed with AIDS most likely engaged in at-risk behaviors that had
nothing to do with being Haitian per se. Probably equally important as a factor was the
campaign of public education and political pressure coming from Haitian organizations like
the Haitian Coalition on AIDS, which provided a persuasive public argument that there was
nothing that made Haitians biologically predisposed toward AIDS infection and that their
inclusion as an at-risk group was the product of a larger climate of anti-Haitian
discrimination.359
Although vindicated by the CDC’s policy change, the damage that had been done to
Haitians in the United States could not be undone. For workers who had lost their jobs, for
homeowners who had been unable to sell their property or tenants who could not find a place
to live, for students who had been isolated or attacked in schools, and for the many other
Haitians who had been hurt by their association with AIDS, the stigma would not disappear
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anytime soon.360 Indeed, when the AIDS issue resurfaced at the end of the decade, it would
stimulate the Haitian community to action precisely because the wounds of the early 1980s
went so deep.
While efforts to counter the AIDS association and stigma became a focus for Haitian
activists for a period in the early 1980s, efforts to defend the Haitian refugees and push for
political change in Haiti continued apace. And the organizing taking place in the early 1980s in
New York and Miami was paralleled by the development of a grassroots movement in Haiti that
had survived the crackdown of 1980 and 1981. A major part of this grassroots resistance grew
out of work being done by progressive elements in the Catholic Church. Unlike many earlier
political opposition movements, the ti legliz groups did not function exclusively in the cities but
reached deep into the countryside and into the lives of Haitian peasants. In the early 1980s the ti
legliz movement established training and education centers throughout Haiti, centers that became
community-based organizations, forming an essential network connecting the various nodes of
grassroots organizing. The ti legliz groups also received critical support from the Catholic-run
Radio Soleil, which became the public voice of the opposition, particularly after other opposition
stations like Radio Haiti Inter were shut down during the 1980 crackdown. In addition, the ti
legliz movement received an enormous boost in 1983 when Pope John Paul II visited Haiti and
declared that “things must change,” a statement Haitians understood as a criticism of the
dictatorship and an expression of solidarity with the grassroots resistance.361
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The opposition to the Duvalier dictatorship that was growing in the early 1980s was also
a response to several other developments that drew the ire of the Haitian people and intensified
their dissatisfaction with the Duvalier regime. In 1980 Jean-Claude Duvalier had married
Michele Bennett, the daughter of Ernest Bennett, a leading member of Haiti’s commercial
bourgeoisie with key interests in agricultural exports and the import and distribution of European
automobiles. Symbolizing Baby Doc’s alliance with Haiti’s light-skinned bourgeoisie, the
Duvalier-Bennett marriage further alienated Haiti’s black middle class, the group that JeanClaude’s father, Francois Duvalier, had relied on as the regime’s key base of support.362 In
addition to alienating the black middle class, Duvalier’s marriage and lifestyle provoked
resentment and the anger of the Haitian masses, far from the centers of power. While Haiti
struggled through severe food shortages and drought, the playboy president and his new wife
went out of their way to show off through lavish, televised parties and conspicuous displays of
wealth.363
In the early 1980s the Duvalier regime and the United States implemented other policies
that deepened Haiti’s misery, policies that we can now see contributed to the furious uprising of
1985 and 1986. In May 1982 the Haitian government, under pressure from the United States to
arrest the spread of swine fever, ordered the slaughter of its entire population of native black
pigs. This move decimated what one observer called “the peasant’s most valuable livestock.”364
The black pig was adept at scavenging and surviving on very little, making it a most costeffective resource for rural Haitians. After the slaughter of the entire Haitian black pig
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population, the Haitian and the United States governments repopulated the countryside with
white pigs from Iowa, animals that shared none of the black pigs’ survival skills and, in fact,
required an enormous amount of money to sustain. Although the Haitian and US governments
claimed that the slaughter was an act in defense of public health, they failed to convince many of
the rural Haitians affected by the program that it was a necessary step, adding to the frustration
and resentment brewing in Haiti’s countryside.365 To make matters worse, the Reagan
administration’s policy regarding Haitian immigration cut off a major destination for outmigration, reducing Haitians’ ability to escape the deteriorating conditions in the country.366
In 1984 Haitians in five northern towns launched four days of protests over hunger and
dwindling food supplies; during that time they raided warehouses for staples and rations. In the
course of the uprising, “aba lamize” (down with poverty) became “aba Duvalier.”367 In 1985
Haitians again launched a series of protests, this time targeting high gasoline and fuel prices.
Although we can now see the worsening crisis of the early 1980s and the uprisings of 1984 and
1985 as preludes to the nationwide rebellion that forced the dictatorship’s collapse less than one
year later, the outcome was not at all clear at the time. In fact, Haitians had one more severe test
to endure under Duvalier.
In November Ronald Reagan won a second term as US president, an outcome that again
had negative consequences for the grassroots resistance in Haiti. As in November 1980,
Duvalier took the occasion of Reagan’s reelection to clamp down on his political opponents.
Human rights groups reported a major spike in violence, arrests, “increased incommunicado
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detentions,” new bans on political parties, and a renewed attack on the independent media. In
congressional hearings, Michael S. Hooper, speaking on behalf of the human rights monitoring
group Americas Watch, testified that the wave of repression in 1984 was “the most significant
deterioration in the Haitian government’s respect for the fundamental human and legal rights of
its own citizens since the massive crackdown by Haitian security forces in late 1980 and early
1981.” The National Coalition for Haitian Refugees and the Lawyers Committee for
International Human Rights joined Americas Watch in documenting the crackdown and urged
the State Department to cut off aid to the Duvalier government and to decertify Haiti in the
Department’s annual review of human rights.368 It would take even greater turmoil in Haiti,
however, to convince the US State Department that it was time to sever its ties to the Duvalier
regime.
In late 1984 and early 1985, anti-Duvalier forces in Haiti were reeling from a renewed
campaign of repression, and Haitians in the United States were feeling the harmful effect of the
AIDS stigma. But the early to mid-1980s were also filled with promise for Haitian activists.
Resistance to the Duvalier regime in Haiti was growing more determined and protests more
frequent.

In the United States the movement in defense of the Haitian refugees kept growing;

the founding of the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees in 1982, an organization that brought
together Haitian, religious, labor, and civil rights organizations, was evidence of this expanding
movement. The founding of the Haitian Information and Documentation Center, or SELA, in
1982 and the launching of the Haitian weekly Haiti Progres in 1983 marked two other important
events in the history of Haitian politics and activism in New York. SELA and Haiti Progres
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both would play leading roles in community education and mobilization. While the linked
campaigns for democracy in Haiti and freedom for the Haitian refugees continued to face major
obstacles, movement activists were going forward.

The Uprooting and “the Muzzle is Off”
In July 1985 Jean-Claude Duvalier announced a referendum vote in which Haitians
would decide whether he should remain in power. The outcome, the Haitian Ministry of
Information announced, was 99.8 percent in favor of the “President for Life.” Although
designed to demonstrate the regime’s commitment to political liberalization, the vote failed to
placate its critics either at home or abroad and actually further eroded the regime’s legitimacy in
the eyes of many. In an op-ed piece published in the International Herald Tribune, Michael
Hooper, executive director of the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, observed that the
results of the sham referendum “put most Soviet bloc countries to shame. They rank right
behind the 1983 elections in Albania in which only a single ‘no’ vote was recorded, and behind
the results of the 1971 referendum in Haiti in which 100 percent of the voters were recorded as
approving Francois Duvalier’s designation of his 19-year-old son to succeed him.”369 JeanClaude Duvalier’s attempt to silence those who criticized the fraudulent vote also aided his
detractors and emboldened the opposition in Haiti and abroad. For publicly challenging the
legitimacy of the referendum, the regime had three Belgian priests expelled from the country. A
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fourth priest mysteriously died a day before his expulsion, a victim of the Haitian secret police,
the Vatican’s Observatore Romano reported.370
The incident in Haiti and the presence of the exiled priests in Miami encouraged Haitians
in the United States to renew their call for the dictatorship’s end. At the Notre Dame d’Haiti in
the Little Haiti neighborhood of Miami, three thousand people assembled for a solidarity meeting
with the Belgian priests organized by the Haitian Refugee Center. The Reverend Gerard JeanJuste took the gathering as an opportunity to argue for close partnership between the resistance in
Haiti and the dictator’s opponents abroad. “We are fighting for the liberation of our people,”
argued Jean-Juste. “Nothing can intimidate us . . . I hope that the Haitian community in Miami,
in New York, etc., continues to show solidarity in the struggle of liberation waged by Haitians
along with those within the diaspora.”371
In New York the Haitian community organized a protest at the United Nations to be
culminated in a march to the Haitian Consulate on Forty-Second Street. Although the
demonstration was intended to draw attention to repression in Haiti, the incident instead
spotlighted the problem of police violence in New York City. When the one thousand Haitian
protesters approached the consulate offices, they encountered mounted New York police
officers, who violently broke up the demonstration; many of the protesters were wounded and
two landed in the emergency room.372 In response, the Haitian Fathers issued a statement of
protest, as did the Haitian-American Citizens for Action, which in an open letter to New York
Mayor Edward Koch claimed that the “blatant act of brutality and civil rights abuse” against the
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Haitian protesters was just another example of the city’s disrespect and “lack of sensitivity
toward the Haitian community.”373 The July 28th Contingent, which described itself as “a
coalition of Haitian revolutionaries, progressive forces, and patriots,” argued that there was a
relationship between the incident in New York and what was going on in Haiti, seeing parallel
attempts “to stifle the righteous upsurge of the masses and suppress their anger. Thus, the
premeditated and brutal attack launched on Haitian demonstrators by policemen,” they
concluded. As a result of the police action, the group called members of the Haitian community
to another demonstration on August 31, this one against police violence.374
In Haiti in the summer and fall of 1985, despite signs of growing unrest, it was not at all
clear that the decades-long dictatorship was entering its last months. An incident at the end of
November in the coastal city of Gonaives eventually lit the flame of protest that would soon
spread across all of Haiti and ultimately force Duvalier’s departure. On November 27, 1985,
students of the coastal city of Gonaives took to the streets to protest the Duvalier dictatorship.
Continuing the tradition of protest that had emerged in the same city one year earlier, a mass of
young people, including twenty-year-old Jean-Robert Cius, nineteen-year-old Daniel Israel, and
thirteen-year-old Mackenson Michel, marched through the streets chanting, “Nous bezwen
chanjman radikal nan peyi a!” (We need a radical change in the country!) When the military
fired upon the demonstrators, killing Cius, Israel, and Mackenson, Gonaives erupted. Soon all of
Haiti had joined the rebellion. The Duvalier regime’s rather routine attempt to suppress a single
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expression of dissent had this time provoked an uprising. This event was the beginning of the
end for Duvalier.375
The shooting of the student protesters in Gonaives on November 28 galvanized the
movement in New York and Miami just as it did in Haiti. Flyers circulating throughout the
community provided detailed accounts of the violence in Haiti and called Haitians abroad to
action. “Transform the cry from Gonaives into strength for revolution!” one leaflet ordered.376
On Manhattan’s Upper West Side, more than one thousand Haitians gathered for mass at the
Holy Name Roman Catholic Church in honor of the martyred young people of Gonaives. At the
conclusion of the service, men wearing black armbands and women with heads covered with
black scarves went out into the bitter December cold to march down Amsterdam Avenue,
carrying three coffins draped in the red and blue Haitian flag. The event concluded in an
auditorium with speakers and the singing of the Dessalinienne, the Haitian national anthem.
Haiti Progres, always both chronicler and participant in the movement, judged the event a
success but also encouraged the diaspora not to allow this to be just “a symbolic act around a
tragic event” but instead to make it “a step in the fight” for Haitian freedom.377 In Miami the
protests that erupted in the wake of the Gonaives incident were smaller but more militant and
spontaneous. On the streets of Little Haiti, several protests sprang up in the weeks following the
shooting deaths in Gonaives. On December 10, echoing the Gonaives protests from spring 1984,
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several hundred Haitians marched through the streets chanting, “Down with Duvalier! Down
with misery! Down with oppression! Down with dictatorship!”378
As the new year of 1986 approached and the crisis facing the Duvalier regime grew more
serious, Haitians in New York planned another event that they hoped would support the uprising
in Haiti. On Sunday December 22 more than one hundred activists met in Brooklyn to decide
upon further action. After listening to the testimony of Leone Cius, father of one of the slain
student-protesters of Gonaives, the group unanimously voted to hold a demonstration in
Brooklyn on January 11, 1986.379 A flyer for the demonstration soon began circulating, calling
New York Haitians to action. The flyer explained that “Grande Manifestation a Brooklyn” on
January 11 was called to protest “the assassination of Jean-Robert Cius, Mackenson Michel,
Daniel Israel, and many other compatriots” and to demand an end to America’s support of
Duvalier. Haitians were exhorted to support the young people of Gonaives, Jeremie, PetitGoave, Port-au-Prince, and other regions that had declared an end to the “dictator-for-life” and to
“misery-for-life.” The flyer also featured a telling statement regarding the protest organizers’
sense of connection to the struggle in their homeland: Haiti was in revolt and the people of
Okay, Jeremie, Okap, Petit-Goave, Port-au-Prince were all doing their part. Pointedly, it asked,
“E nou menm Nouyok, sa n’ap tann?” (And, now, New York, what are we waiting for?)380 On a
chilly winter afternoon, New York Haitians responded to the call for protest, packing the streets
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along Nostrand Avenue and Eastern Parkway to listen to speeches and the popular music of
Farah Juste and So Ann.381
Back in Haiti, the country was slipping out of the dictator’s hands. To try to placate the
growing popular movement, Duvalier rearranged the government and offered the people a 10
percent price reduction on government-controlled commodities. This concession failed to bring
peace, however. As the country became increasingly uncontrollable, Duvalier announced he was
doing away with the hated “political police” unit that had orchestrated much of the surveillance
and repression the regime had used against its opponents. But the rebellion continued, virtually
paralyzing the country by the end of January 1986 with daily roadblocks and protests.382
To support the effort to topple the Duvalier regime, activists in the United States
attempted to pressure the US government to withdraw its support for the dictator. The
Committee of Solidarity with the Haitian People (COSPA) initiated a petition campaign asking
the US government and international lending institutions to “withhold economic and/or military
assistance to the present government of Haiti, because of its misuse of funds and human rights
violations, including the recent killing of children.”383 Michael Hooper, executive director of the
National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, joined Aryeh Neier, vice chairman of Americas Watch,
and Michael Posner, executive director of the Lawyers Committee for International Human
Rights, to communicate to Secretary of State George P. Shultz their “utmost dismay with the
continuing deterioration in the Haitian government’s respect for the fundamental rights of its
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own citizens and to request immediate assurances that our government will strongly condemn
these gross violations.” Hooper, Neier, and Posner also pointed out that “this deterioration
occurred at the time of, and just subsequent to, your October 12, 1985, report certifying an
overall improvement in the human rights picture [in Haiti].” They concluded by asking to know
“how our government . . . [can] encourage an end to these tragic abuses and this pattern of
cynical flaunting of international standards by the Haitian government.”384
The US government did ultimately withdraw support for Duvalier, one of the factors in
the regime’s collapse. Regarding the growing instability in Haiti with unease, the United States
had determined by the end of January 1986 that Duvalier had lost control of the country. In an
attempt to moderate the outcome of the uprising, the United States abandoned Duvalier, hoping
to have an influence on the regime’s successor while also recognizing that Duvalier’s continued
presence actually advanced the revolutionary fervor in Haiti.385 On January 30 the US
government announced it would delay delivery of $26 million in aid to Haiti; the following day
administration spokesperson Larry Speakes announced that the Duvalier government had
collapsed. Duvalier denied the report and declared that his government remained “as strong as a
monkey’s tail.” However, mounting protests, the apparent withdrawal of American support, and
the rumors that Speakes’ announcement created were too much for the dictatorship to bear.
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Duvalier’s downfall was imminent, though he was able to stave off total collapse for another
seven days.386
When rumors of Duvalier’s collapse reached the people of Haiti, they took to the streets
in joyous celebration. These same unconfirmed reports sent the Haitian communities of New
York and Miami into several frenzied days of celebration and protest. On Thursday January 30
roughly fifteen hundred Haitians poured into the streets of Little Haiti, waving palm fronds and
tree branches, and bearing the red and blue national colors. “Duvalier is out!” they cried in
jubilation. Anger at the regime and its supporters surfaced when a group of men, rumored to be
members of Duvalier’s secret police force, neared the crowd. Their red Camaro surrounded by
the protesters, the driver tried to escape; throwing the car into reverse, he plowed into the crowd,
killing a forty-seven-year-old woman. The outraged crowd, claiming to have heard the words,
“Vive Duvalier,” seized the driver and beat him until he was rescued by police on the scene.
Confronted by riot police, the protesters briefly resisted, torching the suspected macoutes’ car
and temporarily unleashing their fury on the surrounding eight blocks. In the wake of the shortlived rebellion, Miami city officials sought to calm the Haitians. Miami mayor Xavier Suarez
promised to investigate police violence against the protesters, and police spokesperson Mike
Stewart refused to characterize the incident as a riot, calling it a “disturbance” instead.387
The celebration continued the following morning as residents of Little Haiti returned to
the streets, dancing, singing and waving red and blue banners. Though far from their home in
Haiti, Haitians in Miami symbolically demonstrated their role in the collapse of the dictatorship.
A group of Haitian leaders, accompanied by Mayor Suarez, staged a symbolic takeover of the
386
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Haitian consulate. Every thirty minutes a parade of joyous funeral-goers carried a coffin through
the heart of the neighborhood, representing the death of the Duvalier regime. And an effigy of
Duvalier was first hung up for everyone to see, then torn down and dismembered. The
celebration intensified when the community received the Reagan administration’s report that
Duvalier had fled the country, but their mood descended into disappointment and anger when
Duvalier appeared to refute the claim, and the US government retracted its statement. All in all,
despite the conflicting reports, the mood was one of joy and hope. ''Whether or not he's out, he's
still going to go,'' said Jay Louis, a thirty-six-year-old taxi driver and seven-year resident of
Miami. ''He just won't be able to survive,'' asserted Louis, confidently. Twenty-six-year-old
Ruby Stannys was also hopeful. ''We'll soon be able to see our parents safely and kiss the land
that we love so much,”388 Stannys claimed.
On February 1, for the third day in a row, the Haitians of Miami hit the streets in protest
against the Duvalier regime. Just as they had two days earlier, the protesters channeled their
anger at Duvalier into anger against those they believed supported him. Police were called in to
protect Phil Dorceant, a record storeowner who had a reputation of being pro-Duvalier. As he
finished clearing out his store and preparing to leave the area, angry protesters began hitting
Dorceant’s car with their hands and pelting it with rocks. Police arrested four and soon isolated a
two-block area of Little Haiti that contained the nucleus of the protests. Leaders of the Miami
police department anxiously wondered how long the protests would last and what it would take
to bring peace. "Ultimately, the time is going to come when law and order will have to prevail,"
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said Col. C. J. Zamora. From his perspective amid a growing storm in Haiti, Jean-Claude
Duvalier must have been thinking the same thing.389
The rumors of the collapse of Duvalier’s government also sent shock waves through the
Haitian community of New York. Frustrated over the conflicting reports about the status of their
homeland, fifty Haitians demonstrated in front of the Haitian consulate in New York, demanding
information about what was going on in Haiti. Just as in Miami, Haitians of New York were
initially exuberant and then disappointed over the confusing information coming from the White
House. “Why would Larry Speakes, the ‘well-informed’ White House spokesman, announce the
downfall of the Duvalier government? . . . Why is the Reagan administration playing this
dangerous game with the future of the Haitian people?” one leaflet asked.390 Leo Joseph,
Raymond Joseph’s brother and co-editor of the conservative (but staunchly anti-Duvalier)
newspaper Haiti Observateur, offered this interpretation: ''I believe Duvalier has left. They don't
want the people to know because they will rampage all the businesses and buildings of the
government.'' But whether or not the dictator had in fact fallen, most were certain the tide had
turned in Haiti. Said Joseph, ''When you have a boiling kettle that you keep tight, it explodes.''391
To increase the heat on Duvalier, New York Haitians targeted financial aid from the
United States. Although the US government announced that it had already withheld certification
on $26 million in aid to the country, Haitian leaders in New York insisted that the United States
eliminate all assistance to the Duvalier government. ''Right now, people are dying on the streets
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all over Haiti,'' said Rev. Antoine Adrien, referring to the fifty-five people killed in Haiti in the
previous four days. “We are running out of time,” he urged. ''The way out is clear.” If the
United States would suspend all aid to Haiti, he claimed, “Within one week, it will be over.''
Members of the New York community also urged black Americans to support them, and they
enlisted House of Representatives member Major Owens in their effort. Owens agreed, calling
on the Reverend Jesse Jackson to “issue a definite call on black Americans to take action.”392
Close to one week after the White House’s erroneous report, Haitians in New York and
Miami still anxiously waited on news from Haiti. “I can't sleep because I have the feelings that
I'm going to see my children,'' said Saint Sois Charles, a Miami factory worker and father of six
who had been separated from his family for eleven years.393 Finally, on February 7, 1986, they
got the news they were waiting for. Shortly before 4:00 o’clock that morning, Jean-Claude
Duvalier had fled Haiti.394
The news of Duvalier’s departure reached Haitians in the United States before the sun
rose on February 7. In the words of Haiti Progres, the news “shot like an arrow from Miami to
Montreal,” and as it did, each community exploded in joyful and cathartic celebration. Although
New York was experiencing a nasty winter storm, hundreds of Haitians held a celebration in
Brooklyn’s Grand Army Plaza, followed by a special celebratory mass and an all-night party in
East Flatbush, the predominantly Haitian neighborhood nicknamed La Saline for its connections
to the area of the same name in Port-au-Prince. The next day twenty-five thousand people
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carrying banners and draped in red and blue returned to the plaza while Haitian taxi drivers
mounted the Haitian flag on their cars as they drove through Brooklyn.395
In the streets of Little Haiti the celebration started before dawn. Soon two to three
thousand Haitians were on the streets of the northeastern Miami neighborhood, dancing, singing
and marching arm-in-arm through the pouring rain chanting, “Libete, libete!” Marlene
Athouriste cried, "I'm overwhelmed with joy.” Deeply indentifying with the long struggle of her
people, the twenty-seven-year-old exclaimed, “After 28 years of oppression, how would you
feel? We're going back home finally. It is unbelievable. Home, sweet home." Saying a public
prayer, the Reverend Gerard Jean-Juste expressed thanks for the opportunity “to see the torturer
leave the country we love so much.” He claimed that it was finally time for the Haitian people to
collect the divine blessing that was theirs. “Lord Almighty, it is about time you turned a sweet
breath to our mouths. We are your children," said Jean-Juste.396
At the Haitian consulate of Miami, one hundred Haitians sought to confront those
unfortunate enough to be associated with the toppled Duvalier regime. Standing between the
consulate and the protesters, however, were Miami police in full riot gear. The protesters
persisted, chanting, “Down with Duvalier,” and demanding the emergence of those inside. The
standoff ended only when the police allowed three members of the crowd to enter the building so
that they could see it was empty. Before leaving, however, the protesters left the red and blue
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Haitian flag, replacing the red and black flag that had been displayed during the Duvalier
years.397
In Boston, too, Haitians came as close as they could to taking back their government
while living in the United States. At 10:30 a.m. on February 7 they burst into Boston’s Haitian
consulate, tore pictures of the former Haitian president and his wife from the wall, and demanded
the key to the building, informing the consul that ‘’since the Haitian government has been
toppled, it no longer represents the Haitian people in Boston." Outside of the building, Haitians
danced and talked excitedly, waving the blue and red Haitian flag and watching as the red and
black flag burned on the sidewalk.398
In the hours and days after Duvalier’s departure, there was plenty of celebration in Haiti
and throughout the diaspora. But Haitians had their minds on more than mere celebration. There
was also the urgent task of defending their freedom now that the dictator was gone. Protesters
outside the Haitian consulate in Boston expressed the need for a means to recoup the fortune
Duvalier had stolen from the Haitian people; they demanded that the tontons macoutes and other
members of Duvalier’s network be tried for the crimes that they had committed against the
people.399 The same desire drove Haitians in Miami into conflict with supporters of Duvalier
and with workers at the Haitian consulate. Being away from Haiti, however, the people were
limited in what they could do to eliminate the dictator’s network and to bring those responsible
for state terrorism to justice.
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In Haiti, on the other hand, those who had suffered violence and repression during the
Duvalier era carried out a campaign to dismantle the system that had victimized them and to
punish the individuals responsible. They called this dechoukaj, or “uprooting,” and it was a
bloody affair. Known or suspected Duvalier supporters were exposed to violent acts of
retribution. Perhaps the most common image associated with dechoukaj is that of Duvalier
supporters burning to death after having a flaming tire placed around their necks. “Necklacing,”
as this form of execution was called, was one of the most grisly manifestations of the uprooting.
Another powerful image captures another important aspect of the dechoukaj: the sense that the
uprooting was a blow against imperialism and a step toward self-determination: in the
celebration over Duvalier’s collapse, a statue of Christopher Columbus was torn from its
foundation in a public square in Port-au-Prince and thrown into the bay. The people renamed the
square for a leader of the resistance to the US occupation, Charlemagne Peralte.400
Haitians not only sought vengeance on individual macoutes, but they also endeavored to
smash the whole system of power Duvalier had used to control them. University students battled
to wrest control of their schools from the State. Haitian women marched through the streets of
Port-au-Prince, demanding an end to the practice that required them to exchange sex for jobs and
celebrating the demise of a regime that especially victimized them. In the countryside, peasants
came together to eliminate the system of section chiefs, the network of village strongmen that
Duvalier had employed to maintain control outside of the cities. And at the same time, Haitians
were also working to put something new in place of that which they were uprooting. New
political parties sprang up throughout the country. New newspapers and radio stations popped
up all over. And labor unions re-formed or reactivated their members, as all sectors of the
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popular movement sought to take advantage of their new freedom. The Haitian people
implemented a systematic campaign to literally do away with the filth from the previous decades,
scrubbing clean and repainting their city streets and walls. As Paul Farmer has documented, a
popular saying at the time was “Babouket la tonbe,” which means “The muzzle is off;” the
people intended to use their freed voices.401

A New Era in Nationalist Organizing
The uprooting of the Duvalier dictatorship utterly transformed both Haiti and the Haitian
communities of New York and Miami. Duvalier’s departure cleared away many of the obstacles
that had hindered close cooperation between movement activists in Haiti and the United States.
After the regime’s collapse, communication and travel between Haiti and the United States
dramatically increased, bringing the already connected grassroots movements closer together.
With Duvalier out, many who had lived in the United States for many years and had been
key members of the opposition outside of Haiti decided to return to their home country. Antoine
Adrien and the other Haitian Fathers, who had been such an important part of the anti-Duvalier
movement and the asylum campaign in the New York community, all returned to Haiti by 1987.
Many of the Haitian women activists who had been active in the United States and had been
deeply influenced by the American and the international feminist movements also returned home
to join the burgeoning women’s movement in Haiti.402 As working people who relied on their
US-based jobs and social networks to survive, the majority of Haitians in the United States could
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not afford to return after 1986.403 Still, key figures in the Haitian communities in the United
States did go back, and ongoing ties between these individuals and their contacts who remained
in the United States encouraged a more transnational social and political movement in the years
after 1986.
For those that stayed in the United States, there were many new media and information
networks to keep them connected to Haiti. In the wake of Duvalier’s departure, many of the
journalists that had earlier been forced into exile returned and, with funding from compatriots
abroad, launched radio stations with bases in both Haiti and the United States. Haitian radio and
television stations also began to use telephone connections to broadcast news from Haiti directly
to American cities like New York and Miami. As one source observes, “Now a Haitian
immigrant may be sitting in a kitchen in Brooklyn or driving a taxi up the East Side Drive in
Manhattan and listening to news of a home town in Haiti.”404 Radio stations that remained
rooted in the Haitian communities of the United States were also transformed by the uprooting of
Duvalier. For example, Moment Creole, a New York-based radio station that had before 1986
been principally focused on life in the United States, offering Haitian immigrants information on
education, employment, housing, and the legal system, and encouraging Haitians to participate in
American politics, after 1986 started featuring reports from Haiti, debates about the country’s
future, and phoned-in news and commentary straight from the home country. 405
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The collapse of the dictatorship also transformed the shape and function of print media
for Haitians at home and abroad. After 1986 the two New York-based Haitian weeklies began
distribution in Haiti. They maintained the focus they had always had on Haiti but also continued
to feature advertisements and news from New York, Miami, and Montreal.406 Like the radio
stations and new communication networks, the newspapers began to support information sharing
and dialogue between Haiti and the United States. Kim Ives recalls that in 1986 “essentially all
of Haiti Progres shifted its focus to the ground in Haiti,” and the newspaper established an office
in that country. Ives argues that this development had a substantial impact on the future course
of events in Haiti. “When Haiti Progres arrived in Haiti in 1986, it was like a chemical reaction
. . . All of a sudden, you had this revolutionary organ in their hands,” which from that point
onward began “affecting the liberation theologians, the young militants” and ultimately
contributed to “what became the Lavalas movement [that] brought Aristide to power.”407 Like
Haiti Progres, Haiti en Marche, a Miami-based newspaper launched in 1986 by Marcus Garcia,
one of the journalists expelled from Haiti in the purges of November 1980, facilitated increased
communication between those in Haiti and those abroad.408
Beyond increased travel and communication between Haiti and the Haitian communities
of the United States, the period after Duvalier’s departure featured the development of what
Michel Laguerre has aptly called “border crossing political practices.”409 Those who returned to
Haiti established political organizations and projects that maintained their connection to New
York and Miami and drew critical support from Haitians abroad. Antoine Adrien and William
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Smarth of the Haitian Fathers founded Tet Ansanm, an organization that relied on assistance
from Haitians in the United States to advance its program of grassroots organizing and enhanced
literacy in Haitian Creole. After 1986 many political organizations and parties in Haiti on both
the Left and the Right established chapters in New York, Miami, and Montreal. Benjamin
Dupuy, leader of the MHL and founder and editor of Haiti Progres, also returned to Haiti, where
he began building the National Popular Assembly (APN), a political organization that
maintained close contact with supporters in New York and Miami. This process of
transnationalization ensured that the Haitian communities of the United States would remain
closely connected and deeply involved in the unfolding history of Haiti.410
The migration of formerly US-based Haitian activists back to Haiti and the establishment
of transnational political organizations had a lasting impact not only on Haitian politics in the
United States but also on politics in Haiti. A twenty-five-year-old named Yves, who identified
himself as a “cultural nationalist,” recalled the impact that this process had on the development
of an anti-imperialist consciousness among young Haitians. “You know that after February 7
there were a lot of different kinds of people that returned to the country. And there were leftists
among them. And they also were anti-imperialists . . . So anti-Americanism developed, with the
press conferences” that the leftist groups held. Jean, a student leader from Carrefour, also
remembered the impact of “the appearance of a series of groups and individuals who returned
and gave press conferences which showed all of the positions of the U.S. on the development of
the country.” Guy, a third student activist, linked the political activity of activists who had
returned from the United States to the political development of Haitian students, remembering
that “the people who returned permitted youth to develop . . . For example, people honored
410

Ives, interview; Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc, Nations Unbound, 208; Charles, “Haitian Life in New
York and the Haitian-American Left,” 299.

177
Charlemagne Peralte [the leader of the nationalist resistance against the US occupation of Haiti
in the early twentieth century] as a true national hero.”411
The uprising in Haiti, the departure of Duvalier, and the establishment of networks and
organizations that tightened the connection between Haiti and Haitians in the United States all
contributed to what one source characterizes as “an upsurge in Haitian nationalism among people
who had become firmly rooted in the U.S.” Following the dictatorship’s collapse,
Haitians in New York, for the first time since the beginning of the migration, flaunted
their Haitian identity. Haitian taxi drivers decorated their cabs with bumper stickers
declaring “Haiti Libere (Haiti is Liberated).” Haitians could be seen in the subway
wearing tee shirts or buttons with Haitian flags. Virtually all Haitian immigrant
organizations were swept up in the excitement and began to discuss organizing activities
towards Haiti and setting up organizational linkages or offices in Haiti.412
Events in 1985 and 1986, culminating in the collapse of the almost thirty-year
dictatorship, ushered in “a new era of nationalist organizing” for Haitians in the United States.413
But since Haiti continued to be the site of turmoil, haunted by the lingering specter of repression
and political violence, Haitian activists had to channel the community’s embrace of Haitian
nationalism into ongoing protest rather than sustained celebration. Nonetheless, Duvalier’s
departure in February 1986 had fundamentally altered the terrain of Haitian politics in New York
and Miami. After this point in 1986, Haitian activists in the United States drew on the expanded
communication networks, the media operations that were operating in both Haiti and the United
States, and the connections among activists who had returned to Haiti and built cross-border
political organizations to inform and to drive their political activism.
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Fighting Against “Duvalierism without Duvalier”
In New York and Miami the Haitian activists that had worked for so long to topple the
Duvalier regime and to support the resistance inside Haiti shared the hope that Baby Doc’s
departure signified a new beginning for their country. But they also maintained a deep sense of
doubt about the prospects for change and a deep fear that “Duvalierism” would persist despite
the absence of Jean-Claude, concerns that appeared ever more legitimate as events continued to
unfold in Haiti.
After Duvalier’s departure, Haitian leaders, with US government guidance and support,
formed the Conseil National de Gouvernement (National Council of Government, or CNG).414
Representing both civilian and military leaders and a range of political positions, the National
Council of Government appeared to offer a greater voice to the Haitian people. It took steps to
distance itself from the past regime, freeing political prisoners, repealing the Duvalier’s
constitution of 1983, and announcing the dissolution of the hated tontons macoutes.415 Despite
the appearance of change, however, the CNG did not represent much of a departure from the
past. Of the six positions in the National Council of Government, four were occupied by
individuals who had previously served the Duvalier family, including Duvalier’s former minister
of information and his minister of defense and interior. Heading the National Council of
Government was Henri Namphy, a US Army-trained general who had served both Papa Doc and
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Baby Doc.416 Regarding the continuity between Duvalier dictatorship and the newly formed
CNG, Fritz Longchamp -- program director for the Washington Office on Haiti, an organization
founded in 1984 to support democracy and human rights in Haiti -- reported that “people have
expressed their frustration over the new National Governing Council. The overwhelming
presence on this council of military and civilians who were closely associated with the Duvalier
regime is a matter of great concern.''417 Viter Juste, a businessman and community leader in
Little Haiti, agreed. ''It doesn't sound to me like Baby Doc has really gone into exile. He has left
all his friends in power. Perhaps he has just gone on a European vacation.''418 In Haiti, too,
many were distressed by the degree of continuity between the previous and the current
governments. Throughout the spring and summer of 1986, activists distributed flyers
demonstrating the need to “cut the monkey’s tail of Duvalierism,” an indication that they
interpreted the CNG as a continuation of the dictatorship.
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1. Cutting the Monkey’s Tail of Duvalierism. A handwritten note on the reverse side reads,
“Haiti, Spring/Summer, 1986. One of many flyers distributed throughout Haiti during the period
of ‘dechoukaj.’ It illustrates cutting the monkey’s tail of Duvalierism. Courtesy of HaitiProgres,” Source: Haiti Dechoukaj Collection. Schomburg Center for Research in Black
Culture, New York Public Library.

Although the first commercial flight from the United States to Haiti after Duvalier’s
departure was completely packed with excited homeward-bound exiles, many also remained
skeptical about the new government and hesitant to immediately rush back to Haiti. While
many, like Joseph Etienne of the Haitian Center’s Council of New York, expressed their desire
to return, they also might have agreed with Etienne that it was wise “to wait to see the shape of
the new government” before doing so. The Reverend Gerard Jean-Juste also advised caution.
“There was no coup or revolution,” he said. And since "we still have a lot of Duvalier's people
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in the government” and “we don't know what has changed," he warned that Haitians considering
returning home needed to be careful.419
An even greater concern for some Haitian activists in the United States was the fear of an
American intervention in Haiti if popular unrest continued. Almost immediately after the
collapse of Duvalier’s government, this concern began surfacing at events in Haitian
communities in the United States. A central message of a large demonstration in Brooklyn on
February 8 was “No to American interference.” Two days after Duvalier had left Haiti, a rally
and celebration in Miami featured a banner on stage that read “No U.S. Intervention in Haiti.”
Likewise, a demonstration on February 15 in the Boston City Hall Plaza announced its first
objective as the denunciation of “the menace of American intervention” in Haiti, and a protest in
front of the United Nations in New York on February 21, which began as an action against the
Namphy-led CNG, soon featured protesters chanting, “USA, CIA, Hands off Haiti!”420
Although the Reagan administration was not inclined to send a US military force to Haiti
in 1986, it was, to the dismay of anti-CNG activists, publicly embracing General Namphy and
the National Council of Government. After Duvalier’s departure and the formation of the CNG,
the United States resumed foreign assistance to Haiti and pledged increased assistance and new
sources of aid to the country. US Ambassador to Haiti Brunson McKinley congratulated
Namphy on “his sincere commitment to build democratic institutions.” Although “some are
dissatisfied that General Namphy has not carried through more basic social and developmental
reforms,” Ambassador McKinley acknowledged, the CNG was “doing its best to fulfill its pledge
419
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to the Haitian people” and thus “needs and deserves our help and support.”421 In November
1986 the Reagan administration invited General Namphy to the White House where he met with
the president, the vice president, the secretary of state, and the administrator of the Agency for
International Development. An official statement on Namphy’s White House visit declared,
“President Reagan expressed his firm support for General Namphy's efforts to build democratic
institutions and achieve the goal of a working democracy.” The White House also took the
occasion of Namphy’s visit to herald the increase of US aid to Haiti to just over $100 million.422
The American government’s role in overseeing the transition from Duvalier to Namphy
and its strong support for the CNG instilled resentment and anti-American sentiment among
some student activists in Haiti. In a December 3, 1987, interview, Guy, a seventeen-year-old
student activist, described how hostility toward the United States spread in the wake of
Duvalier’s departure:
Anti-Americanism developed little by little in Haiti. There were youth who realized that
it was the Americans who were the cause of the problems. After February 7 [the day
Duvalier left Haiti] it exploded. What made it explode? [Secretary of State George]
Schultz was the first one to announce that Jean-Claude had left, but he hadn’t left yet.
Then people saw that it was a U.S. Air Force plane that came to get Jean-Claude. As
soon as they saw that it was an American compromise, and then out of nowhere the
KNG appeared and they asked who formed it? People didn’t quite understand where
these people came from, who put them there. So they started asking questions . . . They
understood that the Americans gave them arms for repression against the people. Then
everyone started to understand.423
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Haitian activists in the United States were also distressed by the US government’s
support for the Namphy regime. In response to Washington’s support for the CNG, the
Brooklyn-based Committee against Repression in Haiti, the coalition that six years earlier had
led the mobilization against the 1980 crackdown that coincided with President Reagan’s first
election, called a demonstration in Washington, DC, for the end of March 1986. A flyer
advertising the demonstration highlighted the three greatest threats to the Haitian people: “the
establishment of a Duvalierist junta under the aegis of the United States, the menace of North
American intervention in Haiti, and the interference of the State Department in the internal
affairs” of the country.424
In Miami, too, members of the Haitian community were critical of US policy toward
Haiti, but, as in earlier periods, they linked their protests to the imprisonment and deportation of
Haitian refugees. Although developments in Haiti took center stage for many Haitian activists in
this period, the campaign in defense of the refugees imprisoned at the Krome Avenue facility and
in other immigration prisons never stopped. In fact, the Haitian Refugee Center hoped to
channel some of the excitement over Duvalier’s departure and the anger over US support for
Namphy into the movement for the refugees. As the US government prepared to deport one
hundred more Haitian refugees imprisoned at Krome, the Reverend Gerard Jean-Juste, the
leading voice of grassroots activism in Haitian Miami, addressed a letter to immigration officials.
Jean-Juste warned that Haitians of Miami had shown their will to take to the streets the previous
week when they demanded and celebrated the end of the dictatorship. Now, he declared, they
were willing to do the same thing to defend their compatriots facing deportation.425
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At the end of April 1986 a violent incident in Port-au-Prince further entrenched Haitian
activists in their opposition to the Namphy regime. On April 26 tens of thousands of people
marched from a service memorializing the estimated sixty thousand people who had perished in
the Duvalier years to Fort Dimanche, the prison where many of the victims had lost their lives.
The army, though now serving at the pleasure of Henri Namphy rather than of Jean Claude
Duvalier, opened fire on the crowd, killing at least six and wounding fifty, according to Amnesty
International. When the human rights organization appealed to the Haitian government for an
independent inquiry into the Fort Dimanche incident, the Namphy regime responded that while it
would conduct an investigation, it considered the army’s action the “normal reaction of enlisted
soldiers in the face of an attempted invasion by individuals openly encouraged by agitators.”426
In the eyes of many US-based activists, the incident confirmed what they had been saying for
some time: Namphy represented little more than “Duvalierism without Duvalier.”427 The event
also drew the attention of Haitians in New York and Miami to one of the leaders of the memorial
service: Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
Aristide would ultimately become perhaps the most well known figure in the popular
movement of Haiti. But in April 1986 he was just one of many leaders in the grassroots
insurgency fighting against the Namphy regime. As a young man, Jean-Bertrand Aristide had
made his way from a modest, rural upbringing to the Port-au-Prince neighborhood of Cite Soleil,
where he enrolled in a school run by the Salesian order of the Roman Catholic Church. During
this period he embraced the ideas of liberation theology, crucial in his development since the
core ideas of liberation for the poor and oppressed shaped every aspect of his subsequent
426
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political activity and life. In 1979 Aristide left Haiti for Israel, where he studied biblical
theology, but he returned to Haiti three years later and began to garner a reputation for his sharp
and witty sermons that criticized the Duvalier dictatorship. Such criticism rarely went unnoticed
by the dictatorship, so the Salesians sent Aristide to Montreal and into exile where he was less of
a threat to the Duvalier regime and the regime was less of a threat to him.428
In January 1985 as the popular movement against the dictatorship was gathering
momentum, Aristide returned to Haiti and took a position in the parish of Saint-Jean Bosco, an
area at the periphery of the slum neighborhood of La Saline in Port-au-Prince. It was a fortuitous
time to return to the country, and Aristide threw himself into the popular movement, soon
becoming a center of anti-Duvalier activity in Haiti’s capital city. Aristide and the community
formed Solidarite Ant Jen (SAJ) (Solidarity among Youth), and the poor youth of SAJ partnered
with the ti kominote legliz (base ecclesiastical communities), grassroots popular organizations
associated with the church that were sprouting up in the countryside. From his pulpit Aristide
delivered weekly messages of liberation, encouraging the overflow crowds to join the movement
for freedom. Despite ominous warnings and a failed attempt on his life, Father Aristide, or Pe
Titid as he was known in the community, carried on, making Saint-Jean Bosco the locus of Portau-Prince’s popular movement that toppled Duvalier and later fought on to resist the CNG and
General Namphy.429
As the conflict between the Namphy regime and anti-government activists escalated in
Haiti in the spring and summer of 1986, Haitians in the diaspora found new ways to support the
resistance in Haiti. In March the Union Intersydicale d’Haiti (UIH) issued an appeal to Haitian
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workers in the country and throughout the diaspora to join the upcoming May Day mobilization
in Haiti. May Day in 1986 could be historic, the UIH argued, since it was the one hundredth
anniversary of the Chicago eight-hour movement and the Haymarket affair, and the fortieth
anniversary of the Haitian Revolution of 1946, which represented an important moment in the
struggle for labor rights in the country. The New York-based Association of Haitian Workers
(ATH) answered the UIH call by sending a delegation to join the International Workers’ Day in
Haiti. Although the ATH reported disappointment at the size and nature of the May Day events,
indicating perhaps the limited influence of the UIH, members of the New York Haitian
delegation were able to make a number of appearances on Haitian radio stations to share a
statement of solidarity with Haitian workers and to detail ways in which the movement in the
United States was working to support the popular movement in Haiti.430
As New York-based activists were trying to assist the rebuilding of the Haitian labor
movement, young Haitians in American cities noticed the leading role students were taking in
the popular movement. As a result, Haitian students in New York, Miami, and Boston
responded by building their own branch of the solidarity campaign. In April 1986 students in
New York formed the Haitian Association of Students (ASETHA), announcing that the first
meeting of the organization was to be held on April 13 at Medgar Evers College in Brooklyn.
“The action of students in Haiti has awakened the conscience of youth in the diaspora,” the
provisional committee of ASETHA declared. The committee saw that it was time to
“consolidate and mobilize the students at the university level, vocational and secondary
education and establish a close link with other student organizations;” their goal was to
“eventually unite in a federation whose head office is in Haiti.” At the same time, the founding
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members of ASETHA aimed to “elevate the level of awareness of students on social, political,
and cultural problems” and generally to “support and defend the interests of students against
injustice.”431
Later that summer, as students in Haiti went on strike against the leaders of the CNG,
Haitian students in the United States mobilized to support them. On June 28 the Association of
Haitian Students of Miami issued a statement supporting the National Federation of Students of
Haiti and condemning the CNG and American interference in Haiti. The next day the
Association of Haitian Students of New York and Massachusetts followed suit. As Haiti
Progres observed, the Haitian students, “even far from home, intend to contribute to the
campaign conducted by the popular, progressive sector in Haiti.”432
In the fall, protests in Haiti multiplied. In September, protests against the CNG led by
students and young people sprang up once again in the city of Gonaives. "They still haven't done
anything for the people except change the black and red flag to blue and red," charged Alfphonse
Joseph, one of the Gonaives organizers. In Port-au-Prince, those calling for the resignation of
Namphy and the other leaders of the CNG staged back-to-back days of protest. While praying
and singing hymns in front of the National Palace, protesters were suddenly met by police who
fired rubber bullets and grenades of tear gas into the crowd. By early October people were
demonstrating their anger and frustration with the CNG all over Haiti as the cities of Port-dePaix, Cap Haitien, Jeremie, Les Cayes, and Miragoane all joined Gonaives and Port-au-Prince as
sites of popular unrest. Fearing the threat posed to his regime, General Namphy warned that
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Haiti was at “the edge of anarchy.” Participants in the popular movement in Haiti and the United
States, on the other hand, saw promise rather than peril in the widespread uprisings.433
Haitians activists in New York and Miami responded to the escalation in Haiti with a
major escalation of their own, revealing the extent to which the movements in Haiti and in the
United States were becoming ever more tightly joined. Ironically, it was a backfired attempt to
capture the support of the Haitian diaspora by the imperiled Namphy regime that helped clarify
this relationship. At the end of September, the CNG endeavored to rally the diaspora by inviting
Haitians to return to the country. In response, a group of Haitians living in cities across the
United States and around the world rejected the appeal, saying, “Duvalierism is in full swing in
Haiti;” as a result, the exiled Haitian remained “a stranger in his own country.” The statement
went on to explain that even though they could not return to Haiti, those in the diaspora
identified with the Haitian people, “sons and daughters of the same nation, members of the same
body, even victims of a dictatorial regime,” and they remained “comforted by the tenacity of our
people to conquer their political rights.” At the same time, the Haitian Refugee Center, the heart
of the popular movement in Miami, also issued a statement of solidarity with the Haitian people,
as did other elements of the Miami community. The Association of Haitian Students, too, issued
a statement denouncing the CNG offer and stating support for the people of Haiti.434
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In mid-October activists in the Haitian communities of both New York and Miami
stepped up their involvement in the effort to support the anti-CNG resistance in Haiti. The
Miami-based Committee of Solidarity with the Haitian People announced they would lead four
straight days of protests and picketing outside the Haitian consulate of Miami. These actions
were presented as a way for Haitians in Miami to act “‘en symbiose’ (in harmony) with the
popular movement in Haiti.”435 Haitian activists in Miami also staged numerous demonstrations
through the month of October 1986 in the largest mobilizations in Miami since Duvalier had fled
Haiti.436
Activists in the New York community sought to mobilize the community en symbiose
with the resistance in Haiti. Reminding Haitians of the role they had played in tearing down the
Duvalier dictatorship, the Committee against Repression in Haiti declared that it was time to
reinvigorate such action. “Once again, as before the fall of Duvalier, democratic and progressive
organizations, youth groups, priests and engaged laity . . . [all] require the support of the diaspora
in their fight.”437 At an emergency meeting in Brooklyn at the headquarters of the Association of
Haitian Workers (ATH), a group affiliated with Ben Dupuy’s Movement for Haitian Liberation
(MHL) and the newspaper Haiti Progres, activists formed the Ad Hoc Committee to Support the
Struggle of the Haitian People. Reporting on the development, Haiti Progres commented on the
role of Haitian activists abroad: “The Haitian Diaspora in the U.S. is a force that must be
maximally utilized.” The article pointed out that as the CNG became “more and more isolated,”
it tried to suppress the popular movement. But Haitians in the diaspora could “help our people
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be the coup de grace for this illegal government, [and] at the same time, uproot imperialism.”438
On December 6 nearly two thousand people participated in a march and demonstration against
the CNG and its American support at Brooklyn’s Grand Army Plaza, the first major action since
Duvalier’s departure brought thousands into the street on January 11.439
While thousands of Haitians answered the call to protest in Miami and New York, not
everyone supported actions like the December 6 demonstration in Brooklyn. The conservative
newspaper Haiti Observateur, for example, had called on its readers to boycott the action.
Seeing the action as the work of Haiti Progres, its ideological and political opponent, Haiti
Oberservateur refused to support the demonstration and ran the headline, “No to the
Demonstration of [Haiti Progres editor-in-chief] Ben Dupuy”440 Despite the opposition,
however, activists at Haiti Progres and other organizations in New York and Miami were
increasingly able to raise consciousness of the relationship of Haitians in the United States to the
struggle back home; in the years following Duvalier’s departure, they were also increasingly able
to mobilize their own Haitian communities.
As 1986 came to a close, people in Haiti, New York, and Miami had experienced a major
transformation. The previous year, which had witnessed the collapse of an almost thirty-year
dictatorship and the popular fury and excitement that had surrounded that event, turned over new
ground in both Haiti and the Haitian communities of the United States. And in the struggle
against “Duvalierism without Duvalier,” activists in Haiti, New York, and Miami would, in close
cooperation, continue to forge new paths.
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This period of new opportunities and political openings had, somewhat ironically, been
initiated by a severe crackdown on anti-Duvalier forces in Haiti as well as on Haitian refugees
attempting to enter the United States. In 1980 the repression in Haiti that accompanied the
election of President Ronald Reagan temporarily closed the door on the political opening of the
Carter years. But the crackdown on the grassroots resistance in Haiti caused activists in the
United States to intensify their anti-Duvalier organizing. And the Duvalier regime’s effort to
force opposition journalists and other leading dissidents into exile tightened the connections
between the anti-Duvalier resistance inside and outside Haiti. At the same time, the Reagan
administration’s stringent new policies that had been introduced to staunch the flow of Haitian
refugees to the United States further galvanized the refugee movement.
From 1980 to 1986, and especially after February 1986, activists in Haiti and in the
United States developed a closely linked, cross-border movement. Haitians in the United States
recognized that they were part of a border-crossing movement that was en symbiose with the
movement in Haiti. Furthermore, activists in each location drew upon this international
movement, first as a tool in their battle against “Duvalierism without Duvalier” and later as a
tool to construct a democratic alternative to “Duvalierism” and to empower Haitians seeking
freedom and equal treatment in the United States.
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Chapter 4
A Growing People’s Movement, 1987-1989
On February 7, 1987, Haitians in the United States marked the first anniversary of the
collapse of Duvalier’s dictatorship. In Miami the day began with a memorial service for the
victims of the Duvalier regime and for the woman killed after being struck by a car in Little Haiti
in the previous year’s celebration. In the afternoon the unity of the memorial service gave way
to discord, revealing the level of frustration felt by Haitian activists one year after Duvalier. In
Little Haiti some attended a block party featuring a fashion show, live music, and food vendors.
At the same time, several hundred angry protesters approached the Haitian consulate, carrying
signs that read “Namphy Must Go” and “We Want True Democracy!” Carmen Biambi, an
organizer of the protest, insisted, “Haiti is under a state of siege, and people are getting arrested
day and night.” She accused organizers of the Little Haiti festival of being “pro-government
loyalists,” a charge Henri C. Marcellus, director of the Radio Cultural Club, a co-sponsor of the
event, denied. Whether the day’s competing events revealed differing perspectives on Namphy
and the CNG, one thing was clear. The jubilation of the year before for many had faded.441
On the streets of Port-au-Prince the scene contrasted even more starkly with that of the
year before. There was no joyous celebration or thrilling destruction of monuments to Duvalier.
Instead, the capital was eerily calm. Fearing violence, most Haitians stayed inside and off the
streets. Stores remained closed. To guard against what he called the ‘’demogogic and anarchic
forces that wish to direct the nation on a path of chaos,’’ Lieutenant General Namphy sent
armored vehicles and truckloads of soldiers into the streets and ordered others to sack the homes
and offices of opposition leaders, arresting five in the days leading up to the anniversary.
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Observing Haiti just over a year after Duvalier’s departure, the North American Congress on
Latin America reported that Haiti “remains in an eerie and uneasy interregnum. Rather than
revolution, the transition represents a continuum, suggesting the French adage, plus ca change,
plus c’est la meme chose – the more things change, the more they stay the same.”442 In Haiti, as
in the diaspora, one year after Duvalier there was little to celebrate.443
Given the situation in Haiti, many Haitians in New York and Miami who hoped to return
to a post-Duvalier Haiti were still reluctant to make the trip. Some had returned, including the
Haitian Fathers, Ben Dupuy, and other leaders of the popular movement in the diaspora. The
Reverend Gerard Jean-Juste of the Miami Haitian Refugee Center had been back to Haiti four
times since Duvalier’s departure but still insisted that things would fundamentally have to
change for him and many other Haitians for them to return permanently. “Unless there is some
stability and development, I don’t think we will go back,” said Jean-Juste. Lucien Christophe, a
forty-three-year-old Miami businessman, agreed, saying, “We have been working to build
something here, and it is hard to give it up to go to a situation where you could have nothing.
Duvalier is gone, but the things of Duvalier are still there.” For many Haitians in the diaspora,
the persistent “things of Duvalier” included both political repression and the lack of economic
opportunity in Haiti.444
As they had during the Duvalier era, Haitians at home and abroad saw the American
government’s hand in the persistence of Duvalierism. Reports of US military assistance to Haiti,
which in 1987 helped the Haitian military grow in size and which supplied upgraded weapons
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and military advisors trained to school Haitian soldiers and police in “disturbance control
techniques,” seemed to confirm the perception that the United States was backing repression.445
Attempting to counter the increasingly negative image of the US presence in Haiti, State
Department officials circulated a memo among US Mission employees stressing that military aid
to Haiti represented less than 1.5 percent of the total economic assistance the United States
provided to the country. Regarding the civil disturbance training and equipment the United
States was providing to the Namphy government, it was, the memo stated, “designed to give
these [Haitian] soldiers the ability to deal with genuine threats to public security without
resorting to inappropriate force, which has led to injuries and even loss of life in the past.”446
Many Haitians, however, appeared unconvinced that such assistance was good for their country.
Walking through downtown Port-au-Prince in early 1987, one could see “U.S. Out of Haiti”
spray-painted on city walls.447 Resentment against the United States also reflected the desire of
some Haitians to break free of the economic model imposed by Washington. As discussed
earlier, the importation of US-produced rice and the imposition of North American white pigs
were policies that Haitian peasants believed undercut their ability to survive. And the exportoriented assembly industry, proposed as the economic salvation of the country, was also seen by
critics as something that benefited the wealthy and international investors much more than it did
ordinary Haitians. Giving voice to this frustration, Jean-Bertrand Aristide criticized US presence
in Haiti: “U.S. companies put in one dollar and take out four.” Only a small number of Haitians
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benefited from the country’s relationship with the United States, Artistide argued; he claimed
that “the Americans haven’t helped the poor people. They help the rich, the army.”448
In the United States, Haitians viewed their continued exile and the ongoing refugee crisis
as evidence of the continuity between Duvalier and the leaders that succeeded him in the
National Council of Government (CNG). As Haiti Progres observed in April 1987, refugees
kept attempting to flee Haiti despite the fact that Duvalier was gone and a more “democratic
climate is supposed to reign in Haiti.” But “the same causes produce the same effects,” the
newspaper noted, concluding that “from the persistent attempts to flee the country we can
measure the extent of ‘change’ that took place in the country from Duvalier to the CNG.”449
The Haitian Refugee Center and its partner organization Kombit Libete continued to be
the driving force in the Haitian grassroots movement in Miami. However, in the wake of
Duvalier’s departure, Kombit Libete became Komite Veye Yo, or Veye Yo as the group was
known. Translated as “Watch them,” Veye Yo signified its members’ suspicion of the new
Haitian government and their belief in the need for active vigilance of events in Haiti and all
those that would usurp the popular uprising taking place there. In the spring of 1987 Veye Yo
announced its intention to facilitate a “permanent mobilization against the CNG and to
demonstrate the refusal of the Haitian people with respect to North American military aid” to
Haiti. Towards this end, Veye Yo called Haitians of Miami to join a demonstration every
Wednesday, Friday, and Saturday from noon until one o’clock in the heart of Little Haiti.450
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While Haitian activists in the New York and Miami were dismayed over the unfinished
nature of the uprooting and the ongoing refugee crisis, the spring also brought hope. In March
1987 the Cuban-Haitian Adjustment Act went into effect. A provision of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, the new law gave Haitians and Cubans who arrived as
part of the large wave of refugees in the early 1980s a chance to apply for permanent residency.
As long as they had arrived before January 1, 1982, refugees were eligible for residency, a
provision that not only would allow them to stay in the United States without fear of
imprisonment and deportation but that also would make it much easier to travel back and forth
between Haiti and the United States. This provision provided tremendous relief for people like
Vilbert Myrthil, a thirty-nine-year-old co-owner of a welding shop in Little Haiti who came to
Florida by boat as part of the great surge in Haitian refugees at the end of the 1970s. The same
was true for Marie Joseph, a forty-eight-year-old resident of New York. ‘’I’ve been waiting so
long,’’ said Joseph. ‘’Now I can go back to Haiti and see my family and bring them back to New
York.’’ On the first day the law was enacted, the Miami INS offices were flooded with thousands
of Haitians eager to file an application for residency. 451
The passage of the Cuban-Haitian Adjustment Act was the product of years of hard work,
coordinated by a leading organization in the refugee movement, the National Coalition for
Haitian Refugees (NCHR). Michael Hooper, the executive director of the NCHR, authored the
bill, after which the NCHR and its allies exerted substantial effort to mobilize political support
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for the legislation.452 The legislative campaign ultimately won the active support of influential
members of the labor and civil rights communities. The International Ladies Garment Workers
Union (ILGWU) put forth a resolution in support of the legislation, and AFL-CIO President
Lane Kirkland, also a member of the Executive Committee of the NCHR, sent a letter of support
to Congressman Peter Rodino, who had introduced the legislation in the House of
Representatives.453 Also in support of the campaign, Clarence N. Wood, vice president of the
National Urban League, addressed a letter to Immigration and Naturalization Commissioner
Alan Nelson, insisting that “any regularization of Cubans must also include the regularization of
this comparable group of Haitians.”454 The executive directors of the League of United Latin
American Citizens and the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights also sent letters of support. 455
When the Cuban-Haitian Adjustment Act finally became law, it was a milestone
achievement, albeit with significant limitations. The new law was attached to the larger
Immigration Reform and Control Act, which established stiffer sanctions on employers of the
undocumented workers and authorized expanded enforcement against those in the country
illegally. These aspects of the legislation would hurt undocumented Haitians in the United
States,
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Michael Hooper was quick to point out. The Cuban-Haitian Adjustment Act also gave legal
status only to those who could verify that they had arrived before January 1, 1982, leaving many
Haitian refugees still in limbo. Nonetheless, Hooper wrote for Haiti Observateur, “The 32
member organizations of the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees and myself personally are
proud to have been able to work to craft and propose legislation to bring a minimum of justice to
the lives the Haitian boat people who have suffered for so long.”456
In Haiti, too, the first months of 1987 brought promising signs that the efforts of
grassroots activists were bearing fruit. In January 1987 a broad range of popular organizations in
Haiti came together under the leadership of schoolteacher Victor Benoit to form the Komite
Nasyonal Kongres Organizasyons Demokratik (National Committee of the Congress of
Democratic Organizations), or KONAKOM. In a statement issued at the conclusion of its first
meeting, KONAKOM declared that one year after Duvalier’s departure, no meaningful changes
had taken place in the country and therefore the Congress of Democratic Organizations was
forming to ensure democracy, end poverty, and protect the freedom of all segments of the
population.457
Another hopeful development was the creation of a new constitution that limited the
power of the president, decentralized political power from Port-au-Prince, and elevated Creole
and Voudoo, the language and the religion of the majority of Haitians, to nationally-recognized
status. Although the previous year’s election of a national assembly to draft the constitution
attracted little interest, what emerged, according to a report by the North American Congress on
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Latin America, was “a daringly liberal constitution promising rights most Haitians have never
known.”458 Once it became clear that the new constitution was different from those that
preceded it, it began to gather support. The proposed constitution also reflected many of the
demands articulated by the member organizations of KONAKOM, another reason for the
heightened interest in and support for the document. What’s more, aspiring politicians in the
diaspora appreciated that the national assembly rolled back the CNG’s efforts to exclude them
from seeking elected office in Haiti, a right they would enjoy under the proposed constitution. “I
am for the constitution because it is the first one really in the interest of all the miserable
people,” said Alexander Flerum, an unemployed ironworker from Leogane. However, some
considered the new constitution less significant. As one retired surveyor remarked, “The
constitution on paper is good, but experience tells me it won’t be respected.” Despite some
questions about how much the new governing document would change the situation in Haiti, it
enjoyed a substantial degree of support and would become an important symbol in succeeding
political struggles in Haiti.459
Even though KONAKOM and the new constitution enjoyed much popular support, not
all elements of the grassroots movement got behind either initiative. It was, according to the
leftist Democratic Unity Confederation (KID), “a pretty flower with no fragrance, fine sounding
promises . . . aimed at putting the people to sleep.”460 In March organizations representing the
grassroots Left came together to create a new confederation that would oppose the constitution.
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In Saint-Jean Bosco, the home parish of Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide, one thousand people
crowded into a community hall to hold the founding meeting of the National Popular Assembly
(APN). The APN was a national organization made up of local popular assemblies representing
peasants and urban workers. Ben Dupuy, editor of Haiti Progres and longtime activist in New
York, was one of the chief figures behind the founding of the APN. With the launch of the APN,
Dupuy sought to create a more radical alternative to KONAKOM, which he considered too
reformist. Instead of focusing on the new constitution and the elections scheduled for
November, the APN advocated direct action, such as land occupations, demonstrations, strikes,
and grassroots organizing and education. Francois Pierre-Louis, another leading figure of the
APN and member of Dupuy’s New York-based network, explained, “APN’s approach is
different in that we think the origins of Haiti’s social, political, and economic problems lies in
class conflict and the country’s heavy dependence on the United States and other capitalist
countries.” One of the APN’s critics claimed that the organization “want[s] to immediately
install a revolutionary people’s democracy,” a charge that Dupuy and other founding members
would have likely agreed with.461
Along with KONAKOM, the founding of the APN illustrates the blossoming of a diverse
grassroots movement in Haiti in the spring of 1987. In addition, the APN’s roots and its ongoing
engagement with organizations in the United States provides an interesting example of the
border-crossing politics that connected Haiti with other centers of movement activity after 1986.
The APN was directly connected to key grassroots organizations in New York and Miami,
organizations that often promoted its vision and its activity to members in the diaspora. The
Brooklyn-based Association of Haitian Workers (ATH), which was also affiliated with Dupuy
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and his earlier organization, the Haitian Liberation Movement (MHL), sent a statement of
support and solidarity to the founding meeting of the APN as did Veye Yo from Miami.462 From
the summer of 1987 onward, Dupuy and his supporters drew on this network of organizations; in
return, to stay connected to their allies in other cities and countries, movement participants could
turn to Dupuy’s Haiti Progres, now distributed widely in Port-au-Prince, Miami, and New York.
In the spring of 1987, the achievements of grassroots activists in both Haiti and the
United States gave Haitians reason to be cautiously hopeful. The passage of the Cuban-Haitian
Adjustment Act was a significant achievement by Haitian activists and their supporters in the
labor and civil rights communities. The development of a diverse grassroots movement in Haiti
with close connections to the grassroots movement in New York and Miami also held out much
promise. That summer, however, the struggle between the CNG and the popular movement
suddenly intensified, and the sharpened conflict threw Haitians in Haiti, New York, and Miami
into emergency mode.

Under Attack
At the end of June, the Confederation of Autonomous Haitian Workers (CATH),
according to one report, “the most active union [in Haiti] . . . with scores of affiliates in industry,
the transport sector, and peasant cooperatives,” called a forty-eight-hour general strike to protest
the economic policies of Namphy and the CNG.463 In response, the Namphy regime moved to
dissolve the union, sending soldiers to union offices and arresting five, including CATH
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executive secretary Jean Auguste Mezieux. At the same time, Namphy moved to further
circumscribe his opponents’ influence by announcing that he would be the sole arbiter of Haiti’s
upcoming elections rather than allowing the Provisional Electoral Council to oversee elections as
directed by the newly approved constitution. In response, the multi-faceted and, at times,
divided popular movement issued a unified call for a general strike to protest Namphy’s action.
On June 29, the cities of Jacmel, Petit Goave, St. Marc, Les Cayes, and the capital city of Portau-Prince were shut down. Protesters erected burning barricades of tires and garbage on the
streets of the cities and constructed a burning roadblock that paralyzed the highway running from
St. Marc to Port-au-Prince. In their attempt to dismantle the barricades and break the strike, the
Haitian army killed at least six and wounded many more in the first day of the action. However,
the government’s show of force failed to break the strike, which continued to paralyze the
country for a second and a third day.464
Acting in concert with the general strike in Haiti, Haitians in Miami also mobilized. On
the third day of the general strike, Haitians assembling for a regular meeting of Veye Yo occupied
the street outside the Haitian Refugee Center in Little Haiti and called for an end to the CNG and
an end to US support to the Namphy regime. Only one day earlier Father Willy Romelus, bishop
from the Haitian city of Jeremie, had called for the resignation of the CNG. On the streets of
Miami, Haitians repeated Romelus’ exhortation to “rache manyok, bay te a blanch” (uproot the
plants, clear the land of Duvalierism). The next day more than eight hundred Haitians massed
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outside the Haitian consulate in Miami to call for the departure of the Namphy regime.465
Finally, after days of determined protest in Haiti and abroad, the Namphy regime announced that
it would reverse its decision and place control of the elections back in the hands of the
Provisional Electoral Council.466
This concession by the CNG did not resolve the standoff, however, as opponents of the
government took Namphy’s backtracking as an opportunity to go on the offensive. One week
after the initial launch of the general strike, Haiti was again paralyzed. This time, however, the
demand was for the CNG to step down. As protests continued, so did violent reprisals by
soldiers. By the end of June, at least 28 people were dead and 110 were wounded.467
As the crisis in Haiti entered its fourth week, the coordinating committee of fifty-seven
organizations, including the National Committee of the Congress of Democratic Organizations
(KONAKOM), issued an appeal to the Haitian people to sustain the struggle against the CNG, to
continue the general strike, and to support CATH, the union federation under attack by the
Namphy regime. “The people are standing fast, in order to show that it no longer wants that
CNG,” the statement proclaimed. The statement also exhorted the people to resist the
government:
The people will do nothing, not go to elections or anything else under this Macoute
government, which is a totally dependent flunky of a foreign government . . . We ask all
chauffeurs, all merchants, all workers, all civil servants, all the unemployed, all patriots
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who are struggling to emerge from the darkness in both Port-au-Prince and the provinces,
to respect the strike directive. We specially ask Gonaives and Cap Haitien to stand fast
and not stray from the path of deliverance until that CNG steps down.
The statement concluded, “Long live the constitution of 1987. Long live the people’s
alternative. Long live the CATH. Long live democracy for Haiti.”468
Observing the prolonged crisis, the US State Department appeared frustrated with all
sides of the conflict and worried about the outcome. In a confidential memo to State Department
officials and US Mission employees, US Ambassador to Haiti Brunson McKinley argued that
General Namphy had “provoked the crisis by badly miscalculating the public mood and his own
room for maneuver.” But the anti-government opposition was also to blame, McKinley
indicated. “Overconfident after their initial victories, [the opposition] decided to push for the
departure of the CNG. Groups of the democratic left (i.e. interested in elections) decided to
make common cause with diehard rejectionists” including ‘the communists’ and ‘the New Yorkbased Haiti-Progres group’.” As a result, “control of the strike and public perception of it
slipped inevitably towards the left,” McKinley warned, citing as evidence a march led by Rene
Theodore of PUCH (the United Haitian Communist Party) “in which red banners were waved
and at least one American flag burnt.” In addition, Ambassador McKinley noted that the monthlong crisis had also heightened the profile of “Father Aristide, the radical firebrand” who had
“reemerged in the second half of the crisis in an overtly political guise.” Considering the outlook
for Haiti, the ambassador argued that “the current crisis may be coming to an end,” noting that
public support for continuing the general strike seemed to be waning. Still, “the crisis has led to
a sharp and unhealthy polarization,” Ambassador McKinley concluded, and the United States
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could not be particularly confident in either the CNG or the Haitian politicians that might replace
it.469
Like certain State Department officials, Haitian activists in the United States were
watching the protracted struggle in Haiti carefully. What is notable about the activity in the
Haitian communities of New York and Miami in the summer of 1987 is how in sync the USbased activists seemed to be with the activists and actions on the ground in Haiti. In early July,
when the anti-government opposition launched the second phase of the general strike in Haiti,
five hundred Haitian protesters and their supporters held a march of their own in New York.470
On July 11, when leaders of three Haitian political parties in Haiti made a public call for an
unlimited general strike to continue until the CNG collapsed – an effort they were unable to
sustain, as many as two thousand people marched through the Miami neighborhood of Little
Haiti and more than one thousand people participated in a demonstration at Grand Army Plaza in
Brooklyn.471 Haitian activists in the United States were able to parallel the action in Haiti so
effectively, in part, because there were members who participated in the struggle at both
locations. For example, some like Ben Dupuy of the APN and Haiti Progres, participated
directly in the struggle in Haiti and then traveled to the United States to mobilize the community
in its support for the struggle in Haiti. Furthermore, transnational media like Dupuy’s Haiti
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Progres, which according to one report was “widely read” in Haiti just as it was among Haitians
in the United States, also carried news back and forth between activists in the two locations.472
While Port-au-Prince and other Haitian cities were engulfed in conflict, Namphy worked
to shore up his base in the countryside, making a trip to Haiti’s rural northwest region to
demonstrate his support for powerful families and large landowners that were facing an
increasingly mobilized peasant population. On July 23 in the northwestern town of Jean-Rabel,
landowners sent a large group of hired men to attack members of the group Tet Ansamn, a local
peasant organization that was leading the struggle for land reform in the region. Peasants who
were caught traveling along the road to Jean-Rabel were hacked to death and dismembered with
machetes. Bodies were tossed into a nearby ravine.473 A Haitian government-sponsored
commission that investigated the incident issued a report that acknowledged that the July 23
violence had resulted in “200 plus [dead], over 100 wounded and an unknown number
disappeared.” However, the commission’s report also downplayed the responsibility of the large
landowning families for the violence, characterizing the incident instead as the culmination of a
series of confrontations between “the Tet Ansanm movement” and “various sectors of the JeanRabel area population,” including not only landowners but also peasants not affiliated with the
Tet Ansamn movement. The government-sponsored report also blamed “the Church Institution
[which] failed to take action to rein in a movement – and its leader,” the liberation theology-
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inspired Father Jean-Marie Vincent, who had been among the religious leaders helping to
organize the peasant movement around Jean-Rabel.474
The massacre at Jean-Rabel effectively silenced some of the regime’s critics, but it also
inspired others to intensify their resistance. Jean-Bertrand Aristide was one of those that
continued to speak publicly against Namphy. In the days and weeks after the Jean-Rabel
massacre, Aristide used the radio and his pulpit to indict the Namphy regime for the peasant
deaths in the northwest. Aristide’s denunciations of Namphy aired on the radio program
L’Ayisyen, which played tape-recorded sermons and messages from the outspoken priest; these
broadcasts enabled Haitians in New York to hear Aristide’s indictments of the Namphy regime.
In both Haiti and the Haitian communities of the United States, Aristide’s public statements
during such times of crisis served to bolster the transnational resistance movement.475
To neutralize Aristide and the ti legliz movement of which he was a part, Namphy
obtained the cooperation of Catholic Church leaders. In an attempt to sever the priest from his
base in Saint-Jean Bosco parish in the Port-au-Prince neighborhood of La Saline, the church
authorities directed Aristide to relocate to a distant suburban parish on the outskirts of the city.
In response to the transfer order, young people whom Aristide lived among and worked with in
La Saline staged a sit-in and hunger strike at Haiti’s national cathedral, Notre Dame d’Haiti,
refusing to cease until “Pe Titid” was returned. Facing the determined youth and the ongoing
political crisis in the city and country, the church authorities rescinded Aristide’s transfer.476
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When its initial attempt to undercut Aristide and the ti legliz movement failed, the
Namphy regime shifted to a more direct attack on progressive priests. On Sunday August 23, a
group of progressive priests and nuns, including Father Antoine Adrien and Father William
Smarth, several members of the Holy Ghost Fathers, who had been known as the Haitian Fathers
during their time in exile in New York, and Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was gathered in a
small church in Saint Marc, a city in the northwest region of the country. The ti legliz leaders
had been invited to the church to perform a memorial mass for the peasants murdered at JeanRabel. As the local church leader was introducing Aristide, gunmen burst into the building,
firing their guns and attacking members of the congregation. Aristide, Adrien, Smarth, and JeanMarie Vincent, another clergyman and organizer of peasants in the Northwest, managed to
escape the attack, but as they sped away from the scene, they encountered a roadblock that had
been set to ambush them. In the pouring rain, soldiers and macoutes beat the priests and
smashed the car windows. The priests barely managed to escape with their lives. This incident,
meant to scare the priests and their followers into silence, instead backfired as spreading news of
the incident provoked even more anger and agitation from their supporters in the grassroots
opposition movement.477
The deteriorating situation in Haiti, perhaps along with the continued pressure of USbased Haitian activists and their supporters, began in the summer of 1987 to have an impact on
lawmakers in Washington. In the first week of August, a group of thirty-six members of the
House of Representatives issued a statement that criticized the Namphy-led government, called
for an independent commission to investigate the scores of deaths in Haiti in recent weeks –
twenty-four were dead and many more injured in the last week of July alone, and insisted that the
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Reagan administration suspend military aid to the junta. For its part, the Reagan administration
also expressed concern about the situation in Haiti, although it was unclear whether it was more
disturbed by the violent attacks on protesters or the protests themselves. “Anytime the people
are in the streets you have to worry,” one member of the administration commented. Still, the
turmoil in Haiti and the growing attention that American lawmakers were paying to the country
prompted the State Department to affirm its “unequivocal support” for Haitian democracy and to
pledge to review the situation. Later in the month the Reagan administration ruled that Namphy
and the CNG were making satisfactory progress toward a democratic transition, and US military
aid to Haiti would thus continue.478
Some Haitians in the United States were concerned with ending military aid to the
Namphy regime not only because they supported a democratic Haiti but also because continued
state-sponsored violence endangered their many family members and friends that remained in the
country. One incident in Boston illustrates how this personal connection with the crisis in Haiti
made demands for the United States to cease aid to the CNG urgent. At seven o’clock on
Monday morning, August 31, Antoine Thurel, a fifty-six-year-old cabdriver who had lived in
Boston since the mid-1970s, walked up the steps of the Massachusetts statehouse, doused
himself in flammable liquid, and set himself on fire with a burning cigarette. He died within a
minute. Before he took his own life, Thurel had hung a sign, handwritten in French, on the fence
near the steps. It stated that he, like many Haitians in the diaspora, was sick with grief and
anxiety over the situation in Haiti and angry with the United States for perpetuating the crisis.
Thurel’s note stated:
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Because of many difficulties and my family responsibilities, I want to offer myself in
holocaust for the complete liberation of my country. Note to the C.N.G. Macoute, a
product of the C.I.A. Note to the soldiers of death paid by the U.S. through [Haitian
businessman] Raphael Bazin. Note to the American Hand on the country. May Father
Aristide live in Haiti. May Haiti live for the New Liberation.
According to Thurel’s wife, and as his statement indicated, he was distraught over the reemergence of the Tontons Macoutes in Haiti. One of Thurel’s daughters who was still living in
Haiti had been almost killed when Haitian police had forced their way into her home. At his
funeral, which drew two thousand people, Thurel was hailed as a martyr for his country.479

The Promise and Peril of National Elections
As the fall approached, the future for Haiti was uncertain, and this sense of uncertainty
was felt throughout the diaspora, just as it was in Haiti. What would it take to end US support
for the Namphy regime? Would national elections actually happen in November as the new
constitution directed? If they did, would they be truly democratic or yet another farce aimed at
keeping the old guard in power? General Namphy addressed some of these questions in a speech
before the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 1987. Aware that US support
for the CNG was slipping away, and in an effort to cling to what little legitimacy remained for
his government within the international community, Namphy announced that elections would go
forward as planned in November. After the elections were over, he stated, power would be
transferred to an elected civilian government. While Namphy explained his intentions to
members of the General Assembly, however, outside the UN building, angry demonstrators
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accused the CNG of state terrorism; they expressed doubt that free and democratic elections
could ever happen under such a regime.480
In both Haiti and the diaspora the reaction towards the promised elections was mixed.
Some, like those who protested Namphy’s visit to the United Nations, thought fair elections such
an impossibility that they considered non-participation to be the best strategy. The National
Popular Assembly (APN), for example, called for a boycott of the upcoming elections.481 But
others in the popular movement thought elections held the promise to do away with Duvalierism
in Haiti. The most prominent group to embrace this latter position was the Front National de
Concertation (National United Front), or FNC, an organization that included KONAKOM and
that had evolved out of the Committee of 57, the group that had led the summer strikes and
protests. At the beginning of October, the FNC selected Gerard Gourgue, leader of the Haitian
Human Rights League and former minister of justice under the CNG, as their candidate for
president in the upcoming November elections.482
As the appointed date approached, it became more and more difficult to believe that the
election would be fair and democratic. On October 13, Yves Volel, a presidential candidate who
had lived in exile in Manhattan for fifteen years, was making a speech outside the police
headquarters in Port-au-Prince when he was approached by men suspected to be plainclothes
policemen and shot in the head.483 Another incident occurred after the Provisional Electoral
Council announced that twelve presidential candidates would be barred from running in the
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election due to their ties to Duvalier; enraged supporters of the former dictator attacked election
offices and machine-gunned and torched the homes and stores of Electoral Council members and
rival presidential candidates, sending some election officials into hiding. Those hoping to derail
the elections also burned down one of the buildings where ballots were being printed.484 Despite
the wave of violence, the CNG refused to provide protection to the Provisional Electoral Council
or its members, and Namphy even refused to speak about the violence in a national address just
days afterwards. The Reagan administration, too, refused to publicly condemn the attacks,
choosing instead to keep a low profile as the election approached.485
One week before the election, Port-au-Prince was again engulfed in violence. Members
of the Tontons Macoute burned down the Marche Salomon, a large market area in Port-auPrince. Magalie St. Louis, the seventeen-year-old daughter of a market woman who lost
everything in the blaze, observed “a little child, three years old. They told him to say ‘viv
l’arme’ [long live the army]. He couldn’t say ‘viv l’arme’ he said ‘viv l’arma.’ Maybe that’s
why they cracked his skull. They put a big hole in his head.”486 More than twenty people were
killed and many more wounded in the days leading up to the election. One body was deposited
on the doorstep of the house of Gerard Gourgue, the candidate backed by the National United
Front. “You see how Haiti is now? Nothing but trouble,” declared one person who had fled to
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the Dominican Republic. “Before the Tontons Macoute used to go after people at night; but now
they do it in broad daylight. The army is behind and they are in front.”487 In the absence of any
government or police protection, residents of Port-au-Prince began organizing their own
neighborhood defense groups with the aim of creating ''zones free of violence and fear'' and a
safe space from which to participate in the election. Despite the terror in the days leading up to
the election, many Haitians remained determined to vote. Standing around the body of a man
murdered the previous night, a group of neighbors and friends shouted, ''We're going to vote
anyway. We won't be abused!''488
On the eve of the first national elections in thirty years, Port-au-Prince was like a ghost
town. Fearing violence, stores were shut up tight and street vendors and even beggars were
conspicuously absent from the city streets. Uncertain what the next day might bring, many left
the city for the countryside.489 Watching from abroad, Haitians in the United States may have
been hopeful, but they also shared the deep sense of apprehension that pervaded Haiti as the sun
went down on Saturday November 28.
When they turned on the radio and television Sunday morning to get news from Haiti,
Haitians in the United States learned of the blood bath that had taken place in the early morning
hours of election day. Voters, some wearing their finest suits or their white dresses, lining up at
polling stations at 6:00 a.m. were mowed down by gunfire and hacked to death with machetes.
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Polling stations were burned to the ground. Gunmen targeted international journalists. Thirtyfour people were reported dead, but it later became clear that many more had died in the election
eve and election day violence.490 As one observer reported, “Bodies lay sprawled atop one
another.” A horrified French cameraman gasped, “We have seen a massacre.” Whereas before
the election day violence, as one observer noted, “The army doesn’t want to show its face in
front, but they’re behind those in civilian clothes who carry out the attack,” on November 28 and
29 the army’s position became clear.491 According to James Ferguson, “The thin line between
the army and the Tontons Macoutes had finally vanished. Army vehicles were to be seen, but
they were merely following the cars of the death-squads, lending open support to the Duvalierist
gangs.” Just three hours after the polls opened, the Haitian government declared the elections
cancelled. Hours later Lieutenant General Namphy dissolved the Provisional Electoral
Council.492
When Haitians in the United States learned of the election day violence, they frantically
tried to reach relatives and friends in Haiti. In Brooklyn, Marie Jeanne unsuccessfully tried to
contact her two sisters in Port-au-Prince and her parents in Cap-Haitien. Others rushed to
informal community centers like the store operated by Wilson Desir, where worried friends and
relatives desperately waited to hear about their loved ones. ''I am very scared for my family. I
haven't heard from them. I've tried to call,” said Alubtion Cadet as she sat with others at Desir’s
store. A report came in that the tontons macoutes had switched back into their blue uniforms for
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the first time since the Duvalier era, adding to the fear that Haiti had relapsed into full-scale
dictatorship. Grief and fear mixed with anger over the violence and the aborted election. The
only solution now, according to Hempstead, Long Island, resident Evans Romelus was to remove
the Namphy regime by force. ''We have to fight. We have to organize, buy weapons and go
down there,” he claimed.493
Like those in New York, many Haitians in Miami were shocked and outraged by the
violence and the cancelled election. At the Haitian Refugee Center in Little Haiti, a crowd
hastily prepared signs for an emergency protest. Shouting over the noise created by the angry
congregation, Farah Juste explained the feeling of Miami Haitians. "They're very mad. They
want to block up the street.
They want to take a boat there to help out.” Juste also noted that many blamed the US
government as well as the CNG for the election tragedy. After making their preparations,
protesters flowed out of the doors of the Haitian Refugee Center and into the street, where they
joined hundreds of others in a spontaneous protest that shut down the main thoroughfare running
through Little Haiti.494
For Haitians in Miami, the flame of anger that ignited on November 29 grew all week.
Nightly protests drew hundreds and sometimes up to one thousand people. On Saturday
December 5 as many as ten thousand people (twelve to eighteen thousand, according to some
Miami radio stations) joined a protest march that stretched ten blocks through northeastern
Miami and wound through the streets of Little Haiti. Like Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who
stated that “the American government is responsible – along with the Haitian government – for
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those who have died,” Haitian protesters in Miami blamed both the CNG and the Reagan
administration for what had happened on election day.495
But Haitians had another threat to respond to. In the wake of the election day massacre, a
growing chorus of American policymakers were calling for a US invasion of Haiti.496 Many
protesters at the demonstration engaged this idea. One large banner read, “Don’t even think
about intervention. Give the weapons to us and we’ll do the job!” Michelle Baptiste, a Miami
resident since 1981, addressed a potential US invasion. “"The guns they used to shoot our
people were provided by the U.S. government. Now they talk about U.S. intervention in
Haiti. We don't want any more U.S. help. All we want is freedom."497
Grassroots activists were not the only ones prepared to condemn the Namphy regime’s
role in the election day violence. After the massacre of November 29 and the dissolution of the
Provisional Electoral Council, the Reagan administration suspended military aid to the Haitian
government. Soon after, the US House of Representatives and the US Senate both voted
unanimously to cut off aid to Haiti until a civilian electoral council was reestablished. The
Organization of American States also condemned the election day violence and called for new,
democratic elections.498
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In an attempt to placate both domestic and international critics, Namphy announced that
new elections would be held on January 17 of the following year. To oversee the election, a new
electoral council would be created. This time, however, the electoral council would not be
composed of independent, civilian members. Instead, Namphy himself would handpick the
members of the electoral council, a provision that for most observers cast even more doubt on
the legitimacy of the process.499 “Even if the government forms another electoral council again,
the people wouldn’t go for it. It would be another Macoute election,” argued a Haitian refugee
living in Santo Domingo.500 Few believed that the new elections scheduled for January would be
anything more than a farce.501
In Haiti, Miami, and New York, Haitian activists condemned the January elections and
called for a boycott. Louis Roy, a retired doctor who had returned to Haiti after many years of
exile in Canada during the Duvalier era, articulated the position of the majority of Haitians.
''Anyone who believes [the CNG and the newly appointed electoral council] are going to give us
a fair election is a fool. And if the American government believes this, they are as much a fool
as anyone else,” he declared. In mid-December Roger Biamby of the Haitian American
Community Association of Dade County and seven other leaders of the Miami Haitian
community traveled to Washington to convey the same message and to urge American officials
to refuse to recognize the upcoming election. At the same time, the New York-based Committee
against Repression in Haiti was holding a press conference at the United Nations. Adding its
voice to the widespread condemnation of the January elections, the Committee called on the
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United States to discontinue all forms of aid to the Namphy government and to pursue a formal
investigation of human rights abuses under the regime.502
On New Year’s Day, 1988, as Haitians celebrated their national independence, Namphy
delivered a speech from the National Palace. In the address, which was broadcast on state-run
radio and television stations, the leader of the military government called for national
reconciliation and unity, appealing to Haitians’ “love of the nation” and “defense of the country.”
As he spoke, thousands of Haitians were marching through the streets of Miami in yet another
large protest against the CNG and the upcoming election.503
No one knew what the new election day would bring. Would there be more violence or
would Haitians escape more bloodshed? To be safe, many decided to board boats and buses that
would take them away from the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince until the election was over.504
Some American authorities were also anxious about the elections. Referring to the massive
wave of Haitian and Cuban refugees that had arrived in South Florida at the beginning of the
decade, Florida Governor Bob Martinez told reporters that he “had a great concern that what
happened in 1980 does not occur again in 1988.”505 As the election approached, US Naval ships
neared Haiti, ostensibly as part of long-planned training exercises; however, the Navy made sure
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its ships were well positioned in case they were needed to evacuate the seven thousand American
citizens living in the country or to stem a new tide of Haitian refugees.506
On the eve of the election, the Namphy government carried out a last-minute crackdown
on individuals and groups calling for a boycott and a general strike; the crackdown again brought
the Haitian capital to a standstill. On election day voting proceeded without the violence feared
by many. Participation was sparse and widespread irregularities pointed to suspected fraud. But
despite these problems, the Reagan administration promised to work with whoever emerged as
the victor. That person was Leslie Manigat, a rotund, fifty-seven-year-old political scientist and
university professor.507
The day before Manigat was set to take office as president, Haitians in the diaspora
organized joint actions to assert their opposition. On February 6 more than one thousand
Haitians marched through the commercial district of Miami, chanting, “Down with Manigat,
People Power! Down with all macoute government, people power!” According to Gerard JeanJuste, Haitians of Miami refused to “give Manigat a chance,” even though the US State
Department and those close to the Haitian government counseled them to do so. Instead, they
were saying that they “did not want ‘Papa Doc,’ ‘Baby Doc,’ ‘Namphy Doc,’ or ‘Manigat Doc’.”
According to Jean-Juste and the Miami activists, the new president was nothing more than a
“popet wel” or marionette, and to accept him would be to endorse and strengthen Macoutism and
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Namphy himself, who was the one pulling the strings. “Now more than ever it is time for
Haitians to roll up their sleeves and not lower their arms,” argued Jean-Juste. That same day
four hundred people gathered in Brooklyn to add their voices to those condemning Manigat’s
election.508
In the first months of the new presidency there was little change in the political situation
in Haiti, but then Manigat attempted to take on the powerful military leader and former head of
the CNG, General Hanri Namphy. On June 17 Manigat ordered the removal of Namphy from
his postion in the army, placing him under house arrest. President Manigat then appeared on
state-run television to announce to the country that Namphy had been retired. But hours after
Manigat’s announcement, gunfire and grenade explosions erupted around the Haitian capital in
attacks by soldiers loyal to General Namphy. Manigat, who had misjudged his ability to
challenge Namphy and the Haitian military, lost the intervening struggle. By the morning of
Monday June 20, General Namphy had reestablished himself as head of the Haitian government
and had dismissed President Manigat, sending him into exile in the Dominican Republic. The
removal of Manigat and Namphy’s own reestablishment as head of the Haitian state was done in
“protection of the nation’s highest interests,” the general explained to the Haitian people. He
claimed that without his intervention, Haiti would have been “on a path that was leading [it]
irrevocably to the most brutal form of dictatorship,” a fate from which Namphy claimed to have
saved the nation.509
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To his opponents, Namphy’s resumption of power seemed to confirm their position:
despite the recent election, the Namphy-led military remained in control. While some, like
Miami resident Viter Juste, believed that “it is still better to keep Manigat” because the coup
"means more than ever, the Duvalier regime is getting back in power," others agreed with Gerard
Jean-Juste, who described Manigat’s ouster as “just one more intrigue between hard-core
Duvalier supporters." No wonder, then, that Haitians in South Florida ignored Manigat’s visit to
their city and turned a deaf ear to his appeal for support. Speaking at the Miami International
Airport just days after his removal, Manigat begged the diaspora for its “support against the
military coup” and “for the reestablishment of democracy in Haiti." But Manigat’s arrival and
press conference drew only about two dozen people, most of whom had family connections to
his short-lived regime. "We could care less about Manigat," said the president of the Haitian
American Community Association of Dade County, Roger Biamby. The Reagan administration,
too, ignored Manigat’s appeals for support, announcing one day after the coup that it would
maintain diplomatic relations with Namphy and that it would not consider economic sanctions
against the military regime.510

New Campaigns, International and Local
As the “hard core Duvalier supporters,” as Jean-Juste called them, were maneuvering for
power in Haiti, Haitians in Miami and New York were developing new areas of struggle in the
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local branches of the popular movement. In the spring and summer of 1988, Haitians in the
diaspora found ways to support their allies in Haiti while at the same time building campaigns to
defend their communities in the United States.
For the Miami Haitian community, the first of these spring campaigns focused on an
environmental threat suddenly facing the people of Haiti. In the first months of the year, a cargo
ship containing thousands of tons of incinerated garbage from the city of Philadelphia decided to
deposit its load on a coastal area near the Haitian city of Gonaives. The waste company, which
had been contracted by the city of Philadelphia to dispose of the refuse, settled on Haiti as the
repository for its cargo after unsuccessfully attempting to unload the waste in Honduras and
other Latin American countries. Despite one successful attempt by Haitians to block the
unloading of the waste, by early February Philadelphia’s garbage was being dumped daily on the
Haitian shore. The incinerated waste-ash contained dioxin and other suspected cancer-causing
agents; three to four thousand tons of it had been dumped on Haitian shores by mid-February.511
To support the people of Gonaives in their campaign to have the waste removed, Veye
Yo, the grassroots activist group led by Father Gerard Jean-Juste, made the toxic waste a top
target in its campaigns that spring and summer. On March 19 Miami Haitians gathered for a
rally to condemn the dumping and to call for the removal of the waste. Farah Juste, a popular
performer and community leader active with Veye Yo and the Haitian Refugee Center in Miami,
called on Miami Haitians “to mobilize, stick together and fight,” declaring that “our country is
not a garbage can.” Other speakers at the rally did not focus exclusively on the toxic waste
piling up near Gonaives; they connected the environmental crisis to the political crisis in Haiti.
Haitians were not only being exposed to harmful toxic waste but also to the “macoutes infecting
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the country;” they demanded the removal of both.512 On April 2, at the next, even larger
demonstration, the activists were joined by other South Florida organizations and the
environmental group Greenpeace. The protests continued to have a dual focus, aimed at
removing both the physical waste from Gonaives and the “trash government” of Haiti. At the
demonstration on April 2, protesters also began a new strategy, deciding to target Haitian consul
to Miami Antonio Jean-Poix, the Haitian government’s representative who had recently
provoked the community by dismissing their concerns, claiming the waste was “just trash” and
nothing to worry about.513 Throughout the spring and summer of 1988, activists with Veye Yo
maintained the campaign against both toxic waste and what they considered the toxic
government of Haiti.514
The second new campaign initiated by Haitians in the United States in the spring of 1988
centered on a legal battle that would determine the security and legal status of thousands of
Haitian farm workers. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which had allowed
Haitians who had come to the United States before 1982 to obtain permanent residency, also
offered residency to agricultural workers that had worked in the perishable crop industry for at
least ninety days in the period from May 1985 to May 1986. Many undocumented Haitians
qualified for residency under this provision. The problem for farm workers, however, was
proving that they met these minimal requirements. Living in migrant labor camps, few farm
workers were able to provide proof of residence. As the growing seasons changed, most laborers
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changed employers frequently, many traveling up and down the East Coast wherever there was
work. Growers paid in cash, kept few records, and were often unwilling to file the necessary
affidavits to verify their employees’ status since it would expose their failure to pay Social
Security and to provide other legally required benefits to their undocumented workforce.515
Without this documentation, there was no way for the many Haitians that qualified for it to reach
this path to legal residency.
The case of Marie-France Jean Philippe, a thirty-four-year-old Haitian woman who had
come to the United States by boat in 1985, illustrates the quandary that many Haitian farm
workers were in. After arriving in South Florida, Jean Philippe soon made her way to the town
of Homestead, where she started by picking lemons but soon switched over to working in the
bean fields. She labored from 5:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. and was paid $2.50 per bushel of beans that
she picked; from this sixteen-hour day in the field Jean Philippe earned a maximum of $200 a
week, an income with which she supported her three children who remained back in Haiti.
When she learned that she was eligible to become a legal resident of the United States, Jean
Philippe went to her crew chief and requested a document verifying her status, which she
received and which she submitted to the INS. But when the INS contacted the owner of the
company for which she worked, the owner denied knowing her, and so the immigration office
denied Jean Philippe’s application. Even though she had been partially successful in navigating
the complex process required by the new law, Jean Philippe encountered other obstacles that
kept her from achieving residency.516
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To expose this problem, the Haitian Refugee Center and its partner organization Veye Yo
began organizing a residency for farm workers campaign. One of the first rallies in defense of
farm workers’ legal rights occurred on May 7. Then, on June 13, seventeen Haitian and Mexican
farm workers, along with the Haitian Refugee Center and the Catholic Diocese of Palm Beach,
sued the Immigration and Naturalization Service in a class-action suit that charged that the
agency’s application of the law for farm workers violated the intent of the legislation,
discriminated against agricultural workers, and was illegal.517
On July 6, the first day of hearings on the lawsuit, hundreds of members of the Haitian
community rallied outside the Miami federal courthouse. For the next five days of proceedings,
farm workers, including Marie-France Jean Philippe, testified to the trouble they had had with
the INS’s application of the law. Inside and outside the courtroom, hundreds of Haitians
gathered daily to support their compatriots. Even after the conclusion of the opening hearings,
the Haitian Refugee Center and Veye Yo continued to mobilize the community in defense of the
farm workers. On Saturday, July 23, five hundred farm workers and community supporters
rallied and marched for four hours, concluding with a protest outside the Miami INS offices.518
Finally, on Monday August 22, the long-awaited ruling was ready. In federal district
court, Judge Clyde C. Atkins ruled in favor of the farm workers, citing the “excessive
documentary proof” required of them by the INS as evidence that the law had been applied
illegally. Judge Atkins ordered the immigration service to establish new hearings for the
fourteen thousand agricultural workers covered under the lawsuit and granted the workers
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temporary work permits until the new hearings took place. The ruling also shifted the burden of
proof onto the INS, easing the pressure on the workers themselves. In the future the agency
would be required to accept workers’ affidavits unless it could prove the documents to be
false.519
News of the favorable ruling occasioned a celebration at the office of the Haitian Refugee
Center in Little Haiti. At a rally the day after the ruling, 150 cheering and singing people
gathered to celebrate their victory. Ira Kurzban, attorney for the Haitian Refugee Center,
explained that the ruling not only gave new hope to the many Haitian and Mexican farm workers
in Florida, Georgia, and Alabama that were represented in the class-action suit, but it also could
be used as a precedent in addressing the immigration agency’s discriminatory treatment of the
four hundred thousand farm workers across the country. Judge Atkins’ ruling represented
another significant legal victory by a South Florida-based Haitian community that had become
adept at combining legal challenges, political pressure, and mass mobilization in its defense of
the undocumented.520

New Attacks and a Shifting Movement
While Haitian activists in the United States were spending the spring and summer months
organizing around environmental and legal issues, their compatriots back home were
experiencing an intensifying assault by the military junta. Once back in power, Namphy
abandoned any pretense of separateness from Duvalierism. On July 8, 1988, the Haitian leader
announced that his government was doing away with the provision of the Constitution of 1987
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that had barred members of Duvalier’s regime from holding political office for ten years. Now,
Namphy declared, Duvalierists would be officially welcomed back into formal political
positions. To underscore the point, two prominent Duvalier supporters, General Claude
Raymond and the former finance minister Clovis Desinor were in attendance for the
announcement.521 Three days later Duvalierism reasserted itself in another way as Lafontant
Joseph, a veteran human rights activist in Haiti, was found stabbed to death in a jeep near the
Port-au-Prince airport. Caribbean Rights, a regional human rights organization, called Joseph’s
murder “an act of political assassination.”522
The murder of Lafontant Joseph was just the beginning of a wave of violence that
engulfed Haiti in the summer of 1988. One of the bloodiest incidents, which occurred on the
morning of September 11, attempted again to eliminate Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who continued to
be a leading voice for the grassroots resistance in Haiti. During a Sunday morning worship
service led by Father Aristide, twenty to thirty men dressed in civilian clothes and carrying guns
and machetes burst into the church at Saint-Jean Bosco and began attacking the crowd.
Congregants moved to surround Aristide, who was shielded and successfully evacuated, but the
violence left more than one dozen dead and close to eighty wounded. One witness reported
seeing “a pregnant woman with a bullet hole in her belly.” Aristide’s church in Saint-Jean Bosco
was torched. After attacking the congregation at Aristide’s church, the assassins moved on to the
offices of opposition politicians and the headquarters of Radio Cacique, an anti-Namphy station.
In the hours after the attacks, a group of men claiming responsibility appeared on television and
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radio. "We were after Father Aristide. What you saw yesterday (Sunday) was child's play,” said
the men. “In whatever parish Father Aristide is accepted, a heap of corpses will attend that
Mass."523
If, as many suspected, the violence was orchestrated by the Haitian government in order
to strike a fatal blow against the popular movement, the action failed completely. In fact, the
massacre at Saint-Jean Bosco and the subsequent violence were the last major events that finally
led to Namphy’s ouster. On September 17, less than one week after the church attacks, a group
of non-commissioned officers led by Prosper Avril, commander of the Presidential Guard,
removed Genernal Namphy and declared Avril president of Haiti. Since Namphy’s removal
happened through a rank-and-file rebellion of sorts within the Haitian military, some thought it a
positive step for the popular movement. Avril and the non-commissioned officers, or “ti solda”
(little soldiers), attempted to cultivate this image as well, promising to "raise the prestige of the
Haitian people degraded by so many acts which have revolted the conscience of the Haitian
people and the world."524
As excited as they were to see Namphy’s departure, many elements of the popular
movement both in Haiti and in the diaspora refused to put their trust in Avril, pointing out that
Prosper Avril had been a top aide to Jean-Claude Duvalier and had likely played a major role in
facilitating Baby Doc’s draining of the national treasury, both before and after the collapse of the
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dictatorship. “He is known as a Duvalierist and all Duvalierists are criminals,” argued Sylvio
Claude, leader of the country’s Christian Democratic Party.525 When news of the coup and
Avril’s assumption of power reached Miami, the Haitian community of South Florida hit the
streets once again in three consecutive days of action, the largest of which drew six thousand
people. “The replacement of Namphy by Prosper Avril cannot solve the problems of the Haitian
people,” declared members of Veye Yo. “A serious mobilization” against the “macoute element”
was the only way toward “a total liberation.”526
In the months following the coup, the popular movement in Haiti and in the diaspora
became increasingly unified in its opposition to Avril. Jean-Bertrand Aristide continued to be
one of the leading figures articulating the stance of many in the popular movement, actions for
which he once again became a target. Having gone into hiding in the aftermath of the Saint-Jean
Bosco massacre, Aristide dramatically reemerged at a church mass for thousands of people two
weeks later. Soon after his return, Aristide made a statement on Haiti’s Radio Soleil in which he
praised the “valiant soldiers” carrying out the rank-and-file rebellions, but he also criticized
Avril, cautioning the new president that the people “must consider all of the great Duvalierists as
great criminals until they prove otherwise.”527
In late September 1988, the Catholic Church leaders again attempted to rein in the
outspoken priest by removing him from his base in Saint-Jean Bosco. After rumors began
circulating that the church was going to try again to force Aristide’s transfer, fifteen hundred
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young people held a demonstration and a march in Port-au-Prince. Two weeks later the Catholic
Bishops Conference issued a statement condemning liberation theology and its practitioners, and
the Vatican informed Aristide that he was being transferred to Canada. On October 13, just days
before the deadline the church had given Aristide to leave Haiti, six thousand people took to the
streets to protest the order. The next day ten thousand came out to demand that Aristide be
allowed to stay in the country. Protesters erected burning roadblocks and seized buses, and one
hundred youths staged a sit-in in front of the National Cathedral in Port-au-Prince.528 In the
United States, too, Haitian activists mobilized in defense of Aristide, mounting demonstrations in
Miami, New York, and Boston. The Association of Haitian Students of the diaspora issued a
statement of solidarity with Aristide and the progressive church as did the Association of Haitian
Workers in New York, Veye Yo in Miami, and other Haitian community and professional
organizations.529 This large-scale mobilization succeeded in shielding Aristide from removal,
allowing him to remain in Haiti past the October seventeenth deadline the church had given for
his transfer. Unsuccessful in its efforts to quiet the outspoken priest, on December 15, the
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Selesian Order of the Catholic Church expelled Aristide for being a “destabilizing” force and for
“incitement to hate and violence” and “the exaltation of class struggle.”530
At the end of November the popular movement in Haiti and abroad stepped up its
campaign against Avril. Coordinated actions took place around the first anniversary of the
election day massacre of 1987. As the anniversary day approached, the Confederation of
Autonomous Haitian Workers (CATH), along with the National Popular Assembly (APN) and
other popular organizations, called a nationwide general strike to advance a series of political
and economic demands, demands that included the prosecution of Duvalierists responsible for
crimes, the disarming of macoutes, the release of political prisoners, and the rescinding of the
Catholic Church’s transfer order for Jean-Bertrand Aristide. At the same time, Veye Yo was
preparing the South Florida community for a demonstration in solidarity with the planned
general strike in Haiti.531
The week after the call for a general strike had been made, people in Haiti and the United
States observed the first anniversary of the election day massacre. In Port-au-Prince as many as
ten thousand people, organized by the United Haitian Communist Party (PUCH) along with other
organizations, participated in a protest march that began at the burned-out ruins of Aristide’s
church at Saint-Jean Bosco. The march made its way through the city to the Bellegarde
Argentine School, the place where one year earlier fifteen people had been murdered, and on to
Rue Valliant, where many more had died in the attack on voters. “The country will have
democracy,” chanted the marchers. Haitians in New York, too, remembered those murdered one
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year earlier by organizing a picket line in front of the Haitian consulate in New York.532 Just as
they had done in the parallel mobilizations to defend Father Aristide, in these protests on the
anniversary of the election day massacre, Haitian activists in the United States staged actions that
were designed to support the work of their partners in the grassroots movement in Haiti.

Refugee Rebellions and Haiti “In the Mouth of the Wolf”
As many poured their energy into organizing for the general strike and the protests on the
anniversary of the aborted election, Haitian refugees imprisoned in Miami’s Krome Avenue
Detention Center renewed their own campaign for freedom and asylum. On November 15 the
approximately two hundred Haitians still imprisoned at Krome contacted Father Gerard JeanJuste to inform him that they intended to carry out a hunger strike in one week to protest their
ongoing incarceration. The hunger strikers demanded the release of the pregnant women and the
children imprisoned in the facility, the reunification of the families separated by the policy of
refugee incarceration, and the abandonment of procedures that they claimed were discriminatory
towards Haitians. Starting on November 23, as Haiti was crippled by the general strike, the
refugees launched a three-day hunger strike at the Krome Avenue prison.533
Even as the refugees attempted to exert pressure on local authorities to grant them their
freedom, they also sent out an appeal to national leaders. Three days after the conclusion of the
hunger strike, the prisoners at Krome sent an open letter to President-elect George H. W. Bush.
The letter, signed by “all the Haitian prisoners of detention at Krome,” articulated a protest both
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against their incarceration and against the unjust situation in Haiti that had propelled them into
their current situation. “Monsieur le President,” the letter opened, “We young Haitians detained
at Krome, Miami, ask you to say a word in our favor as you do in favor of the Cuban [refugees].”
The letter writers pointed out that the Haitian government was carrying out a campaign of
“repression, assassinations, the crushing of democracy, denial of all rights to workers, the
persecution of students, smuggling, robbing from the people . . . [and] it is because of these
governments ‘kraze zo’ that we are forced to risk our lives in small boats and to use false papers
to flee Haiti.” They appealed to Bush, “You should understand our problems.” They explained:
We want freedom in our country. We want respect for human rights for all Haitians. We
want to abolish the system of 'Tonton Macoutes, of ‘kraze zo,’ of repression. Do not send
weapons to these Duvalierist assassins . . . Mr. President-Elect, before you take the oath,
come help us. Say a word for us Haitians who are at Camp Krome in Miami. We know
you are a believer, so are we. We would like to find the freedom to celebrate Christmas
with our families.534
Though the campaign by the refugees at Krome failed to stimulate any action from the
incoming president, it successfully caught the attention of the refugees’ compatriots in the
Haitian community of Miami. Indeed, before launching the action, the refugees inside Krome
had informed Father Jean-Juste of their actions so that Haitian activists outside the prison could
coordinate their refugee support work with the strike, which the organization Veye Yo did with
renewed vigor once the hunger strike began. On December 11, fifty members of the Miami
community traveled to visit those imprisoned at Krome. When the group learned that the
authorities at the prison intended to bar their delegation from further contact with their
imprisoned compatriots, they blocked the entrance to the facility, insisting that if they were not
allowed to enter, neither would anyone else be allowed to enter. Finally the group was allowed
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in. As a result of the standoff, authorities also conceded part of the protesters’ demands,
agreeing to free three of the Haitian children at the facility.535
During the next month, the conflict at Krome intensified significantly. When Haitians
arrived at the facility for a planned protest, they found themselves confronting a line of guards,
standing just inside the fence, a line of guards outfitted in full body armor, holding shields and
clubs. Helicopters circled overhead as the center was placed on modified lockdown, restricting
the movement of the refugees inside the prison walls. This militarized response to the Haitian
protesters added to their indignation. "If they treat us like this and we're on the outside, how do
you think they're treating them on the inside?" Betty Ferguson wondered. "When they are ready
to shoot us down like dogs, then that means they know we are right!" she exclaimed. Joining the
protest were members of the black American community of Miami, including Ray Fauntroy,
president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference of Dade County. Fliers distributed at
the protest listed “equal treatment for black refugees” as a key demand, and the protesters
appealed to black Americans’ sense that black people, whether American or immigrant, were not
being treated fairly in the city of Miami.536
If authorities at Krome seemed to be prepared for war, it was because the city of Miami
had in the previous weeks resembled a war zone. At the beginning of the year, Miami had
experienced a great influx of Nicaraguan refugees who, unlike Haitians, were not being sent back
to their country or locked in detention facilities like the Krome Avenue prison. "They interdict
the Haitians at sea . . . and they meanwhile offer the red-carpet treatment to Nicaraguans,"
Gerard Jean-Juste angrily observed. Black Americans were also concerned about the arrival of
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the Nicaraguan refugees, whom they saw as another immigrant group who they feared would
push them further back in line when it came to the search for jobs and economic opportunity.537
As a result, Miami was a tense place when on January 16, 1989, Clement Lloyd, a black
motorcyclist, was shot and killed by William Lozano, a member of the Miami police department.
Black Miamians reacted with furious violence to the incident, which they regarded as only the
most recent in a long history of police attacks on the black community. For days the black
neighborhoods of Overtown and Liberty City were engulfed in flames, in acts of looting, more
shootings, and more deaths. Though some Haitians were eager to separate themselves from the
violent rebellion, casting the riot as exclusively the work of black Americans, others saw the
police violence and the black community’s response as yet another illustration of racial
inequality and injustice that affected both black Americans and black immigrants in this
Southern city.538
As authorities in Miami struggled to regain control of their city, in Haiti the Avril regime
too found itself confronting a rebellious population that was demanding change. By the first
months of 1989, there were few who still held to the hope that Avril represented any opening for
popular empowerment. The Avril government’s decision to grant Franck Romain (the Port-auPrince mayor suspected to be responsible for the attack on the congregation at Saint-Jean Bosco)
safe passage to the Dominican Republic especially indicated to the people that Avril intended no
break with Duvalierism. Even the regime’s public statements suggested it no longer intended
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any transition to democratic government. While one official promised that elections would take
place in twelve to fifteen months, another member of the Avril government stated that “with 75
percent illiteracy and 50 percent unemployment,'” the Haitian people were “not ready for
immediate democracy.”539
In the spring of 1989, unwilling to wait until the Avril government deemed them
adequately prepared for democratic involvement, members of the popular movement launched a
major campaign to force Avril out and to uproot the remaining elements of Duvalierism. In midJanuary, the Confederation of Autonomous Haitian Workers (CATH) along with a number of
popular organizations, including the Peasant Movement of Papaye (MPP), the National Popular
Assembly (APN), and the League of Former Political Prisoners (LAPPH), called a general strike.
The strike was intended to force the extradition of Franck Romain from the Dominican Republic
and the removal of toxic waste from Gonaives, and the acceptance of a series of other popular
demands. The day before the general strike was to commence, students in Cap Haitien erected
flaming barricades and clashed with soldiers. As the third anniversary of Duvalier’s collapse
approached, more protests and clashes between soldiers and groups of students and workers
occurred in other parts of the country.540
Although they saw February 7, the anniversary of Duvalier’s departure, as a key moment
for mobilization, popular organizations also treated the occasion as critical time to take stock and
to determine strategy. A group of popular organizations in Haiti proposed to put together a
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three-day forum, which would bring together participants of the popular movement from around
the country. To fund this people’s forum, a wide range of organizations, including the
Confederation of Autonomous Workers (CATH), the National Popular Assembly (APN), the
Peasant Movement of Milot (MPM), the Haitian Workers Committee (COH), the Revolutionary
Committee of the Unemployed, the student group Zafe Elev Lekol, and the women’s group Famn
Ayisyen Leve Kanpai, sent a message to their partners in the diaspora asking for financial
support. Members of Veye Yo and the Miami Haitian community responded by raising six
hundred dollars for the people’s forum.541 To mark the anniversary of Duvalier’s departure,
Haitians in New York also organized an event, headed by the 28 July-Charlemagne Peralte
Coalition, which featured Jean-Baptiste Chavannes of the Peasant Movement of Papaye (MPP)
but which significantly included the playing of a taped message from Father Aristide to the
members of the movement in the diaspora.542
On February 7, the anniversary of the collapse of Duvalier’s government, the movement
in Haiti launched another general strike; this time they demanded the departure of Prosper Avril.
Protesters followed the strike with another round of nationwide actions on February 20. To
defuse the explosive situation, Avril announced the creation of a new electoral council and tried
to shield his government from charges of macoutism by restoring portions of the 1987
constitution, including the banning of Duvalierists from office. Significantly, however, the
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proposed restorations did not bring back the elements of the constitution that limited the role of
the army.543
The turmoil in Haiti was also producing a new surge in the number of refugees
attempting to reach US shores. In the first four months of 1989, 2,669 Haitians were stopped by
the US Coast Guard and returned to Haiti. In March alone, 1533 would-be refugees on sixteen
boats were stopped and turned back, the largest monthly number since the interdiction program
had begun in 1981.544 Many of those who managed to reach US shores were sent to Krome,
adding to the deteriorating situation and intensifying crisis at the facility. By mid-April the
number of detainees at the Krome Avenue facility was back up to fifty, most of whom were
Haitian.545
While Haitians of Miami were fighting for the refugees’ freedom, the young people of
the New York Haitian community were engaged in a struggle that centered upon their experience
as students in New York. In late April, in response to a proposed cut in public funding for the
City University of New York and a rise in tuition rates, students at City College barricaded
themselves in administration offices to protest the increased costs. According to Georges Vilson,
a City College student and member of the school’s Haitian Club, “It was an extraordinary thing
to see the Haitians participate in such large numbers in this action." Following closely on the
City College protests and the occupation of administration offices, protests spread to many of the
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other colleges that were part of the City University of New York system. On May 1 young
Haitians joined other Brooklyn College students in an attempt to shut down the campus by
chaining the doors of the college’s Boylan Hall and occupying the road at the corner of Nostrand
and Flatbush Avenue for almost an hour.546
If in the spring and summer of 1989 Haitians in the diaspora were deeply involved in
local struggles, they were also anxiously watching developments back in Haiti. Prosper Avril
had once again successfully staved off threats to his power, it seemed, after crushing a revolt that
had sprouted within the Haitian military.547 But few judged the political situation to be
sustainable. As one observer noted, Haiti was “in the mouth of the wolf – you don’t know when
it might snap shut.”548
The popular movement in Haiti certainly recognized the precarious political situation,
which it attempted to take advantage of in its push for an opening. KONAKOM remained active
in the summer of 1989 through a wide array of activities that brought its members into conflict
with the military regime. In June, for example, one leader of the KONAKOM chapter in
Northern Limbe was arrested for organizing a peasant cooperative. In July KONAKOM sent an
open letter to General Herald Abraham, interim commander-in-chief of the Haitian Army, urging
the military to “stop treating members of vigilance brigades [the neighborhood self-defense
groups that had sprung up in anticipation of the election violence of 1987] as potential
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terrorists.”549 At the end of August twenty-five popular organizations, including the
Confederation of Autonomous Haitian Workers (CATH), the National Popular Assembly (APN),
the League of Former Political Prisoners, and the Confederation for Democratic Unity (KID),
called a press conference to announce that they had joined to form a “common front against
repression.” Francois Pierre-Louis, co-leader of the APN, denounced the Avril regime for
supporting "death-squads” that “operate with complete impunity."550
At the end of September, in response to growing domestic and international pressure,
Avril announced that elections would be held in the next year, but as a report co-authored by the
New York-based National Coalition for Haitian Refugees (NCHR) stated, democratic elections
were impossible unless the military government ceased its campaign of repression, violence, and
human rights abuses.551 The Avril regime confirmed its unwillingness to take such steps two
months later when it arrested Evans Paul, Jean-Auguste Mesyeux, and Etienne Marino. The
three men, arrested in Carrefour, a suburb of Port-au-Prince, just after signing a statement urging
Haitians to join a month-long mobilization against the Avril government, were all leaders of
popular organizations: Paul headed the Confederation for Democratic Unity (KID), Mesyeux the
Confederation of Autonomous Haitian Workers (CATH), and Marino the September 17 Popular
Organization. The day after their arrest, the government presented the beaten and bloodied
prisoners to the nation on state-run television. According to the Avril regime, they were guilty of
trying to violently overthrow the government. This attempt by the Haitian government to
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intimidate the movement, however, failed, as had happened so often before. Instead of being
frightened into inaction, the movement was spurred on, particularly after seeing the images of the
bloodied prisoners on government-controlled television.552
To protest the leaders’ arrest and assault, CATH called a forty-eight-hour general strike.
As the strike got underway, angry Haitians in both New York and Miami descended upon their
cities’ Haitian consulates. Writing on behalf of the Committee against Repression in Haiti, Ben
Dupuy sent an open letter to General Avril that stated, “We demand the immediate release of
three jailed leaders and an end to attacks against those who oppose your regime.” In an open
letter to Amnesty International, Dupuy pointed out that “it is the hallmark of Duvalierists to
concoct completely phony plots in an attempt to justify crackdowns on their political opponents.
Avril’s round-up of leaders of the opposition is likely to broaden unless quick and strident
international protest is made.” In Miami the Haitian Refugee Center, Veye Yo, and Amnesty
International held a press conference to highlight the Avril regime’s responsibility for human
rights violations. One week later even larger protests occurred, with thousands of Haitians filling
the streets of both Brooklyn and Miami. When the men still were not free after a week and a
half, five activists in New York initiated a hunger strike in solidarity with their imprisoned
allies.553
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It took two more months of virtually constant mobilization to obtain the freedom of the
three prisoners, and weeks more of protest before Prosper Avril’s departure. Though it might not
have been apparent at the time, as the year came to a close, the people of Haiti and Haitians in
New York and Miami were approaching a period of great change and enormous victories for the
popular movement in each place. And on the eve of this watershed moment, there were
indications that Haitian activists in the United States were increasingly effective in building and
carrying out campaigns that would make 1990 and 1991 such important years. The new
campaign of resistance by refugees in the Krome Avenue facility, coordinated with assistance by
Father Gerard Jean-Juste and activists with Veye Yo and supported by members of the Miami
African American community, showed the tightening partnership between those inside and those
outside the prison. Similarly, the parallel actions in Haiti, New York, and Miami that protested
the arrest of the three opposition leaders in Haiti show that Haitian activists outside the country
identified with the movement and shared many of the same objectives as the grassroots
resistance inside Haiti. This overlap and coordination among activists in Haiti and in the Haitian
communities of the United States was stronger at the end of 1989 as the result of the previous
years of organizing and building the networks of political activism.
From 1987 to 1989 Haitian activists nurtured their border-crossing, grassroots political
movement and in the process continued to strengthen the relationship among organizations and
activists in Haiti, New York, and Miami. When in the years after Duvalier’s departure, activists
in Haiti came under intense attack by those trying to roll back the popular movement, activists in
Miami and New York as well as in Haiti responded with vigorous mobilizations. In addition, in
this difficult period Haitians in the United States not only helped to defend the popular
movement in Haiti, but also channeled some of the energy generated in this struggle toward
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campaigns in defense of Haitians in the United States. In 1990 and 1991, Haitians at home and
in the diaspora would finally be able to bring to harvest the seeds they had sown throughout the
many years of difficult struggle.
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Chapter 5
The Tipping Point, 1990-1991
On May 5, 1990, the New York Times featured a front-page article with the headline,
“Long Docile, Haitian-Americans Turn Militant.” Below a picture of Haitians imprisoned at the
Krome Avenue Detention Center, the Times’ James LeMoyne described the transformation that
was underway. “Deeply angered at being treated as suspected AIDS carriers, illiterates and
unwanted black immigrants, Haitian-Americans are abandoning years of quiet acceptance and
sharply demanding redress for what they charge is a pattern of prejudice and abuse.” As
evidence for his observation, LeMoyne cited the large demonstrations that had taken place in
Miami and New York the previous month. These actions, the work of “increasingly active
political and community groups,” LeMoyne stated, signaled “a new determination to organize
politically to force the Federal Government to change the way it treats both Haitians seeking
entry to this country and those who live here.”554 Two months later an article by Rick Bragg in
the St. Petersburg Times made a similar observation about Haitians in Miami. A “passive
philosophy has been in practice in this city of expatriates, exiles and refugees since significant
numbers of Haitians first came here in the late 1970s.” But now, the author argued, Haitians’
passivity has been replaced with militancy. “Lately those sounds of supplication are being
drowned out by angry crowds and breaking glass, signs that Miami Haitians are tired of being a
non-aggressive, submissive ingredient in this so-called melting pot.”555 Haitians in the United
States had undergone a sudden and profound change, it seemed.
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The authors of these articles were right in concluding that the Haitian communities of
New York and Miami had reached a critical juncture. Anger over the continued incarceration
and deportation of Haitian refugees and the stigma Haitians had suffered from their association
with AIDS reached a tipping point in 1990. The articles concluded correctly that the historic
actions in the spring of that year were pieces of a larger community mobilization that had
reached the current unprecedented heights.
What LeMoyne and Bragg got wrong, however, was the process by which the Haitians in
the United States had reached this important point. Rather than a sudden and complete aboutface from “docile” and “passive” to “angry“ and “militant,” the evolution toward a more
mobilized and activist community had been occurring for some time. Indeed, as demonstrated in
earlier chapters, the Haitian communities of New York and Miami had in earlier periods
exhibited a great deal of militancy and were, at certain points in the early 1980s and especially in
the previous four years, highly mobilized. Furthermore, the unprecedented level of mobilization
that Haitians achieved in 1990 and 1991 was not solely a reaction to mistreatment by American
authorities. It was also the result of their link with the popular movement in Haiti that was
reaching its pinnacle in exactly the same period.
From January 1990 to October 1991, Haitians of New York and Miami were engaged in a
wide range of campaigns that focused on issues both in the United States and in Haiti. This
unprecedented mobilization thrust the community into struggles for fair treatment for Haitian
workers and consumers, for change in immigration policy and an end to abuse and imprisonment
of Haitian refugees, and for an end to police brutality and to biased federal policies that
encouraged anti-Haitian discrimination. Along with their unparalleled level of involvement in a
wide range of US-based campaigns, Haitians in New York and Miami continued their solidarity
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campaign in partnership with those struggling for democracy and popular empowerment in Haiti.
In fact, because the popular struggles in the United States and in Haiti were so closely joined,
they fed one another. When the popular movement reached a pinnacle in Haiti, it also peaked in
the United States, allowing Haitians in New York and Miami to engage in a level and a range of
popular mobilization hitherto unseen.

From Haiti to Brooklyn, Struggles Old and New
In the first month of 1990, General Prosper Avril, the military leader who had come to
power in the soldiers’ revolt that ousted Lt. Gen. Henri Namphy, intensified his crackdown on
political opponents, which he had renewed two months earlier. “To protect democratic
accomplishments against terrorism,” General Avril announced, he was placing the country in a
state of siege. A new wave of arrests and violence swept the country; Avril targeted independent
radio stations and forced leading members of the opposition into exile.556
The Haitian community of Miami, which had last come out in force in November to
protest the arrest and torture of the opposition leaders Paul, Mesyeaux, and Marino, met the news
of continued repression in Haiti with another series of mobilizations. On January 13, five
thousand people participated in a march to protest the Avril regime and the support it received
from the United States. This was the largest demonstration by the South Florida Haitian
community since more than ten thousand people had protested the election massacre in
November 1987.557 Smaller protests continued in the days and weeks that followed, including
556

Michael Norton, “Military Declares State of Siege, Arrests Political Opponents,” Associated Press, Jan. 20, 1990,
AM cycle; Michael Norton, “Police Raids on Independent Radio Stations Stop Newscasts,” Associated Press, Jan.
22, 1990, AM cycle; Michael Norton, “Major Civic Leader Expelled, Raising Fears of Military Dictatorship,”
Associated Press, Jan. 21, 1990, AM cycle.
557

“Miami: la communaute chauffee a blanc,” Haiti Progres, Jan. 17-23, 1990, 8.

247
one action marking the day that Louis Roy and Hubert de Ronceray, two opponents whom Avril
had forced out of the country, arrived in Miami.558
In New York, too, Haitians met reports of the wave of repression in Haiti with a renewed
mobilization, though on a smaller scale than that of their counterparts in Miami. On January 20
the “Followers of Jesus Christ in the Catholic Church of Brooklyn” mobilized its members for a
picket line that drew approximately fifty people.559 On January 27 more than one thousand
people rallied in front of the United Nations and then marched to the Haitian consulate in New
York. The group put forth three demands: the departure of Avril, the end of Avril’s state of
siege, and the annulment of the Haitian government’s new policy of requiring an entry visa of
Haitians returning to the country from abroad, which was seen by many in the exile community
as a way to monitor and target returning refugees and political opponents.560
The actions by those in the diaspora were just one source of pressure that was building on
the Avril regime. Internationally, human rights organizations were intensifying their criticism of
the Haitian government as were Haiti’s key allies and supporters.561 Days into the crackdown,
ambassadors from the United States, Canada, and France met with Avril to urge him to end the
violence and to lift the siege. France also announced it was suspending aid to Haiti.562 Leaders
of the grassroots resistance in Haiti, too, protested the renewed repression by the Avril-led
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government. Appearing on the Catholic-run Radio Soleil, Bishop Willy Romelus denounced
Avril’s tactics. “They have made rubbish of the constitution,” the bishop declared. Nine other
Haitian bishops soon joined Romelus in a statement they made asking Avril to end his campaign
of repression.563
Finally, on Monday January 29, Avril both ended the state of siege that he had initiated
nine days earlier and announced that he would no longer require visas for returning Haitians.
Opposition groups maintained their campaign of resistance, however, in both Haiti and the
United States. On February 7, the day marking the fourth anniversary of Duvalier’s departure,
five thousand people marched, as they had on January 13, in opposition to Avril and in support
of democracy in Haiti. On the same day, the Haitian government released eight political
prisoners, including Evans Paul, Jean-Auguste Mesyeux, and Etienne Marino, the three men
whose detention and beatings had sparked the widespread protests in November.564
General Avril’s efforts to crush his opponents before the scheduled October elections had
failed miserably. In fact, throughout the month of February, Avril’s opponents gained strength
in a series of maneuvers meant to isolate the general and ultimately to force his resignation. On
February 14, Bishop Willy Romelus publicly charged that in the existing political situation,
elections were impossible and Avril needed to step down. By the end of the month, most
political parties, labor unions, and members of the opposition had pledged to boycott any
election held while Avril was in office. Additional human rights reports highly critical of the
Avril regime contributed to the pressure, and an increasingly rebellious population insisted on his
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departure.565 Finally, on March 12, Prosper Avril stepped down and left Haiti aboard a US C141 transport plane, which took the general and his family to an Air Force base in Homestead,
Florida.566
Not sure what might be next for Haiti, Haitians in the United States were excited but also
anxious about Avril’s departure. When they heard that Avril was heading to the United States
and that he might be establishing himself in Boca Raton, Florida, an uneasy crowd of people
gathered outside the Haitian Refugee Center. "Everybody is happy, but we are still watching,"
said thirty-year-old Pierre Joseph. Another group gathered outside the US attorney’s office in
Miami to protest the US-granted exile and to urge Avril’s indictment. A third congregation
gathered outside the front gates of the Homestead military base. "We're here to tell him he's not
welcome in this society, in this country," proclaimed one of the protesters. "We want him to be
tried and imprisoned and even executed like Ceaucescu in Romania."567
Haitians in Miami also took Avril’s defeat as an opportunity to try to topple the Haitian
government’s closest representative in Miami. On the same day that Avril left Haiti, between
fifty and one hundred people climbed the walls of the Haitian consulate in Miami and broke into
the building. As in the past, this location, which represented the Haitian government locally,
became the site of the Miami community’s demands on their government back home. Those
occupying the consulate demanded the resignation of Avril’s consul to Miami and the
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appointment of one of the members of the Haitian diaspora as the new representative from Haiti
to the city. The group put forth Pastor Jean Renelus, a leader in the occupation of the consulate,
as their choice. After approximately four hours, FBI agents and representatives of the State
Department persuaded the demonstrators to leave the building. But before they left, members of
the group were able to collect stacks of documents listing opponents to the Avril government and
individuals on the Avril regime’s payroll.568
Two days later, members of the New York community followed the example of their
counterparts in Miami and took over the Haitian consulate in New York. For ten hours
supporters held a picket line outside the building while the occupation took place. According to
Antoine Brutus and Wilson Desir, leaders of the New York community, the Haitians inside the
building negotiated with the State Department the closing of the consulate for twenty-four hours
until a replacement for the current consul could be arranged.569
In Haiti, power had passed to a provisional government; Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, a
supreme court justice, had been named provisional president. Trouillot and the new government
promised to prepare the way for elections, a claim Haitians at home and abroad viewed with a
mixture of skepticism and cautious optimism.570
The struggle over the future of Haiti was not the only thing occupying the Haitian
community of New York in the winter and spring of 1990. That January, while some members
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of the community were mobilizing against repression in Haiti, others were mobilizing to defend
themselves from abuse in their new home. At 6 a.m. on Tuesday January 30, workers at the
Domsey Trading Company of Brooklyn walked off the job, an action that began one of the most
memorable and bitter labor struggles in the history of Haitian New York.
The Domsey Trading Company specialized in salvaging used clothing and either
reselling it in a neighborhood thrift store or exporting it, often to developing countries. The
company had been founded in 1950 by the Salm family, working-class Jewish immigrants from
Germany. By the late 1980s Peter Salm had taken over the family business, operating a
company that had evolved from a modest operation in which his grandparents had “look[ed] for
old clothes to take off the zippers and buttons and resell them" to a company that made multiple
millions in annual profits. In January 1990 when the strike began, Domsey employed a mostly
immigrant workforce of over two hundred workers, a workforce that was approximately 85
percent Haitian with the remaining workers from Latin America (particularly Honduras and other
Central American countries) along with some African Americans.571
The workers, who spent their workday sorting, grading, repairing, pressing and repackaging the used clothing, were required to wear a large number pinned to their chest so that
managers could easily identify workers. A union organizer assigned to Domsey recalled,
"Believe it or not, the bosses call the workers by their numbers, not their names, and if you don't
wear your number, they send you home, and you lose a day's pay." Badinal Brice, one of the
Haitian workers at Domsey, was number 347. Brice remembered hearing, “347, 347 hey, let’s
go, let’s go, man.” Sometimes instead of being sent home, workers without their numbers were

571

“Brooklyn Workers -- Mostly Haitian Immigrants – Strike at Clothing Factory,” PR Newswire, Jan. 30, 1990;
Deborah Sontag, “U.S. Victory Is Empty to Workers; Insults, Dismissals and a 4-Year Wait for Pay They Won,”
New York Times, June 9, 1997, B2.

252
fined. "If you do not attach the card to your pocket, you pay five dollars,” reported Brice. This
was a hefty fine for workers that received between three and four dollars an hour. “Six times I
paid the five dollars,” he recalled.572
The indignity of the number system and the low pay and frequent fines were not the only
grievances the Domsey workers had. Though they routinely worked ten-hour days, the workers
received no overtime pay; some reported receiving only eight hours pay for ten or more hours of
work. When the workers complained, reported a Haitian worker, the bosses pointed out “that in
Haiti we would make three dollars per day, whereas today, in the U.S., we are paid $3.35 per
hour,” but, the bosses observed, “we are still not satisfied.” If the workers were not happy, they
should leave, argued management. In addition, the Domsey workforce received no time off for
public holidays, few health benefits, and no retirement benefits. Safety and health were also
serious concerns at Domsey. Workers reported that fire exits in the Brooklyn facility were
intentionally blocked and that they had to breathe in dusty, dirty air without protective masks.
Workers who needed to use the bathroom had to find one of the few bathroom passes that were
circulating among the hundreds of workers in the warehouse, a task that was sometimes so
difficult workers would have to relieve themselves at their work stations. “We are compelled to
a full slavery,” lamented Jean Leon, another Haitian worker at Domsey.573
To remedy the situation, workers approached the International Ladies Garment Workers
Union (ILGWU) in 1989, asking that the union represent them at Domsey. Although the
workplace already had a union, it was considered by all to be a company union, which only
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existed, as one worker put it, “to the advantage of management.” “It works against our interests.
We do not want this yellow union,” declared Gilman Joseph. It was a “bogus union,” in the
words of another worker. Needing new representation, the workers went to the ILGWU. But
upon catching the scent of a union-organizing drive, Domsey managers ratcheted up their
practice of interrogations, threats, intimidation, and surveillance. Jean Leon felt surrounded by
spies at work and claimed management and its agents carried tape recorders to catch the words of
disloyal workers.574
In spite of Domsey’s efforts to suppress it, by late in the year the organizing campaign
had built enough support among the workers that the union was able to hold its first open
meeting, which was attended by about one hundred workers (a third of the workforce) in a
Brooklyn church near the Domsey warehouse. The workers elected an organizing committee of
six workers to represent them, and on December 1 the committee approached management with
a petition signed by the majority of the workforce requesting that the company hold a vote to
give the workers a choice whether to affiliate with the ILGWU. When they were presented with
the petition, Domsey managers threw it to the ground and cursed the workers. Within half an
hour, one of the members of the organizing committee named Giles Robinson, an African
American and native of South Carolina who had worked at Domsey for twenty-seven years and
who had watched the Salm brothers grow up, was fired. In the following month two other
members of the committee, Lucien Henry and James Anthony Charles, were also dismissed.575
Domsey managers hoped that the firing of half of the organizing committee would
squelch the union drive. Joe Blount, the lead organizer for the ILGWU at Domsey, believed that
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“the idea was that the other [workers] would wake up and be scared. But it enraged them
instead.” Many, like John Harris, one of the Haitian workers at Domsey, felt they had no choice
but to fight back. As Harris explained, “We are not protected by a union that defends our
interests. We do not enjoy any respect as Haitians.” As a result, “the Latin Americans and we
have formed a ‘tet ansanm’ to begin this strike.” This tet ansanm, or coalition, walked off the
job on January 30, 1990, taking approximately two-thirds of the Domsey workforce off the
warehouse floor.576
Fighting partially for “respect as Haitians” and with strong support from their community
in Brooklyn, many of the Haitian workers on strike saw the Domsey struggle as one for dignity
both as workers and as Haitians. Jean Leon understood management’s actions as an attempt to
silence the outspoken, mostly Haitian workforce. “The ‘crime’ imputed to our countrymen is
that they demand their rights. Given this state of things, we decided to strike.”
The labor struggle quickly grew ugly. One day Peter Salm set up a folding table loaded
with bananas in front of the picket line. “These are for you monkeys to eat,” said Salm,
scratching himself under his arms. “Stupid niggers” and “lazy black boys” were other terms the
Salms reserved for the strikers. The women on strike were often singled out for abuse. The
female strikers were, according to management, “whores” and were the targets of other explicit
sexual language. In another incident, a company security guard known as George or “Big Nose”
produced a dildo to taunt the women on the picket line.577
The Domsey owners also gave the striking Haitian workers reason to understand the
conflict as a struggle over their dignity as Haitians. According to a detailed report produced by
576
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the National Labor Relations Board, Domsey owners told workers on the picket line that they
smelled and should go back to Haiti. When one of the Salm brothers yelled, “Go back to
Duvalier” at the strikers, they yelled back, “Go back to Hitler.” The owners found the strikers’
response completely outrageous, commenting soon after, “It is extremely ludicrous that any
human being could think that we could sit down and negotiate with animals such as these.” On
another occasion, agents of the company sprayed water from the roof of the Domsey warehouse
down on the picket line, prompting Salm to announce that the water would help the Haitian
workers “wash out their AIDS.”578
As the strike stretched on, management brought in a set of replacement workers it had
secured from a prison work release program. Later management brought in a group of mostly
Dominican workers to labor in place of the striking workers. Despite management’s efforts to
break the strike, however, the workers held on, bolstered by a community mobilized in their
support. In addition, the Domsey workers and the ILGWU filed multiple complaints of unfair
labor practices with the National Labor Relations Board; as the battle in Brooklyn continued,
these charges worked their way through the legal system. The Haitian community, which had
mobilized in support of the workers since the beginning of the strike, held another support rally
to mark the sixth month of the labor action. But it would take another year before any resolution
to the conflict would come.579
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Blood and Boycotts
As the Domsey strike was unfolding and as the movement in support of the ongoing
struggle in Haiti continued, a third campaign sprouted in the first months of 1990, demonstrating
the greatly increased level of activity and mobilization among Haitians in the United States
during this period. In February, a change in federal policy brought the issue of the AIDS stigma,
which had previously been such a concern for the Haitian community, thundering back.

A

month and a half into the new year, the FDA announced that it was revising its rules applying to
blood bank donations from Haitians. Previously donations from Haitians had been accepted as
long as the donor had come to the United States before 1977 (the year the agency identified as
the point of origin for AIDS in the United States). According to the new FDA policy, however,
Haitian blood would no longer be accepted at US blood banks, no matter how long the donor had
been in the United States. Acknowledging that “individuals from Haiti would be upset by this
policy,” FDA spokesman Brad Stone insisted that this revision was “the only fairly reliable
method we have to protect the blood supply.”580
For a community that continued to suffer the stigma of the earlier Centers for Disease
Control action, the return to a federal policy that singled them out as disease carriers evoked fear
and intense anger from the Haitian community. "Young people are going to be ashamed to say
they're Haitian. What are they going to [do] with us if we let them say we're carriers? Put us in
quarantine?” asked Theresa Voigt, a twenty-five-year Haitian resident of the United States581
Others responded with righteous indignation, portraying the new FDA policy not only as the
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latest campaign of cruelty to be carried out against an oppressed people but also as a continuation
of the injustice of colonialism. A cartoon in the Brooklyn-based weekly Haiti Progres featured a
dark-skinned Jesus wearily carrying a cross labeled SIDA (the French acronym for AIDS).
Standing behind the suffering man were two inhuman looking figures with faces covered by
surgeons’ masks, dressed in laboratory coats and gloves, with the French and the American flags
prominently displayed on their chests.582
Haitians’ fear about the impact of the FDA policy change was well founded. Soon after
the announcement, Joseph Etienne of the Haitian Center’s Council of Brooklyn reported that
Haitian domestic workers had begun losing their jobs. Etienne also reported that “in a public
high school in Brooklyn, after a 10-year-old Haitian girl used a telephone, they sprayed it.” The
situation in South Florida was much the same. Louis Germain, assistant director of the HaitianAmerican Community Association of Dade County, reported, ''People have lost their jobs, and
Haitian students are being stereotyped. Last week a teacher in a class on AIDS told the students
if they don't want to get AIDS they have to remain free from drugs and homosexuality and stay
away from Haitians.” In Central Florida, Renald Bonnaire, a young Haitian father, despite
testing negative for AIDS, was initially blocked from donating blood for his own daughter,
Destiny, who needed a transfusion in order to have surgery. Chantal Thomas, executive director
of the Haitian American Community Center in West Palm Beach, articulated the outrage felt by
many Haitians: “It is insulting. How dare they do something like that?”583
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The new FDA policy was, in fact, rooted in the same understanding of AIDS and the
Haitian community that had prompted the Centers for Disease Control earlier to include Haitians
as one of the four H’s (the high risk categories of hemophiliacs, homosexuals, heroine users, and
Haitians). Like the CDC, the FDA argued that the best way to secure the blood supply was to
consider all Haitians as potentially diseased. But when they were pressed to explain why all
Haitians were being treated as a threat, a FDA spokesperson equivocated. “Haitians are not a
higher risk group per se, but we don’t have effective screening devices.”584
Just as they had in the early 1980s, Haitians in the United States rejected the US
government’s rationale for placing their community in the at-risk category; they immediately
began building a campaign to challenge the decision. Already highly mobilized through the
ongoing struggle for democracy in Haiti, the campaign for the imprisoned refugees, and smaller
campaigns like the Domsey strike, Haitians in New York, Miami, and Boston met the change in
FDA policy with action. As Paul Farmer observes, unlike earlier campaigns against the AIDS
stigma in which community response had been somewhat hampered by political and class
divisions, “This time members of the diaspora community reacted with unanimity and in great
numbers.”585 In early March, a demonstration in front of the Miami office of the Food and Drug
Administration drew eight thousand people. One of those at the protest, Rendell Jean, an
eighteen-year-old Haitian immigrant who had recently signed up with the United States Army,
said the FDA action had made him decide to leave the United States instead. "How can I join the
army of a country that doesn't respect me for who I am? And they want to know why there are
racial problems in this country. It's stupid acts like this that cause it," argued Jean. As Marliene
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Bastien recalls, Haitian activists in South Florida protested the policy by blocking the road to the
Miami International Airport for hours. Activists like Bastien, who had for years been organizing
around refugee issues and working to support the grassroots resistance in Haiti with Father
Gerard Jean-Juste, the Haitian Refugee Center, and Veye Yo, were now leading the AIDS
protests in the South Florida community.586
In the northeastern United States, too, Haitians were resurrecting the anti-discrimination
campaign they had built in the early 1980s. Following the demonstration in Miami in March,
seven thousand Haitians demonstrated in Boston against the new blood ban. And in New York,
just as in Miami, the activists who had been organizing to support the resistance in Haiti and to
defend the Haitian refugees in the United States refocused on the AIDS issue. For example,
members of the Haitian Information and Documentation Center, known to the New York
community as SELA, one of the centers of political activism in New York throughout the 1980s,
continued to organize around the AIDS issue in the period between the CDC about-face in 1985
and the FDA blood ban in February of 1990, even while they continued their support for
democracy in Haiti and justice for the Haitian refugees.587
In late March and early April, the campaign continued to pick up steam. In New York,
Haitian students demonstrated against the blood ban. From Washington, DC, the National
Haitian American Health Commission issued a press release calling the new FDA policy
“insensitive” and “lacking scientific rigor.” Building on the growing momentum, Haitians in
New York, under the banner of the Haitian Enforcement Against Racism (HEAR) -- a coalition
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of student, community, and church-based activists, called for a protest march to take place on
April 20; Haitian radio stations and newspapers publicized the upcoming action for weeks.588
As demonstrators assembled for the April 20 march, scheduled to cross the Brooklyn
Bridge and mass around City Hall in downtown Manhattan, it was difficult to determine how
large the turnout would be. New York City police projections for the event ranged from two
thousand to ten thousand while the organizers of the action projected that they would attract as
many as thirty thousand participants. But by 12:30 p.m. the number of protesters waiting to
march across the Brooklyn Bridge had already reached twenty thousand. By the time the march
began, the number of protesters was so large that police were forced to completely halt vehicular
traffic. Around City Hall, where the march concluded, more than fifty thousand people (one
hundred thousand to one hundred fifty thousand was the estimate of march organizers and the
Haitian press) massed for a five-hour rally that eventually coaxed Mayor David Dinkins to
address the crowd. “The FDA is wrong. I predict they’re going to reverse themselves. I
recognize that the Haitian community in particular has been discriminated against,” declared
Dinkins to a cheering sea of blue and red, the colors of the Haitian flag.589
Although Mayor Dinkins’ predication was correct, the FDA reversal did not happen
immediately. However, the two and a half months of mobilization and the surprisingly strong
action in New York on April 20 did have an immediate impact. Just days after the New York
City AIDS March, the FDA announced that it was planning to abandon its total exclusion of
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Haitian blood donations. But as the summer came to a close and the fall began, the policy
excluding Haitians stood, forcing the Haitian communities back into action. To keep the process
moving and to force the FDA finally to reverse its policy, members of the Haitian community
launched another large mobilization, this time with a demonstration in October in Washington,
DC. Finally, in December of 1990, the FDA announced that it was dropping its exclusion of
Haitian blood and that it would discontinue any further exclusion based solely on donors’
ethnicity or national origins.590
As before, change at the federal level did not reverse the damage that had been done
by a stigma-reinforcing policy. Still, the Haitian community viewed the FDA reversal as a
major victory. In fact, many Haitians see the AIDS campaign in general and the historic
April 20 AIDS march in particular as a historic moment in the political history of the Haitian
community of New York.591 “New York: an historic day! The diaspora says no to
discrimination,” proclaimed a Haiti Progres headline above a photograph of the streets of
lower Manhattan completely filled with Haitian marchers. The massive turnout on April 20
“gave the Haitian community legitimacy with the powers that be,” argues Haitian community
and labor organizer Ray Laforest.592 “That was a wakeup call. We had doctors, lawyers,
maids, kids who left classes in school, all marching. It was wonderful,” remembers
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community activist Ninaj Raoul.593 Kim Ives even suggests that the power demonstrated by
the New York City AIDS march might have had an impact in Haiti.
People saw that and they said, “Wow! We are strong! We really can rock things!” And
to some extent the Lavalas movement may even have been spawned a little bit by that big
April march . . . Having been in it, that would have been my feeling, that somehow that
AIDS march would have had an effect on what happened in Haiti [with the election of
Jean-Bertrand Aristide] six months later.594
In fact, Aristide himself acknowledged the action’s significance as part of the trans-border
movement when he called April 20 “part of the struggle of the forces of life against the forces of
death, a struggle engaged not just in Haiti but around the world.” Though it is difficult to
measure the impact of the AIDS march in Haiti, it is certain that Haitian activists in New York
saw it as part of their ongoing campaign for justice and dignity in both Haiti and the United
States.
A number of factors produced the surprisingly powerful action on April 20, 1990. One
reason for the unprecedented outpouring of support by the Haitian community was that the AIDS
issue was one that allowed community members to transcend traditional divisions. As Lionel
Legros, a founding member of L’Ayisyen and SELA, recalls, the issue of discrimination and the
AIDS stigma “drove Haitians of all classes together.”595 Lily Cerat agrees. The AIDS issue was
one of the “issues that affected every Haitian young and old . . . The differences became
secondary.”596 Paul Farmer also argues that “AIDS-related discrimination was an issue that
could mobilize diaspora Haitians like no other.” According to Farmer, the secret to the power of
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April 20 lay in the large number of workers and students at the march, people, Farmer argues,
that “had come to the United States to work and study . . . and AIDS-related discrimination
compromised these activities more than any of the other forces that had demoralized these
communities since their establishment.”597
It is surely true that the AIDS issue was unique in its capacity to bridge political, class,
and generational divisions in the Haitian community, and Farmer may be correct that the AIDS
stigma posed the greatest threat that Haitian students and workers had ever encountered to the
opportunity they were seeking in the United States. But students and workers also represented a
large portion of the smaller but significant numbers of people that had protested the Duvalier
dictatorship, just as they had been a sizable proportion of the tens of thousands who had
celebrated the Duvalier dictatorship’s collapse in February 1986.
As important as the uniqueness of the AIDS issue was in explaining the unprecedented
outpouring of April 20, it is insufficient to explain what happened. The Haitian community
responded to activists’ call on April 20 not only because everyone could identify with the threat
of the AIDS stigma, but also because the anti-discrimination campaign was linked to and drew
strength from, a wider, multifaceted Haitian movement that was mobilizing Haitians on a
number of different fronts and around a number of different issues. Haitian radio stations like
Radio Soleil and Radio Tropicale that did so much to mobilize the Haitian community for the
march were also key conduits of information on happenings in Haiti and spaces for public
discussion and debate of Haitian politics.598 Lily Cerat remembers that it was the “politicalcultural activism,” the “community organizing machinery in place . . . [and] ready to come
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together and to thrust on that day” that allowed the Haitian community to achieve what it did.599
Some of those political-cultural networks and the community organizing machinery had been
constructed in the earlier phase of the AIDS fight. But much of it had also been built and
energized in the other struggles of the period, including the movement for empowerment and
democracy in Haiti, the struggle to defend and free Haitian refugees in South Florida, and the
many fights for justice and fair treatment for Haitian workers and students throughout the
diaspora.
Even those organizations whose origins lay directly in the fight against the blood ban
included member groups and individuals that had been and would continue to be active in the
broader Haitian popular movement. For example, Haitian Enforcement Against Racism
(HEAR), a leading organization in the April 20 march composed of community, church-based,
and student groups, was founded by student and community activists after authorities refused to
accept blood donations from Haitians at a blood drive at Stonybrook College. Guy Victor, the
president of HEAR, had, before taking on the AIDS campaign, been active in the campaign to
support the grassroots movement in Haiti. Victor was also a close associate of the Reverend
Gerard Jean-Juste and a strong supporter of Jean-Bertrand Aristide; in fact, in the year following
the April 20 march, Victor became one of the directors of the “10th Department” chapter in New
York City (Aristide’s extension of Haitian government in the diaspora), and HEAR remained
active in Haitian community struggles, including the campaigns against police brutality in the
later 1990s.600
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The AIDS campaign happened at a moment when activists in Haiti and in the Haitian
communities of the United States were achieving an unprecedented level of community
mobilization.601 The activists leading the community mobilization were linked by networks that
were engaged in multiple, overlapping campaigns. And the different points in the multifaceted
movement reinforced one another, a key factor in Haitians’ unprecedented surge of power in the
spring of 1990.
Although the most dramatic moment in the AIDS campaign occurred in New York, the
energy unleashed throughout the diaspora by the anti-discrimination campaign also shaped an
angry and sometimes violent spring and summer for Haitians in Miami. At the same time that
they were organizing against the FDA policy, members of the South Florida community were
escalating their campaign for imprisoned refugees, an effort that had taken on new urgency with
the proliferation of reports that prisoners, many of whom had been imprisoned for years inside
the Krome Avenue Detention Center, were being subjected to physical, psychological, and
sexual abuse by guards in the facility. In April a Miami Herald editorial reported conversations
in which former detainees told of a “guard beating a Haitian man until he vomited blood, another
guard breaking a Latin detainee's arms and legs because he refused to pick up a dirty napkin . . .
of yellow drinking water that caused diarrhea, and strip searches during which Bibles and
cosmetics were confiscated.”602 Haitian women reported being threatened with deportation
unless they had sex with guards. By May the Haitian Refugee Center had collected more than
one hundred sworn affidavits from refugees charging harassment and abuse at Krome, and a
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federal probe into the allegations was underway. Hoping to defuse a potentially explosive
situation, INS spokesman Duke Austin claimed that there was no evidence to support such
charges. Krome was “a good facility” that “meets all standards of detention,” Austin claimed.603
At a moment when Haitians in the United States were more mobilized than ever before,
reports such as these added fuel to the fire that was already spreading rapidly. Just nine days
after the massive New York City AIDS march, Miami became the site of another dramatic event.
On Sunday April 29 more than one thousand protesters (as many as twenty-five hundred
according to some sources) converged on the Krome Avenue facility to demand freedom for the
refugees. Despite the presence of riot police that had been deployed in anticipation of the
demonstration, the protesters stormed the front gate of the facility, tearing it down completely.
The group then advanced to the next barrier, but it was stopped by police before they could
advance. Explaining what drove the crowd to take such steps, the Reverend Gerard Jean-Juste
explained, "We want freedom and justice for the Haitian refugees and all the refugees detained.
We must break down the walls of Krome, which remind us of Hitlerism."604 Observing the
battle at Krome, the various actions in the AIDS campaign, and the general state of the Haitian
diaspora, Jocelyn McCalla, director of the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, identified “a
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new awareness among Haitian-Americans.” The Reverend Jean-Juste echoed McCalla’s
observation; “What we are now saying is ‘enough is enough’,” he stated.605
Later in the summer of 1990, the Haitian community of Miami was again at the center of
an intense confrontation with local authorities, but this time the controversy also drew Miami’s
black American and Cuban communities into the fray. As we have seen, in Miami’s complex
history of racial and ethnic relations, black Americans and Haitians sometimes had come into
conflict but at other times had found reason to unite over their common experience of anti-black
exclusion and racism in the city of Miami. As the summer progressed, the energy of the highly
mobilized Haitian community merged with the long-simmering anger and frustration of Miami’s
African Americans to produce a tense standoff between the city’s temporarily unified black
population and the largely Cuban city leadership.
Things began to heat up in mid-June, as Miami’s black population was excitedly
preparing for the arrival of Nelson Mandela, who was scheduled to address a convention of labor
unionists assembled for the annual meeting of the American Federation of State, County, and
Municipal Employees (AFSCME). Black Miamians viewed Mandela as a hero for his leadership
in the campaign to end apartheid in South Africa; they considered it a distinct honor to host this
champion of black freedom, especially in a city where they felt the black population was too
often abused, excluded, or simply ignored. Shortly before his arrival, however, an ABC News
broadcast of Nelson Mandela’s expressing gratitude for the support of such international figures
as Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and Cuban leader Fidel Castro reached Miami city leaders.
Mandela’s statement, in the words of Melanie Shell-Weiss, proved to be “infuriating [to] Cubans
and Jews in Miami alike” and prompted the city to ignore Mandela’s visit, allowing the African
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National Congress leader to come and go “with no official acknowledgement or greeting from
the city’s political leaders whatsoever.” To an already frustrated and marginalized black
community, this act was the ultimate insult. “To reject Mandela is to reject us,” declared a
statement by the Miami NAACP.606
Another incident days later further enflamed the anger of the black residents of
Miami. On Friday June 29 Abner Alezi, a Haitian immigrant, went into Rapid Transit
Factory Outlet to have a pair of pants repaired. According to Alezi, his request for service
turned into an altercation with the Cuban storeowner; after quarreling with the storeowner, he
was beaten and arrested by Miami police. The storeowner claimed Alezi initiated the
violence when the owner failed to give him immediate service. On Saturday morning
following the incident, Haitians tuning into WKAT-AM, a Creole-language radio station,
heard Alezi describe his beating and arrest. On WKAT and other Haitian radio stations,
announcers urged members of the community to stand up to such treatment, connecting
Alezi’s beating and arrest with the abuse of Haitian prisoners at the Krome Detention Center
and the city’s snub of Nelson Mandela. ''The terrible treatment of Haitians and blacks in
general has gone way too far,'' declared one Haitian radio commentator, calling Haitians to
converge on the site where the incident had occurred. Haitian radio announcers also called on
“blacks in Overtown, Liberty City, and Opa-Locka to join Haitians in the protest.”607
Over the next two days, approximately one thousand people protested in front of the
Rapid Transit Factory Outlet, forcing the Cuban owner, Luis Reyes, to remain inside until
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Miami police could finally sneak him out a back exit. After the Miami chief of police
promised to convene talks with Haitian leaders, the protest appeared to be over. In fact, the
conflict was intensifying.608
After the first two days of protest at Rapid Transit, it was the turn of Cuban radio
commentators to weigh in on the situation, which they did by attacking Miami city officials
for failing to take a tougher stand against the Haitian and African American protesters. On
Monday July 2, Miriam Alonso, a Cuban-American city commissioner, contacted Miami City
Manager Cesar Odio, wanting to know why the Miami police department refused to exercise
“firm control” of the situation. When demonstrations resumed outside the store the following
week, Miami police abandoned their initial conciliatory approach to the Haitian protesters.
After a peaceful day of protest on the part of the demonstrators, a team of Miami police in
full riot gear (160 strong according to one report) appeared in the early evening to disperse
the crowd, quickly descending upon the demonstration, using shields and nightsticks against
the protesters. Television news cameras broadcast the police tackling those trying to escape
and beating people already on the ground. The incident sent twelve to the hospital and sixtythree to jail, thirty-four of whom could not demonstrate that they were legally in the country
and were thus handed over to INS custody and transferred to the immigrant prison on Krome
Avenue.609
The next day the Washington Office on Haiti, the Haitian human rights organization
founded in 1984, issued a scathing critique of the police attack, condemning both “the
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unnecessary use of force by the police” and “the pattern and history of violence directed at
Haitians by Hispanic shopkeepers in our community.” Tying the two sources of violence
together and referencing the factors that had led to four urban uprisings in Miami in the last
decade, the statement observed, “Once more, systematic police brutality has struck the
inhabitants of Miami. This time, it was started by a Cuban shop owner’s treatment of a
Haitian customer and was then continued by Hispanic police mistreatment of Haitian
bystanders.” The Washington Office on Haiti asked Haitians in Miami to boycott businesses
where they “are not treated with respect and dignity,” a call that the Reverend Gerard JeanJuste and other leaders of the Miami Haitian community supported.610
In the aftermath of the violence outside of the Rapid Transit Factory Outlet, the
statements issues by different groups further revealed a starkly divided city. At a press
conference that brought together the different segments of black Miami, a black American leader
charged that Cubans would not have been treated the way “his brothers” had been treated.611
The NAACP and the Archdiocese of Miami called for an investigation into the incident by the
US Justice Department. But the Miami chief of police, Perry Anderson, defended the
department’s conduct, saying, faced with the same situation again, "I would have given the same
warning to disperse . . . and the [same] arrest mode would have taken place." While Haitians
congregated at a community center in Little Haiti to listen to testimony of those injured in the
incident, the president of the Latin Chamber of Commerce, Luis Sabines, presented a statement
"applauding" the police operation. "The way the police acted occurred because the demonstrators
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didn't obey the law or the repeated warnings to stop their illegal activity," declared Sabines. The
incident even revealed fissures in the Haitian community: more radical voices like Jean-Juste’s
supporting a boycott of selected Hispanic-owned stores while other leaders, such as Fritz Bazin,
cousin of the Haitian politician Marc Bazin, denied even the slightest animosity between the
Haitian and the Cuban communities. "There is absolutely no hostility between Cubans and
Haitians . . . We have had good, warm relations for years,” claimed Bazin, a chaplain for the
Miami police department.612
The confrontation between black and Hispanic communities of Miami continued to
intensify later in July when leaders of the African American community announced that they
were calling for a boycott of the city of Miami. City officials had gone too far when they had
ignored Mandela and had arrested and beaten the protesting Haitians, they claimed. “The black
community is declaring its independence,” announced lawyer H.T. Smith, leader of Boycott
Miami: Coalition for Progress. Unless area city officials apologized for snubbing Mandela,
committed to increased business and employment opportunities for blacks in the city,
investigated the July beatings of Haitians, and reviewed the biased immigration policies toward
Haitians, black leaders promised to maintain a boycott that could cost the city millions of
dollars.613 Outside the Rapid Transit Factory Outlet, continuing protests linked the recent
grievances of black Miamians as protesters chanted, “From South Africa to South Florida,
apartheid must go.”614
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Although Miami city officials initially failed to take the boycott threat seriously, it soon
became clear that black leaders would be able to carry out an effective and costly action. One
month after the call to boycott, three groups announced they would be holding their annual
conventions elsewhere, a potential loss of millions of dollars. Dr. Yvonnechris Veal, chairperson
of the National Medical Association, explained that her organization had decided to move its
1992 convention from Miami to San Diego because “the racial climate is anti-black” in Miami.
Likewise, Matthew Scott, spokesman for the black lawyers group, the National Bar Association,
acknowledged that “blacks in Miami are not treated well socially, economically, or politically.”
Like the National Medical Association, Scott’s organization was pulling its planned 1993
convention from the city, as were the National Association of Black Prosecutors, the National
Organization of Women, the American Civil Liberties Union, the National Alliance of Postal and
Federal Employees, and others. According to Melanie Shell-Weiss, the boycott, which lasted
until 1993, “cost the city anywhere between $10 million and $50 million” and “demonstrated the
ability of Miami’s black leaders to mobilize the community [and] amass a groundswell of
support.” Along with the unprecedented actions at the Krome Detention Center and the Abner
Alezi affair, the boycott demonstrated that the highly mobilized Haitian community of South
Florida was playing an increasingly significant role in the political and social struggles in the city
and the region.615
In the spring and summer of 1990, activists New York and South Florida, many of whom
were leaders in the earlier campaigns for democracy in Haiti and in defense of refugees in the
United States, achieved an unprecedented level of community mobilization. Efforts to end the
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plight of Haitians imprisoned at Krome, protests against police violence, and especially the
campaign against the AIDS stigma drew the support of a large number of Haitians; the degree of
community support in these causes was the product of years of political education and organizing
by political activists in each location.

Aristide and Lavalas in the Diaspora
As the tumultuous year wore on, the intertwined campaigns and the connections among
Haitians in New York, in Miami, and in Haiti became more and more evident. Less than one
month after the April 20 AIDS march in New York City and exactly one week after more than
one thousand protesters tore down the front gate of the Krome Avenue Detention Center in
Miami, another event created a surge of excitement and energy among Haitians in the United
States. In the first week of May, readers of Haiti Progres opened the newspaper to find an
advertisement for an upcoming event at the Church of Saint Theresa in Brooklyn. Father JeanBertrand Aristide was coming to New York.616
On the afternoon of Sunday May 6, the man widely acknowledged as the most popular
symbol of the popular movement in Haiti and its voice stood before an audience of
approximately two thousand people in Brooklyn, New York. Employing the charisma and
skillful wordplay that had helped propel him to great popularity among the common people of
Haiti, Aristide attempted to evoke the same enthusiasm among Haitians of New York. In
addition to his desire to win popular support, Aristide presented an argument that framed the
struggle of the people in Haiti and the struggles of Haitians in the diaspora as one, common, and
inseparable struggle. According to Haiti Progres, Aristide paid tribute “to the Haitians who, on
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April 20, defied the FDA,” claiming “that April 20 was part of the struggle of the forces of life
against the forces of death, a struggle engaged not just in Haiti but around the world.” Asking
for continued support for the popular movement in Haiti, Aristide declared, “We need to
continue in light of April 20 to affirm our solidarity with the Haitian people.”617
Aristide also drew on an incident that nearly everyone in the audience that day would
have been familiar with. Referencing the experience of David Aupont, a twelve-year-old Haitian
boy who had recently come to New York and who had been assaulted and severely burned in
Brooklyn, Aristide equated the young immigrant’s suffering with that of others who remained in
Haiti. “That same fire that burns David at the age of 12 years had burned other people on
September 11” in the massacre “at Saint Jean Bosco, and this same fire has burned more during
the massacres of peasants,” Aristide declared. Staying with the theme of fire, Aristide
characterized the situation in Haiti as a cigar, held by macoutes and foreign imperialists but
dangerously burning on both ends. “Since April 20, it is lit at both ends, they cannot smoke as
they want. And when we declare ourselves ready to die this proves it's true.” Aristide
continued, “Blood for blood,” implicitly rejecting the FDA policy that treated Haitian blood as
tainted by disease. “We who have the blood of freedom in our veins . . . stand with all the
Haitians who have that blood in their veins to say [to] Macoutes and American imperialists:
Americans, here is your cigar, FDA, here is your cigar, Tontons Macoutes, here is your cigar,
criminals, here is your cigar. Haiti or death!" At the end of the evening event, organizers
collected $11,000 to support the work of Lefanmi Selavi, the community organization and
shelter for street children that Aristide had founded in Port-au-Prince in 1986.618
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Aristide claimed he was in the United States to facilitate dialogue between the movement
in Haiti and that in the diaspora as well as to raise funds for Lefanmi Selavi. However, some
Haitians wondered whether the visit might also have something to do with the promised elections
approaching in Haiti. Did Aristide’s appearance signal his intention to run for president? Was
his visit to the largest community in the Haitian diaspora the first stage in his presidential
campaign? According to Daniel Huttinot and Lionel Legros, co-founders of SELA and hosts of
the popular New York Haitian radio show L’Ayisyen, “It was obvious to us that [Aristide] was
campaigning.” When, during the same May visit, Aristide appeared on the radio program,
Huttinot and Legros remember that “we did ask him if he was going to be a presidential
candidate, and he completely, categorically denied it.” In fact, he said that “if he were to become
a presidential candidate, the Haitian people should give him the ‘pere lebrun’” (the euphemism
referring to a mode of execution whereby a group of people place a burning tire around a
person’s neck).619
After his return to Haiti and throughout the summer, Aristide maintained that he did not
intend to be a candidate in the upcoming elections, claiming, according to Alex Dupuy, to be
“free of the disease of ‘presidentialism’ . . . that afflicts so many Haitian politicians.” However,
after the Provisional Electoral Council, encouraged by a pledge of international observers and
international support for the upcoming elections, established that elections would take place on
December 16, 1990, it seemed increasingly likely that the winner of the presidential contest
would have unprecedented legitimacy. After Roger Lafontant, the former head of the tontons
macoute and interior minister under Jean-Claude Duvalier, threw his hat into the ring as the
candidate for the Union for National Reconciliation (URN), the neo-Duvalierist party, Aristide
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reversed himself and also officially declared his candidacy.620 Acknowledging his change of
position, Aristide claimed that without a candidate that could unite the fragmented popular
movement,
We would ultimately concede to the bourgeoisie a limited suffrage that they would not
have dared to propose themselves, which would produce an administration without social
perspectives, opaque to outside observers, and devoid of justice. Dark forces, relieved of
their criminal component, would be able to regain control and perpetuate themselves . . .
[And so] I announced my candidacy for the presidency of the republic on October 18.621
Despite his immense popularity as the symbol and voice of the resistance to neoDuvalierism in Haiti, Aristide’s presidential candidacy was not universally supported within the
popular movement, neither in Haiti nor in the diaspora. Whether to participate in the election
itself was a complicated question, as Alex Dupuy observes, since in Haiti “some activists
opposed the elections altogether and argued instead for the formation of a coalition government
that would reflect the various sectors of the progressive popular movement.” Even after Aristide
had declared his candidacy, “two of the base organizations from Aristide’s parish of Saint Jean
Bosco,” Solidarite Ant Jen (Solidarity Among Youth) and Konbit Veye Yo (Vigilance
Committee), “joined with others like Tet Kole pou Yon Mouvman ti-Peyizn (Solidarity with the
Small Peasant Movement) to publicly criticize Aristide’s decision to participate in the
elections.”622
In New York, Aristide’s candidacy exposed the numerous political divisions in the
community that occasionally were obscured by a sense of unity created by causes like the AIDS
campaign. On the Left, Ben Dupuy’s Haiti Progres endorsed Aristide while Raymond Joseph’s
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conservative Haiti Observateur supported the right-of-center Marc Bazin, a former World Bank
economist with a reputation as a kandida meriken for the backing he received from Washington,
and one of the favorites of the Haitian bourgeoisie.623
As the Haitian community in New York was divided, the Haitian Left in New York was
also split regarding Aristide’s presidential campaign. Lily Cerat recalls the tensions within the
popular movement that resulted from their differing responses to Aristide’s campaign. There
was “a faction that did not support him, on the Left, because they believed that elections do not
solve anything . . .There were these little tensions, you know, like, elections for what? We need
a revolution.”624 SELA was one of the most well-known organizations that declined to throw its
support behind Aristide precisely because they thought an electoral strategy would be likely to
short-circuit the people’s movement in Haiti that otherwise had such revolutionary potential.
“We were not too favorable . . . because we thought it was really putting all our eggs in one
basket," remember SELA members Daniel Huttinot and Lionel Legros.625
Nonetheless, Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s presidential campaign produced tremendous
excitement both in Haiti and throughout the Haitian diaspora. Although officially running under
the banner of the Front National pour le Changement et la Democratie (FNCD, National Front
for Democracy and Change), Aristide soon created the organization that would have a more
important bearing on and association with his presidential bid: Operasyon Lavalas (OL).
Lavalas symbolized a cleansing torrent or, in Aristide’s words, “a river with many sources, a
flood that would sweep away all the dross, all the after-effects of a shameful past.” The refrain
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of Aristide and Lavalas, “‘Yon sel nou feb; ansanm nou fo; ansamn, ansanm nou se Lavalas,’
(Alone we are weak; united we are strong; all together we are a cleansing torrent),” quickly
became known throughout Haiti and the diaspora.626 In his campaign across Haiti, Aristide drew
massive crowds. In Gonaives, Aristide’s visit on the anniversary of the November shootings of
the student protesters, shootings that had triggered the protests that eventually brought down
Baby Doc, as many as seventy thousand people turned out to support the candidate. A campaign
rally in Cap-Haitien, the country’s second largest city, drew sixty thousand. And In the weeks
and months following Aristide’s entering the presidential race, millions of people registered to
vote, moving 92 percent of the population into the category of eligible voter, up from roughly
one-third before October 1990.627
Aristide’s presidential campaign also infused the already activated diaspora with another
surge of energy. As soon as Aristide became a presidential candidate, backers in New York
formed the Committee to Support Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Soon after, campaigning and
fundraising in the diaspora was officially taken over by the New York-based Central Committee
of Operation Lavalas, headed by Wilson Desir, president of the Alliance for Haitian Émigrés,
Ben Dupuy, founder of Haiti Progres and leader of the Committee Against Repression in Haiti
and the APN in Haiti, and Rene Dejean, who was described in Haiti Progres as “an independent
patriot.”628
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Aristide’s supporters in the diaspora represented a critically important part of his
campaign, not only in terms of organizing support among their compatriots in places like New
York, Miami, and Boston, but also in their ability to buttress the candidate’s campaign in Haiti.
In his study of Haitian border-crossing politics, Michel S. Laguerre argues that “it has become
evident that any presidential candidate who does not enjoy the backing of a large segment of the
diaspora will have enormous difficulty winning in the general elections.” Part of this power,
Laguerre argues, comes from the influence of diasporic newspapers, which “through their
provocative political ideas – at times somewhat inflammatory – and their vast distribution
network . . . have not only marginalized the local papers in Haiti, but also contributed to the
shaping of the political discourse in Haiti.”629 Through its enthusiastic support for Aristide as
well as its attacks on opposing candidates like Marc Bazin, Haiti Progres shaped the political
debate both in Haiti and in the diaspora. In this way, Haiti Progres -- an institution that had its
origins in the anti-Duvalier movement in exile and that was founded by Benjamin Dupuy, a
leading activist in Haitian New York who after 1986 became an important member of the Left in
Haiti’s blossoming grassroots movement -- contributed significantly to the ascendance and
ultimate election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, a landmark achievement of the grassroots movement
in Haiti that was, as the case of Dupuy and Haiti Progres illustrates, also the achievement of
activists with roots in the Haitian communities of the United States.
During the presidential campaign of 1990, Aristide’s supporters in the United States also
raised a large amount of money to support Aristide’s campaign in Haiti. This financial support,
Michel Laguerre argues, challenged Haiti’s traditional political system by allowing candidates
like Aristide “to displace, or at least compete with, the traditional elite’s control over the political
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process.” In addition to financial support, Laguerre notes that members of the diaspora offered
technical skills and other human resources to their candidates of choice; they also had a
substantial influence on how family members and friends in Haiti voted, especially because so
many in Haiti were dependent on the continuing flow of remittances from supporters abroad. In
the election of 1990, some Aristide enthusiasts even returned to Haiti to work on his campaign,
and some voters who had maintained their Haitian citizenship returned in December to cast their
ballot for the popular candidate.630
One sign of the diaspora’s importance to Aristide’s presidential run was the candidate’s
campaign stops in Miami and New York. On Saturday November 3, Operasyon Lavalas
announced that it would be holding a campaign rally in Miami and then would move on to New
York. In anticipation of the North American portion of his campaign tour, Aristide appeared on
Radio Tropicale in an interview, reprinted in part by Haiti Progres, that reinforced the
understanding of Haitians in the diaspora that they were full participants in the developments
unfolding in Haiti. Asked how he intended to implement and fund the ambitious projects he
pledged to complete once he became president, Aristide replied, "The biggest bank that the
Haitian people own” is “the people itself, both in Haiti and in the Diaspora." This “human
library” would give his administration the “knowledge, experience and expertise” necessary to
transform the country. Just before Aristide’s appearances in Miami and New York, the message
to Haitians in the diaspora was clear: if they would “invest heavily,” they would have a
prominent place in the new Haiti.631
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On November 2 Aristide arrived in Miami. In Little Haiti, Aristide’s image was already
everywhere, campaign posters plastered on lamp posts, store windows, and any other available
space. The candidate himself appeared at the offices of Veye Yo for an afternoon press
conference. With hundreds of people gathered outside, Aristide took questions from reporters.
“What ideology do you follow?” asked a reporter from the Miami Times. The three points of
Lavalas’s program are “justice, participation, and transparency,” Aristide replied. "Do you agree
with the principles of non-violence of Martin Luther King?" asked another. "We continue to use
the same non-violence,” said Aristide, “but we call on an active non-violence." Linking
Aristide’s presence with the ongoing conflict in the city of Miami, a reporter from CBS Channel
6 informed the candidate that "some people today think you're going to bring another wave of
problems to Miami . . . [to] make the community more activist than it already is." In a response
aimed at both the Haitian and non-Haitian residents of Miami, Aristide commented that
"Haitians know what they want. But the first thing we want when we are living in other
countries is unity . . . Some Cubans have not been able to understand the methods used by the
Haitians to make Florida a better place to live but [Haitians] are prepared to live with other
people on the basis of mutual respect."632
From the press conference, Aristide and his supporters moved to the main event in his
visit to Miami, a massive rally at the Miami stadium. Haitian cab drivers carried people, free of
charge, to the stadium. Upon their arrival, rally goers found a festive scene, hosted by many
musicians, including fifty Haitian raras wearing tee shirts printed with the title “Lavalas Band.”
Aristide, flanked on stage by Father Gerard Jean-Juste, Evans Paul, the singer and community
activist Farah Juste, and other supporters and members of the FNCD, delivered a stirring address
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to an enthusiastic crowd of twenty thousand people. Invited to support the campaign effort,
throngs of people moved toward the collection bins located close to the stage, contributing
$30,000 to Operation Lavalas. At the conclusion of the rally, Aristide supporters launched a
spontaneous celebration and march through the streets of Little Haiti, concluding with another
informal rally at the headquarters of Veye Yo.633
Aristide’s arrival in New York, Haiti Progres reported, engendered the same “joy” and
“fervor” as it had in Miami, even if the northern Haitian community was “more reserved, more
stable, and, dare we say, more gentrified.” In Brooklyn, Aristide appeared before a jubilant
crowd of fifteen thousand people. The candidate was joined onstage by the three directors of the
Central Committee of Operation Lavalas in the diaspora (Desir, Dupuy, and Dejean), popular
musicians like So Ann, and other community leaders and supporters, including members of the
Haitian Enforcement Against Racism (HEAR), which had been the primary force behind the
April 20 AIDS march. After another impassioned address by the candidate, Lavalas collected an
additional $18,000 to add to the campaign fund.634
Throughout Haitian communities in the United States, the substantial support for JeanBertrand Aristide’s presidential bid was undeniable. Lily Cerat recalls some of the reasons for
Aristide’s popularity among Haitians in New York. “There were people who were, like, this guy
symbolizes, embodies, everything I’ve ever wanted to see in a Haitian leader. We shared class,
language . . . He communicated well, he was very charismatic . . . He was able to communicate
with people in a language that they understood and communicate things that they had dreamed
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of.”635 During his campaign visit to New York, Aristide returned to L’Ayisyen for another
interview, despite the fact that SELA was one of the groups on the Haitian Left that refused to
support his candidacy. As the radio show’s hosts recall, somebody called in and asked, “What’s
going on? How come you formed a committee in New York and we don’t see any of the
members of L’Ayisyen? We were expecting to see them as part of your committee. So Aristide
said, ‘Well, I understand that they do not agree with the position I’m taking now so they are
entitled to their opposition’.” Because of Aristide’s immense popularity, their opposition to
Aristide’s candidacy cost popular organizations like SELA some status in the community. “We
did pay some consequences for our position toward Aristide. When we did not support
Aristide’s candidacy, SELA suffered,” they admit.636
As the December 16 election approached, excitement built throughout Haiti and the
diaspora. But apprehension and fear also spread as people contemplated the possibility of
another election day massacre like the one that had occurred in November 1987. Violence
seemed increasingly likely after the neo-Duvalierist candidate Roger Lafontant refused to
concede even though he had been declared ineligible for candidacy. That fear intensified when,
on December 5, the electrical power in an area where an Aristide rally was taking place suddenly
went out and a grenade exploded, killing seven and severely wounding more than fifty.
Aristide’s supporters were undeterred, however, turning the funeral service for those killed in the
incident into yet another opportunity to demonstrate their support for their candidate, Pe Titid.
Father Gerard Jean-Juste, the longtime director of the Haitian Refugee Center and leader of Veye
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Yo in Miami, having returned to Haiti to support Aristide’s campaign, was one of the clergymen
who presided over the funeral-turned-rally, which drew eight thousand people.637
On Sunday December 16, Haitians finally went to the polls and, despite long lines and
many delays, cast their ballots at polling stations guarded by armed police and international
observers. In the United States, Haitians anxiously awaited the results of the presidential
election that they felt so invested in. In the Little Haiti neighborhood of Miami, a crowd of more
than four thousand people rallied, dancing, singing and chanting their support for Aristide. To
the north, Broward County Haitians also marked the election day with a festive rally and
celebration at Snyder Park in Fort Lauderdale. At the Cabane Choucane restaurant, excited
discussion of the elections filled the dining room along with the smell of lambi and griot, two
specialties of Haitian cuisine. At a Haitian supermarket in Fort Lauderdale, Ansom Monestime,
a Haitian father of two who had traveled to Florida by boat in 1979, expressed his belief in the
potential of an Aristide victory for people like him who remained in Haiti: "This is a chance for
change in Haiti. This is a chance for Haitians to stop getting in boats for here."638
Throughout the diaspora there was great relief once it appeared that there would be no
replay of the election violence of 1987. And when reports of the election results began coming
in, for many, relief turned to jubilation. Early on Monday December 17, with four of the nine
departments reporting election returns, it looked like a landslide victory for Aristide; 70.6
percent favored the Lavalas candidate while only 12.6 percent voted for his closest challenger,
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Marc Bazin. The final result was just over 67percent for Jean-Bertrand Aristide, making the best
known voice of the popular movement the next president of Haiti.639
When word got out that Aristide had won, Haitians once again took to the streets. A
joyous celebration erupted in Port-au-Prince with thousands of people holding up pictures of
Aristide and waving tree branches. In Miami the neighborhood of Little Haiti also exploded with
joy and excitement at the news. There, too, thousands of people flowed into the streets,
prompting Miami police to close off a four-block section of the neighborhood. All day long the
community celebrated: dancing, singing, waving blue and red banners and tree branches, and
even holding up live roosters, the cok kalite, or fighting cock, which had become the symbol of
Aristide and his campaign. Likewise, in New York a spontaneous celebration erupted on Eastern
Parkway in Brooklyn. In Manhattan, at the West Side restaurant of Soleil, as in other Haitian
establishments throughout the city, it was party time. "This is a day for jubilation. We finally
have hope and we have shown that democracy can exist in Haiti," exclaimed Frantz Fequiere, a
thirty-six-year-old taxi driver and law school graduate from Haiti.640
Of course, not all Haitians were celebrating Aristide’s victory, either in Haiti or in the
United States. “Aristide is not the man here,” commented one resident of the wealthy Port-auPrince suburb of Petionville, an area in which most residents had backed Marc Bazin. In New
York, Leo Joseph, brother of Ray Joseph and publisher of the newspaper Haiti Observateur,
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reported that the newspaper staff had received threats for opposing Aristide. “We feel Aristide
has a very violent language and he is a divisive influence in Haitian society. Promoting justice in
his own camp may mean resorting to violence to settle certain scores," Joseph cautioned.
Opposition to Haiti’s new president-elect also existed inside the US government. According to
John Shattuck, an assistant secretary of state in the Clinton Administration, “Aristide was
regarded by some elements of the Pentagon and CIA as an unstable political leader who risked
plunging Haiti into more violence and instability.”641 In spite of reservations like these,
however, in the aftermath of Aristide’s triumph, many Haitians at home and abroad agreed with
Joseph Saint Hilaire, an engineer for the New York City Transit Authority, when he called
Aristide’s election “a second independence.”642
On New Year’s Day, the day Haitians also celebrate their national independence, the
newly elected president sent a message to Haitians in the diaspora, appealing to them to continue
the close relationship that had been built over several years. Now that Haiti had a democratically
elected government, he urged them to return to Haiti to contribute to the project of remaking the
country. Addressing the countries of the diaspora one by one, “Sisters and brothers who live in
the United States . . . sisters and brothers who live in Guadeloupe . . . in Martinique, Guyana . . .
Europe . . . Africa,” he explained that when they were added to the Haitian nation within the
country’s territorial boundaries with its nine geographical departments or states, Haitians of the
diaspora became the nation’s “10th Department.” As part of their mother country, these Haitians
of the Tenth Department had a responsibility to their people and their nation. Despite the
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“humiliation” Haitians abroad had been forced to endure, said Aristide, despite the “miseries of
the bateyes [sugar cane operations] of Santo Domingo, despite the tribulations in the Krome
prison camp, despite the shock of humiliation caused by the AIDS hurricane . . . these problems
have failed to destroy the Tenth Department.”643
It was time for Haitians of the diaspora to end their long, difficult period of exile and
return home, Aristide announced. “The time has arrived. What time is it? Time to go home.”
Although many might have concerns about returning to Haiti, the president-elect acknowledged,
he worked to assuage their worries and fears. “There is no danger because we work to eliminate
it . . . Thanks to our solidarity we were able to establish security.” Assuming there was no real
threat to their safety, Aristide encouraged them, “You who have much experience, a lot of
knowledge, come. Come with what you own . . . Come and create work, come to work.”
Aristide declared, “The country needs you.” For those who wanted to contribute to the
rebuilding of Haiti but were reluctant to completely uproot once again, Aristide offered a
commitment to “make things easier for those who want to come here and who, when they want
to leave can do so without difficulty. If you come for a few days, do it at ease. And even if you
come for a few months. What we desire is that you can go home whenever you want and leave
where you work just as freely.” Not all Haitians might be interested in returning to Haiti
permanently, allowed Aristide, but he urged these members of the Tenth Department “not to
forget your country.” Haiti was still home.644
Aristide’s New Year message to the Haitian diaspora also demonstrated his
understanding of what had made the enormous victories of the previous year possible. “What is
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the most beautiful in the heart of our culture,” said Aristide, “is the 'tet Ansanm,' solidarity. That
is what we find in cities, in the hills, deep in the provinces where one always knows that 'yon sel
dwet pa manje kalalou,’ or the pain of one is the suffering of the other.” The people of Haiti at
home and abroad were family, held together naturally. Likewise, the popular movements in
Haiti and in the diaspora were naturally connected, Aristide argued, linked by “the umbilical
cord of Lavalas.” The “flesh of our culture,” the “tet ansanm” (“coalition” or “coming
together”), the “solidarity” is the thing “which in 1990 led us to mobilize so that in the diaspora,
as here, the entire world has seen the power of this ‘tet ansanm’.” Aristide urged Haitians to
follow this natural connection back to their mother country. “At least come see, come take a
peek . . . The door is open. We are waiting for you.”645
One week into the New Year and exactly one month before the new president was to be
inaugurated, the deep fears harbored by many Haitians about the possibility of another coup were
realized. Roger Lafontant, the Duvalierist who had vowed to block Aristide’s ascendance to
leadership, attacked the new government, attempting to stage a coup even before the new
administration had officially begun. On the night of January 6, forces led by Lafontant attacked
the National Palace, forcing Ertha Pascal-Trouillot, the head of the Provisional Government, to
step down and driving Aristide into hiding. Soon after, Lafontant appeared on radio and
television to inform the Haitian people that he was assuming leadership of the country.
Lafantant declared that the December elections were “a masquerade,” a “scathing insult” to the
people of Haiti. Claiming the backing of the army and the police, Lafontant announced that he
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had taken action to save the country from the communist dictatorship that Aristide
represented.646
News of Lafontant’s coup attempt traveled like wildfire throughout Haiti. In the early
morning hours of January 7, tens of thousands of Haitians took to the streets to protest the
attempt, filling the streets in cities and towns throughout the country. In Port-au-Prince masses
of people streamed toward the National Palace, armed with stones, sticks, machetes, and
whatever makeshift weapons they could find, to try to defend Aristide and the Haitian
government from yet another Duvalierist takeover. News of the coup attempt traveled with
equal speed throughout the diaspora. At 3:00 a.m. a crowd began forming outside the Haitian
supermarket on Sunrise Boulevard in Fort Lauderdale, and the streets of Little Haiti in Miami
were filling with angry protesters. In Boston, at least five hundred Haitians (and as many as
three thousand, according to one report) soon took to the streets. Another five thousand were
preparing to mass outside the United Nations building in New York.647
Confronted by tens of thousands of armed people and receiving reports that the whole
nation (including the Tenth Department) was rising up against the coup, the Haitian army faced a
choice: it could support Lafontant and encourage the uprising or back the democratically elected
president and avoid becoming the target of an enraged populace. Military leaders chose the safer
route, meeting the people’s demand that Lafontant be arrested and that the Provisional
Government and Aristide as president-elect be restored. In Miami, a city where it often is
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impossible to separate local and international politics, Mayor Xavier Suarez carried the news to
the thousands of people gathered in the streets of Little Haiti, assuring the protesters that the
State Department had confirmed that Lafontant was under arrest and that the coup had been
aborted. A taped radio message from Aristide himself, played to crowds assembled in the
American cities, confirmed the same outcome.648
The coup’s failure transformed the mass protests into joyous celebrations, but the agitated
protesters remained angry, which was manifested in the streets of Haiti as well as in Miami and
elsewhere. In Port-au-Prince, the coup attempt provoked crowds into another mini dechoukaj, or
uprooting, driving attacks on suspected macoutes as well as on the property of opponents to
Aristide. In Little Haiti, angry people demonstrated their willingness to employ similar tactics.
Carrying a tire above his head to symbolize the pere lebrun, or necklacing, Jean Cadet declared,
"This is to put around Lafontant's neck. They arrested him in Haiti, but they should bring him to
54th Street so we can deal with him." When someone claimed to have heard nineteen-year-old
Marie Joseph yell, “Vive Lafontant, a bas Aristide” (Long live Lafontant, down with Aristide),
the young woman was attacked and pelted with bottles until she was finally rescued from the
angry crowd by Miami police. Speaking to reporters later, Joseph admitted to her support for
Lafontant and claimed that the coup “was something that had to happen, that should have
happened.” But while the failed coup attempt provoked intense anger among some Aristide
supporters and revealed deep rifts among Haitians in the United States, it also inspired hope.
"This is the final showdown between the people and the Macoutes," Mona Michel, director of
the Haitian Refugee Center, optimistically forecast. "This was [Lafontant’s] last card and he
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played it out, and we now know democracy will triumph in Haiti," Lils Renoir, of the Haitian
Democratic Foundation, agreed.649
With the newly elected Haitian government secured from attack, temporarily at least,
Haitians at home and abroad returned to the business of preparing for the February seventh
inaugural celebration. Some, like Father Gerard Jean-Juste, the longtime leader of the Haitian
Refugee Center and Veye Yo in Miami, left the United States for what they expected to be a longterm or even permanent return to Haiti.650 Others intended to return only temporarily for the
inaugural festivities. Whether they intended to remain in Haiti or not, Haitian activists coming
from outside the country were welcomed back as partners in a movement that had elevated a
grassroots activist to the presidency. Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s inauguration on February 7, 1991,
launched days of celebration in Haiti, one of which was dedicated to honoring members of the
diaspora. On this “Diaspora Day,” according to one participant, “everybody who was anybody
from New York and Miami ended up in Port-au-Prince for that day.”651
In the first months of 1991, Aristide took steps to formalize the relationship between the
Haitian government and its supporters in the diaspora. To do so, he appointed a central
committee of leaders in the diaspora, made up of representatives of each of the various Haitian
communities outside of Haiti.652 Later, Aristide recalled,
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With Lavalas’s rise to power, Haiti had grown greater, extending far beyond its 27,000
square kilometers and nine departments. Even before February 7, we had created a tenth
department encompassing our compatriots outside, who had multiple roles. Without
them, what would become of some of the families on the island?653
According to Kim Ives, however, the creation of the Tenth Department was not simply a matter
of the new president’s implementing an innovative way to channel resources and assistance from
the diaspora to Haiti. “[Aristide] really had no choice” but to create the Tenth Department,
argues Ives. “It was natural.” Aristide’s victory “was really the victory of everybody.” The
diaspora “was a huge part of his base. He was to some extent supported, funded, and reliant on
that diaspora, which he knew had the cadre,” Ives explains. “Most of his advisers . . . were
dyaspora.” As a result, Aristide’s establishment of the Tenth Department was less of an
innovation than it was the formal recognition of something that had been built and solidified over
the previous few years. “The 10th department was really the consummation . . . like two people
who have lived together for ten years getting married,” explains Ives.654
Even if the creation of the Tenth Department formalized a relationship that already
existed, it also created something new: an official structure for Aristide’s supporters who
remained in New York and Miami through which they could channel energy and resources in
support of the popular movement in Haiti. During the spring and summer of 1991 in various
American cities, committees of the Tenth Department met to establish themselves and to carry
out one of the department’s first major campaigns, a fundraising campaign called Voye Ayiti
Monte (Help Haiti Go Forward), or VOAM.655
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The great hope and excitement of the period, both in the potential of Aristide’s
administration and in the achievement of the diaspora, were symbolized by an image featured in
the pro-Aristide Haiti Progres. The picture depicted two hands reaching for each other, closely
resembling the outstretched hands of God and Adam in Michelangelo’s painting, The Creation of
Adam, in the Sistine Chapel. Almost touching, one hand is labeled “Haiti” and the other,
“Diaspora.” Behind the outstretched hands, a glowing sun rises over the edge of a mountain
range. With Haiti and its diaspora united, it was a new day for Haitians, the image suggested.656
In the diaspora in the spring and summer of 1991, campaigns other than the fundraiser for
Haiti were carried out as well. Though Aristide’s election had produced a dramatic and sudden
drop-off in the number of Haitians attempting to reach the United States by boat, the refugee
crisis in South Florida continued for the many Haitians still imprisoned at Krome and other
immigration detention centers.657
The strike at the Domsey factory in Brooklyn also continued, although it was carried out
primarily in the courtroom rather than on the picket line. Strike supporters had succeeded in
drawing sustained support from the Haitian community as well as from high profile supporters,
including Jesse Jackson and US Congressman Major Owens. At the end of July, after nineteen
months on strike, the workers, mostly Haitian, got the court ruling they were looking for. A
dixieme department,” Haiti Progres, Feb. 26-Mar. 6, 1991, 9; “New York: le dixieme department s’organise et se
structure,” Haiti Progres, Mar. 6-12, 1991; “New York: 2000 compatriotes assistant a une reunion pour structuration
du dixieme department,” Haiti Progres, Mar. 13-19, 1991, 10; “Le pere Gerard Jean-Juste ratifie officiellement la
composition du comite proviso forme a New York,” Haiti Progres, Mar. 20-26, 1991, 11; “Structure du dixieme
department arrondissement de New York,” Haiti Progres, Mar. 27-Apr. 2, 1991, 11; “Mini-congres; le statut du
dixieme define,” Haiti Progres, July 24-30, 1991, 9.
656

657

Marie Celie Agnant, “Tant et tant de mains unies,” Haiti Progres, Feb. 20-26, 1991, 21.

Stepick, Pride against Prejudice, 107; “Refugies haitiens: une action en justice intentee contre l’immigration de
Miami,” Haiti Progres, July 24-30, 1991, 11; “Miami: une jeune compatriote s’eleve contre les mauvais traitements
des refugies haitiens,” Haiti Progres, Aug. 14-20, 1991, 10; “Miami: greve de la faim a Krome,” Haiti Progres,
Sept. 4-10, 1991, 10.

294
federal judge in Brooklyn ordered the owners of Domsey Trading Company to rehire the 208
workers out on strike and to compensate them with back pay amounting to $2 million. At a time
when Haitians had seen solidarity and community mobilization lead to a thrilling victory in
Haiti, this triumph in the Tenth Department of New York seemed one more sign that the tide had
turned. But when the Salm brothers delayed reinstating the strikers and refused altogether to
rehire 10 workers, 6 of whom represented the original strike committee, it began to seem that
victory was not right at hand after all.658
As members of the Tenth Department continued their work, at the end of September
Aristide returned to the United States, where he was again received with great warmth and
enthusiasm by the Haitian communities of New York and Miami. Addressing the United
Nations General Assembly, Aristide made sure to highlight not only those concerns facing
people in Haiti, but also those confronted by the diaspora as well. The status and treatment of
Haitians at the Krome Avenue Detention Center in Miami and the mistreatment and unjust
deportation of Haitian cane cutters in the Dominican Republic received special mention from
Aristide. In addition to speaking at the UN, Aristide was the honored guest at the Cathedral
Church of Saint John the Divine, a function attended by ten thousand people at which Aristide
was awarded the key to the city by Mayor David Dinkins.659
On his way back to Haiti, Aristide stopped to visit the Haitian community of Miami, the
other critical point in his US support network. The central event of his visit was an energizing
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rally in the Miami arena, which gave Aristide and the Haitian community of South Florida ample
opportunity to congratulate one another on their successful partnership. The event also featured
a celebration of the increasingly strong relationship between Haitians and black Americans in the
city of Miami. Demonstrating how close the two elements of the black community of Miami had
become during the intense conflicts of the previous year, H.T. Smith, spokesman for the black
community’s boycott of the city, called Aristide’s visit “a great day for all the people of Miami.”
Smith declared, "African Americans are here tonight to proclaim to the whole world that the
struggle of the Haitian people is not just a Haitian struggle. It is the struggle of people of African
descent around the world.” Contributing to the bountiful good will between the sometimes
feuding black American and Haitian communities, Aristide affirmed that his presidential victory
was "a victory for us all, for black Americans and Haitians." After his successful debut at the
United Nations and an enthusiastic reception by residents of New York and Miami, Haitian and
non-Haitian alike, it appeared that things could scarcely be better for Aristide and the people of
Lavalas.660
Three days later, however, the president’s residence came under attack by members of
the Haitian army, forcing Aristide to flee to the National Palace. There he was arrested and
taken to the head of the Haitian army, Brigadier General Raoul Cedras, who informed Aristide
that he was being removed from office. Narrowly escaping execution, Aristide was placed on a
plane to Caracas, Venezuela. Aristide’s quick removal and the army’s willingness to use deadly
force against any potential mobilization ensured that this attempt would be different from the
failed coup of January, which had been reversed by the spontaneous action of the Haitian people.
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Haitians who dared challenge the army by venturing onto the street were met with violence;
hundreds of people lost their lives in the days following the removal of Aristide.661
As before, reports of Aristide’s removal and the conflict in Haiti quickly translated into
turmoil on the streets of American cities. The shock and anger among US Haitians took its most
extreme form on the streets of Miami. Hours after Aristide’s arrest and forced exile, as people in
Haiti were being cut down on the streets of Port-au-Prince, more than one thousand people
gathered in shock and bewilderment in Little Haiti. These confused gatherings grew into a fullscale insurrection the following morning. Through a cloud of tear gas, angry Haitians blocked
city streets with flaming barricades and battled Miami police in riot gear. Insurgents torched a
police car and looted the stores of suspected macoutes.662 In New York, several thousand
Haitian protesters massed outside the United Nations building on the east side of Manhattan,
raising their voices against the UN Security Council’s failure to convene an emergency meeting
to address the crisis in Haiti. Smaller actions in other parts of the Haitian diaspora also sprang
up. In Boston, more than two thousand people protested the attack on democracy in Haiti. In
Montreal and in Tampa, Haitians turned out to protest the removal of Aristide. In Elizabeth,
New Jersey, thirty-three Haitians were arrested and charged with disorderly conduct for banging
trash cans and blocking the streets in protest.663

661

Farmer, Uses of Haiti, 152-54.

662

Tracy Fields, “Local Haitians Wait, Worry While Watching Events At Home,” The Associated Press, Sept. 30,
1991, AM cycle; “Haitians Loot Store in Miami after Aristide Arrest,” Agence France Press, Oct. 1, 1991; Tracy
Fields, “Disturbances in Miami's Little Haiti after Aristide Arrest,” The Associated Press, Oct. 1, 1991, AM cycle.

663

Peter James Spielmann, “Haitians Rally Outside UN, Demand UN Action,” The Associated Press, Oct. 1, 1991,
AM cycle; Tracy Fields, “Haitians Riot in Miami After Coup in Homeland,” The Associated Press, Oct. 1, 1991,
PM cycle; “'The Hardest Blow'; Montreal's Haitians Declare Their Support for Aristide,” Gazette (Montreal), Oct. 1,
1991, A6; Kathryn Marchocki, “Haitians in Hub Protest Ouster,” Boston Herald, Oct. 2, 1991, 3; “Haitians Protest
in Tampa,” St. Petersburg (FL) Times, Oct. 2, 1991, 6B.

297
Day after day the protests continued. On Tuesday, two days after the coup, violence
subsided in Miami, but thousands marched through the streets of the city, calling for Aristide’s
return. On the same day, six hundred marched in Montreal. On day three of the coup, as
repression against Aristide supporters mounted in Haiti, more than twenty thousand people
demonstrated in Miami’s Bicentennial Park. In New York, the thousands who maintained a
daily presence outside the United Nations building were there to add their voices to Aristide’s
own when he arrived on Thursday to address the UN Security Council and deliver his appeal for
international support.

On the following day, another protest of eight thousand people massed in

Miami, and in Boston Haitians gathered for a rally at City Hall. "It is up to us to show the world
that we want the return of President Aristide," said Wilson Desir. One week into the crisis in
Haiti, members of the Haitian diaspora were in a state of constant mobilization.664
The coup of September 29, 1991, abruptly extinguished the euphoria that had
accompanied the string of victories and the expanding community power that Haitians had
achieved in the previous year and a half, making the period from 1990 to 1991 the pinnacle
moment for the linked popular movements in New York, Miami, and Haiti. Engaged in a wide
range of campaigns, both local and international, Haitian activists in each location had achieved
an unprecedented level of mobilization and channeled the popular movement that they had been
steadily building and stubbornly defending into real victories. The local struggles in this period,
664
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the struggles for union recognition and workplace justice in Brooklyn, against discrimination and
abuse in Miami, and against the reemergence of the damaging AIDS stigma in Haitian
communities across the United States, were stronger and more successful because they were tied
together by activists that were rooted in and actively sustaining the transnational movement. In
addition, Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s electoral campaign in the Haitian diaspora and his relationship
with Haitian activists in the United States during his first term in office was the formalization of
the border-crossing politics that had been developing in the preceding years. The movement that
elevated Aristide to the presidency of Haiti, like the other groundbreaking campaigns of the
period, was the product of the linked popular movement that had its roots in the struggle against
the Duvalier dictatorship and that sprouted and blossomed from 1986 to 1991. But in the wake
of the coup, activists in Haiti, New York, and Miami were back on the defensive, forced for the
next several years to devote all of the energy they had generated and all of the organizational
structures they had built in the previous five years to the task of pushing for Aristide’s return to
Haiti, calling for an end to the repression and violence that raged on in Haiti, and defending the
enormous new wave of refugees that the coup and its repression produced.
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Chapter 6
Defending Democracy: Fighting to Reverse the Coup and Protect the Refugees,
1991-1994
The coup years, which stretched from September 1991 to October 1994, were incredibly
difficult years for Haitians in both Haiti and the United States. Many who remained in Haiti
were subjected to unspeakable acts of violence and terror. In the United States, though guarded
from the direct violence of the coup, Haitians watched in horror as death squads systematically
hunted down members of the popular movement and as refugees who had been able to escape the
violence were first imprisoned and then returned to Haiti. The three-year coup period were even
more difficult for Haitian activists both in Haiti and abroad because the coup was a direct attack
on their project of popular empowerment that stretched back to the anti-Duvalier resistance and
that truly blossomed from 1986 to 1991. The intense and urgent mobilization of the coup years
was concerned with defending those in Haiti from repression and violence as well as defending
democracy in Haiti. For those in the diaspora, all of the hard work they had done constructing
organizations and networks, educating and organizing their communities, and building alliances
with American organizations and movements became an essential foundation from which to
wage the struggle to reverse the coup and defend the Haitian refugees.

Repression and Resistance
In the days and weeks following the September 30 coup, hundreds and perhaps thousands
of people were killed in Haiti. Ten days after Aristide was forced from office and placed on a
plane to Venezuela, Amnesty International reported that hundreds had been killed; many more
had been injured, arrested, and tortured by the machin enfenal (hellish machine) that had taken
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hold of Haiti.665 The Washington Post estimated the death toll in the first eight days after the
coup to be from 250 to 600 or more. Other sources put the death count in the first days of the
coup much higher. Bishop Willy Romelus, a Haitian priest based in the southern town of
Jeremie and longtime supporter of the popular movement in Haiti, stated, “There are reports that
in the first few days after the coup more than 1,500 people were killed. Yet no one could find all
the bodies so a report got out that these figures had been exaggerated. Not at all,” said Romelus.
After the slaughter, Romelus claimed, the army “loaded the bodies on trucks and hauled them
away. After unloading the bodies, they drove back, loaded more bodies. They repeated this time
after time until all the bodies had been removed.” And those who survived initial attacks and
made it to the hospital for treatment were still not safe; soldiers were reported entering hospitals,
threatening doctors, and executing those they had failed to kill in their first attempt.666
Some of the violence that engulfed Haiti after the coup was carried out by the Haitian
Army under the direction of Raoul Cedras, the general at the head of the coup regime. However,
Col. Joseph Michel Francois was the military leader more intimately involved in the campaign of
repression. Civilian death squads, one of the most notorious of which was known as FRAPH
(Front pour l'Avancement et le Progrès Haitien), worked in tandem with the military and were
responsible for some of the most horrendous acts of violence. According to Beverly Bell,
FRAPH members collected “trophy photographs” of their victims; they would commonly “slice
off the faces of their victims before depositing them in open-field garbage dumps in Cite
Soleil.”667
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Together the Haitian military and paramilitary groups like FRAPH carried out a
campaign of violence and repression that was not entirely arbitrary; it targeted individuals and
organizations that were part of the popular movement. When a protest against the coup erupted
in the impoverished Port-au-Prince neighborhood of Cite Soleil, soldiers opened fire on those
calling for Aristide’s return, killing thirty. Aristide supporters and members of the Lavalas Party
were driven underground when soldiers and members of the paramilitaries attacked their homes
and businesses. In the days following the coup, Evans Paul, leading Lavalas member and mayor
of Port-au-Prince, was arrested and beaten. Manno Charlemagne, the people’s troubadour, was
also arrested. Astrel Charles, a pro-Aristide member of the Chamber of Deputies, was gunned
down while leaving a church service. Jacques Caraibe, director of Radio-Caraibe, too was
executed. Gerard Jean-Juste, the longtime director of the Haitian Refugee Center in Miami who
had returned to Haiti to participate in the Aristide government, was driven underground, hunted
by the military and death squads.668
Women were a particular target of the violence following the coup; in fact, sexual
violence became one of the hallmarks of the military and paramilitary campaign against the
popular movement. Even before Duvalier’s departure, but especially in the years since 1986,
Haitian women had emerged as a central component of the popular movement, a role their
opponents attempted to curtail through the use of gendered violence. Women’s organizations
and human rights groups reported that rapes increased dramatically in the period after the coup.
Beverly Bell observes, “During the 1991-1994 coup period, women’s bodies became domains
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for the regime to assert its power and authority with rape regularly used as a weapon of war.”669
"The institutionalized impunity that exists in Haiti creates a situation in which soldiers and their
associates can do what they want to women and get away with it," lamented Clorinda Zepher, a
women's activist attempting to document and publicize the sexual violence. "We are talking
about the sexual violation of women from 12 to 64 years old. It's an outrage. It's part of the
repression that the people in this country have been living under."670
As effective as sexual assault was in terrifying female members of the popular
movement, it also had the effect of discouraging political activism among its victims, an effect
that the women’s attackers may have recognized. Venante Duplan described the isolation and
debilitating shame that often accompanied rape by the zenglendo (terror squads):
When Aristide left Haiti, the zenglendo overtook the area. They shot everything they
saw. The zenglendo came into my house, they beat me, they slapped me. Four of them
raped me, martyred me, vanquished me, sliced through me . . . After the rape, I suffered
so much shame. The people where I was living abandoned me . . . People make fun of
me. “This is a zenglendo’s mistress.”671
Details of the ongoing violence and repression were published in a report by a trio of
human rights organizations, the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, Americas Watch, and
Physicians for Human Rights. The report added details to the emerging picture of post-coup
violence and repression. Entitled “Return to the Darkest Days,” the report argued that Haiti after
the coup had been thrown back into conditions like those during Duvalier’s dictatorship. In
addition to large numbers of deaths and injuries, the post-coup violence had displaced 250,000
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people, the report noted. At a press conference coinciding with the release of the document, the
journalist and author Amy Wilentz reported,
Throughout the country no one is safe who has ever participated in any kind of
democratic organization. Hundreds of small community groups have been under attack,
houses have been burned down, the leaders of these groups are hunted down and even the
members are hunted. These are not just peasant groups and labor unions, which come
traditionally under threat whenever the right wing is in the ascendency in Haiti, but also
church groups throughout the country.
As in earlier times of repression, the independent media was especially targeted, prompting
Wilentz to claim that “the voice of Haiti's young democracy is being silenced.” Wilentz also
noted that in the first days after the coup, many prisoners were released from Haiti’s National
Penitentiary, “among them, notorious criminals from the Duvalier days, torturers, murders, and
masterminds of terror,” who on their release joined the campaign of violence.672 Considering the
scale of violence and terror in the post-coup period, it is little wonder that people like Martine
Fourcand felt a powerlessness she described as “virtually annihilating.” She explained, “Anyone
could be shut up in a house and in the middle of the night hear the cries of someone being killed
less than fifty meters away, and not be able to do anything. That powerlessness is conducive to
destroying people.”673
Despite this feeling of powerlessness and the threat of violence, members of the popular
movement resisted the coup. Some like Martine Fourcand maintained individual acts of
resistance and survival. “Painting was what allowed me to hold on. Painting was a way to try to
limit the effects of the destroyers on my individual life, on my capacity to reflect, on my capacity
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to react,” remembered Fourcand.674 Others published and distributed underground newspapers
and tracts denouncing the coup regime and demanding Aristide’s return. Students stayed out of
school, and even when they were in school, they held protests against the coup.675 Despite the
extreme risk of such acts, there were cautious pro-Aristide demonstrations in Haiti. On October
14, grassroots organizations transmitted a call for a general strike from a radio station in the
Dominican Republic. The following week a group of ninety Catholic priests issued a unified
statement calling for Aristide’s return.676 Even in the bloody first months after the coup,
individual and collective acts of resistance occurred.
As part of this ongoing campaign of resistance, women played a central role. Though a
particular target by death squads and agents of the coup, Haitian women were able to build
unique networks and modes of resistance, exploiting gendered social space to facilitate their
campaign. While collecting water or washing clothes in the river, for example, rural women
shared information and discussed strategy. For their communication and planning, the machann,
or market women, utilized the marketplace, a communal space in Haitian cities and towns for all
people. As a site of resistance, the marketplace often became the site of violence. As Alerte
Belance recalled, “FRAPH always used to come through the marketplace and trample it, because
they said that this group is a lavalas group.”677 But even though it was dangerous, women
continued to use the marketplace as a hub in the underground communication network.
According to Beverly Bell, market women would “pass clandestine messages back and forth on
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notes scribbled on the ragged orange gourde bills they exchanged for goods.”678 Women also
supported each other by smuggling food and supplies to those in hiding and taking care of the
children left behind.679
Perhaps the most critical act of resistance during the coup years was the dangerous effort
to collect and disseminate evidence of violence and human rights abuses inside Haiti. Haitian
activists took great risks to communicate with each other and to get information to journalists
and human rights organizations outside the country. Beverly Bell describes activists’ “faxing in
the dark of night from a different secure location each week.” When death squads threatened her
life, Marlene Larose moved her family to the rooftop of their residence; from there, they
documented the activities of the death squads, sending photographs and other information to
human rights organizations in the United States. In the coup years, the underground resistance in
Haiti maintained contact with its allies outside the country. Indeed, in the campaign to educate
the world about what was happening in Haiti, the lines of communication and the partnership
between activists inside and outside Haiti proved vital. Much as it had done during the Duvalier
years, the internal resistance provided information about the situation in Haiti and received
information about what was happening outside the country from its international supporters.680
This crucial exchange of information between journalists and activists was possible because of
the courage of people like Larose and Lelenne Gilles, who was part of the complex underground
information network. “There were almost no radio stations left functioning at that time, because
the army had destroyed most of them . . . However, there were Haitian radio stations in the
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diaspora. When they needed information, they called journalists in Haiti. I used to give the
news to Miami, to New York, and sometimes to Canada, the Netherlands, and Martinique,”
remembered Gilles. “I didn’t have a mike in my hands but I had a telephone. They would call
me. I would lie under my bed and broadcast news by the phone.”681
Haitians’ ability to resist and to ultimately reverse the coup was contingent not only upon
the actions of those in Haiti. As it had been during the Duvalier years and in the tumultuous
period from 1986 to 1991, the relationship between the resistance inside and that outside the
country was of critical importance, perhaps at this moment more than ever before. As previously
noted, large protests in New York, Miami, and other American cities had begun as soon as
Haitians in the United States learned of the coup. Another began on the morning of October 11,
1991, when tens of thousands of Haitians massed in Brooklyn on Grand Army Plaza. Haitian
cab drivers circled the area with pictures of Aristide taped to the grills of their cars. As the
protest marchers set out, they retraced the route of the historic April 20 demonstration across the
Brooklyn Bridge toward lower Manhattan. Marchers wore white stickers reading “Democracy
or Death.” Many held pictures of Aristide, blue and red Haitian flags, and signs that proclaimed,
“No Aristide, No Peace,” a slogan that also echoed from the chanting crowd. Once across the
bridge, the march twisted its way past the historic Customs House at Bowling Green and paused
for a spontaneous rally at Federal Hall where Wilson Desir, the director of the Alliance of
Haitian Immigrants, leapt up on the steps and addressed the cheering crowd. Passing by Wall
Street, young militants climbed on the iconic Wall Street bull statue to wave the Haitian flag,
producing a thunderous roar from the crowd. The marchers then moved on toward the southern
tip of the island, leaving the Wall Street icon covered with pro-Aristide stickers and posters.
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When the march poured into Battery Park, the number of participants numbered anywhere from
60,000 (the NYPD estimate) to 150,000 to 200,000 (the Haiti Progres estimate), surpassing the
turnout of the historic April 20 AIDS march the previous year. At the culminating rally in
Battery Park, the platform of speakers included many who had long been involved in community
organizing, including a leader of the Haitian Enforcement Against Racism (HEAR), Lionel
Legros from SELA, and Haiti Progres’ Ben Dupuy (now ambassador at large for the Aristide
administration). New York Mayor David Dinkins also addressed the crowd, declaring, “This
coup poses a threat not simply to the democratic aspirations of Haitians, but to democracy
everywhere.''682
The largest ever single-day mobilization in the history of Haitians in the United States,
the October 11 march and demonstration illustrates the depth of opposition to the coup in the
Haitian diaspora. While Haitians who joined the protest represented no single class background
or political orientation, and while the tens of thousands of Haitian demonstrators must have had
varying degrees of identification with Aristide and the activists he chose to represent him in the
Tenth Department, the substantial turnout suggests that for many Haitians, opposition to the coup
trumped class and political divisions.683 In fact, the same thing can be said for the three-year
campaign to return Aristide to Haiti. As we will see, not all Haitians in the United States
opposed the coup or joined the call for Aristide’s restoration. But the majority of Haitians in the
United States did support the restoration of democracy in Haiti and favored Aristide’s return.
Even those on the Left, like the members of SELA, who had opposed Aristide’s presidential run,
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threw themselves into the campaign, as one SELA member put it, to “defend that Aristide
democracy.” Lionel Legros, co-founder of SELA and L’Ayisyen, explains, “When Aristide was
elected, he was elected . . . so we condemned the military, the coup d’etat. We supported the
return of Aristide . . . [and] we organized and brought people into the street to oppose that
coup.”684 After the October 11 demonstration, the New York community remained mobilized,
staging an action in Brooklyn on October 26 and another demonstration at Wall Street in
Manhattan on November 4, each demonstration drawing several thousand participants.685
Haitians in Miami were equally involved in the effort to roll back the coup, though as had
become the pattern, the South Florida community’s level of mobilization took on a more
spontaneous and continuous character than the well-organized and coordinated actions of Haitian
New York. The New York community from its origin had a range of political leaders and formal
political organizations. To carry out a coordinated campaign by such a diverse range of
organizations and interests required careful planning and negotiation. In Miami, on the other
hand, rather than being spread out over a range of organizations and leadership, Haitian activism
centered primarily in the Haitian Refugee Center and Veye Yo, all under the leadership of Father
Gerard Jean-Juste. “Miami was more like Haiti in a sense,” Kim Ives recalls. “You had this
charismatic priest [Jean-Juste]in the center of it who would say, ‘OK, tomorrow we’re going to
go out and march!’ and the people would all go out, and it would be more like the spontaneous
Lavalas demonstrations in Haiti, which had very little structure [or] planning.”686 In the eight
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weeks following the coup, activists in Miami staged four separate marches of five thousand.687
In addition, Veye Yo held daily and nightly protests on Northeast 54th Street in the heart of Little
Haiti for months after Aristide’s forced exile.688 Tony Jean-Thenore, one of the young people
that took over leadership of Veye Yo when Father Gerard Jean-Juste returned to Haiti to join the
Aristide government, recalls the constant mobilization of the coup years. “We fought against the
coup d’etat from day one,” remembers Jean-Thenore. “It took place on Saturday, September 29,
1991. Until October 15, 1994, we were on the street daily making demonstrations here in
Miami, [going to] New York, Washington, DC, protesting against the coup d’etat. It was tough.
It was tough.”689
As Jean-Thenore’s statement suggests, Haitians organizing against the coup in their own
cities coordinated actions in Washington, DC, as well, just as they had done during the Duvalier
years and from 1986 to 1991. On Friday October 18, one week after the massive march and
demonstration in New York City, ten thousand to fifteen thousand people from New York,
Miami, Philadelphia, New Jersey, and other locations around the country, and from Canada
gathered in DC for a march from the Capitol to the White House to urge the Bush administration
to commit to the restoration of the Aristide government. Marching to the sounds of Haitian rara
bands, demonstrators drew attention to the violence in Haiti with signs that read “Stop the
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massacre” and “Stop the Haitian holocaust” and “Democracy or death,” the common chant from
the previous week’s action.690
The purpose of these mass demonstrations against the coup was to apply political
pressure on officials in Washington, to focus the spotlight of the international community on
Haiti, and to show solidarity with the resistance inside the country, all central elements of the
campaign to defend Haitian democracy and to reverse the coup. Activists also closely monitored
and reacted to the media’s portrayal of the situation in Haiti. In the days and weeks after the
coup, some American publications began running stories that suggested that Aristide was partly
responsible for the coup and implied that the attack on the Haitian government was a justifiable
response to what they saw as Aristide’s reckless and divisive leadership. The most persistent
media critic of Aristide with the highest profile was the New York Times’ correspondent in Haiti,
Howard W. French.691 On October 22, the Times ran a piece by French entitled “Ex-Backers of
Ousted Haitian Say He Alienated His Allies;” the piece characterized Aristide as a recalcitrant,
potentially dictatorial leader who encouraged violence. Conversely, French portrayed the army
as the savior that had relieved Haiti of “a heavy handed president.”692 The day following the
publication of French’s piece, approximately eight hundred protesters gathered outside the New
York Times’ midtown offices. According to the Times’ own coverage of the demonstration, “the
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crowd was particularly incensed” by French’s article “that said some supporters now believe
President Aristide contributed to his downfall through his insular style of leadership.”693
Going hand-in-hand with media portrayals of Aristide as a polarizing and violent figure
were increasingly common claims that Aristide had initiated a period of increased human rights
violations in Haiti. In fact, there is little evidence to support this charge. According to a study
conducted by The Washington Office on Haiti, which analyzed the human rights situation in the
country from June 1989 to June 1991, a period covering not only the Aristide presidency but also
the preceding Trouillot and Avril administrations, documented human rights violations did not
increase but in fact fell sharply in the period after Aristide’s inauguration.694
Despite little evidence, however, stories continued to circulate that suggested that the
coup was justifiable and that the Aristide government need not be restored, prompting proAristide activists to continue their campaign to defend the Haitian president. After the
Washington Post published an editorial that charged Aristide with intimidating political
opponents and destructively polarizing Haitian society, Ben Dupuy responded with a letter
defending Aristide. “This argument, which the Post readily accepts, is being advanced only by
the Cedras regime and the unscrupulous politicians lurking behind this bloody coup d'etat,”
Dupuy stated. “Despite constant pressure from a desperate and massive constituency to go
beyond legal methods, President Aristide has meticulously respected the often quirky
constitutional limits imposed on his ability to propel urgently needed reforms. He has repeatedly
encouraged his followers to do the same.” Dupuy concluded by urging the Post and US
policymakers “to listen more closely to the Haitian people themselves. This will help in the
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future to avoid the human rights certification of dictators like Jean-Claude Duvalier and Henri
Namphy and exonerate the record of outstanding democrats like Father Aristide.”695
As much popular support as there was for reversing the coup and restoring the Aristide
presidency among Haitians in the United States and in Haiti, there were those that supported the
coup and opposed Aristide’s return. In Haiti, Aristide’s opponents shared much the same
opinion of the exiled president as his detractors in the American press. A congressional report
documents these anti-Aristide arguments; interviews with anti-Aristide Haitians cited the exiled
president’s “actions to appeal directly to the masses, to place his supporters in positions in the
military, the government, and the courts, and to move forward with a reform program” as
evidence of Aristide’s attempt to “consolidate power in violation of the constitution.” Aristide’s
opponents also claimed that he endorsed “the use of violence and, in particular, the practice of
killing individuals by igniting gasoline-filled tires around the victim’s neck.”696
Aristide’s opponents in the United States shared this view of the exiled president.
Alejandro Portes and Alex Stepick found middle-class Haitians in South Florida especially likely
to regard Aristide as a danger to more privileged Haitians. Portes and Stepick report,
One middle-class woman interviewed shortly after the coup asserted that Aristide
intended to “kill” all the better-off Haitians. The owner of a major import-export
business claimed that Aristide had used the shantytown mobs to silence the middle class
and anyone who opposed him. These groups rallied too, carrying placards supporting the
coup and arguing that Haiti could be saved only if Aristide was kept out.697
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On December 1, 1991, one such demonstration took place far from Little Haiti in suburban
Kendall, where approximately thirty Haitians demonstrated against efforts to return Aristide to
Haiti.698
In New York, too, a small minority of the Haitian community supported the coup and
opposed Aristide. ''When [Aristide] became president, he just started pointing fingers. He was
more angry at the rich than trying to do anything for the poor,'' argued Sandra David, a twentyfour-year-old college student in New York.699 A more influential voice in the anti-Aristide
camp was Ray Joseph, founder and editor of the conservative Haiti Observateur. Using the
platform of his own newspaper as well as his regular contributions to the Wall Street Journal’s
“Americas Column,” Ray Joseph became the most prominent Haitian opponent of Aristide in the
United States. Well-positioned in the Haitian and American media, during the coup years Joseph
remained an influential player in the public relations battle between those who opposed JeanBertrand Aristide and those who supported him.

A New Refugee Crisis
As much as activists focused on mobilizing against the coup, another issue – the defense
of refugees, would soon take on equal weight for Haitians in the United States. As had happened
in the 1970s and 1980s, the asylum campaign for Haitian refugees became fused with the
campaign for democracy and popular empowerment in Haiti. However, in the first weeks after
the coup, it was not certain what US policy would be toward those fleeing post-coup violence.
In fact, it looked as if the US government might finally revise its position, which historically had
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refused to classify Haitians seeking shelter on American shores as bona fide political refugees, a
position that now seemed untenable considering the coup and the violence in Haiti.
In the weeks following the coup, immigration officials appeared uncertain how to deal
with the undocumented Haitians already in the United States. Officials in South Florida
announced in late October that they were temporarily suspending the deportation of Haitians. In
response to the move by Florida officials, Duke Austin, a spokesman for the federal Immigration
and Naturalization Service, insisted that "there is no blanket suspension of deportation.”
However, Austin added, “We will be circumspect and cautious about returning anyone at this
time.” One month after Aristide’s removal, US policy toward those escaping post-coup violence
appeared somewhat undefined.700
Soon, however, a dramatic increase in the number of refugees seeking asylum in the
United States drove the Bush administration to clarify and harden its stance toward the Haitian
refugees. In the first weeks of November, hundreds of Haitians took to the sea to escape the
crisis in Haiti, the first of tens of thousands that would attempt to reach the United States in the
following months. As the numbers of refugees increased, so did the pressure on the Bush
administration, which had condemned the coup and supported the Organization of American
States’ sanctions against Haiti’s coup regime. To forcibly return the Haitians would expose the
administration to substantial domestic and international criticism while, on the other hand, the
president and the administration’s officials were reluctant to open American doors to the
enormous throng of refugees waiting to escape Haiti. Facing a serious political quandary with an
election year approaching, the Bush administration searched everywhere for a way out of the
Haitian refugee crisis.
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For the time being, American officials did not immediately repatriate the refugees, but
they also refused to admit them to the United States, which meant that officials had to determine
what to do with the rapidly expanding population of Haitians interdicted at sea. By midNovember, about half of the refugees captured at sea were being held aboard US Coast Guard
vessels, some housed in tents erected on decks of the ships while others were sent to a newly
created refugee camp at the US naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.701 However, with the
exodus showing no signs of abatement, the Bush administration searched for a more lasting
solution. As the number of Haitians captured at sea neared one thousand, American officials
sought to discourage more refugees from leaving Haiti, broadcasting in Creole a message
through the Voice of America that told Haitians that “with very few exceptions, Haitians picked
up on the high seas will not be brought to the United States." The government transmission
asserted, "The United States government urgently advises Haitians that risking their lives in
small boats is not the answer to their situation."702 The Bush administration also appealed to
Belize, Suriname, and other Caribbean and Latin American countries to accept the Haitians in
what the Miami Herald called a “high-seas US gambit to avert [the refugee] influx to South
Florida.”703
The Bush administration’s refusal to allow the captured Haitians to enter the United
States and the fear that authorities might soon move to repatriate the refugees reinvigorated the
asylum campaign that had grown strong in the preceding decade. Ray Fauntroy, a longtime
leader of refugee support activity in South Florida, declared that the Southern Christian
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Leadership Conference (SCLC) was preparing to mount its own aerial search for boats
containing Haitian refugees; if the Coast Guard continued to block them from entering the
United States, the SCLC announced that it would “get vessels and rescue these people
ourselves.”704 On November 17, with nearly 1,800 Haitians now interdicted en route to the
United States, five thousand people marched in Miami demanding that the United States grant
asylum to the refugees and that it back the restoration of the Aristide government.705
Refugees and their supporters soon learned that their fear that officials were preparing to
repatriate the refugees was well founded. On November 18, the US State Department announced
that it would begin returning to Haiti the nearly two thousand refugees intercepted since the
beginning of the month. For those who had worried that the surge in Haitian refugees portended
the beginning of a massive influx of Haitians to the United States, the Bush administration’s new
policy of forcible return was welcome news. The decision of whether to accept the Haitians
"boils down to an economic decision on what Florida taxpayers can withstand," argued Nancy
Roman, press secretary for Florida Republican Congressman E. Clay Shaw Jr. "It seems hardline and dispassionate, but sometimes you have to act with your mind and not your heart,"
claimed Roman in defense of the Bush administration decision.706 Daniel A. Stein, executive
director of the Federation for American Immigration Reform, a Washington-based organization
established to limit immigration and promote a tougher stance toward the undocumented, also
applauded the Bush administration’s decision. “As compassionate as it might seem to offer
‘temporary’ asylum to Haitians, the consequences of such an act could prove disastrous,” Stein
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wrote in a Palm Beach Post editorial entitled “Can We Survive a Haitian Exodus?” Stein
argued, “The Bush administration correctly concluded that granting the first wave of boat people
asylum would trigger a wholesale exodus.”707
However, the repatriation policy also provoked a firestorm of criticism. Addressing a
rally of two thousand people in the Miami neighborhood of Little Haiti, Jesse Jackson denounced
the Bush administration’s “racist” stance as “David Duke foreign policy,” a reference to the
former Ku Klux Klan leader and presidential candidate from Louisiana. "We can't be against the
coup and then send terrified people back into the arms of the terrorists,"708 Jackson declared.
Representatives from the Haitian Refugee Center in Miami pledged to challenge the legality of
the new policy in court. Writing in the Christian Science Monitor, Bill Frelick, a representative
of the US Committee for Refugees, characterized the Bush administration’s policy as
hypocritical:
Over the years, the United States and other rich industrial countries, removed from
refugee hot spots, have maintained pressure on potential first-asylum countries not to turn
back refugees. Our government has pressured third-world countries, for example, telling
Thailand not to push back Laotians and Cambodians, and Malaysia not to prevent
Vietnamese boat people from landing. Our government has noted that the international
system of burden-sharing can't function if refugees are not given immediate, temporary
protection at the point of escape. Now the US finds itself positioned as a country of first
asylum. Haitians are fleeing the clamp-down in the aftermath of the overthrow of
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide by boarding rickety boats and taking their chances on
dangerous seas. Given the close proximity of Haiti to Florida, rescuing them should be a
simple matter.709
However, “rather than acting in accord with the international legal consensus for refugee
protection, the US government looks for dumping grounds among regimes that have shown little
707

Daniel A. Stein, “Can We Survive a Haitian Exodus?” Palm Beach (FL) Post, Nov. 30, 1991, 22A.

708

Beth Duff-Brown, “Jesse Jackson Leads Haitian Rally in Miami, Calls U.S. Policy Racist,” The Associated Press,
Nov. 26, 1991, AM cycle.
709

Bill Frelick, “The Haitian Boat People,” Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 20, 1991, 18.

318
regard for refugees in the past,” Frelick argued. “Let us do the decent thing, the simple thing as
the true country of first asylum, and offer temporary protection to the people who have appealed
to our humanity,” he concluded.710 Even the majority of registered voters in Florida disagreed
with the administration’s repatriation policy, despite the potential economic impact on the state
of a large influx of refugees. According to a Mason-Dixon Opinion Research poll, 57 percent of
Florida voters believed that Haitians should be able to stay in the United States temporarily or
until it was safe for them to return to Haiti.711
With his administration’s new policy under such scrutiny, President Bush sought to
defend his position. “Let me assure you, [the Haitian policy] is not based on some race or double
standard,” the president maintained in an interview with a reporter from WTVJ, Miami. “It’s a
fair policy” and one that “does make a distinction between economic and political refugees.”
The president also reasserted US support for Aristide’s restoration, though he sounded somewhat
ambivalent about it. “We're trying to work with the OAS to restore democracy, even though
Aristide is -- there's a little controversy surrounding him. But he was elected. He ought to be
restored. And we are supporting sanctions in the OAS to get him restored.” Even so, the
president insisted, opposition to the coup did not mean the United States needed to change its
policy toward Haitian refugees. “If it's political persecution by some of these bullies that threw
out Aristide, those people can seek asylum. But if you have just the whole country turning out
for economic reasons, and the economy of Haiti is a disaster, we just can't handle that. So that's
the moral underpinning of this policy,” Bush concluded.712
710

Frelick, “The Haitian Boat People.”

711

Elizabeth Grudzinski, “Bush, Florida Split on Haitians,” Miami Herald, Dec. 13, 1991, A1.

712

“Interviews with NBC Owned and Operated Television Stations,” Nov. 20, 1991. Public Papers of President
George Bush. Accessed online:
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?submit=Search&search=haiti.

319
In addition to the public debate over refugee policy, the Bush administration’s efforts to
interdict and repatriate Haitians seeking refuge in the United States triggered a new phase in the
legal battle over Haitian refugees. On November 19, one day after the announcement of the new
policy, Federal District Court Judge Donald Graham ruled on an emergency appeal made by the
Haitian Refugee Center, issuing an injunction against the Bush administration’s repatriation
program. According to Judge Graham, the government’s repatriation policy violated US law on
refugees, which banned the deportation of people who face political persecution in their
countries of origin. The injunction brought the Bush administration’s efforts to return the
refugees to Haiti to a temporary halt, but not before 538 refugees had already been forcibly
returned to Haiti.713 The Justice Department then appealed the ruling, but its appeal was rejected
by the Eleventh Court of Appeals, which sent the case back to the district court of Judge C.
Clyde Atkins, a justice that had in the past made some significant rulings in favor of Haitian
refugees. On December 3, Judge Atkins extended the prohibition on repatriation, issuing another
temporary injunction that gave the US Justice Department seven days to appeal the decision or to
come up with a plan to provide a fairer system for legitimate political refugees.714
At this moment in early December, just one month after the surge of refugees had started,
6,372 people had been intercepted at sea, 538 had been returned to Haiti, 550 were at refugee
camps in Honduras and Venezuela, and 2, 247 were on Coast Guard vessels. The majority of the
refugees (3,090), however, occupied a growing refugee camp at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. And
just as the Krome Avenue Detention Center had in earlier periods become a particularly
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important site of struggle for the asylum campaign, so the camp at Guantanamo became a
significant location in the complex battle over Haiti, the Aristide government, and the proper
policy toward the refugees. By mid-November, lawyers and advocates from the Haitian Refugee
Center were traveling to the refugee camp in Cuba to observe immigration interviews and to
carry messages back to family and friends in the Haitian communities of the United States.
Visits by American leaders in the asylum campaign, like New York Congressman Charles
Rangel and Jesse Jackson, also heightened the profile of the Guantanamo camp.715 And the
actions of the refugees themselves contributed to the growing notoriety of the camp. On
December 12, as the boredom, tension, and fear of repatriation grew for the 5, 513 refugees that
occupied the camp, a rumor that Fidel Castro wanted them off the island and intended to kill
them if they were not gone in five days sent the refugees into panicked action. Marching,
chanting, tearing down the tents that housed them, and trying to break through the concertina
wire that surrounded the camp, the Haitians called for their freedom and a release from the limbo
of life in Guantanamo. Although brief, this rebellion was to be the first of many acts of
resistance by the Haitians at Guantanamo over their prolonged incarceration.716
Because of the growing crisis at Guantanamo and the fierce political and legal battle
being waged between the Bush administration and the refugees and their supporters, by
December 1991 the popular movement in the United States was just as focused on defending the
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refugees seeking asylum in the United States as it was in pressing for the return of Aristide.
However, as already noted, for most activists by this point the two issues were utterly
inseparable. As in earlier years, movement activists who were motivated by the urgent need to
pressure American officials to grant their compatriots asylum also recognized that if they
achieved asylum for the refugees, it would mean that they had succeeded in distancing the US
government from the regime in Haiti and in increasing American pressure on the coup regime
back home. For this reason, the campaign to restore democracy to Haiti and the effort to defend
the refugees from forcible return were, for the activists involved, part of a single movement.
As 1991 came to a close and the new year began, the wave of Haitians seeking refuge in
the United States still showed no signs of abating. On January 24, 1992, the US Coast Guard
intercepted 1,072 refugees fleeing Haiti by boat, the largest number in a single day since the
interdiction program had begun eleven years earlier. Just days later, 1, 305 refugees were
captured in another record-breaking day.717 The unparalleled exodus coincided with the release
of a report by the human rights organization, Amnesty International; the report documented that
there were at least 1,500 murders in the three and a half months since the coup and that members
of church, labor, and other grassroots organizations were being tortured, disappeared, and
massacred by the military regime that had removed the Aristide government.718
The ever growing refugee crisis made the ongoing political and legal battles over the
Bush administration’s refugee policy all the more urgent for both sides. Supporters of the
Haitian refugees in the US Congress were attempting to push a bill through the House of
Representatives that would grant temporary protected status to Haitian refugees until democracy
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was restored in Haiti. The legal tug-of-war continued as well. On December 17, 1991, a federal
appeals court ruled that the government could proceed with the repatriation of Haitian refugees.
According to the court, the Haitians being held on Coast Guard vessels and at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, were not protected by the 1967 United Nations Protocol on Refugees because they had
never actually reached American soil. Cheryl Little, attorney for the Haitian Refugee Center,
called the ruling “devastating” and warned that “many of the Haitians, if returned, will face lifethreatening situations."719 Hours after the federal appeal court’s ruling, Federal District Court
Judge C. Clyde Atkins issued another injunction temporarily blocking the refugees’ return.720
Then, after the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals again overturned Judge Atkins’ ruling, the
Haitian Refugee Center made a last-ditch effort to stop the forced return of the refugees by
claiming that the refugees had a right to meet with legal counsel before repatriation, an argument
that Judge Atkins agreed with, leading to yet another temporary halt of the repatriation
process.721
Frustrated by the legal challenges to its effort to return the Haitian refugees, the Bush
administration attempted to apply political pressure on the court. As the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals considered the latest injunction barring the repatriation of the Haitians, Bush
administration officials submitted affidavits to the court claiming that twenty thousand Haitians
were massing in preparation for departure to the United States. Only the initiation of repatriation
proceedings could stem this massive exodus, the administration argued.722
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More effective than political pressure, however, was the Bush administration’s effort to
circumvent the Eleventh Circuit Court altogether. On January 31, the United States Supreme
Court granted the Justice Department’s request for a stay on the federal court injunction that
blocked the refugees’ return, opening the way for repatriation even before the appeals court ruled
on the legality of the action.723 Immigration officials moved swiftly, beginning the forced return
of the Haitians held by the US Coast Guard as well as the 12,500 refugees detained at
Guantanamo Bay. Federal officials also took the endorsement of the nation’s highest court as an
opportunity to begin deporting Haitians held in American detention centers.724
As the United States began returning the refugees to Haiti, protests erupted in Miami and
New York. Attending a protest rally outside the offices of the Haitian Refugee Center in Little
Haiti, Wilson Antoine, a twenty-four-year-old Haitian allowed to enter the United States to
pursue political asylum, lamented, “Upon returning to Haiti, [the refugees] will be killed.”
Picket signs at the Miami protest read “Justice for Black People,” “Fight Racism,” and “If You
Don’t Want Us, Let Haiti be Free.”725 In New York, Haitians gathered in Times Square to
advance the twin demands for Aristide’s return and for asylum for Haitian refugees. Joseph
Pierre, a New York cab driver, expressed the interconnectedness of the two demands that many
felt. “You know what we have to say to Bush?” Pierre asked. “Aristide must come back before
he send[s] the people back.”726
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The Bush administration’s policy of forcibly returning Haitian refugees reinvigorated an
already large asylum campaign in the United States that included many American organizations,
particularly those rooted in the African American community. Even before the action by the
Bush government, the AFL-CIO had on at least two occasions expressed its strong support for
asylum for the refugees.727 The National Council of Churches, an organization that had been
advocating for Haitian refugees since the early 1970s, was also a strong proponent of asylum.728
Civil rights organizations like the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (black
congresspersons in particular) were deeply involved in the asylum campaign well before the
government resumed repatriation.729
After the Supreme Court ruling that authorized the repatriation of Haitian refugees and
the Bush administration’s resumption of their forced return to Haiti, those already active in the
campaign stepped up their involvement as newcomers, both organizations and individuals, were
drawn into the movement. The widespread engagement of old and new organizations placed the
experience of Haitian refugees and the asylum campaign in a national and international spotlight
stronger than any before. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata,
admonished the United States for its move, stating that she “regrets the decision of the
government of the United States to resume the return of Haitian asylum seekers” and “fears that
those being returned may, in fact, be exposed to danger upon their return.”730 The NAACP
issued a statement that called the forced return of Haitian refugees “unconscionable.” It reiterated
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its support for temporary protected status for Haitians fleeing the post-coup violence.731
Renowned African American dancer and artist, Katherine Dunham launched a well-publicized
hunger strike to protest the Bush administration’s treatment of Haitian refugees. Her action was
soon supported publicly by comedian Dick Gregory, another well-known member of the black
American community who for many years had been active in work that supported Haiti.732 On
March 16, 1992, the Quixote Center/Quest for Peace took out a full page ad in the New York
Times that featured 3,500 individuals and organizations calling for the United States and the
Organization of American States to “restore democracy to Haiti” and to “welcome Haitian
refugees.”733 Haiti Progres reported on the New York Times’ statement as a remarkable
expression of solidarity with Haiti and a sign of the rising tide of support among Americans for
the Aristide government and Haitian refugees.734
Just months after the refugee crisis had begun in earnest, the asylum movement had made
some notable achievements. Due in part to its diversity, a result of its gaining the backing of
many American organizations, the movement was as large as it had ever been, giving it an
unprecedented profile and power. At the end of February 1992, the US House of
Representatives voted 217 to 165 to suspend the forced return of Haitian refugees from the
Guantanamo Bay camp. Though the action in the House alone did little to protect the refugees
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facing repatriation, it was a substantial rejection of Bush administration policy and a strong
indicator of the breadth of backing the asylum movement had cultivated.735
In the courtroom, too, refugee advocates continued to partially obstruct the Bush
administration’s efforts. On March 27, 1992, US District Court Judge Sterling Johnson Jr. issued
another temporary restraining order, again blocking the repatriation of the approximately 3,000
refugees remaining in the Guantanamo Bay refugee camp.736 The political and legal campaign in
defense of the Haitian refugees even managed to pry the door open wide enough for nearly 6,000
Haitians to be granted permission to enter the United States and apply for asylum, a remarkable
victory when compared to the nearly complete denial of asylum granted to Haitian refugees for
all of the Duvalier years as well as the subsequent period of “Duvalierism without Duvalier.”
Nonetheless, the fact remained that by mid-March 1992 more than 9,400 refugees had been
forcibly returned to Haiti.737 Despite their achievements, the Haitian refugees and the refugee
movement remained embattled.

A Presidential Campaign and the Politics of Refuge
In Haiti, February 7, 1992, passed without incident. In the days and weeks leading up to
the national holiday, which marked the departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier and the first
anniversary of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s inauguration, pro-Aristide protesters had
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staged what one report called sporadic, “lightning-quick protests in which demonstrators avoid
clashing with police.” On February 7 a group of approximately one hundred people attended a
“protest mass” to highlight the anniversary of Aristide’s becoming president and to call for his
return. Broadcasting over the radio from his place of exile in Venezuela, Aristide took the
anniversary of his inauguration as an opportunity to exhort Haitians to “raise the flag of
resistance even higher.” But as much defiance as there was among the Haitian population, the
mood was cautious, even fearful. Father Antoine Adrien, who had been one of the leading
voices of anti-Duvalier exiles during his period of exile in New York, took the occasion to
express what was needed to bring democracy back to Haiti. Haitians would have to rely on
themselves, not the international community, Adrien insisted. "We know it is our own strength,
our own courage, our own determination that will bring [democracy] back," he said.738
Adrien was correct that the ability of the Haitian people to resist the coup was a critical
piece of the effort to restore democracy to Haiti, but his statement overlooked how dependent the
internal resistance movement was on the support of the international movement during the coup
years. In fact, the protest movement of Haitians and their supporters abroad, particularly in
North American cities like New York and Miami, was more important than ever in determining
the survival and the success of the popular movement in Haiti. The interconnectedness of the
internal and external resistance movements and the external support that the internal resistance
received were the critical factors in the eventual restoration of democracy in Haiti.
Part of the strength of the international campaign to restore democracy to Haiti came
from Jean-Bertrand Aristide himself. After initially being forced into exile in Venezuela,
Aristide moved to Washington, DC, where he established his operational base for the rest of his
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period in exile. During that time, with cooperation from the US government, Aristide skillfully
exploited his residency in the United States and his placement in the international community.
Because the US government had condemned the coup and had refused to recognize the coup
leaders as the legitimate government of Haiti, in the eyes of the State Department Aristide
remained president and Jean Casimir, Aristide’s ambassador to the United States, continued to
function as the official representative of the Haitian government in Washington. And since the
United States continued to recognize Aristide and his cabinet as the official government of Haiti,
Aristide was able to represent himself as the head of Haiti’s government to American and United
Nations officials during his period in exile. Aristide and the US government cooperated in other
ways as well. After the September coup, President George Bush had frozen Haitian government
assets, but after Aristide constituted his government in exile, the US State Department gave
Aristide access to those funds. Although these Haitian government funds were controlled by the
Treasury Department, it was required to release them to Aristide when so ordered by State
Department. Access to these resources enabled Aristide to support his staff, to employ former
Maryland Congressman Michael Barnes to advise him and represent him to the American
government and people, and to finance the many trips he made throughout the United States and
around the world to cultivate support for his return to Haiti. Other members of the Aristide
administration also traveled extensively to build the campaign. Myrto Celestin Saurel, minister
of education and later minister of social affairs for the Aristide government, recalled that during
the coup years, “I attended human rights and labor conferences all over the world. Everywhere
we went, we raised the Haitian flag high and asked that the impunity of human rights abuse no
longer be tolerated.”739
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Having the head of the democratically elected government and the symbol of the popular
movement among Haitian and American activists in the United States gave great strength and
energy to the US-based resistance campaign. When Aristide appeared at a rally in the Miami
arena in mid-March, the event provided a surge of energy to the already mobilized community,
drawing more than fifteen thousand people to the packed arena with many more turned away at
the door.740 In New York in April Aristide’s presence at a massive rally in Central Park drew
more than twenty-five thousand people (and perhaps as many as one hundred thousand). The
president-in-exile also cultivated support in more intimate settings; in the same New York trip he
met with two hundred members of the Baptist Ministers' Conference of Greater New York and
Vicinity, several thousand Haitian students at Brooklyn College, and leaders of the Tenth
Department.741
But the US-based movement for democracy in Haiti owed its vigor and sustained
mobilization to more than Aristide’s presence in the United States and to his skilled
campaigning. Their strength in mobilization that the Haitian communities of the United States
exhibited from September 1991 to October 1994 was also very much the result of the earlier
seeds of organization and coalition building planted by activists and community members during
the Duvalier years and grown from 1986 to 1991. The political education that Haitian activists
in New York and Miami had received and their experience with mass mobilization first during
Fire, 225.
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the Duvalier years and then from 1986 to 1991 proved essential to their ability to build and
sustain an international campaign against the coup from 1991 to 1994. Leaders like Antoine
Adrien and Gerard Jean-Juste, who had been leading figures in the earlier exile resistance to
Duvalier and in campaigns to support the Haitian refugees maintained connections with
movement activists from inside Haiti. Just as important as the leaders were rank and file
activists, affiliated with organizations like Veye Yo in Miami and SELA in New York, who had
organized and demonstrated against repression in Haiti, the US government’s jailing and
deportation of Haitian refugees, and the CDC and FDA’s labeling of Haitians as AIDS carriers,
and who now led the campaign to overthrow the coup regime and to return Aristide to Haiti. As
Linda Basch, Nina Glick Schiller, and Cristina Szanton Blanc correctly observe, “Their
positioning within the United States has enabled transmigrants to gain access to U.S. media, to
lobby in the halls of Congress, and demonstrate in the streets.”742 But it was more than position
within the United States that gave Haitian activists in New York and Miami such strength and
resilience in the early 1990s. It was their history and experience with an intertwined and
multifaceted international movement that enabled them to effectively resist and ultimately roll
back the coup.
Activists in the United States recognized that if they were to succeed in their joint
campaign to return Aristide to Haiti and to protect the Haitian refugees fleeing the coup regime,
they would need to keep the international spotlight on these twin issues. In this effort, they were
greatly aided by the US presidential election of 1992. During the period of campaigning leading
up to the election, both the incumbent, President George H.W. Bush, and his Democratic
challenger, Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton, were forced to define their position regarding policy
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toward Haiti and the Haitian refugees. In addition, supporters of Aristide and the Haitian
refugees were able to exploit developments along the campaign trail to elevate their own
campaign for asylum for Haitian refugees and the restoration of Haitian democracy.
In May 1992, just six months before he would stand for reelection, President Bush’s
political quandary centering upon the refugee crisis intensified when thousands of Haitians once
again took to the sea in an effort to reach the United States. On May 15 nearly 1,000 refugees
were intercepted by the US Coast Guard, the largest number captured in a single day since the
previous January. Several hundred more were brought aboard US vessels and transferred to
Guantanamo Bay the next day, bringing the number of Haitians at the US-operated refugee camp
in Cuba to almost 10,000 and the total number of Haitians captured at sea since the coup to
29,261.743
One week later, as the flow continued, packing the Guantanamo camp with more than
twelve thousand Haitians, the Bush administration unveiled its policy governing those fleeing
Haiti. The US Coast Guard would no longer pick up all Haitian refugees at sea and transfer them
to Guantanamo Bay. Instead, those “in no imminent danger” would be encouraged to return to
Haiti or take their chances at sea. Only those in sinking vessels would be rescued. Refugee
advocates condemned the new policy and the Bush administration’s continued unwillingness to
grant asylum to the Haitian refugees. But the Guantanamo camp was at maximum capacity,
American officials countered. In the words of Navy Commander Greg Hartung, “There is no
room at the inn.” Although the policy was intended to act as a deterrent to those Haitians
preparing to attempt the voyage to the United States, refugees at the Guantanamo camp argued
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that the policy shift would not stop the exodus. “This new decision makes no difference. As
long as things stay bad in Haiti people will risk it all to come here,” argued Etude Erne, a twentyeight-year-old mother of two.744
Perhaps sharing the refugees’ view that the new policy would not do enough to
discourage Haitians’ attempt to reach the United States, Bush soon articulated yet another change
in the policy governing the refugees. On May 24, from his summer home in Kennebunkport,
Maine, President Bush issued Executive Order 12,807, which directed the US Coast Guard to
stop transferring Haitians captured at sea to Guantanamo Bay for interviews and processing;
instead the Coast Guard was to return them directly to Haiti. The Kennebunkport order carried
the US government’s practice of interdiction, initiated by Reagan, one step further. It not only
stopped Haitian refugees before they could reach American shores, but it also returned them to
Haiti without any sort of screening or interview process. A May 24, 1992, “White House
Statement on Haitian Migrants” aimed to clarify the reasons for the policy change. The
“executive order which will permit the U.S. Coast Guard to begin returning Haitians picked up at
sea directly to Haiti . . . follows a large surge in Haitian boat people seeking to enter the United
States and is necessary to protect the lives of the Haitians, whose boats are not equipped for the
600-mile sea journey,” it claimed. But the refugees’ safety at sea was not the only concern, the
White House explained. “The large number of Haitian migrants has led to a dangerous and
unmanageable situation. Both the temporary processing facility at the U.S. Naval Base,
Guantanamo and the Coast Guard cutters on patrol are filled to capacity. The President's action
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will also allow continued orderly processing of more than 12,000 Haitians presently at
Guantanamo . . . Under current circumstances, the safety of Haitians is best assured by remaining
in their country.”745
Advocates for the Haitian refugees reacted to the Kennebunkport order with outrage.
Cheryl Little, attorney for the Haitian Refugee Center of Miami, called the directive
“horrendous.” Little claimed, “It’s going to be impossible now for the Haitians to be fairly
processed.” Ira Kurzban, longtime attorney and advocate for Haitians in Miami, argued that the
Kennebunkport order “shows the failure of the Bush administration to deal with the underlying
problem, which is restoration of democracy” in Haiti.746 In addition to criticism, the
Kennebunkport order drew legal challenges from refugee and civil rights organizations and a
group of law students working through Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic of Yale
Law School.747 Amnesty International joined those opposed to the new policy, declaring that
President Bush’s policy toward the refugees would cause a “Caribbean curtain” to descend
between the United States and its poor southern neighbors, locking out those seeking freedom
from violence and fear. William O'neill, a specialist on Haiti with the New York-based Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights (LCHR), called the Bush administration’s action a "gross violation
of international law." Bill Frelick of the US Committee on Refugees agreed. “From now on,
other countries throughout Asia, Africa, the Caribbean and Latin America will be able to point to
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the U.S. example and say, 'If the world's richest country says it has no room for refugees, we
cannot be expected to accommodate them’.”748
President Bush got a chance to respond to his critics at a question and answer session
with the Mount Paran Christian School community in Marietta, Georgia, three days after he had
issued the executive order. In response to one comment that the new policy “seems to run
contrary to what America has stood for over the past couple hundred years,” President Bush
reiterated the long-standing policy of the US government that held that most Haitians were not
legitimate refugees. “Yes, the Statue of Liberty still stands, and we still open our arms to people
that are politically oppressed,” the president stated. But “we cannot and, as long as the laws are
on the book, I will not, because I've sworn to uphold the Constitution, open the doors to
economic refugees all over the world. We can't do that.” Bush administration officials had
repeatedly insisted that Haitians who needed to escape political violence could still file for
asylum at the US embassy in Port-au-Prince. However, the president also made clear that he
believed most Haitians would be ineligible for asylum. To the same questioner at the Georgia
school, Bush insisted, “I am convinced that the people in Haiti are not being physically
oppressed. We've got all kinds of ways to monitor that situation there.” Bush assured his
audience, “A returnee, for example, a guy that's taken from Guantanamo and sent back . . . I
would not want on my conscience that that person having fled oppression, anyone that was
fleeing oppression, would be victimized upon return.”749
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Arkansas governor and Democratic candidate for president, Bill Clinton embraced the
opportunity to attack his Republican rival over Bush’s new Haitian policy. Voting in his home
state’s presidential primary, Clinton told reporters that America needed to do more to restore
democracy in Haiti, and until that happened, it should let Haitian refugees stay in the United
States.750 Two days later, adding to the growing chorus of protest over the Kennebunkport order,
Clinton issued a formal statement in which he claimed to be “appalled by the decision of the
Bush administration to pick up fleeing Haitians on the high seas and forcibly return them to Haiti
before considering their claim to political asylum.” The Clinton campaign insisted, "This policy
must not stand.” Explaining why the policy must not stand, Clinton stated, “It is a blow to the
principle of first asylum and to America's moral authority in defending the rights of refugees
around the world.” Taking the Bush administration to task for its overall policy toward Haiti,
Clinton called the Kennebunkport order “another sad example of the administration's callous
response to a terrible human tragedy” that “will not be resolved until Washington addresses more
firmly and coherently the question of restoring democracy to Haiti.” Finally, Clinton declared,
"As I have said before, if I were president, I would -- in the absence of clear and compelling
evidence that they weren't political refugees -- give [Haitians] temporary asylum until we
restored the elected government of Haiti."751 Although Haiti and the Haitian refugees already
had been a focus in the campaign, the Kennebunkport order and the political furor it provoked
ensured they would remain an important issue defining the two candidates in the national
presidential election of 1992.
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The Bush administration’s policy change toward the Haitian refugees also influenced the
political maneuvering of Aristide as well as that of his opponents. On one of his many speaking
tours, Aristide told a crowd of supporters in Minnesota that Bush could not solve the refugee
crisis without returning him to Haiti. “Once democracy is back in Haiti, people will stay in
Haiti,” Aristide assured his audience.752 Ray Joseph used the refugee crisis not to attack the coup
regime but to attempt to relieve the pressure the international embargo was exerting on the coup
regime in Haiti. Joseph criticized the embargo, and despite the fact that he had so often in the
past used the pages of his newspaper, Haiti Observateur, to attack those who insisted on
classifying Haitians as economic migrants rather than political refugees, Joseph declared that
"these are economic refugees created by the (embargo) of the United States and its allies.” They
were not fleeing political violence but were “seeking economic opportunity because conditions
have worsened,” Joseph claimed. Accept the refugees or lift the embargo on Haiti, Joseph
demanded.753
The coup regime in Haiti, too, recognized the political saliency of the refugee crisis and
became more proactive in attempting to stem the exodus, a move it hoped would undercut the
political necessity of Aristide’s return in the eyes of American lawmakers. Later that summer,
Haitian officials began arresting organizers of refugee boats. (The Miami Herald speculated that
this was an attempt to appease the US government.) The Immigration Police Unit of the Haitian
government acknowledged that it was stepping up its campaign to punish the organizers of
refugee expeditions who too often went free after being repatriated to Haiti. One of the targets of
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this campaign was Father Gerard Jean-Juste, still in hiding in Haiti, who sent word that the coup
regime was particularly set on his “extermination” because it believed he was encouraging
Haitians to flee and seek refuge in Miami.754
A legal battle paralleled the political battle over the treatment of Haitian refugees.
In early June, US District Court Judge Sterling Johnson Jr. issued a ruling on the legal challenge
to President Bush’s Kennebunkport order. ''This court is astonished that the United States would
return Haitian refugees to the jaws of political persecution, terror, death and uncertainty,” the
ruling stated, calling the government’s actions ''particularly hypocritical given its condemnation
of other countries who have refused to abide by the principle of (repatriation).” Nonetheless,
Judge Sterling reluctantly acknowledged that he could find no legal grounds to block the
president’s executive order.755 The following month a US Court of Appeals disagreed with
Judge Johnson’s assessment of the order’s legality, however, ruling against the US government
and overturning the Kennebunkport order. The Clinton campaign, ever eager to highlight its
differences with the Bush administration on Haiti and the refugees, praised the appeals court
action, which had overturned Bush’s “cruel policy of returning Haitian refugees to a brutal
dictatorship without an asylum hearing,” and reasserted its position that “we respect the right of
refugees from other parts of the world to apply for political asylum, and Haitians should not be
treated differently.”756 However, the victory for the refugees was short-lived; the US Supreme
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Court immediately stayed the appeals court ruling, allowing the Bush administration’s
repatriation without asylum hearings to continue.757
Without legal obstructions to their effort to return the Haitian refugees, immigration
officials carried out a rapid repatriation campaign. By the end of June 1992, only 1,570 refugees
remained at the Guantanamo camp, which only one month earlier had been packed with more
than 12,000. At this point, approximately 37,000 Haitians had been intercepted trying to reach
the United States since the coup at the end of September 1991. Although nearly 11,000 were
allowed to pursue applications for political asylum, 27,048 had been repatriated to Haiti. These
numbers indicate that while American officials recognized the crisis in Haiti as more serious than
the crises that preceded it, prompting them to approve an unprecedented number of Haitians to
enter the asylum process, they still rejected the legitimacy of a majority of Haitian refugee
claims, sending more than two-thirds of the would-be refugees back to Haiti.758
The US government’s hopes to finish the process of repatriation and finally close the
refugee camp at Guantanamo was frustrated, however, by a legal predicament posed by the
presence of 233 Haitian refugees infected with HIV, the virus causing AIDS. These refugees,
their advocates claimed, were being held “in a cruel limbo” because immigration officials had
ruled that they had the right to pursue asylum claims in the United States but had barred them
from entering the country due to a law excluding immigrants with infectious diseases. 759 The
plight of the remaining refugees at Guantanamo received more publicity after news of a series of
protests by the refugees over mistreatment and their prolonged detention began reaching activists
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and supporters in the United States. Interpreters and civilian workers at the refugee camp
reported that the Haitian refugees suffered atrocious treatment and conditions. One claimed to
have seen “three Haitian men handcuffed, penned inside a tight circle of razor-wire” and left in
the direct sun. Another reported witnessing “two men hogtied after they refused to lie face down
on the ground following a recent protest.” A fifteen-year-old Haitian boy was put in detention
after he was found with a carton of milk, a violation of a rule prohibiting food in the tents, a
policy intended perhaps to discourage the invasion of the “rats as big as cats” that were rumored
to live among the refugees in their tent city.760 Yolande Jean, one of the remaining 233 refugees,
reported on life in the camp:
We had been asking them to remove the barbed wire; the children were playing near it,
they were falling and injuring themselves. The food they were serving us, including
canned chicken, had maggots in it. And yet they insisted that we eat it. Because you’ve
got no choice. And it was for these reasons that we started holding demonstrations.761
The conflict between refugees and camp authorities escalated over the summer of 1992.
According to those refugees involved in the protests, their demonstrations earned them
intimidation, threats, beatings, and placement in isolation. After twenty of the leaders of the
protest movement were separated from the rest of the group as punishment for the protests,
another fifty led a demonstration that ended with the refugees’ torching the temporary structures
that made up their makeshift housing at the Guantanamo camp.762
In the summer and fall of 1992, the plight of the Haitians at Guantanamo and the overall
Haitian crisis continued to draw supporters into the movement to defend the refugees and to
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restore democracy to Haiti. The involvement of African Americans in particular continued to
grow. In June, TransAfrica, an organization that had previously been active in the campaign to
maintain sanctions against South Africa’s apartheid government, announced that it was joining
the campaign for the Haitian refugees.763 The following month the NAACP announced that it
would be cosponsoring a demonstration with TransAfrica on the upcoming September 9. A
statement from the directors and board members of TransAfrica and the NAACP described the
Bush administration’s policy toward Haitian refugees as “tainted with racism” and called African
Americans to join an act of civil disobedience in front of the White House as a “statement of
conscience” and “solidarity with our Haitian brothers and sisters who are fleeing Haiti for
freedom.”764 Although the purpose of the September 9 demonstration seems intended more to
conduct a high profile act of civil disobedience than to mobilize significant numbers, the protest
did draw several hundred participants, of whom ninety-five were arrested, including the tennis
player and civil rights activist Arthur Ashe.765
Black members of Congress too continued to promote the cause of the Haitian refugees
and to push for a stronger US effort to support Aristide’s return to Haiti. They did so because
they identified a connection between the injustices that poor, black people suffered in Haiti and
the injustices that black people suffered in the United States. In a congressional hearing on US
policy toward Haitian Refugees, Charles Rangel, representative from New York and member of
the Congressional Black Caucus, tried to explain how a whole segment of the Haitian population
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was vulnerable to political persecution by equating their situation with that of African
Americans. “The only criteria to feel the strength of the army is to be poor, is to be unarmed, is
to seek democracy . . . to be a supporter of Aristide,” Rangel argued. “People in this country”
might believe “that if you are poor and black you cannot be a political refugee,” Rangel
continued, “but you can go to Louisiana and look where the people live, you can look at the color
of their skin and determine who voted for [David] Duke and who didn’t vote for Duke and
certainly you can see in Haiti who supported Aristide and who did not support him.”766 Donald
M. Payne, another member of the Congressional Black Caucus, also equated the injustice
experienced by Haitians with that of African Americans:
It is a time when the images of the injustice of the Rodney King case and the ensuing
violence in Los Angeles are still in the minds and hearts of many Americans, in particular
Americans of African descent. For the Bush administration to violate the accepted
agreement by preventing access to first asylum protection for the Haitian refugees is in
the poorest taste and demonstrates a complete lack of sensitivity to the problem of urban
Americans.767
As the national election neared, supporters of Aristide and the refugees continue to take
advantage of the dueling presidential campaigns to draw attention to their own campaign.
Haitian activists and their supporters staged demonstrations timed to coincide with many of the
state primary elections. On the eve of the New York presidential primary, a protest in Times
Square organized by the Haitian Enforcement against Racism (HEAR), one of the leading
organizations responsible for the April 20 AIDS march of 1990, drew thousands. Movement
activists also staged large demonstrations at the Democratic National Convention, where they
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urged the party’s nominee for president to support stronger actions to protect the Haitian
refugees and to restore democracy in Haiti.768
On November 3, 1992, Bill Clinton defeated incumbent President George Bush and
independent candidate Ross Perot to become the forty-second president of the United States. In
his first press conference after his electoral victory, Clinton announced that he would reverse the
Bush administration’s policy of forcible repatriation of Haitian refugees and institute a system
that would guarantee asylum hearings. Though in these first statements as president-elect
Clinton stopped short of his earlier campaign promise to grant temporary asylum to all Haitian
refugees, his support for a policy change was encouraging to those in the movement.769 On the
streets of Little Haiti in Miami, one could see the hope that some had harnessed to the Clinton
election. Images of Aristide on one side of tee shirts worn by some in the Haitian community
and the image of Clinton on the other symbolized the assistance and support they expected the
newly elected US president to provide to the elected president of Haiti. Steven Forester, attorney
for the Haitian Refugee Center, observed that Haitians at home and abroad were “hoping to hear
. . . that top on Clinton’s foreign policy agenda is the restoration of Aristide.”770
But while Clinton’s election and the promise of greater support for the Haitian refugees
encouraged many, it distressed others. Florida Congressman E. Clay Shaw Jr. warned that a
policy that opened the door to Haitians would have “a potentially disastrous effect on South
Florida that could exceed Hurricane Andrew,” the storm that had devastated the state earlier that
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year. “Should thousands of Haitians feeling that denial of access has ended seek entry into
Florida, the impact on the state and the entire country could be catastrophic,” insisted Florida
Governor Lawton Chiles in a letter addressed to Clinton. Some critics of the president-elect
claimed that aerial photos showed that in the wake of Clinton’s election, nearly seven hundred
boats were being prepared in Haiti for departure to the United States. The Federation for
Immigration Reform, an organization calling for a moratorium on immigration to the United
States and stronger enforcement of immigration codes, sponsored commercials in South Florida
that urged people to contact Clinton and to demand that he continue the Bush administration’s
policy of direct return of Haitian refugees.771 Feeling the pressure, perhaps, one week after the
press conference in which he announced his upcoming policy change, Bill Clinton told reporters
that he was not “going to articulate a policy that would promote mass migration without
question.”772 Like the Bush administration before it, the Clinton administration would have to
contend with the thorny political questions of how to deal with the Haitian crisis and how to treat
the Haitian refugees.

Confronting Clinton
The year 1993 began with another bid by Haitian refugees at Guantanamo to gain their
freedom. However, this campaign originated not in Guantanamo, where more than two hundred
HIV-positive Haitians remained in limbo, but back in the Krome Avenue Detention Center in
Miami. The new phase of the campaign was sparked by the refugees’ anger over an incident that
clarified the American government’s differential treatment of Haitians and Cubans seeking
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asylum in the United States. On December 29, a group of Cubans hijacked a commercial flight
and flew it to Miami, where they applied for political asylum. Immigration officials detained the
Cubans for one day and then released them to their friends and families in South Florida.
Angered by the lax treatment of the Cubans, Haitians in the Krome Avenue facility argued that
had the plane been filled with Haitians, the hijackers would never have received such lenient
treatment. In fact, some recalled that in 1989 when two Haitian soldiers commandeered a
missionary plane in an attempt to escape the military regime ruling Haiti at the time, they were
arrested and ultimately received life sentences in federal prison. To protest the continuing
inequality in the treatment of Haitians and Cubans, 150 Haitian refugees at the Krome Avenue
facility launched a hunger strike, promising to die unless they were all released at the same time,
and given water and access to telephones and the media. As had happened so often in the past,
the action inside Krome soon was supported by angry protests outside the institution’s gates; it
also prompted members of the Dade County NAACP and others to stage their own hunger
strikes in solidarity.773
If refugees and their advocates were discouraged by the persistence of differential
treatment of Haitians and Cubans, they soon had to confront an even more distressing reality.
On January 14, 1993, President Clinton announced that despite his many statements of support
for the Haitian refugees, his multiple criticisms of the Bush administration’s treatment of
Haitians, and his promises to overturn his predecessor’s policy of direct repatriation, the practice
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of interdiction and direct return would continue. The president explained his about-face in a
February 10, 1993, town hall meeting in Detroit, Michigan:
I did what I did because of the evidence that people in Haiti were taking the wood off the
roofs of their houses to make boats that were of questionable safety, to pour in thousands
of numbers to come to this country, when we knew for sure hundreds of them would die
on the high seas coming here in a human tragedy of monumental proportions; and that if
they came here, they would all come to south Florida, where the unemployment rate is
high . . . and the Federal Government has constantly broken their commitment to the
people of south Florida to help them deal with the immigrant problem. I decided that the
better course was to launch an aggressive effort to restore democracy to Haiti and to
launch an aggressive effort to protect people who want to apply to be political refugees in
this country, in Haiti, and to process their applications all over the island, which is what
we are doing now.774
To ensure that none of the thousands of Haitians that were rumored to be readying to flee
Haiti succeeded in their endeavor, Clinton ordered twenty-two Coast Guard cutters and patrol
boats to block the would-be refugees’ path to the United States.775 Haitians reacted to Clinton’s
reversal with shock and outrage. At Guantanamo, refugees launched hunger strikes, which were
met again with violent retribution by camp authorities. The lesson of this betrayal, Marlene
Doufeuille declared, was that “Haitians should count on themselves first, and then see what other
people can do.”776
Clinton’s reversal on the refugee issue seemed to confirm what some had long been
arguing: the popular movement in Haiti and in the United States should not pin its hopes on
support from Washington or the rest of the international community. Instead, Haitians at home
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and abroad should be focused on building and supporting direct, armed resistance to the coup
regime. Peter Hallward notes, “Some people on the left of the movement, including Ben
Dupuy’s APN (later PPN), urged Haiti’s president to abandon his diplomatic dependence on the
U.S. and to sanction an armed liberation struggle.”777 Kim Ives concurs, observing that Dupuy
and some of those identifying with “the Haiti Progres, Marxist-Leninist [current] began
immediately to plan revolutionary responses and tried to convince Aristide that this was the best
way.” By contrast, Ives argues, the “social democratic current said we have to go through the
Democrats . . . Aristide more or less went with that [latter] current but was trying to do his own
agenda.” Daniel Huttinot of L’Ayisyen and SELA remembers that the coup aroused a nascent,
armed rebellion throughout Haiti; he offers an explanation for Aristide’s failure to support it.
“The resistance movement inside Haiti was willing to confront the military” but “Aristide did not
support them because . . . [he] want[ed] to be in control of everything, and if that armed struggle
was developing inside Haiti, Aristide would not have any control.”778 These disagreements over
the proper strategy of resistance, present from the beginning of the coup, intensified as new
proposals for Aristide’s return emerged.
Eschewing direct confrontation with the coup regime, the movement to restore Aristide
continued to focus on pressuring the United States and the international community to support
the return of Haiti’s elected leader. Jesse Jackson told a crowd of thousands of protesters in
Miami that the movement needed “to keep the pressure on Clinton” to restore Aristide. In New
York a large demonstration outside the United Nations attempted to apply the same pressure to
world leaders. In Washington, DC, in April 1993, thousands of people marched from the Capitol
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to the White House. One of the marchers held a placard that read, “President Clinton, the
Haitians are watching you.”779
To placate some of his critics, Clinton announced that he intended to drop the exclusion
of HIV-positive immigrants from the United States, a move that would finally allow the Haitians
languishing at the Guantanamo camp to make it into the country. But the refugees, in the midst
of an ongoing hunger strike to protest their prolonged detention, were not impressed by Clinton’s
promise. “All this talk about Clinton lifting the ban is just talk,” declared Fifi Pierre, who had
been a prisoner at Guantanamo for one year. Members of the US Senate also were not impressed
by Clinton’s pledge; they voted seventy-six to twenty-three to pass a law that would maintain the
ban on immigrants carrying diseases like AIDS, though the Senate’s efforts to write the barrier –
currently just an immigration policy regulation -- into law later died in the House of
Representatives.780
In June 1993 despite deep disappointment with the Clinton administration and the
seemingly endless crisis in Haiti, there were signs of hope. The previous March, the case of the
refugees stuck in the Guantanamo Bay camp had come before a federal court and in June they
received their ruling. Calling the US government’s treatment of the HIV-positive refugees
“outrageous, callous, reprehensible,” Judge Sterling Johnson Jr. ordered the Haitians’ immediate
release and entrance to the United States. News of the ruling sparked an outburst of celebratory
singing and dancing, and cries of “Long live freedom” at the Guantanamo refugee camp.
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“Finally, some justice,” proclaimed Rolande Durancy, director of the Haitian Refugee Center of
Miami.781
Developments in Haiti also gave some reason for cautious hope. In response to the
complete intransigence of the coup regime, the United States and the United Nations introduced
tougher sanctions against Haiti, imposing an oil and arms embargo and freezing the
internationally held assets of the coup leaders. Haitians in the United States were also somewhat
heartened by the resignation of the acting prime minister for the coup regime, Marc Bazin, and
by reports that the tighter sanctions had forced Haitian officials to come to the bargaining table
with Aristide and the international community. Mediated negotiations between President
Aristide and General Raoul Cedras, initially set to take place at UN offices on Manhattan’s East
Side, took place instead on Governor’s Island just off the southern tip of New York City.
Officials explained that the relocation was prompted by “security concerns in light of anticipated
demonstrations by exiled Haitians opposed to military rule in their homeland.”782
The Governor’s Island Accord, as the agreement between Aristide and Cedras came to be
known, included provisions requiring that General Cedras and the other leaders of the coup
regime step down. In return, they would be granted blanket amnesty. Aristide would be
empowered to name a new government and would return to Haiti on October 30, 1993. In
addition, the United Nations would send a team of “military experts” to Haiti to prepare the way
for Aristide and to oversee the reformation of the nation’s armed forces. Despite serious
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reservations about the terms of the agreement and under intense pressure from the United States
and the UN as well as the pressure from a worsening situation in Haiti, Aristide agreed.783
The Governor’s Island Accord not only received reluctant backing from Aristide, but it
also drew a lukewarm reaction from Haitians in the United States. In Miami and New York,
Haitians expressed skepticism about whether the agreement would actually return Aristide to
Haiti. “I’ll believe it when I see it. These Haitians can come up with all kinds of ways to
surprise you,” said Brooklyn resident Jacques Larose. Others expressed outrage at both the
terms of the agreement and the nature of the negotiations themselves. The United States “is
asking Aristide to negotiate with a killer,” declared New York radio host Ricot Dupuy. Still,
“amnesty is a sour pill we will have to swallow,” Dupuy allowed.784 Others were not so
accommodating. In response to Aristide’s agreement to allow the United Nations Security
Council to send a “peacekeeping force” to Haiti, Haiti Progres founder Ben Dupuy resigned
from his position as Aristide’s ambassador at large, declaring that the exiled president had
surrendered Haiti to “international tutorship.”785
Despite some of his supporters’ opposition to an international military force in Haiti,
Aristide affirmed his support for this provision of the agreement later that month, sending a
formal request to the United Nations for a one-thousand-member multinational force to be sent to
Haiti.786 Ray Joseph, co-founder of Haiti Observateur and fierce opponent of Aristide, took the
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exiled president to task for advocating an armed intervention of Haiti. In an editorial entitled
“Look Who is Cheering U.S. Imperialism,” Joseph observed that on the seventy-third
anniversary of the United States’ occupation of Haiti, Aristide had stood before his parishioners
in Saint-Jean Boscoe and had issued a withering attack on US imperialism. But “that was 1988,”
Joseph wrote. Today, “his words haunt him.” Always eager to find a new angle to assert his
opposition to Aristide, Joseph used the apparent inconsistency in Aristide’s new stance to argue
once again for the international community to abandon its support for the democratically elected
leader. “Restoring Mr. Aristide to power must not be construed as a restoration of democracy in
Haiti,” claimed Joseph.787
As the October deadline for General Cedras’ resignation and the appointed date for
Aristide’s return approached, those who opposed US participation in the UN peacekeeping force
in Haiti became more vocal. The capture and killing of American soldiers participating in a UN
action in Somalia and the images of US troops being dragged through the streets of the Somalian
capital of Mogadishu convinced some members of Congress that the cost of American
participation in such campaigns might outweigh the benefits. But members of the Congressional
Black Caucus, which had pushed hard for the Clinton administration to take a tougher stand with
the coup regime in Haiti, insisted that American support of and contribution to a UN force was
necessary. Haiti and Somalia “are not parallel situations,” argued Representative Kweisi
Mfume, chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus. “Unlike Somalia, we have the
democratically elected and recognized government of President Aristide to work with."788
Clinton administration officials too tried to corral support for the UN effort in Haiti by playing
787
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the ever reliable refugee card. If the international effort to return Aristide to Haiti failed, warned
Secretary of State Warren Christopher on NBC’s Meet the Press, “We’re likely to have a flood
of immigration creating a very serious problem in this country.”789
In spite of their stated support for the UN peacekeeping mission, when the time came to
carry out the mission, the stern resolve of the Clinton officials collapsed in the face of
widespread fear that Haiti could become another Somalia. On October 12, the USS Harlan
County attempted to deliver the first American soldiers to Haiti. The ship was met by hundreds
of armed supporters of the coup regime, demonstrating on shore and menacing American
diplomats and officials that had come to greet the American forces. Instead of confronting the
two to three hundred demonstrators, the ship retreated, prompting cheers by the relatively small
group of soldiers and attaches that had come out to protest.790 The ship’s retreat shocked and
angered those who had hoped an international presence would be the beginning of the end for the
coup regime. In Cite Soleil, a poor neighborhood and Aristide stronghold in Port-au-Prince,
Almones Louisme argued that the retreat of the USS Harlan County proved that “the Americans
are full of just words.” Father Gerard Jean-Juste, still in hiding in Haiti, expressed the feeling of
many Haitians at home and abroad. The spectacle of ''The United Nations, the Organization of
American States, [and] the Clinton administration plunge[ing] their noses into dust in front of a
few hundred thugs” was “unbelievable!” declared Jean-Juste. From his perspective inside the
Clinton administration, Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck was less surprised by the
retreat than he was that the mission had been attempted at all. “After eighteen U.S. Army
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Rangers had been killed in Mogadishu and the Clinton administration had been pilloried in the
Congress for allowing the United States to participate in the peacekeeping mission in Somalia, it
is remarkable that the Harlan County was sent to Haiti at all,” Shattuck argued.791
The Clinton administration’s failure to follow through had consequences far beyond the
deep disappointment that it engendered. When Alerte Belance, pro-Aristide activist and
neighborhood leader, heard that there was an agreement that would finally bring Aristide back to
Haiti, she prepared once again to confront the forces that had terrorized the people after the coup.
At the last minute when Titid and the other big chiefs signed an accord at Governors
Island in New York to say that the president was to return on October 30, 1993, they
began carrying out the lion’s share of the massacres. The big thugs with their gangs of
bastards went out to break us all, to stop the return from happening. Still, we believed the
foreigners; when they signed the Governors Island Accord and said that the president
would return, we believed it. So I came out of hiding. That’s how the bastards got me,
when they were attacking so many mothers and fathers of children to keep our president
from coming home. That’s why they came to kill me at Titanyen. They came for me on
October 15, several days after I’d returned from hiding.792
Belance was captured, mutilated, and left to die. Though Belance managed to survive the attack,
others lost their lives in the violence following the retreat of the USS Harlan County. The same
day that the death squads came for Belance, Haitian Justice Minister Guy Malary was gunned
down in broad daylight.793
The campaign of violence and terror carried out by anti-Aristide forces in Haiti extended
to the United States as well. The acts of retribution against Aristide supporters had been forecast
by the delivery of death lists to prominent members of the popular movement in both Haiti and
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the Haitian communities of the United States. Rolande Durancy, director of the Haitian Refugee
Center in Miami, received one of the death lists. Next to her name was a notation that read,
“Urgent, to be killed before October 30,” the day Aristide was scheduled to return to Haiti. On
October 25, Dona St. Plite, a pro-Aristide radio host, was shot to death in Miami while leaving a
benefit event for the family of Fritz Dor, another pro-Aristide radio commentator that had been
murdered in 1991. St. Plite was the third pro-Aristide radio host to be murdered since 1991.
Gerard Jean-Juste, also prominently featured on many of the death lists, urged Miami officials
from his hiding place in Haiti “to do their best in finding the assassin now. We want justice.”
Three other members of the pro-Aristide organization Veye Yo also were targeted in what
members of the Haitian community of Miami believed was a growing wave of political violence
spilling over from Haiti to South Florida.794
The deadline mandating the resignation of General Cedras came and went as did the date
scheduled for Aristide’s return to Haiti. On the first day of November, Cedras remained at the
head of the coup regime and Aristide remained in the United States. Though Clinton pledged a
renewed effort to pressure the coup regime through another arms and petroleum embargo and a
new round of economic sanctions, many observers thought they saw a flagging commitment
from the United States. In the wake of the collapse of the Governor’s Island Accords, the
National Popular Assembly (APN) urged Aristide to withdraw completely from UN-sanctioned
negotiations with Cedras and the Haitian military. The failure of the Governor’s Island
agreement also prompted opponents of the coup regime to initiate new campaigns of armed
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resistance in Haiti.795 And reminiscent of the Duvalier years, Haitians in Montreal began
building support for an expedition of armed exiles that would return to Haiti so that they could
topple the coup regime themselves.796
Faith in the international community’s commitment to restore Aristide eroded even
further at the beginning of November when reports circulated that key players in the coup
regime, including General Raoul Cedras, had been on the CIA payroll for many years and had
received support from the CIA right up until the coup of September 1991. As more information
emerged, it also became clear that Emanuel “Toto” Constant, another recipient of CIA funding,
had used agency resources and intelligence to launch FRAPH, one of the death squads
responsible for some of the most horrendous acts of violence and terror against Aristide
supporters in Haiti.797 It was this knowledge, no doubt, that caused a coalition of fourteen
popular organizations in Haiti to issue a statement the following summer declaring that “the
major author of the coup is the US Embassy, the CIA, the Pentagon and the Bush
Administration. Having conceived, planned, and directed the coup, these same US institutions
are today seeking to consolidate the coup d’etat under the Clinton administration,” continuing to
“covertly support and guide the coup.”798
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In response to what appeared to be the international community’s diminishing
commitment to the restoration of democracy in Haiti, Aristide made a new effort to pressure
Clinton, playing the refugee card more aggressively than ever before. In February 1994 the
Haitian president-in-exile informed the US government that he was preparing to abrogate his
country’s agreement with the United States that authorized American authorities to intercept and
return Haitian refugees, an action that would go into effect in six months. Jocelyn McCalla,
director of the National Coalition for Haitian Refugees, observed that Aristide’s tactic was a bold
and risky move. “He’s playing hardball,” McCalla commented. The move could “make him or
break him.” Michael Ratner of the Center for Constitutional Rights recognized the utility of
Aristide’s tactic, arguing that “Aristide will never go back to Haiti as long as the United States
believes it will not face a (Haitian) refugee problem.”799
In the winter and spring of 1994, many other groups were also mobilizing to pressure the
Clinton administration to fulfill its stated goal of returning Aristide to Haiti. From the Haitian
communities of the United States as well as from Haiti came appeals for Clinton to act decisively
to end the coup and return Aristide to power. The National Coalition for Haitian Refugees called
for “concerned Americans to flood the White House switchboard with calls denouncing U.S.
policy toward Haitian refugees.”800 From Haiti, a group of people’s organizations sent a letter to
President Clinton in which they denounced his “silence about the horrors (being committed) in
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Haiti;” they reminded him “that Americans of Haitian origin voted for you because they were
convinced that your presence in the White House would inaugurate a new era for Haiti.”801
The Congressional Black Caucus continued its pressure on Clinton as well, announcing
that it was backing a hunger strike by TransAfrica’s Randall Robinson to protest US policy
toward Haiti and the Haitian refugees.802 According to Assistant Secretary of State John
Shattuck, the pressure from the CBC and from Robinson’s hunger strike had a sizable influence
on Clinton. He observed, “Clinton knew Robinson and admired what he had done on apartheid.”
When “the press began reporting that the White House wanted to stop the erosion of black
leadership support by changing its Haiti policy,” Shattuck continued, the president felt even
more pressure.803 In addition, an increasing number of Democratic members of Congress
sharpened their criticism of the Clinton administration, arguing that the president was forcing
Aristide to make too many concessions and to compromise too much with the coup regime as a
condition for American backing of his return. Senator Tom Harkin called the United States’
Haiti policy “embarrassing and shameful.” Referring to the failed attempt to send American
soldiers to Haiti following the Governor’s Island Accord, Harkin lamented that the United States
had been intimidated by ''a ragtag collection of no more than 100 drug peddlers and murderers,''
while “'all the pressure is being put on President Aristide as if he's the bad guy.”804
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The American labor movement also joined the campaign. In February 1994 the New
York-based National Labor Committee criticized the embargo on Haitian goods that was
intended to squeeze the coup government until it stepped down, calling the embargo “a joke.”
Low-wage assembly firms in Haiti continued to operate, sending millions of dollars of cheap
goods to the United States, the organization claimed. Haiti Progres also noted the “booming”
US trade with Haiti and reported on the National Labor Committee’s campaign to spotlight
particular corporations, like Sears, that were, despite the embargo, profiting from sweatshop
labor in Haiti. In April, twenty-four presidents of the largest labor unions in the United States
called on Clinton to plug the leaky embargo, their goal being to end the “savage” repression in
Haiti. The union presidents also urged the administration to halt its policy of “interdiction and
forced repatriation of Haitians fleeing their country.”805 Opposing labor’s efforts to plug the
holes in the commercial embargo, seventy American companies launched their own campaign to
pressure the US government to extend the exemption that enabled them to operate in Haiti.806
The profile of the refugee campaign continued to develop as new members and new
tactics drew attention to the situation in Haiti and the experience of Haitian refugees. A group
calling itself Artists for Democracy in Haiti, which included entertainers and celebrities like
Spike Lee, Susan Sarandon, Robin Williams, Robert Deniro, and Harry Belafonte, began
sponsoring television and print media ads calling for fair treatment of Haitian refugees and a
restoration of democracy in
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Haiti. When Sarandon and Belafonte appeared on a “Celebs for Haiti” episode of the television
show Donahue, Sarandon brandished a sweatshop-produced baseball that had made its way to
the United States through the porous embargo.807 In mid-April six members of Congress were
arrested in an act of civil disobedience outside the White House. Later in the month another
protest against the administration’s Haiti policy drew thousands and, according to one source,
“boiled to the brink of violence outside the White House” before it subsided.808 “Things are
heating up all over the place,” exclaimed the Academy Award winning director, Jonathan
Demme, another active member of the movement. The Washington Post observed “a rising tide
of activism on Haiti” in which “a growing chorus of ordinary people, celebrities, and lawmakers
[were] protesting the US policy of forced repatriation of immigrants from Haiti.”809 US policy
toward Haiti and Haitian refugees was “becoming more and more a civil rights issue, and as it
does, the traditional civil rights coalition is again falling into place," observed Henry Berger,
chairman of Americans for Democratic Action.810
Lest they be drowned out by the growing chorus of the pro-Aristide movement, antiAristide forces in the United States also became more vocal in April and May of 1994. In his
Wall Street Journal column, Raymond Joseph reasserted his belief that Aristide’s return would
not bring democracy to Haiti; he lambasted the embargo on Haiti, which he claimed was taking a
terrible toll on the country. “Barring an all-out military invasion, does the ‘international
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community’ intend to continue the senseless destruction of Haiti in order to see Mr. Aristide
reinstated as President and his vision of a new Haiti put in place?” Joseph asked. And while
Aristide and his supporters were claiming that the only way to stem the flood of Haitian refugees
to the United States was to restore democracy to Haiti, Joseph made the opposite argument. If
Clinton insisted on returning Aristide to Haiti, the situation in the country would grow so bleak
that “the United States might as well prepare for the thousands, even millions, of refugees who
could undoubtedly be considered both ‘political’ and ‘economic’ refugees as the widespread
repression we see today in Haiti multiplies and requires a new round of international
sanctions,”811 Joseph argued. Adding his voice to those attempting to counter the expanding proAristide movement, Clinton’s predecessor, President George H.W. Bush called on the Clinton
administration to abandon its support for Aristide. Aristide had been “unwilling to
compromise,” Bush argued, “and in attacking President Clinton’s policies he is attacking those
who have been trying hard to help him.” The United States must separate “backing democracy”
from “backing Aristide,” Bush declared.812
The intensifying pressure on the Clinton administration to resolve the crisis in Haiti in the
spring of 1994 came not only from an ever growing campaign in the United States, but also from
a rapidly deteriorating situation in Haiti. In February the United Nations Human Rights
Commission published a report that documented a massive surge in violence since the collapse
of the Governor’s Island Accord the previous October. Paramilitaries and soldiers were
operating with total impunity, targeting “members and leaders of popular and human rights
811
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organizations, peasants, trade unionists, students, journalists, clergy, and anyone suspected of
supporting the return of President Aristide,” even children, the report stated. The commission’s
report also presented evidence that refugees returned to Haiti by the United States had been
arrested and imprisoned. At least three thousand people had been killed since the coup, many
after having been abducted in nighttime raids on pro-Aristide neighborhoods.813 Other sources,
too, demonstrated a spike in terror tactics in the spring of 1994, particularly by the FRAPH death
squad, founded by Emmanuel “Toto” Constant. One FRAPH incursion into the Port-au-Prince
neighborhood of Cite Soleil killed at least seventy people. In April FRAPH was responsible for
a massacre of Lavalas supporters in the Raboteau area of Gonaives on the northwestern coast of
Haiti.814 Another report of human rights violations in March and April of 1994 stated that in one
neighborhood of Port-au-Prince, “corpses lay in the streets for many days and sometimes were
eaten by pigs . . . many bodies have not been identified.”815
In the spring of 1994 the violence in Haiti continued to spill over into the Haitian
communities in the United States. There was disturbing new evidence that the very same
organizations terrorizing people in Haiti were orchestrating violence in the United States. On
March 9 three board members of Veye Yo were attacked, and thirty-one-year-old Daniel Buron
was shot and killed in Miami, making Buron the fourth Aristide backer since 1991 to be killed on
the streets of that Florida city. Local authorities, the Miami Herald insisted, needed to “call in
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the FBI.”816 The Haitian death squad FRAPH opened branches in Miami, New York, and
Boston and, according to one source, began “using conference calls to keep in constant contact
with Haiti.” Beverly Bell, an American backer of Aristide, called FRAPH “transnational
terrorists.” The New York Times observed, “To supporters of Haiti's ousted President, JeanBertrand Aristide, the shooting of Mr. Buron, and the official reaction to it here, are frightening
proof that the Haitian military's enforcers can act with impunity anywhere, even in a major
American city.”817 The following July, Lionel Louis, a community activist and Aristide
supporter, was shot dead in New York. After the newspaper Haiti Progres published a list of
alleged FRAPH agents working as interpreters at the refugee camp in Guantanamo Bay, it also
began receiving threats. One telephone call warned, “The fire of the gun will get you in Haiti or
here. You cannot escape.”818 “I know my life is still in danger,” acknowledged Alerte Belance,
the grassroots organizer who had been nearly killed by anti-Aristide death squads the previous
October and who was now filing a $30 million lawsuit against FRAPH in a US court. “But
surely God will not let FRAPH do any more damage to me.”819
The renewed violence in the spring of 1994 produced yet another major surge in refugees
attempting to reach American shores. In response, the Clinton administration announced at the
beginning of May that it was modifying its policy toward Haitian refugees. The United States
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would again allow asylum screening to take place aboard American ships for some of those
intercepted en route to the United States. Others would be transported to “third countries” that it
called “safe havens” where they would be housed until their asylum eligibility was determined.
At the same time, the Clinton administration made plans to reopen Guantanamo Bay as a major
destination for the refugees.820
The response to the Clinton administration’s planned change in its refugee policy was
largely negative, although some of those active in the Haitian campaign celebrated the policy
shift. For example, following the administration’s announcement, Randall Robinson called off
his twenty-seven-day hunger strike.821 Others, however, were skeptical. “Most of us are going
to take a wait-and-see attitude” after the “emotional roller coaster” and “various flip-flops” of the
last couple of years, one commentator said. Ricot Dupuy, manager of the New York City radio
station Radio Soleil, said Haitians were “sad, mad, bitter about Clinton sending refugees all
over.”822 The Christian Science Monitor pointed out that “simply processing refugees at sea will
by itself make no difference in the numbers of Haitians eligible for admittance to the U.S.”
Many continued to worry “that shipboard screening will be a hasty process with little regard for
nuance and not right of appeal.”823 Haiti Progres observed that despite the Clinton
administration’s supposedly softer stance toward Haitian refugees, 768 people had been returned
to Haiti between May 13 and 17, which gave May the “highest monthly total in eighteen
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months.” In addition, the administration’s policy was another obstacle for refugees; sending
refugees to “third countries” gave advocates and lawyers less access to the refugees and placed
them outside the jurisdiction of US law.824
The differing responses to Clinton’s policy opened a rift among advocates in the Haitian
refugee campaign. While the National Coalition of Haitian Refugees was somewhat approving
of the US government’s proposal to send refugees to “safe havens,” the Brooklyn-based Haitian
Women for Haitian Refugees condemned the policy, demanding “an end to the Guantanamo
detention camp and the blatantly racist policy forbidding Haitians to be treated equally as other
refugees who are permitted to enter the U.S.”825

A Looming Invasion
In May of 1994, as the crisis in Haiti and the corresponding refugee exodus continued,
talk of a US-led invasion of the island nation as the only solution to the stalemate became more
widespread. The possibility of an invasion drew mixed reactions from Haitians, though the
majority, it seems, was opposed to military intervention in Haiti. A National Public Radio report
stated that while most Haitians were skeptical that tightened sanctions would be effective in
displacing the coup regime, “Haitians all across the political spectrum . . . also oppose the idea of
U.S. troops descending on Haiti.”826 The Minneapolis Star Tribune concurred, observing that
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“while most Americans favor a multinational invasion of Haiti (54 percent according to the latest
USA Today-CNN-Gallup Poll) Haitian Americans generally do not.”827
In Haiti, while some supported the deployment of the American military, there was also
substantial opposition to a military invasion, and not just among supporters of the coup regime.
At the end of July, Haiti Progres published a statement from a coalition of popular
organizations, including Ben Dupuy’s National Popular Assembly (APN), Tet Kole, Solidarity
Ant Jen (SAJ), Veye Yo, and nine other organizations, that opposed an invasion. Antoine Adrien,
one of the Haitian Fathers who had been a leader of the Haitian community in Brooklyn and who
was now “the man considered closest to [Aristide] Haiti,” stated, “I do not think [an invasion] is
necessary, and I do not think it’s a good thing.” Many Haitians like Gilbert LaGuerre worried
that a US-led invasion to restore Aristide would usher in a “second 1915,” the year US Marines
landed in Haiti to begin a nineteen-year military occupation of the country. But others like
Rodrigue Fequiere, who believed that nothing short of military action would oust the coup
leaders, insisted, “We need an invasion.”828
Among pro-Aristide, non-Haitian Americans, there was a similar division, though unlike
the majority of Haitians in the United States, they tended to support the idea of an invasion.
Randall Robinson, one of the most prominent American members of the movement to defend the
refugees and to restore democracy in Haiti, supported a US-led invasion of Haiti.829 In mid-July
the Philadelphia Enquirer found the forty members of the Congressional Black Caucus “sharply
827

Steve Berg, “Life on Hold in Little Haiti; Emigres in Miami Wait and Worry,” Star Tribune (Minneapolis, MN),
July 24, 1994, 1A.
828

Le Camp populaire dit: Non a l’intervention etrangere!” Haiti Progres, July 20-26, 1994, 1, 17; “Popular Groups
Unite Against Invasion,” Haiti Progres, July 20-26, 1994, 9; Welna, “Few Haitians Support U.S. Military
Intervention;” “Haitians Express Mixed Feelings Over Prospect of U.S. Intervention,” Associated Press, May 11,
1994, AM cycle.
829

George Gedda, “Robinson Blasts Haiti Policy, Urges Invasion,” Associated Press, May 24, 1994, PM cycle.

365
divided on the wisdom of using armed force” in Haiti. While Senator Carol Moseley-Braun
argued that “the time for intervention has not arrived and I hope it never will,” Representative
Carrie Meek claimed, “We don’t have any other options,” and asserted, “Haitians want an
invasion but they don’t want an occupation.” Haiti Progres, itself fiercely opposed to the
invasion, heard among statements by members of the Congressional Black Caucus and some
liberal Democrats, “strident demands for a military invasion.” The newspaper interpreted the
motives of those backing an invasion, not as a desire to help Haitians and Haiti, but as a desire to
stem the flow of refugees; it argued that “Democrat Bob Graham and Republican Connie Mack,
the two Senators from Florida” supported an invasion of Haiti because their “racist hatred of
Haitian refugees is greater than their hatred for President Aristide.”830
In mid-July, as 2,860 Marines waited in warships off the coast of Haiti, Haitians heard a
radio broadcast by Jean-Bertrand Aristide that further stimulated anxious discussion of a
potential US invasion. “I am returning to reinstate security for all Haitians to live in peace . . .
The day of my return is not far off,” Aristide said.831 Then, on July 29 Aristide sent a letter to
the United Nations Security Council requesting a US-led multinational force to take “swift and
determined action” to enforce the Governor’s Island Accord. “Aristide Takes the Plunge, Backs
U.S. Invasion,” lamented a Haiti Progres headline. The newspaper also took the occasion to
renew its criticism of Aristide’s strategy, arguing that “since he headed to Washington shortly
after the Sept. 1991 coup d’etat his exiled government has sought to exorcise the demon with the
devil. Instead of mobilizing popular resistance – armed or unarmed – to the Haitian military, the
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exiled government has favored using the countervailing power of the U.S. state to remove the
coup leaders.” Days later the UN Security Council voted to authorize a US-led invasion of
Haiti.832
Following Aristide’s endorsement of a military invasion of the country and the UN’s vote
to authorize such a force, it seems more Haitians shifted their position toward supporting the
action, though with serious reservations. “I support a military intervention if it uproots the
military system we’ve got now. Haiti doesn’t need a military occupation, but ever since we won
our independence we’ve never been free,” stated Jean-Claude, a bus driver in Port-au-Prince.833
In the Flatbush neighborhood of Brooklyn, Jean Wesnel expressed a similar sentiment. “No one
hopes that there would be an intervention in Haiti but we have reached a crossroads. The
military has caused too much suffering” argued Wesnel. Mary Jacque, a refugee who had fled
Haiti one year earlier, expressed a similar sentiment. “So many of my friends have disappeared,
many people appear dead on the streets everyday. They have to get those criminals out,” she
insisted.834
For some opponents of military intervention, Aristide’s consent and the United Nation’s
approval of a US-led invasion led them to resist the prospect even more vehemently. On the
anniversary of the 1915 US invasion of Haiti, the Haitian communities of New York and Miami
hosted lively events featuring popular performers like Manno Charlemaigne and Myriam
Dorisme. Their purpose was to link the history of American imperialism and the looming US
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intervention.835 Haiti Progres reported that “a growing number of grassroots organizations both
in Haiti and in the United States are coming out in opposition to military intervention, arguing
that it will strengthen the Haitian military and be aimed at crippling the popular movement.”
The Haitian Conference of Religious People, a group of 1,400 Catholic Priests and Nuns in Haiti,
issued a statement that argued that “this intervention will be against the people of Haiti, since it
arises from the same logic as the coup d’etat which simply means to ‘legitimize’ under
international cover, its principal achievement: the total erasure of the Haitian people from the
political scene of its own country.” In Boston a coalition of thirty-six organizations formed the
Haitian Anti-Intervention Network.836 Asked whether he supported the invasion, one Brooklyn
resident declared, “Never! The United States kills my people here. They kill my people there.
They jailed me here. We never trust the United States.”837 Guy Etienne, another opponent of the
invasion, agreed. “No one who controls you has your best interest in mind,” he stated.838 For
those opposed to an American invasion of Haiti, the specter of renewed American imperialism
was as great a threat to the people as the military regime currently in power in Haiti. “Latin
America is very concerned about being invaded by the U.S.,” explained Nydia Velasquez, a
Puerto Rican native and a US representative to Congress from New York City. Despite the
substantial opposition to a US invasion, however, there were people like Una Clarke, a
Jamaican-American city councilperson with a large Haitian constituency, who counted
themselves as allies of the Haitian community but who insisted that military intervention was
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necessary. Clarke argued that “an invasion is the only way to restore democracy and end the
suffering of the people.”839
On September 15, 1994, President Bill Clinton delivered a televised address in which he
issued an ultimatum to the regime in Haiti that it must release its hold on the country or be
removed by force. To Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck, who had been arguing in favor
of a tougher stance toward the coup regime, this was a proud moment in which the president
finally took the steps necessary to restore democracy and to end the bloodshed in Haiti.840 In the
wake of the president’s speech, CBS News reported that a poll by a Miami radio station revealed
that Haitians overwhelmingly supported an American invasion. But according to a National
Public Radio report, although in general American support for an invasion of Haiti “rose after the
President’s speech,” it evoked only “mixed reaction” in “Miami’s large Haitian community.”
Some who supported the invasion continued to do so only grudgingly. “Sometimes you have to
take the very bitter medicine . . . you have to go through painful surgery in order to remove the
cancer and then hope for life to continue,” observed Claude Deux, a chiropractor and Aristide
supporter in South Florida.841
Days later, when news reached Haitians in the United States that a special delegation
consisting of President Jimmy Carter, General Colin Powell, and Senator Sam Nunn had reached
an eleventh-hour deal with the coup government that would prevent a violent confrontation and
potentially even avert a US invasion, there was much relief and spontaneous celebration. But
Haitians were also cautious over the unfulfilled promises of the previous years and angry that
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Cedras was to be granted amnesty and be allowed to stay in the country.842 After the
announcement of the deal, furious protesters took to the streets of Little Haiti, chanting, “Carter
hypocrite! Cedras must go!” In New York at a demonstration outside the United Nations
building, anti-invasion protesters also expressed their anger over the amnesty granted Cedras.843
However, it soon became clear that the deal between the Cedras regime and the United States
would not in fact avert a US military invasion. By September 19, 1994, more than three
thousand American troops were on the ground in Haiti, preparing the way for Aristide’s
return.844
Scholars have offered conflicting interpretations of Haitians’ perspective on the military
invasion of 1994. Peter Hallward suggests that ordinary Haitians were virtually unanimous in
their support of the invasion, dismissing opponents as out-of-touch elites; he even characterizes
grassroots opposition to a US invasion as a figment of journalistic imagination. “Though some
leftwing intellectuals who had supported Lavalas in 1991 were dismayed to see Aristide return in
the company of US troops, journalists who bothered to consult his supporters in the slums

842

Nicole Winfield, “Haitians In U.S. Skeptical of Agreement,” Associated Press, Sept. 19, 1994, AM cycle;
Anthony Mason, “Haitians Living in New York, Miami and Other US Areas Greet News of Accord with Mixed
Reviews,” CBS Evening News, CBS News Transcript, Sept. 19, 1994; Derek Reveron, “Haitians in U.S. Say Deal
for Cedras Was Too Soft,” Morning Edition, National Public Radio, Sept. 19, 1994; Jay Croft and John Fernandez,
“Florida Haitians Split on Pact but Insist 'Cedras Must Go,'” Palm Beach (FL) Post, Sept. 19, 1994, 5A; Jose
Antonio Puertas, “Exiled Haitian Community Rejects Haiti Agreement,” Agence France Presse, Sept. 20, 1994;
Nicole Winfield, “Miami's Haitians Disappointed with Concessions to Cedras,” Associated Press, Sept. 20, 1994,
PM cycle; Ron Scherer, “Haitian Americans in New York Divided Over Pact,” Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 20,
1994, 3.
843

Pamela Constable, “Hundreds In Miami Protest Deal,” Washington Post, Sept. 19, 1994, A20; Ron Scherer,
“Long Isolated, Haitians in the US May Enter Local, National Politics,” Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 22, 1994,
2.
844

“Emotions Run High in Miami's Burgeoning Haitian Community,” Associated Press, Sept. 15, 1994, AM cycle;
Terence Samuel, “Haitians in Brooklyn React with Happiness, Anger, Hope / Immigrants’ Ideas Varied Wildly.
Debate Was Intense,” Philadelphia Inquirer, Sept. 20, 1994, A12.

370
received a different reaction,” Hallward writes.845 In fact, there is abundant evidence that people
in Haiti, like Haitians in the United States, were more divided over the prospect of an American
invasion than Hallward claims. Even those who supported Aristide’s return under a US military
escort did so with more than a little ambivalence. As Beverly Bell points out,
Among the population, opposition to the intervention and the subsequent occupation ran
high. Still the circumstances surrounding the president’s return were viewed with a
mixture of pragmatism and shrewd exploitation of opportunity. Repeatedly citizens
expressed deep awareness of the high price for Aristide’s plane ride home. Then they
shrugged and expressed a variant of the following: “If the foreign presence can help
provide security so we can start organizing and mobilizing, we’ll use that.”846

Aristide’s Return and the Coup’s Aftermath
As American troops continued to arrive in Haiti, the debate over the invasion and the
appropriate treatment of those responsible for the coup raged on in the Haitian communities of
the United States. On October 10, five days before Aristide’s scheduled return to Haiti, a
ceremony in Port-au-Prince marked the resignation of Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras, a development that
brought jubilation to many in Haiti. However, some Haitian activists in the United States were
less sanguine about Cedras’ resignation and the news that he would be leaving the country.
“Cedras’ leaving does nothing. Now Cedras is gone but the U.S. remains. It is a changing of the
guard, but the U.S. is still in charge,” argued Ernest Banatt, a New York activist and member of
SELA.847 Michel Vilsaint, former president of the Haitian refugees of Guantanamo Bay, agreed.
“I don’t think this is true justice,” declared Vilsaint. The editors of Haiti Progres were equally
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unimpressed by the event, particularly because it occurred in the presence of thousands of
American troops. “In fact it is precisely to avoid true justice – and all the pursuant revelations
and anger -- that the US is spiriting the coup leaders out of Haiti to an exile which will likely be
golden, like those of previous Haitian dictators who have serviced US interests,” Haiti Progres
observed. The amnesty law that accompanied the departure of Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras and Brig.
Gen. Philippe Biamby was, according to Haiti Progres, also about maintaining American
interests and power in Haiti. Although Aristide would finally return, “the US government wants
to leave most of the Haitian army intact and for this it needs an ‘amnesty’.”848 Just days before
Aristide’s return to Haiti, Cedras and Biamby were escorted to Panama while twenty-three
“relatives and associates” of the exiled military leaders were allowed to take refuge in Miami.849
For many Haitian refugees, Aristide’s anticipated return brought anxiety as well as
excitement. Soon after the American troops had landed in Haiti, international news reports
showed scenes of violence in which Haitian soldiers and police attacked civilians while US
soldiers stood idly by. Images like these deepened fears of those tentatively considering
returning to Haiti. Many others seeking asylum in the United States worried that Aristide’s
return would undercut their case and would mean quick deportation. Those facing a return to
Haiti grappled with the question of whether the American presence in the country was really
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designed to protect the Haitian population from those who had been attacking it during the entire
coup period. Would it be safe to return Haiti, even with Aristide restored, they wondered.850
Despite the fears of the refugees and the skepticism of certain activists, many other
Haitians looked toward Aristide’s return with a sense of eager anticipation. Just as they had
done after the collapse of the Duvalier dictatorship in 1986 and after Aristide’s election in 1991,
scores of Haitians took to the streets, sweeping, cleaning, and painting. A team of workers set
off to rebuild the president’s house, which had been destroyed during the coup. New colors burst
forth on the streets of Port-au-Prince. Walls that had once featured murals celebrating Aristide’s
election and that had been destroyed during the coup were reclaimed and once again became
space for artists celebrating the democracy in Haiti.851 Francois Menot, a forty-year-old resident
of the Carrefour-Feuille neighborhood of Port-au-Prince, flaunted a small picture of Aristide.
"I've been hiding this in my mattress for three years now. They searched my house many times
and never found it. Now I'm at ease carrying it around again. In my area, we haven't slept for
three days. We've been cleaning up for his arrival. For the first time, we sit and joke around,
talk, late at night." The buoyant attitude of thirty-four-year-old Extra Hubert Auguste also
exemplifies how very high were the hopes for Aristide’s return. "When Aristide comes back, he
will make them sell food at a decent price. Now so many people won't die from hunger.
Everything will be good now. My children will not be so hungry," Auguste declared.852
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Aristide’s ultimate return to Haiti was a triumphant moment for Haitians at home and
abroad. On the eve of Aristide’s return, people from across Haiti as well as the United States
traveled to Port-au-Prince to be in the capital city for the historic homecoming. On October 15,
Aristide arrived. Tens of thousands of people crowded into the area around the National Palace
to see the event while many more were fixed to their radios and televisions. As the president
walked from the US military helicopter to the speaker’s podium, many finally witnessed what
they had waited more than three years to see. To a jubilant crowd, Aristide released a white dove
and declared, "Today is the day that the sun of democracy rises, never to set. Today is the day
that the eyes of justice open, never to close again. Today is the day that security takes over
morning, noon and night.”853 In the northern city of Cap Haitien, Ilmeus Petit patted his heart,
saying, "It's ready to explode. I love my country so much. It's like having a first child." In Little
Haiti and Brooklyn, too, thousands crowded the streets to celebrate Aristide’s return. Haitians
both in Haiti and in the United States considered the restoration of Aristide’s presidency and the
defeat of the coup forces their signal achievement. "Since the beginning we fought, and with the
international community we are happy it has ended well,” said Wilson Desir in Brooklyn. "After
Mandela, this is the greatest day for people of African descent," declared Una Clarke, New York
City councilperson. The hopes of many Haitians at home and abroad could hardly have been
higher. “Today is another independence [day] in Haitian history,” declared Lavarice Gaudin, a
leading activist with the group Veye Yo in Miami. "A new life can begin!" echoed Marie-Helene
Sterilus amid the celebration in Port-au-Prince.854
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As much joy as there was to see Aristide returned and democracy restored to Haiti, there
was also persistent skepticism and concern about the circumstances of his return.

As part of the

Paris Plan that was negotiated in August 1994 and that laid out the terms for his return, Aristide
was to promote “reconciliation” between his base of supporters and those who had orchestrated
and supported the coup. To reestablish the flow of foreign aid to Haiti, the Paris Plan also
required “market friendly reforms,” such as the privatization of state-owned enterprises and the
placement of Haiti under what Alex Dupuy calls “the trusteeship of the international regulatory
and aid organizations.” While many might have considered these conditions acceptable
compromises in exchange for international backing of the restoration of democracy and the
reestablishment of international aid to Haiti, others argued that the plan forced Haiti to surrender
its economic autonomy. Some critics of the conditions of Aristide’s return also saw his
acceptance of the neoliberal model for Haiti prescribed by the Paris Plan as part of the larger
transformation of Aristide from radical champion of the poor to establishment figure.
“Henceforth, Aristide would no longer speak of the Lavalas Revolution to which the bourgeoisie
had to accommodate itself,” Alex Dupuy argues. “Rather, one would hear Aristide and members
of his government in exile talk about the need to return to a government of laws and the necessity
for ‘reconciliation,’ ‘stability,’ ‘sound macroeconomic policies,’ and ‘a vibrant private sector
with an open foreign investment policy’.”855
Like the divergent views on the US military mission to Haiti, Aristide’s acceptance of the
Paris Plan as the condition for his return widened the rift between activists and community
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members who considered such conditions acceptable and those who did not. Although Haiti
Progres continued to support Aristide, the newspaper also became an outlet for criticism of the
president and the terms under which he returned to Haiti. In a piece entitled “Aristide Back in
Haiti, But Still in US Hands” Haiti Progres editors pointed out that the United States had
promised hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to the Haitian government but in return
demanded a program of “privatization and austerity.” These conditions placed upon the delivery
of much needed assistance and the continued presence of American troops in Haiti ensured that
“Aristide can at best be . . . a dissenting prisoner, in which role he would not survive for long. At
the very worst he will become a willing collaborator in US strategies to ‘restructure’ the Haitian
economy with neo-liberal reforms and to indenture Haiti’s political future to elections which are
bought, rigged, and rubber-stamped by the United States in concert with the United Nations and
‘international community,”856 concluded the editors of Haiti Progres. Some of those who
considered Aristide partly responsible for the neoliberal economic model introduced in Haiti
after his return began to view the president somewhat differently, recalls community activist and
labor organizer Ray Laforest. Aristide’s acceptance of the neoliberal program “kind of
discredited what he stood for,” observes LaForest. “And when his government was saying that
‘privatization is modernization,’ that also disconnected [Aristide from those] who were saying
the opposite . . . So that kind of division got reflected here [in New York]. Attacks against
Aristide were also expressed here, so the movement started being divided.”857
The challenge of economic restructuring and the division that it sowed among activists
was not Haiti’s only challenge after Aristide’s return. The country confronted a host of serious
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challenges, not least the complex task of administering justice for crimes committed during the
dark years of the coup. When Pascal Hilaire, an alleged member of a death squad that had
terrorized the Port-au-Prince neighborhood of Delmas, was arrested and arraigned in court, those
thirsting for justice hoped his would be just the first of many such arrests and prosecutions.858
The creation of a Commission for Truth and Justice seemed another hopeful sign that the country
was, however slowly, moving down the path toward justice and reconciliation. To the editors of
Haiti Progres, however, who observed Aristide’s calling on his supporters to respect the law
“while U.S. troops guard law-breaking putchists,” the American occupation and the conditions
placed on Aristide’s restoration made the achievement of real justice an unlikely prospect.859
In Miami, too, there was an effort to bring the perpetrators of violence during the coup
years to justice. In November 1994 Billy Alexander, the son of Haitian immigrants, was arrested
for being the trigger man in the contract killings of Jean-Claude Olivier and Fritz Dor, two of the
pro-Aristide radio hosts murdered in Miami after Aristide’s election. Alexander’s arrest brought
relief to many in the South Florida community, but, as in Haiti, many insisted that the arrest be
just the first step in punishing those who ordered the violent act. “Now we are waiting to see the
police arrest the master with the money,” declared Lavarice Gaudin of Veye Yo, calling for the
investigation to continue until the parties responsible for hiring Alexander were also brought to
justice.860
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For Haitians that expected Aristide’s return to usher in a bright new day marking a rapid
improvement of conditions in Haiti, the last months of 1994 were a time of deepening
disappointment. One report in December 1994 found “increasing disillusionment among slum
residents and social activists over Aristide's cautious approach to the country's problems.” Many
in the Haitian communities of the United States too were frustrated with Aristide’s approach
once he was back in Haiti, particularly for his acceptance of the neoliberal economic model,
which critics called the “death plan for Haiti.”861
In spite of their unease over Aristide’s choices, many of those in Haiti who despaired
over the continuing hardship of life even after Aristide’s return also maintained hope. “I said
that when Titid came back to Haiti maybe I would be better off, but it seems like I’ve gotten
worse. Now, a little can of rice sells for six gourdes (U.S. $.40) . . . Some people are
discouraged. They see that the president came back and that he didn’t do anything for us,” said
Lovly Josaphat.862 “Life is still expensive but, like old people say, Piti piti zwazo fe nich li. Bit
by bit a bird builds her nest. The country was crushed under the three years of the coup, but now
bit by bit it will be fixed. Every time someone does a little work, it will get better.”863 Josette
Perard relates a story that demonstrates not only the ongoing hope that many Haitians held to
after Aristide’s return, but also their view that Aristide would continue to be a central part of the
ongoing popular movement. An American visitor asked a member of a grassroots women’s
organization, “’I don’t see that your situation has improved. Why are you still supporting Titid?’
One of them answered,
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Foreigner . . . I’ll tell you. Had it not been for Titid, you wouldn’t be sitting here talking
with us, poor women who can’t read and write, who have dirty feet, about what we think
about the political situation in Haiti . . . Titid made this possible. Titid came back to
make changes. He can’t give me food and I don’t expect him to, because it’s up to me to
work and feed myself.864
Even as some Haitians were questioning Aristide’s commitment or his ability to improve the
situation of ordinary Haitians, others continued to see the president as the best hope for a new
Haiti.
Looking back on the coup years, Haitian activists saw both achievement and defeat.
From 1991 to 1994, the partnership between the resistance outside Haiti and the resistance inside
the country became critically important. As Ray LaForest observes, “What brought Aristide
back was two things . . . the Haitian people refused to cooperate with the coup” and “what
happened abroad, because of organizing, [also ensured] that this movement was so successful.”
He explains that “bigger and bigger demonstration[s], bigger and bigger support of politicians,”
and “support from all these non-Haitian organizations” showed that “support for Aristide was
getting to be uncontrollable. The US had to respond to that.”865 Members of SELA, another key
participant in the movement to defend Aristide, also saw the pressure mobilized by the external
movement -- particularly on the United States and the United Nations – as critical to Aristide’s
eventual return. According to Lionel Legros, the coup failed because “the pressure that we were
putting on [the United Nations’ headquarters at] 42nd Street where we blocked the street, even
during the weekdays, was too strong.”866
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But the immense effort required to combat coup forces and to bring Aristide back to Haiti
also took a major toll on the Haitian communities of New York and Miami. The coup occurred
just as the linked popular movements in Haiti and in the United States were experiencing a
tremendous crescendo of popular mobilization. As Lily Cerat describes,
One of the things we blame on the Aristide ouster, his years in exile, is the fact that much
energy from the community was . . . poured into that, demonstrating for his return,
meeting with him, pressuring, dealing with the Guantanamo issue, the refugees . . . And
during that time, the course has been the disbanding of that community where you had
strong political-cultural activism, you had strong organization. I mean to have realized
the April 20 [AIDS march] across the bridge, it was because there were organizations
ready to come together, to work together, and to thrust that day! [But] from April 1990
all the machinery in place, the community organizing machinery, the community
activism that was able to grow on April 20 kind of went in one direction after Aristide
became ousted in 1991.867

The strength and resilience of the campaign to restore Aristide was possible because of
the grassroots networks and relationships that had been planted in the anti-Duvalier struggle and
grown from 1986 to 1991. In addition, the new refugee crisis that emerged in the coup years
reignited the refugee campaign and brought in many new members, giving the refugees’ cause
unprecedented national and international exposure. At the same time, however, the coup years
had a disastrous effect on the popular movement, derailing it from the course it had been on at its
height in 1990 and early 1991 and leaving it battered and divided.
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Conclusion
In the summer of 1997, Marcus Garcia was preparing to return to Haiti. Garcia had been
in the United States since November 1980, when as one of the dissident journalists arrested and
imprisoned by Haitian authorities, he had been expelled from Haiti and sent into exile in the
United States. One of the victims of the Duvalier dictatorship’s crackdown that followed Ronald
Reagan’s election, Garcia found that that political change of tides had landed him in Miami,
where he soon used his journalistic experience to become a resource and advocate for Haitian
refugees. With his partner, Elsie Etheart, Garcia launched a radio program for the Haitian
community called Chita Tande (Sit Down and Listen), providing Miami Haitians with news from
Haiti as well as assistance and information for all those attempting to survive the maelstrom that
was Miami in the early 1980s. Four years later Garcia founded Haiti en Marche, the third major
Haitian weekly to be published in the United States. In addition to providing critical information
about both Haiti and the United States, Garcia turned each of his radio and print projects into
political tools, committed to “the refugee cause,” as he says, as well as to democracy in Haiti,
during the coup years using Haiti en Marche to defend the Aristide administration and to provide
information to the resistance inside Haiti. But three years after Aristide’s return to Haiti, Garcia
too was preparing to return. "The community is populated by people who don't need us as they
did before," he argued. And in Haiti "There is so much you can do.”868
The story of Marcus Garcia represents one current in the history of US-based Haitian
activists after 1994. Unlike Garcia, however, other activists chose to stay in the United States
and build upon political projects they had created during the coup years. One organization
created in Brooklyn in 1992 grew directly out of the refugee crisis of the coup years. Marie Lily
868

Elise Ackerman, “Cause for Return; Haitian Radio Host Marcus Garcia's Work in Miami Is Done. It's Time for
Him to Go Home,” Miami (FL) New Times, Sept. 10, 1997.

381
Cerat, a long-time political and cultural activist in New York met Ninaj Raoul at the
Guantanamo Bay refugee camp where they provided translation for the thousands of Haitians
detained there during the coup. After they returned to Brooklyn, they continued to assist the new
refugees; together they formed Haitian Women for Haitian Refugees, an organization that began
by meeting basic immigration, language, and other needs of new immigrants. In subsequent
years Haitian Women for Haitian Refugees grew into a more wide-reaching grassroots advocacy
organization, organizing the community around labor issues and issues of police brutality, and
partnering with those seeking to defend Haitian workers in the Dominican Republic.869
Another activist that chose to stay in the United States and continue the political work she
had started as a member of the Haitian Refugee Center in the early 1980s was Marleine Bastien.
In 1991 Bastien founded an organization whose influence would be felt in the community well
into the post-coup years. Famn Ayisyen nan Miami (Haitian Women of Miami) was dedicated,
according to one report, to “women's rights” and to “social, political, and economic
empowerment of all women and girls, especially Haitian.”870 Bastien founded Famn to fill a
void in community resources and services since the Haitian Refugee Center of Miami was
focused primarily on immigration matters. Although the organization was particularly oriented
around women’s issues, it was meant to serve the broader community as well. “I realized that
when we called the organization “Famn,” it wasn’t that we were only going to help famn,
because when we help the famn – the women – we help everybody,”871 Bastien explains. Under
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the banner of Famn Ayiysyen nan Miami, individuals like Bastien and her frequent partner
Gepsie Metellus emerged in the wake of the coup as community leaders for a new generation of
Haitian activists in South Florida.872
Other activists who continued their political work in the United States after Aristide’s
return concluded that Haitians in the United States needed to seek political power in a more
traditional sense. In the spring of 1994, Haitians in New York created the Haitian American
Political Action Group, which set voter registration and citizenship drives as its first task in the
community. According to Garry Pierre-Pierre, the New York Times correspondent reporting on
the new organization, “While [the founders of the Haitian American Political Action Group]
support the return to Haiti of the ousted President, the Rev. Jean-Bertrand Aristide, they say they
are angry with elected leaders who simply support Father Aristide while ignoring Haitian needs
locally.” New forms of political action like the Haitian American Political Action Group point to
a growing interest in American electoral politics among Haitians. One interpretation of this
development suggests a move away from the Haiti-focused politics that had predominated
through the mid-1990s. But Michel Laguerre reads the creation of the new organization
differently, interpreting the founding of the Haitian American Political Action Group as, in part,
a reflection of Haitians’ ongoing concern over the situation in Haiti. The founders of the new
organization have “realized that if there is to be any change in Haiti, it is likely to come from the
United States,” Laguerre argues.873
Throughout the remainder of the 1990s, new groups like Famn Ayisyen and Haitian
Women for Haitian Refugees as well as organizations that were founded in the earlier period of
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struggle continued to mobilize their communities around political issues that affected Haitians.
When in August 1997 Haitian immigrant Abner Louima was arrested in Brooklyn, beaten, and
sodomized with the handle of a toilet plunger by New York City police officers, Haitian activists
mobilized a shocked and outraged community around the problem of discrimination and police
brutality. The organizing that followed the Louima incident was carried out by organizations
that pre-dated the coup as well as those that were formed after 1994. The largest demonstration
against police brutality in the wake of the Louima incident attempted to recreate the success of
the April 20, 1990, AIDS march by staging another march across Brooklyn Bridge. The march,
which drew thousands but failed to match the level of community mobilization of the earlier
AIDS march, was co-organized by the Haitian American Alliance, an organization of young
community organizers and activists, and the Haitian Enforcement against Racism (HEAR), the
group responsible for the April 20 AIDS march.874
In addition to community protest, campaigns for legislation intended to protect Haitian
refugees in the United States continued into the post-coup period. In October 1998 after an
extensive lobbying effort by Haitian groups and their supporters, including the Congressional
Black Caucus, the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act became law. The new law allowed
the approximately fifty thousand Haitian refugees who had been in the country since December
1995 an expedited path to permanent residence in the United States, an initiative intended
especially to accommodate those who had fled Haiti during the coup years of 1991 to 1994. The
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Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act, which extended to Haitians the same opportunity
offered to Nicaraguan and Cuban refugees in an earlier piece of legislation, appeared to be a
major political victory for the refugees and their supporters. However, like some earlier
legislative and legal victories that did not end up benefiting the Haitian community as much as
expected, the new legislation was implemented in a way that stymied the hopes of many of those
who were eligible to take advantage of it. Although the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness
Act was signed in the fall of 1998, the Immigration and Naturalization Service delayed
publishing the final version of regulations under the law until the spring of 2000. When the
agency did release the final version of the law’s regulations, it gave those eligible to apply for
permanent residency only one week to apply for benefits. For Haitian refugees and their
supporters, the struggle for fair treatment and security in the United States would continue.875
This history of political activism among Haitians in the United States from 1957 to 1994
and the trans-regional and transnational movement that they built and maintained in this period
and beyond, expand our understanding of the role of migration and immigrants in our national
and international histories. One important conclusion that has a bearing on our understanding of
these histories is the finding that Haitian activists were able to reject an exclusive commitment to
either the politics of the old country or those of the new. Instead, they found an issue in their
new country -- asylum for Haitian refugees – that allowed them to maintain a simultaneous
commitment to political change in Haiti and to a defense of their communities in the United
States. This challenges the view of immigrant political activity that treats homeward looking
politics and US-based politics as mutually exclusive. The experience of Haitian activists in this
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study shows that engagement with political issues in the United States and utilization of the
American political and legal systems did not necessarily require a lessening of their commitment
to the home country or the abandonment of a homeward-looking orientation.
The experience of Haitian activists in the United States during the Duvalier years and the
sizable role of the United States in Haiti under each successive presidential administration from
Kennedy to Clinton illustrate another important conclusion: Haitian activists recognized that
even slight shifts in policy and orientation by the United States had major repercussions in a
peripheral country like Haiti. With this understanding, the activists devoted a substantial amount
of effort attempting to mobilize pressure on the US government to adopt policies that would help
them shape the change they wanted to see in their home country. In addition, as residents and, in
some cases, citizens of the United States with the ability to build coalitions with American allies
(as Haitian activists did with religious, labor, and civil rights organizations), immigrant activists
in the United States were in a advantageous position to exert pressure on the American
government, one of the most powerful steps they could take to support their allies working for
political change back in their home country. This conclusion adds to our understanding of the
way migration to the United States had the potential to transform a sending country. Migrants to
the United States were in a position to contribute much more than remittances to those in the
home country, and they were more than simply the first link in a chain of migration that could
bring a family or a whole community to the United States. As this history shows, activist
members of a particular immigrant community could also use their position in the United States
and status as residents or citizens of the United States to push for political change in their home
countries.
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This finding also contributes to our understanding of the dynamic of migration from
former colonies like Haiti on the periphery of powerful empires to core countries like the United
States that continued to maintain an imperial presence over less powerful neighbors. Just as
America’s military and economic presence in the Dominican Republic created the context for
migration from Santo Domingo to New York City (as shown by Jesse Hoffnung-Garskof),876 so
did America’s economic, political, and military presence in Haiti throughout the twentieth
century establish the chain of migration and strengthen the links between Haiti and the Haitian
communities of New York and Miami. While the uneven balance of power between the United
States and Haiti often led to what Haitian activists perceived to be manipulation and even
exploitation of Haiti by the United States, it also facilitated the creation of the transnational
political movement that would challenge both the Haitian and the American governments to
respond to their call for democracy in Haiti and fair treatment for Haitian refugees. And working
from the core of the empire, Haitian activists in the United States were able to advance their
movement in ways that those who remained in Haiti could not.
In addition, these findings make a contribution to the project of internationalizing our
national histories, a task with which a growing number of American historians are currently
engaged. There has been much discussion among historians about how to go about this task and
what these global histories should look like. Speaking on a panel entitled “Writing Global
Histories” at the 2012 American Historical Association conference, Charles C. Bright observed
that historians seem to be employing different and potentially contradictory conceptions of what
he called “globality.” While there are those whose work is international in the sense that it
features networks of transnational and trans-local people and institutions operating across
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borders and often largely outside the realm of state control, there are also global histories which
feature territorializing and imperial models, top-down in approach and concerned with powerful
hierarchical institutions that tower above and across borders. In this latter conception of
internationalism, states, though by no means the only historical agent, play a more prominent
role than in the former network model of global history. Neither of these models by itself is
sufficient, Bright argued, a conclusion that this dissertation also supports.877
In this dissertation, we have seen the power of ordinary people to build movements that at
certain moments successfully challenged the authority of states that were seeking to constrain
and suppress them. As important as these trans-regional and transnational networks were,
however, state power remains a key part of the story. In this history of Haitian activists in New
York, Miami, and Haiti, we see a dialogue between the grassroots networks and state authority;
the international migration of Haitians and the activism of these migrants emerge as important
elements shaping foreign and domestic policy and politics in both the United States and Haiti.
These conclusions affirm Julie Greene’s conclusion that “not only does the crossing of
boundaries make history . . . but the interaction between nation-states and transnational forces
also emerges as a central causal agent.”878
Furthermore, the findings of the dissertation not only advance our historical
understanding; they also have implications for contemporary political and social movements, and
particularly for immigrant activists and their supporters engaged in networks that span region
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and border. First, the Haitian activists in this history were most successful when they combined
legal and legislative approaches with the tactic of community protest and mobilization. As a
grassroots movement, they always recognized the power of protest, but they also worked within
the political and legal systems when they thought it could advance their cause. Second, with the
right tools -- a deep commitment to their home country, lines of communication and information
networks drawing the disparate communities together, political organizations that reached across
region and border, and, especially after 1986, the ability to travel back and forth between the
United States and Haiti, Haitian activists were able to transcend the barriers of distance and
international boundary to create political networks that simultaneously mobilized around issues
as seemingly distant as repression in Port-au-Prince, refugee imprisonment in Miami, and the
impact of the AIDS stigma in New York. This history provides an important lesson for
contemporary immigrant activists: the value and potential strength of trans-regional and
transnational networks and movements. Indeed, the final chapter of this dissertation finds that in
moments of crisis, such as the coup which removed Aristide and attacked the grassroots
movement, international networks and political allies forged in the many years of persistent
organizing and building prior to the coup provided an essential source of strength. Haitian
activists in the United States from 1957 to 1994 found an international approach both to their
international and their local issues to be indispensible, a lesson that may benefit contemporary
activists engaged in international solidarity campaigns or organizing around immigrant and
refugee rights.
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